Bridget
Prentice: The hon. Member for North-West Norfolk probably
knows what I am likely to say about amendments 94 to 97. He knows that
I do not think that every death in custody or state detention
necessarily needs an inquest with a jury. The most obvious example
would be if someone died of natural causes in a prison hospital. Why
should there automatically be an inquest then when there would not be
one for someone in similar circumstances in a general
hospital?
David
Howarth (Cambridge) (LD): I presume the answer to that is
to ensure that the person did die of natural causes in a prison
hospital.
Bridget
Prentice: I think the post-mortem would probably establish
that. It is not necessary to have a jury to sit waiting for that to be
discovered.
David
Howarth: Who is to be the finder of fact if there is a
dispute? Is it to be the coroner or members of the public? If a death
occurs in custody in any way, the finder of fact should be ordinary
people.
Bridget
Prentice: I am afraid I have to disagree with the hon.
Gentleman. I would have thought that that was a pretty obvious example.
If a post-mortem finds that someone died of natural causes, the coroner
is more than capable of carrying out an investigation and a jury is not
needed. In fact, about half of all deaths in state detention occur due
to natural causes, and coroners are more than capable of dealing with
them. If there were concerns about negligent care, the guidance issued
by the chief coroner would almost certainly indicate that
the coroner should exercise their discretion and call a jury. Equally,
as the hon. Member for Cardiff, Central said, in the vast majority of
cases, coroners sit without juries, as they do when dealing with cases
of deaths of armed forces personnel on active service. We have rightly
heard tributes to the coroners in Wiltshire and Oxfordshire for the way
in which they have dealt with the bulk of the inquests into deaths on
active service in Iraq or
Afghanistan. I
am unclear as to whether amendment 97 proposes jury inquests for all
deaths involving armed forces personnel, including training accidents
or even deaths off duty. I would certainly resist the idea that a jury
would be necessary in such cases, unless the situation was similar to
those cited in clause 7(2). The Government are criticised if we appear
to be attempting to stop coroners who sit alone in military inquests
from making critical remarks about Government policy, yet the
Opposition are suggesting that coroners cannot carry out such
investigations on their own and that they need juries. Opposition
Members might have to address that
contradiction. Insisting
on a jury for all inquests into deaths at a hospital, hospice, clinic
or other centre for medical provision, whether public or
private—a chemist’s shop, for example—is similarly
unnecessary. Again, coroners’ independence shows that they are
more than capable of carrying out inquests and of making robust and, if
necessary, critical findings without the assistance of a jury. I am not
convinced that jury inquests should be extended on that
basis. The
hon. Member for Cardiff, Central asked why clause 7(2)(b) mentioned
police officers. It is a restatement of the Coroners Act 1988. We
extended the provision to include the service police force because we
felt that if we were dealing with police officers in one form, we ought
to deal with them in their other forms. The hon. Lady was advocating
extending the provision to all state officials, but it would be
difficult to define a state official. Let me put a scenario to her. If
a tax inspector was driving between two inspections and was involved in
a car accident in which someone died, it could be argued that he was
acting in his capacity as a state official. However, if the accident
happened after he had finished work and was driving home, would she
suggest that that, too, would automatically require a jury? My problem
with amendment 71 is that it lacks
precision.
Jenny
Willott: The provision, as amended by amendment
71, would still be subject to the official
acting “in
the purported execution of the officer’s or member’s duty
as
such”. Therefore,
they would be no more liable if they were driving between appointments
than a police officer would be when driving without blue lights
flashing. Either a rule applies or it does not. I would not have
thought that a tax inspector driving between appointments could be
legally considered as executing his duty, so he would not be
covered. 6
pm
Bridget
Prentice: I do not accept the argument made by the hon.
Lady. If we extended jury inquests to all such cases, does she not feel
that it would be too wide an
extension in terms of who might be defined as a state official in those
circumstances? It seems nonsensical to extend jury
inquests.
David
Howarth: The other, obvious answer to that is that someone
who counts as acting on behalf of state authority for the purposes of
article 2 would count as a state official here—that is certainly
the clearest way of doing it. If the Minister thinks that the amendment
is too vague, I ask her about this specific case: is she against adding
the security services to the
list?
Bridget
Prentice: That would be a far better argument than that
for the general extension to state officials. The hon. Gentleman
mentions article 2, but it is not referred to in his amendment. My
objection to amendment 71 is its lack of precision; if he came back
with a different amendment, perhaps we would have a different
debate. I
conclude by reminding the Committee that in clause 7(3),
there is already the provision for an inquest to be held with a jury if
the coroner thinks that there is sufficient reason for doing so.
Therefore, if a death is attributable to the act or omission of a state
official—as the Liberal Democrats would have it—in the
purported execution of their duty, and if the coroner feels that the
circumstances of the death require an inquest to be held, then it can
be held. All the examples given by the hon. Members for Cambridge and
for Cardiff Central can be perfectly covered by the
subsection. Finally,
if an interested party believed that the circumstances of a particular
case warranted an inquest to be held with a jury, but the coroner had
decided not to call one, that party could appeal to the chief coroner
under clause 30. Again, that will give sufficient protection in any
case where people might feel that a jury inquest would be more
appropriate. On that basis, I hope that the hon. Member for North West
Norfolk will withdraw his
amendment.
Mr.
Bellingham: I am grateful to the Minister for her
comments, and in particular for pointing out that in subsection (3)
there is a wide power for the senior coroner to empanel a jury if he
thinks there is sufficient reason for doing so. I take on board that
all my concerns, and the examples that I gave, could be countered by
that.
The Minister
hinted that there might be a degree of hypocrisy and opportunism on the
part of the official Opposition in wanting to have more juries in place
for defence inquests. However, there is no contradiction at all in our
policy—in fact, we have argued consistently that there should be
more transparency in those inquests. We will come in a moment to our
concerns about secret and certified inquests, but we have never
suggested that there should be anything other than more transparency.
Having a jury in place, notwithstanding the Minister’s
arguments, can assist with that transparency and above all lead the
families involved and the wider public to conclude that justice is
being done. On that basis, and based on what the Minister has told
us—I want to reflect on what she said, and I may well come back
to the issue at a later stage—I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment. Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn. Clause
7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
8Assembling
a
jury Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Bellingham: Clause 8 is about assembling a jury,
and the current situation as I understand it—the Minister will
correct me if I am wrong—is that juries must number between
seven and 11. However, the clause replaces that figure with one of
between six and nine. It might well be a sensible move, but I would
argue that what is in place at the moment makes more sense. Six is too
small a figure for a jury, and I point out to the Committee that the
Bar Council is concerned about that. Furthermore, Inquest has also made
the point that since the R v. Middleton case, to which I
referred earlier, inquest juries have enhanced responsibilities for
providing narrative verdicts. Reducing the figure will put a greater
onus on that smaller number of jurors. That is not necessary. Will the
Minister tell the Committee what is behind that proposal? Is it going
to save any money, and if so, how
much?
Mr.
Boswell: Will the Minister also tell the Committee who
might object in court to a particular member of the jury and in what
circumstances? In other words, do the rules follow those with which we
might be more or less familiar through, for example, the Crown court,
or is there some special regime and a limited number of people who can
engage on
this?
Mr.
Garnier: I assume that it is the senior coroner referred
to in subsection (2) who makes the decision about the number of people
who serve on the jury, but what are the factors that will influence his
decision in choosing which number to
summon?
Bridget
Prentice: The reason why we have put in six, seven, eight
or nine jurors is to give some discretion to the senior
coroner—although it will be likely that the chief coroner will
issue a practice direction suggesting that they should generally start
with nine jurors. The idea is that if a juror fails to turn up or one
becomes ill in the course of a case, it can still go on. It may be that
some potential juror turns out to be disqualified when questioned by
the coroner. That might partly be the answer to the hon. and learned
Gentleman’s question.
Mr.
Garnier: That might relate to the question of how big the
jury panel should be, from which the finite number is selected, but I
do not think that it answers the point that I put to the
Minister.
Bridget
Prentice: The hon. and learned Gentleman is right: it was
a point about what size the panel will be. Those who can be jurors in
an inquest are those who are qualified under the Juries Act 1974. The
coroner will be able to question the persons summoned to ensure that
they are properly qualified, resident and can be sworn properly to sit
on the
jury. Unlike
the Crown court, coroners only summon jurors for particular inquests,
as we know. It therefore seems unreasonable to summon large numbers of
people to serve, considering the changes that some will inevitably need
to make to their work and care arrangements. So, it did not seem
appropriate to summon far more jurors
than might be in the Crown court, as they are unlikely to be required.
We also wanted to make sure that if for some a reason a juror dropped
out part way through an inquest, the whole inquest would not have to be
re-started and a new jury summoned. The coroner will have the power to
summon persons to attend and they will be sworn either by him or in his
presence. In answer to the hon. Member for Daventry, there will be no
opportunity for interested parties to make objections to the jurors who
are summoned. Mr.
Garnier: It is probably entirely my fault for being
obtuse, but if a jury member becomes unfit for some reason and cannot
carry on and the coroner wants to carry on with a reduced number of the
jury, what has that got to do with clause
8?
Bridget
Prentice: Clause 8 is about assembling the jury and it
will therefore be for the coroner to decide how many people need to be
available.
Mr.
Garnier: There is some confusion between the jury
that sits on an inquest—under clause 8(1), it could be six,
seven, eight or nine persons—and the wider pool of people who
form the jury panel, from which the six, seven, eight or nine are
drawn, so a jury of 20 could be reduced by ballot to six, seven, eight
or nine. If an inquest has started, however, and there is a jury of
six, seven, eight or nine, we either have to return to the Juries Act
or we need to have some other guidance or statutory rule stating that,
when a jury is reduced by illness from six to five, the coroner has a
power to continue. That was the point that the Minister addressed and
it has nothing to do with clause
8.
Bridget
Prentice: I am sorry but I am totally lost as to what the
hon. and learned Gentleman is saying. Clause 8 is about
assembling a jury, so the coroner can call on a jury of six, seven,
eight or nine persons, and will presumably call a slightly larger
number to ensure that those who sit are properly qualified to be jury
members. I am not sure what the hon. and learned Gentleman means beyond
that.
Mr.
Boswell: I wonder whether I can assist as a member of the
laity. As I construe the clause it is about assembling a jury, which is
actually the act of beginning an inquest. The coroner will quite
reasonably want a hand of cards, and will then interview and swear in
the requisite number that he thinks appropriate. My hon. and learned
Friend is making a substantial point, which may well be addressed in
other legislation, about the vires of a jury continuing when one or
other of its members, having been assembled and sworn in, drops out. My
tribunal experience was, of course, different because it involved
adjudicating and there was no jury, but I nearly cost people a great
deal of money by becoming ineligible in the middle of the
process.
Bridget
Prentice: I was watching the hon. and learned Member for
Harborough to see whether he nodded at the hon. Gentleman’s
explanation, because I failed to grasp the issue earlier. I will come
back to him and the Committee on it, but he may well have a point that
needs to be addressed.
Dr.
Brian Iddon (Bolton, South-East) (Lab): Is my hon. Friend
aware that in some jurisdictions, the Crown and coroners’ courts
share jurors so as not to call far too many people? Will she confirm
that the clause’s wording does not rule out making surplus
jurors from a coroner’s court available for an adjacent Crown
court?
Bridget
Prentice: That is absolutely correct and it is a sensible
use of jurors and their time, but I do not think that it answers the
question asked by the hon. and learned Member for Harborough, so I will
have to come back to him on the
matter.
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