House of Commons portcullis
House of Commons
Session 2008 - 09
Publications on the internet
Public Bill Committee Debates
Coroners and Justice Bill

Coroners and Justice Bill



The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairmen: Frank Cook, † Mr. Roger Gale
Bellingham, Mr. Henry (North-West Norfolk) (Con)
Boswell, Mr. Tim (Daventry) (Con)
Brown, Mr. Russell (Dumfries and Galloway) (Lab)
Eagle, Maria (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)
Garnier, Mr. Edward (Harborough) (Con)
Gray, Mr. James (North Wiltshire) (Con)
Hesford, Stephen (Wirral, West) (Lab)
Howarth, David (Cambridge) (LD)
Howarth, Mr. George (Knowsley, North and Sefton, East) (Lab)
Iddon, Dr. Brian (Bolton, South-East) (Lab)
Kidney, Mr. David (Stafford) (Lab)
Lucas, Ian (Wrexham) (Lab)
Michael, Alun (Cardiff, South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op)
Moon, Mrs. Madeleine (Bridgend) (Lab)
Prentice, Bridget (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice)
Robertson, Angus (Moray) (SNP)
Willott, Jenny (Cardiff, Central) (LD)
Wright, Jeremy (Rugby and Kenilworth) (Con)
Alan Sandall, Committee Clerk
† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Thursday 26 February 2009

(Afternoon)

[Mr. Roger Gale in the Chair]

Coroners and Justice Bill

Clause 152

Information sharing
Amendment moved (this day): 49, in clause 152, page 100, line 7, leave out ‘any person’ and insert ‘an appropriate person’.—(David Howarth.)
1 pm
The Chairman: I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following: amendment 50, in clause 152, page 100, line 8, at end insert—
‘(1A) No information-sharing order may authorise data to be shared in any way that might result in the date being used for a purpose different from that for which its collection was originally authorised.’.
Amendment 51, in clause 152, page 100, line 9, at end insert—
“‘an appropriate person” means any public authority within the meaning of section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and, for the purposes of that section, any use of data under an information sharing order shall count as exercising a function of a public nature and shall in no circumstances count as an act whose nature is private;’.
Amendment 52, in clause 152, page 100, leave out lines 24 and 25.
Amendment 53, in clause 152, page 100, line 27, leave out ‘it is satisfied’ and insert ‘the following conditions are met’.
Amendment 54, in clause 152, page 100, leave out lines 29 to 32 and insert—
‘(a) the order will not authorise data to be used in any way that implies any new government policy or any deviation from previously announced government policy, and “government policy” in this section means only that policy to which there is clear and unambiguous reference in the speeches or other remarks of Ministers during the passage of a bill or bills in Parliament,
(b) the order is proportionate to the policy objective it seeks to further, and’.
Amendment 356, in clause 152, page 100, line 30, leave out ‘secure a relevant policy objective’ and insert ‘serve the public interest’.
Amendment 55, in clause 152, page 100, line 33, leave out from ‘order’ to end of line 35 and insert
‘does not, other that with that person’s consent, interfere with or restrict any person’s right to or interest in privacy, whether that right or interest arises under any statute or at common law or in any other way.’.
Amendment 56, in clause 152, page 100, line 41, at end insert—
‘(5A) No information-sharing order shall be made unless the authority making the order identifies and publicly declares which existing government policy the order would further, the evidence for the existence of that policy in the speeches or remarks of Ministers during the passage of bills in Parliament and a statement of how the order will further that policy.’.
Amendment 57, in clause 152, page 101, line 8, at end insert
‘, except that such person must be a public authority for the purposes of section 6 of the Human Rights Act, and no power granted under this subsection shall be used to authorise any person further to share data;’.
Amendment 58, in clause 152, page 101, leave out lines 13 and 14.
Amendment 59, in clause 152, page 101, leave out lines 18 and 19.
Amendment 61, in clause 152, page 101, leave out line 22 and insert—
‘(h) modify any statutory instrument made under the Data Protection Act or any statutory instrument made under any other enactment, but may not modify any statute or any rule of common law.’.
Amendment 60, in clause 152, page 101, leave out line 22.
Amendment 147, in clause 152, page 103, line 13, at end insert ‘and
(c) undertake a privacy impact assessment.’.
Amendment 357, in clause 152, page 103, line 13, at end insert ‘and
(c) supply a full privacy impact assessment.’.
Amendment 148, in clause 152, page 103, line 14, after ‘order’, insert ‘and privacy impact statement’.
Amendment 149, in clause 152, page 103, line 18, at end insert
‘and comment on the compatibility of the proposals with all data protection requirements laid down in statute.’.
I have had a look at the grouping of amendments. It is fairly comprehensive and it might be for the convenience of the Committee if we treat our discussions also as a stand part debate. Members of the Committee might like to bear that in mind when seeking to make contributions to the debate.
David Howarth (Cambridge) (LD): The hon. Member for Stafford was in the middle of an intervention at the end of this morning’s sitting, and I would be glad to hear the rest of it.
The Chairman: Order. This Chairman takes the view that interventions fall when the guillotine comes down. However, if the hon. Gentleman wishes to give way to the hon. Member for Stafford, he may do so.
David Howarth: I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman.
Mr. David Kidney (Stafford) (Lab): Does the hon. Gentleman agree with Sir Mark Walport, who said that he never envisaged that clause 152 would deal with medical records, and that he expected a separate scheme especially for medical records? The fact that observers fear that medical records could go willy-nilly everywhere under the clause shows that it is too widely drawn and needs restricting. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the present group of amendments does not quite meet the objections that Richard Thomas disclosed to us in his evidence, and in his memorandum that we have received since then?
David Howarth: I accept both those points. The evidence of Richard Thomas and Mark Walport shows that the Government’s case that they were simply following the Thomas and Walport review is not right. Both Richard Thomas and Mark Walport have clarified their position and say that they are worried that the clause is now far too wide. The hon. Gentleman might also be right that our amendments to tease out the Government’s position are not the proposals that Walport and Thomas wanted to see.
The hon. Gentleman made an important point about medical records, and perhaps now is the right time to mention that the BMA said that there will often be a big benefit for medical research in being able to share information, but that the information does not have to be associated with a named individual. The BMA’s support for data sharing was support for anonymous data to be shared for medical research purposes, not for the purposes allowed under the clause. I should have referred to the use of pseudonyms rather than the data being completely anonymous. We need to track through an individual to undertake the research properly, but the individual must not be named.
Mr. Tim Boswell (Daventry) (Con): Although I do not dissent from the thrust of the hon. Gentleman’s argument, does he agree that one of the difficulties behind such matters is something that I have already mentioned in Committee? The Government tend to take an on-off view of data sharing, as if everything has to be shared rather than just salient parts of the record, which may or may not be anonymised for the purpose for which they required to be shared?
David Howarth: I am sure that is right, but the way to proceed is that mentioned by the hon. Member for Stafford, which is under a specific scheme for pseudonymised medical record sharing. We are talking about an important special case.
Alun Michael (Cardiff, South and Penarth) (Lab/Co-op): In his introductory remarks, the hon. Member for Cambridge was painting the clause as a great plot. However, his argument is now much more to the point. It is about how we undertake the appropriate use of data. Does he accept that it is all about making the right judgments according to the right principles, and the importance of the code of conduct applying in all cases?
David Howarth: I agree that the code of conduct is important, but we have to get the primary legislation right, so that we do not allow the Government too broad a power. We have to somehow control it by using the code of conduct, which will not be all that clear in individual cases. It is important to get the powers right first so that it is more difficult to use them disproportionately. I am not sure whether it is a conspiracy, though I suspect that the right hon. Gentleman is right, but it has become a habit.
My underlying worry about the clause is that it has become a habit to draw up such statutory powers over-broadly. That is how the problems of detail are solved—not by thinking hard about them and being more specific. It seems that the tendency is to solve them by saying, “We will grab the broadest possible power and leave the problems until later.” That is not good enough. Our duty as parliamentarians is to ensure that the powers are incapable of being used in an inappropriate way.
Mr. Edward Garnier (Harborough) (Con): The hon. Gentleman’s point is reinforced when one looks at proposed new section 50B:
“An information-sharing order may provide for the creation of offences triable either way which are punishable—
(a) on conviction on indictment, by imprisonment for a term not exceeding the specified period or to a fine or to both”.
Here we have vague crime and sentencing-making powers that are not described in the Bill, which will be left to a subsequent or the present Secretary of State to devise, about which he and I as Members of Parliament have absolutely no idea. If we are to make the criminal law, it should be clear in the Bill.
David Howarth: That is an important principle. As the penalties and the consequences get worse, the need for parliamentary scrutiny rises. The breadth of the powers are breathtaking in the way that they have been written. The data can be shared with any person or organisation, presumably in any part of the world, not just with someone or with an organisation in Britain, and certainly not just with an organisation that is bound by the Human Rights Act and is not an organ of the state.
An order can be made in pursuance of any relevant policy without any restriction at all. Among the many consequences of an order, or part of the content of an order, is the power to amend primary legislation to change any enactment. It is important to bear in mind that when Mark Walport and Richard Thomas wrote their report, they made it clear that they did not envisage such breadth. They talked about specific circumstances and they now object, and I strongly object, to the possibility of using an information-sharing order to override the provisions of the Data Protection Act.
Walport and Thomas envisaged information-sharing orders subject to the Data Protection Act and all eight of the data-sharing principles, which include the idea that data collected for one purpose should not be used for another. The Government should acknowledge that the Bill as drafted goes way beyond the evidence and policy base that they thought they had in the Walport and Thomas report.
I will go through the points that our amendments raise and ask the Government to comment on them individually. My first point concerns amendment 49 and how information-sharing orders can be in favour of “any person”. I realise, and we debated it earlier, that there are examples of the line being blurred between the public and the private sector. It is now often difficult to tell where that line lies. I can see the origin of “any person” in that. However, to leave the wording unrestrained like that has many dangers.
What happens in the case of data that are controlled by foreign corporations and Governments, and especially by organisations that are not subject to the Human Rights Act, and therefore are not subject to the controls and respect for individual rights and freedom that the Act establishes? I know what the problem is, but I cannot accept that the solution is simply to leave it to Ministers to make up their minds later whether, in any particular case, the person with whom data have been shared is appropriate.
I consider amendment 52 to be the most important in the group, and if I am not happy with the Government’s reply, I shall press it to a Division. The amendment would remove from the definition of “sharing” data that are used for a different purpose from the one originally authorised. That is automatically a violation of the principles of data protection, and I object to a provision in the Bill undermining data protection.
We need to be clear. The idea that Mark Walport and Richard Thomas put forward—that the orders are not meant to be used to undermine the Data Protection Act—is inherently contradicted by the clause. If the Government accept, as I hope they will, Mark Walport’s and Richard Thomas’s criticisms, it follows that they must remove those words.
We have already covered some of the examples. For instance, the medical example is relevant when it comes to using information for difference purposes, as is the identity card database example. The DNA database example is especially relevant, because using DNA in a criminal investigation is very different from using DNA for all the other purposes for which it could be used by the state or others. Amendment 52 is crucial, and I am more interested in the Government’s reply on it than any other point that I make.
The other amendments are more technical, but there are still weaknesses in the clause. Amendments 53 to 56 would change the part of the clause that says that the authority—the Government Minister—needs to be satisfied, before an order can be made, that it
“is necessary to secure a relevant policy objective”,
that it
“is proportionate to that...objective”,
and that it balances
“the public interest and the interests of any person affected by it.”
That strikes me as being far too weak. Our proposals test ways in which the measures in subsection (4) can be strengthened.
Amendment 53 would remove the subjective element. Instead of a decision being made on the basis that the conditions are satisfied in the opinion of the Minister, there would be a requirement for the conditions to be satisfied. That goes back to the point made by the right hon. Member for Knowsley, North and Sefton, East on judicial review. We need to ensure that there is a proper basis for effective judicial review, and give the courts a clear way into the substance of a decision.
1.15 pm
Amendment 54 raises the problem of what constitutes a “relevant policy objective”. How do we know what the Government’s relevant policy objectives are? Could they make new objectives up on the spot, including ones that undermine the principles of data protection? There must be some control over that concept.
Walport and Thomas make it clear that information sharing orders should not be used in a way that changes policy under any circumstances. If that is to be achieved, we must be able to identify what existing policy is, and we cannot allow the use of that phrase in the Bill to justify a change simply because the Government now say that our policy is something different.
Mr. George Howarth (Knowsley, North and Sefton, East) (Lab): I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman, but there should be reliance on the word “relevant”. If something was not relevant, his fears would be upheld in any reasonable legal process that followed.
 
Contents Continue
House of Commons 
home page Parliament home page House of 
Lords home page search page enquiries ordering index

©Parliamentary copyright 2009
Prepared 27 February 2009