Mr.
Bellingham: I want to add one or two quick points. First,
I agree entirely with my hon. and learned Friend that we need laws to
protect lesbian, gay, bisexual and transsexual people from threats of
violence. However, on the other hand, we also need to protect free
speech in this country. I was impressed by the compelling arguments
advanced in two articles, one by Matthew Parris and the other by Peter
Tatchell, written at the time of the original clause in the previous
Bill.
There is a
parallel saving clause in the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006,
section 29J, which says:
“Nothing
in this Part shall be read or given effect in a way which prohibits or
restricts discussion, criticism or expressions of antipathy, dislike,
ridicule, insult or abuse of particular religions or the beliefs or
practices of their adherents”
and so on. It is
similar to the saving clause that became known as the Lord Waddington
saving clause. Surely, if we are going to have a saving clause on the
statute book for one important Act, we should have one for this Bill,
which will become an Act in due course.
I believe
strongly in freedom of speech and I pick up on a point made by the hon.
Member for Cambridge. In the past, the police have been pretty
heavy-handed with various people who have been reported or complained
about. We had the case of Joe and Helen Roberts, who were advised by
the police that they risked prosecution when they simply expressed
public concerns about sexual orientation literature in a council
library. The Minister will recall that Sir Iqbal Sacranie, the former
head of the Muslim Council of Britain, was investigated by the police
after a complaint was passed to the CPS about his expressing concerns,
on Radio 4’s flagship “Today programme, about sexual
behaviour and civil partnerships. The author Lynette Burrows was
interviewed by the police after a complaint was made about remarks that
she made, on Radio 5 Live, about same sex couples adopting.
I appreciate
that the Minister will say in her response that there is a high
threshold for this new offence, and I am sure that she will explain
that to us. However, I still
believe that without a saving clause, we will have an attack on free
speech. I deplore, as does my hon. and learned Friend, any threatening
or abusive behaviour that is likely to stir up any form of hatred
against the class of people under discussion. However, the Minister
should look carefully at Peter Tatchell’s comments in his
article a year ago. I support my hon. and learned Friend’s
comments. Maria
Eagle: Needless to say, my recollection of what happened
last year in that last great law Committee on which we served, is a
little closer to the hon. Member for Cambridge’s recollection
than to that of the hon. and learned Member for
Harborough.
The clause
completes what I would refer to as unfinished business from last
Session’s Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. I made
clear at the time of the denouement that it was unfinished business
that would be returned to. I agree with the hon. Member for Cambridge
that the Committee ought not to be that surprised that we are returning
to the matter at a suitable opportunity, which this is.
The Committee
should remember that the Commons had a majority of 202 for removing the
Waddington amendment—or the saving clause, as Opposition Members
have referred to it—and saw no case for having such a provision
attached to an offence with an extremely high threshold. The hon.
Member for North-West Norfolk suspected that I might deal with the
threshold of the offence, and I want to remind the Committee that the
incitement to hatred offence under discussion has a very high
threshold. It only captures words or behaviour that are threatening and
intended to stir up hatred—not that are likely to, or that
might, if someone takes them the wrong way, stir up hatred. That is the
highest threshold that one could think of for this kind of
offence.
On that
basis, we believe that the offence is clear, without any saving clause,
and the balance is correct for freedom of expression. It is important
that we preserve freedom of expression, but it has never been absolute
in this country. Offences of speech should be clear, and that is one
reason why we wish to remove the Waddington amendment from the statute
book. We want to ensure that it does not create the sort of loopholes
about which the hon. Member for Cambridge has expressed
concern.
Mr.
Gray: I am sure that the Minister is right to say that the
threshold for the offence is quite high, and therefore that the chance
of a successful prosecution is relatively slight. Indeed, there have
been none in the past, and there are unlikely to be any in future. That
will not stop complaints being made against certain people,
particularly street preachers and fundamentalist Christians of a
certain kind, who make remarks about homosexuality—remarks with
which I disagree—that could be interpreted by some as inciting
hatred. That could result in arrest and police interrogation, which has
happened on a number of occasions, even if it does not result in a
successful prosecution. That in itself is extremely worrying, as these
people believe that they are expressing the views of their Churches as
well as of
themselves.
Maria
Eagle: The offence has a high threshold intentionally. We
want to reassure people that it will not prevent them from saying what
they think about their religious beliefs, which are protected under our
laws. It
captures only words or behaviour that are threatening and that are
intended to stir up hatred. The person using the words or behaviour has
to have the intention of stirring up hatred against a particular group
on the grounds of their sexuality. The offence will capture only the
most extreme behaviour. Having a clear and high threshold provides the
right balance between protecting freedom of expression, which is
tremendously important, and signalling the proper protection of those
groups that have been vulnerable to such attacks in the
past.
Mr.
Bellingham: The Minister is arguing her case cogently and
eloquently. Does she agree that the Association of Chief Police
Officers has a low threshold when it comes to investigating complaints?
What discussions will she be having with her Home Office counterpart?
Should the clause reach the statute book, we do not want endless
complaints being made and police time being wasted investigating
various imams, Christian preachers and people such as Sir Iqbal
Sacranie, who may get a bit carried away on the “Today”
programme. Surely, we need a higher threshold for such
complaints.
Maria
Eagle: I shall comment further on that question. I said
last year, as I have done today, that there is a role for proper
guidance. We must ensure that guidance is produced by the right people
at the right time to deal with the sort of concerns expressed by the
hon. Gentleman and the examples that he used
earlier. The
Joint Committee on Human Rights agrees that the balance in respect of
the threshold for the offence is right, as does the Equality and Human
Rights Commission. Apart from the high threshold, procedural safeguards
ensure that the right balance is achieved. The CPS will prosecute only
if it is satisfied that a prosecution is in the public interest, and
the Human Rights Act 1998 specifies that the police, the CPS and the
court must act in a way that is compatible with convention rights. For
those reasons and others, we concluded that no further provision was
needed in order to protect freedom of expression. Indeed, we believe
that the savings provision inserted into the Criminal Justice and
Immigration Act 2008 in the other place does the opposite of
clarifying the situation; it muddies it. That is why we said that we
would come back to it, which is what we are
doing. I
realise that there are strongly held views across the House and the
Committee. No doubt, we will hear them being rehearsed again in later
stages of the Bill, both here and in the other place. We heard some
examples from the hon. Member for North-West Norfolk of what might be
described as over-zealous police investigatory action in particular
instances. We intend to issue short explanatory guidance about the
offence, which I gave an undertaking to do during the passage of
previous legislation. The CPS will issue guidance to prosecutors, and
we understand that ACPO is currently revising its hate crime manual,
which will include operational advice about the offence of stirring up
hatred. With the procedures in the proposed guidance, there is even
more reason to believe that the section on freedom of expression is not
necessary. The
hon. Member for Cambridge has tabled in new clause 36 another
formulation of what we ought to be looking at in order to make sure
that there is full understanding of the offence. It is not for us to
issue operational guidance on the offence as a Department; it
is, properly, a matter for the police and the CPS. I will, as I have
said previously, make sure that I consult them properly on how to deal
with those matters, because we want to
prevent— David
Howarth: I can see what the Minister is saying about the
police. Operationally, the police are independent of political
authorities, although the increasing role of ACPO needs to be looked
at. The same situation is not true to the same degree with the
CPS—at least that is the Government’s usual position.
Does she see the distinction between the
two?
Maria
Eagle: The CPS issues guidance to prosecutors, and there
are certainly arrangements within the Ministry of Justice, the Home
Department and the Attorney-General’s office, on a tripartite
basis, to make sure that we consult properly on the best way of doing
those things. We will be talking directly to the CPS about precisely
what the guidance should say, and we will also talk about that via the
Home Department. I hope that I assured the Committee that there will be
useful
guidance. I
do not wish to accept new clause 36 at this point, but I accept the
motivation behind it—it is important to have a proper
understanding of new laws as they come into force. Where there is
evidence of a lack of understanding, we should seek to address it at
the earliest possible stage. I ask the hon. Gentleman not to press his
new clause, but I take his point on board and value the support that he
has expressed for the
clause.
David
Howarth: I thank the Minister very much for what she has
said and assure her that I will not seek to press new clause 36 at this
stage.
Maria
Eagle: I hope that the Opposition can find it within
themselves to support clause
58.
Mr.
Garnier: Let me make my position clear. The way in which
clause 58 has arrived in the Bill is, for the reasons that I have
already explained, reprehensible—I will not go over that again.
As the Minister will recall, when the matter was voted on, on Report
and in the various Lord’s
amendments— [Interruption.]
The
Chairman: Order. If members of the Committee wish to have
private conversations please go to the benches
outside.
Mr.
Garnier: The Minister will recall that when the issue was
serially discussed on the ping-pong, it was a free vote issue for my
party—I do not think it was for her party, but it certainly was
for ours—and I am not going to press my resistance to clause 58
today.
Mr.
Garnier: What my hon. Friend does is entirely a matter for
him. The Minister should realise that, simply because I am not going
personally to demand a vote on clause 58 stand part, does not mean to
say that we are not deeply disappointed by how the Government have
reneged on the deal to save their anti-strike clause. I know the hon.
Member for Cambridge takes a different view, but that is
politics. Question
put, That the clause stand part of the
Bill. The
Committee divided: Ayes 11, Noes
3.
Division
No.
6] Question
accordingly agreed to.
Clause
58 ordered to stand part of the
Bill. 9.30
pm
Clause
59Qualifying
offences
Mr.
Garnier: I beg to move amendment 403, in
clause 59, page 34, line 16, at
beginning insert ‘in
relation to the offences listed in subsection (2)(a) to
(d),’.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 404, in
clause 59, page 34, line 18, at
end insert ‘or attempted
murder’. Amendment
74, in
clause 59, page 34, line 19, at
end insert— ‘(c) grievous
bodily harm with intent contrary to Section 18 of the Offences Against
the Person Act
1861.’. Amendment
406, in
clause 59, page 34, line 19, at
end insert— ‘(c) an offence
under section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (wounding
or inflicting grievous bodily harm with
intent); (d) an offence under
section 20 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (wounding or
inflicting grievous bodily
harm); (e) an offence under
section 16 of the Firearms Act 1968 (possession of firearm with intent
to endanger life); (f) an
offence under section 16A of the Firearms Act 1968 (possession of
firearm or imitation firearm with intent to cause fear of
violence); (g) an offence under
section 18 of the Firearms Act 1968 (carrying firearm or imitation
firearm with intent to commit an indictable offence or to resist
arrest); (h) an offence under
section 19 of the Firearms Act 1968 (carrying firearm in public
place).’. Amendment
75, in
clause 59, page 34, line 20, after
‘death’, insert ‘or
injury’. Amendment
405, in
clause 59, page 34, line 20, after
‘death’, insert ‘, wound, or grievous bodily
harm’.
Amendment
76, in
clause 59, page 34, line 20, leave
out ‘or
both’. Amendment
77, in
clause 59, page 34, line 23, at
end insert— ‘(c) any other
weapon or means of causing injury including but not limited to hands
and
feet.’. Clause
stand
part.
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