Mr.
Garnier: I shall certainly consider that—by the
time I get to the end of the sentence, I shall have reached a
conclusion.
I have two
points. In case Justice feels that it has been traduced by my
amendments, it is coincidental—I did not see the Justice brief
until after tabling the amendments. We were, broadly, testing the same
area of
law. On
the Minister’s final point about being teased about introducing
more anonymity into the criminal law, she is right to be wary of doing
so. It is fair to say that, based on how the emergency legislation has
been used in the six months since it was passed and on what we heard
from those witnesses who spoke about it in the evidence session, it
seems at least in relation to anonymous evidence that, despite one or
two rough edges, it is working. For our part, we are prepared to see
how investigation anonymity orders work
too. I
shall not push the matter further. The Minister has said that she does
not have a totally closed mind on this issue at least. On that basis, I
beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment. Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
David
Howarth: I beg to move amendment 461, in
clause 59, page 34, line 24, leave
out subsection
(4).
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss
amendment 462, in clause 82, page 47, leave
out lines 16 and
17.
David
Howarth: The amendments concern the order-making powers.
Amendment 461 is most relevant to where we are in the Bill at the
moment. Amendment 462 is about clause 82, which is a long way further
on but raises a similar issue. However, I do not want to go into any
detail about clause 82 at this point—it is probably better to
discuss that when we reach
it. I
shall focus on amendment 461. The order-making power in clause 59 is,
simply put, very broad. In effect, it allows the Secretary of State to
add any offences to the list in subsection (2)—parking offences
or anything could be added. However, in effect, it also allows the
Secretary of State to repeal the section by making an order omitting
the two offences in place already, which seems to be a rather
extraordinary power.
Clause 59(4)
goes on to state that
the “Secretary
of State may...amend...so as to add, omit or modify a
condition to be satisfied in relation to an
offence.” I
am interested in how that relates to the first line of subsection (4),
which states that the
“Secretary of
State may by order amend this
section”. Clause
59(4)(b) seems to imply that an amendment could be made, not just to
clause 59, but to any related clause in the rest of the chapter. There
seems to be a contradiction between the way in which the first line is
expressed and what is actually in paragraph (b). If, as I suspect, the
intention of the paragraph is to allow modification of anything else in
the rest of the chapter, it would allow different offences to have
entirely different conditions attached to them. For example, the
definition of “gang” could differ from one offence to
another. That seems to be far too broad, and to allow far too much
arbitrariness in the
scheme. If
one looks through chapter 1, one will find over and over again, in
different clauses, similarly broad order-making powers. It seems to me
that the whole of part 3, chapter 1 could have been replaced by a
provision stating simply
that the Secretary of State may make provision about anonymity in an
investigation. That would be equivalent to what we have. The Minister
said that she would be willing to engage in a debate about the
broadness of the order-making powers, and I now invite her to do
so. Maria
Eagle: I understand the hon. Gentleman’s points.
His amendment 461 would remove the order-making power, effectively
preventing the amendment of clause 59 in the future so as to
include further offences. We envisage possible scope for widening the
use of the new investigation anonymity order in the future. I myself
would not consider widening it very much, which he might find hard to
believe, given his points about the extent of the power. Obviously, we
would want to widen it only if we found that the orders work, and do
something useful in respect of the purposes for which we are putting it
on the statute book. Any extension will be considered on a case-by-case
basis, and any statutory instrument made under it would be by
affirmative resolution, which I hope will give some reassurance to
Members that there will be parliamentary scrutiny of any change to the
list of qualifying
offences. The
hon. Gentleman’s amendment 462 to clause 82 would extend
automatic eligibility for special measures to witnesses to certain gun
and knife crime offences. That amendment would remove the Secretary of
State’s powers to add to, or otherwise amend, the offences in
schedule 12. That provision is a sensible precaution to
provide flexibility and to ensure that we do not always require primary
legislation to extend the provision to cover future possible offences
involving the use of knives and guns. Alongside the Bill is a delegated
powers memorandum, and obviously we will give careful consideration to
any recommendations by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform
Committee in the other place. I have some sympathy with what the hon.
Gentleman has said about the breadth of the power and am prepared to
look at that. On that basis, I hope that he will withdraw the
amendment. David
Howarth: In the light of the Minister’s final
comments, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment. Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn. Clause
59 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
60Qualifying
criminal
investigations Amendment
made: 267, in
clause 60, page 35, line 8, leave
out ‘person or body’ and insert ‘body or other
person’.—(Maria
Eagle.) Clause
60, as amended, ordered to stand part of the
Bill. Ordered,
That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Ian
Lucas.) 9.59
pm Adjourned
till Thursday 5 March at Nine
o’clock.
| 
