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Mr. Harper: The way that the hon. Gentleman came to a conclusion was helpful, given that I was about to ask about the matter. I agree with some of what he said, but there are two dangers in respect of insurance. First, it is already the case that, if something has happened to people that is known about, an insurance company is allowed to take that information into account. If someone has a terminal illness, an insurance company can decide not to write life cover for them or to do so on terms that would be expensive. He might say that that would be discriminatory. However, if that could be done, clearly the basis on which insurance is done would fall apart.
The second danger comes down to the quality of information , which is one reason the moratorium is in place. If individuals can arrange their own genetic testing and know their genetic inheritance, yet the insurance company is not allowed to use it, people will be able to get insurance for all sorts of things, which again may lead to that insurance not being available for everyone. There is a public policy issue to deal with here, but I am not sure that adding a protected characteristic to the Bill is the right way to go about it.
Dr. Harris: I was going to come to all the good points that the hon. Gentleman made and will deal with them in order to save time. He made three points, although he might not have realised that he made a third. The extra point is that part of the problem—unlike when someone is terminally ill and refused life cover, for example—is that even for single allele conditions the actuarial calculations are incredibly complex because many predictive genetic tests are simply not as predicted in all cases.
For example, the genetic condition may not be fully penetrative—it does not exhibit itself physiologically in every case in the same way in every person. It is complex, yet insurance companies may generalise and say, “We know that if we exclude these people we are at less risk of making an adverse offer and paying out a claim. Therefore, we can cut the premiums for everyone else—those who are not afflicted by this genetic predisposition.” If it were an exact science, there would be a stronger case for it, but it inevitably leads to rough approximations and generalisations, which are part and parcel of why this is unfair.
One key reason that this differs from having the condition when considering insurance is the fact that there is a significant public policy interest in encouraging appropriate people to have appropriate tests in their best interests and to ensure that family members, where appropriate and with consent, also have the information to help them to judge their genetic susceptibility.
As the moratorium is, by definition, not permanent, if people worry that a test will be used against them, that is a huge disincentive for those already at a health disadvantage to access the technology, have the test and get early intervention and lifestyle advice where that is relevant. There is a real problem of deterring people from accessing testing, as well as a problem for researchers who have an ethical obligation to ensure that those taking part are not damaged by taking part in research. If there is any concern that life chances will be harmed by taking part in the research and being randomised to the test, for example, the risk of randomisation cannot be offered with equipoise because the researcher knows there is a chance of discrimination. It holds back research.
I hope the Committee will accept that these are serious issues that have to be considered. This is not simply a matter of saying that people are not yet ill and that we can cross that bridge when we come to it—when they are disabled in employment protection terms or when they are symptomatic and insurance companies must be allowed to distinguish between people with serious conditions and those without. We are not suggesting that insurance companies should not be able to distinguish between people with symptomatic serious conditions.
There is an argument, which we heard in the caste debate, that there is not a huge amount of evidence that this discrimination is taking place. While there is a moratorium in respect of insurance, it may well be argued that there is not much discrimination. However, as I said in respect of gender identity—it is well recognised—anti-discrimination law should lead, not always just respond to established poor practice. It is there not only in case of discrimination, so that people can take advantage of it, but as a deterrent to discrimination that might occur. As we know from previous anti-discrimination law, it also enables data to be collected because there is a legal framework. Finally, in this case there are the positive public health and public policy advantages of not deterring people from taking the relevant steps.
In the insurance field, for example, relying on a moratorium does not give the required long-term assurances—this applies to employers as well as insurers. The United States is a country where there is great support for financial services, including insurance companies, some of which have done better than others in recent years. Nobody could say that the United States is hostile to the purchase of private insurance or that its people are not interested in trying to make as much money as possible out of the system—consistent with the law, of course, at least in most cases, and consistent with the ideals of the American dream.
In the United States, research has been carried out to check whether there would be significant gaming—adverse selection, I think it is called in actuarial circles—to identify whether people who were genetically at risk of serious disease would get insurance, up the premium, have the test and not disclose the results, or if the test was banned, take it anyway and screw the insurance companies. In the research that I am aware of, it was not found that that is likely to happen.
People with these serious conditions, or genetic susceptibilities to them, have other things on their mind and there is a cap on the amount of life insurance that people can get without providing the test. That is another way forward—they can get a reasonable amount, but cannot go for millions and millions—and it has worked well.
Members of the Committee will be aware of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 2008—an Act of the US Congress signed into law by President George Bush on 21 May 2008, which prevents medical advances in DNA testing from being adversely used by employers and health insurance companies against people with a genetic predisposition to particular health issues. I think that Act was passed by the House of Representatives by 414 votes to 1, which, by any account, is a significant margin. We would be fortunate to consider in the House anything that attracted such overwhelming support.
That Act refers to the use of family medical history—my understanding is that if the insurance companies had not resisted the restriction of the use of medical tests, they would probably have got away with still being able to use family history—and I have included the term “family medical history” in my probing amendment.
There are positive public policy advantages in doing this and there is clear evidence from other jurisdictions that it is felt to be necessary. We should not have to wait for gross examples of such discrimination in employment—that would put the onus on the victim to come forward before we would act—when there is a clear argument that the measure might be used. It would do away with the need for people to worry about whether the moratorium will continue past 2014 and give certainty to the insurance industry that this is not a path that it needs to spend a lot of time investing in and that we will share the risk. I speak as someone who is willing to pool that risk so that a genetic underclass is not created. I urge the Minister and the Committee to give consideration to the amendment.
The Solicitor-General: We reflected on this and concluded that there is no reason to include the amendment in the Bill. There is no clear evidence of a problem. All the examples sent to us that might be termed genetic predisposition would already be covered by disability discrimination. The hon. Gentleman referred to the insurance industry’s voluntary measure to guard against the inappropriate use of genetic tests, which could lead to certain people being asked to pay higher premiums. That is in place and will last until 2014. It is working well and he has not suggested that it is not.
The other relevant area is employment. The Human Genetics Commission reported in 2006 that it had no evidence of employers using genetic tests. The Information Commissioner has told employers that if they plan to use genetic tests, they must inform the Human Genetics Commission. These measures seem to be working well and are sufficient.
3 pm
Mr. Harper: On the moratorium and the fact that it is in place until 2014, is the Minister able to give the Committee any information about what the Department of Health’s view is on what the next steps might be, or are we at a stage where it is too early to think about that? Given that it is working well, is the Department of Health thinking of rolling that forward, perhaps indefinitely, or is it thinking about a legislative solution along the lines that the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has spoken about?
The Solicitor-General: I will check that and drop the hon. Gentleman a line, so that I can give him a complete answer.
Dr. Harris: The Minister rattled through that response very quickly, but she said that the moratorium was working well. The fact is that it is a moratorium and at some point, a future Government may end it. That would mean that people would be exposed to being required, before they can get insurance, to disclose any genetic test that they have had.
In addition, it is possible that employers may seek to take advantage of what is becoming a more available technology. Other than legislation in this area, I would like to know what future-proofing the Minister can provide that would prevent employers from discriminating against people who would not fall within the disability definition because they are healthy, are asymptomatic but have a genetic predisposition, or do not consent to their information being used by the employer. In itself, that is sufficient to trigger a problem for individuals. I would be grateful if she could provide some information on that.
The Solicitor-General: I rattled through the response quickly because I thought that we were finishing at 3 o’clock and I wanted to try to complete this section. Now we have more time, I am not going to say it all again, but I can slow my pace. The hon. Gentleman has not suggested the moratorium is not working well. Negotiations on an extension or whatever is to follow are for the future. In our view, it is not appropriate to deal with that in the Bill.
This is perhaps a key point for me. If there were evidence of a problem—I make it clear that there is not scant or limited evidence, but no evidence, despite being open-minded about looking for it—it is by no means certain that discrimination law would be the right way to deal with it. It would almost certainly be better tackled through the use of data protection legislation, prohibiting the use of genetic test information in setting insurance premiums and vetting for employment, so I hope that the hon. Gentleman will withdraw his amendment.
Dr. Harris: First, I would like to apologise to the Committee if there was a 3 o’clock time limit that I was not aware of. The Government Whip has been extremely helpful—
The Solicitor-General: It was my mistake.
Dr. Harris: Had there been such a time limit, I would have spoken even more quickly, although I could not compete with the Minister.
I understand the thrust of what the Minister was saying. It would be impossible to respond to all her points, so the best thing I can do is take them away to discuss them with the Human Genetics Commission and others with a particular interest in this matter. We will see if there is a necessity to bring the matter back for further debate. In the meantime, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Lynne Featherstone: I beg to move amendment 113, in clause 4, page 4, line 15, at end insert—
‘belonging to a disadvantaged socio-economic group’.
An amendment to outlaw discrimination against a person on the basis of their belonging to a disadvantaged socio-economic group.
The amendment would outlaw discrimination against a person on the basis of their belonging to a disadvantaged socio-economic group. It is to probe the Minister because we have a socio-economic duty, but no strand, or no protected characteristic for it to work with. As we have said, the socio-economic duty is weak. We think that the amendment might give it real teeth. In providing for a protected characteristic, people from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds would be protected from direct and indirect discrimination. The amendment would make it clear that we believe that socio-economic disadvantage is one of the great strands of inequality.
Mr. Harper: I will not rehearse all the arguments about the socio-economic duty; we did so at length this morning. However, if a protected characteristic were added and, effectively, called a “disadvantaged socio-economic group”, how would one define such a group? Would it be only people who were poor, or would it be a more complex definition? I do not see a definition in the amendment.
Lynne Featherstone: I have to say that I have not defined that in an explicit way at this point because I want to probe the Minister’s thinking about whether the Government would even consider such a characteristic. Obviously, it would require a great deal of thought and work. There would be a number of legitimate concerns that such a protected characteristic would have unintended consequences. However, as other Members have said, that is always the case when new discrimination law is introduced. With will, the Minister might be persuaded to ask the Government Bill Office to establish what those unintended consequences might be, and what would qualify a person to be someone from a disadvantaged socio-economic background. Would it be simply poverty? The definition would be within the sense and meaning that the Government place on the socio-economic duty.
Emily Thornberry (Islington, South and Finsbury) (Lab): I hope that the hon. Lady will not take this the wrong way, but is it possible that the amendment is a clear characterisation of what it must be like to be in a political party that has no chance of having any power? To put forward something that has such a vague aspiration and then ask the Government to go away and sort it out seems unnecessary; there is no background to it and it is not practical.
 
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