Dr.
Harris: I urge the Committee to reject the amendment,
obviously in polite terms, in the spirit of the stage of the debate
that we have reached. [Interruption.] For several reasons.
[Interruption.] The hon. Member for Islington, South and
Finsbury says that if I give reasons in a Public Bill Committee, that
might make some Members change their minds. Well, they could do it on
any basis, but it is
important—
Emily
Thornberry: I do not want the hon. Gentleman to
misunderstand me, but I just want to make it clear that he may well
find that he is pushing at an open door. Perhaps we could, given the
hour, appeal the light and go home.
Dr.
Harris: I take the hon. Lady’s point, but I want to
make a couple of brief points. It is not satisfactory to argue for
special protection for religion while at the same time arguing that it
should be treated the same in every other way. That is asking for
special treatment on the basis of doctrinal and ethical teachings. In
fact, religion already benefits, because political statements of view
receive no protection at all under discrimination, whereas arguably
quite contentious views founded on religion benefit from some
protection albeit, as we know from our previous debates on direct
discrimination, not as many.
John
Mason: If the hon. Gentleman would like to introduce an
amendment suggesting that political beliefs should be protected, I
would be very supportive.
7.15
pm
Dr.
Harris: The harassment provisions in employment give
protection for the treatment of people manifesting their religion in a
way that is not available for people who are manifesting their
political, aesthetic or cultural opinions. Religion and, indeed,
philosophical belief—it is not exclusive to religion—is
already given status. The hon. Gentleman need not worry that it is
being treated like anything else. The fact that it is often in
scripture or ethical teachings is, rightly or wrongly, acknowledged in
the law. We should be careful; Scientology would be covered by his
proposal, as would a whole series of other religions, sects and cults.
The hon. Gentleman needs to be careful in what he is asking us to
endorse. Secondly, his explanatory statement says:
“Indirect
discrimination is still permitted if it is
proportionate”
under the test which we
have already discussed, however it is framed, of clause
18(2)(d).
Again, we
have the same problem, as the hon. Gentleman cannot have it both ways.
If the proposal means anything—and the requirement that the
amendment should be subject to clause 18(2) is the relevant
issue—it does not add any additional protection and should not
be accepted because it makes no difference. If it is his intention that
subsection (2) should be diluted in some way, in respect of something
that just happens to be
“stated
doctrinal or ethical
teachings” then
for the reasons I have given, I urge the Committee to oppose the
amendment.
The
Solicitor-General: I imagine what the hon. Member for
Glasgow, East is looking for is legitimisation or conscientious
objection, but the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon has put
his finger on the point that clause 18 allows justification for
something like that in some circumstances.
What the hon.
Member for Glasgow, East seeks to say is that a provision, criterion or
practice is discriminatory if it requires somebody of a religion or
belief to act in a way that contravenes the stated doctrinal or ethical
teachings of the religion or belief. From the point of view of
protecting the religious, we do not think that that is necessary. It
would be potentially unlawful under the Bill for a provision, criterion
or practice to require an orthodox Jew to work on a Saturday, for
example. The question would be whether such a requirement could be
justified under clause 18(2)(d) in particular circumstances.
Specifying
that one form of behaviour which is clearly covered by the definition
is to be regarded as indirectly discriminatory is an odd thing to do,
because it is already covered. As we rehearsed on an earlier provision,
it may raise questions about others and it might be unclear whether a
provision would be regarded as indirectly discriminatory if it
contravened beliefs which are not doctrinally or ethically linked to a
religion, but which are nevertheless commonly held. I think the hon.
Gentleman is familiar with that argument. Putting it in a nutshell,
this would muddy the waters, and it would not give any enhanced
protection to the religious. The best way to deal with it is to put in
the unamended definition of indirect discrimination, make it applicable
to religion or belief as we do already, and that is
that.
John
Mason: I thank the Minister for her points and on that
basis I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn. Clause
18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Ordered,
That further consideration be now adjourned.—(Lyn
Brown.) 7.19
pm Adjourned
till Thursday 18 June at Nine
o’clock.
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