[back to previous text]

John Mason: The word “balance” is one that I like. I hope that the Solicitor-General will take the points made on board. This is an incredibly difficult area. I had better move on.
The reason for asking the Solicitor-General to explain the position is the concern in some circles that specific laws against harassment, especially if they are widely drawn, may create a risk to free speech. I presume that there is a risk that someone could claim that mere disagreement with them over an issue related to a protected characteristic had created an offensive environment or made them feel violated. However, those are subjective terms.
The law on harassment is controversial. In 2005, the Government considered introducing harassment on the grounds of religion in the provision of goods and services. Since then, they have undertaken a discrimination law review and they concluded that the Bill should not introduce harassment on the grounds of religion or sexual orientation in the provision of goods and services. Indeed, clause 27(8) specifically excludes those grounds. I assume that the Government saw that introducing the right to sue for offending feelings while receiving goods or services had the potential to unleash a wave of litigation.
Harassment has a more limited application in the provisions of goods and services, but on employment it applies to all strands. One obviously has less choice in the working environment than in the marketplace. For example, if one does not like the atmosphere in one shop, one can go to another; but it is much harder to switch if one does not like the atmosphere at work. If we are to have a harassment law on all grounds for employment, and if we are to apply it also to the provision of goods and services and some other grounds, we must be careful about the threshold in order to prevent misuse. The definition of harassment is already set about with limitations. The question is not whether we have limitations, but what they should be. Why is it necessary for us to go further than the EU?
The Solicitor-General: I intervene to deal with the hon. Gentleman’s point while he is still on his feet. He is right that the EU test is narrower than ours. He said that our wider test, as he characterises it, has been in our law since 2003, although we think that it has been in our law since 2000. We would break the principle of non-regression if we narrowed it to the EU test. Does he have an answer other than that which is prohibited?
John Mason: I raise these points for discussion. If it is impossible to wind things back, I must accept it. However, I am grateful for the clarification provided by the Solicitor-General, although perhaps she is not aware of why, in 2000 or 2003, a different definition was brought in.
Finally, and I hope briefly, I touch on the amendments tabled by the hon. Member who represents Abingdon—I wish to save time by not saying the full name of his constituency, or will that upset the people of west Oxfordshire? I wish to speak to amendments 230 and 231—and possibly 232 and 233, which are related. They seek to extend the harassment provisions to cover religion and sexual orientation in the provision of public services. I am naturally interested to see that the definition uses the “and” formulation of my amendment rather than the “or” formulation used by the Government. However, given what I have said, I obviously oppose extending the Bill to cover harassment on those grounds.
I shall touch on some of what the hon. Gentleman said. He mentioned the question of schools, and specifically mentioned homophobic bullying. I am sure that we are unanimous in agreeing that such behaviour should not happen. I know that schools—both faith schools and other kinds—are desperately trying to tackle bullying of all kinds, and I fully support them in that. I understand that faith schools in England and Scotland want to teach, for example, that sex outside marriage is wrong; indeed, that forms part of the ethos of such schools. However, we do not want such a statement to be thought of as bullying. For example, in Glasgow every child lives in the catchment areas of two schools, so every family and every child can choose between a faith school and a secular one.
Emily Thornberry: What, therefore, would happen to a young man whose Catholic parents want him to go to a particular school, but who, at the age of 13 or 14, decides that he is gay, and finds himself bullied by teachers who tell him that there is something profoundly wrong with him because he wants sex outside marriage?
John Mason: There is a difference between making a statement such as, “I believe it is wrong to have sex outside marriage,” and bullying. The two are not the same. I hope—I certainly have faith in Glasgow schools of all descriptions—that schools are attempting to tackle bullying at all levels, but that is not to say that they accept all forms of behaviour as just being okay.
Dr. Harris: The hon. Gentleman is saying that there are some schools—state schools, state-funded schools—providing that public service that want to teach that gay sex is always wrong. They can cover it on the basis of sex outside marriage but, as the hon. Member for Islington, South and Finsbury said, that means that gay sex is always wrong, always sinful and something to be condemned, to put it mildly. I cannot believe that this Committee, this House—certainly this applies to my party—and the Government think that that is acceptable. A school must not do that. A school can say that certain organisations or religions believe that, but it has a terrible effect on young people who are gay, lesbian, bisexual and so on.
The evidence, which I have not read out, although I could, shows that the feeling that one is being bullied and instances of bullying are a particular problem in faith schools, precisely for the reasons that the hon. Gentleman gives. It is not right for him to hide behind the argument that their ethos says that sex outside marriage is wrong. That means that being gay is always wrong if people express it sexually, which every gay person is entitled to do within the law.
John Mason: Our policy—this is our party policy, for the benefit of the hon. Member for Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock—is that if sufficient parents want a particular type of school, be it religious, non-religious or whatever, we would aim to provide that type of school. It could be Catholic or we could be talking about other Christian denominations. We have at least one Jewish school in Scotland and we are looking at Muslim schools in Scotland as well. Those would be schools run by the public sector.
I believe in diversity. If there is one thing that I am trying to get across in Committee, it is the idea of diversity, of live and let live, of being inclusive and of allowing different views. We do not have to have all schools saying that marriage is unnecessary or not particularly a good thing. We can have some schools saying that marriage is a good thing. We can have other schools taking a more relaxed view about the issue. Parents would have a certain amount of choice about which one they wanted their child to go to.
To take another example, is it unrealistic to imagine that someone could walk into a parish church or faith school on polling day, cast their vote and then claim to have been religiously harassed while in receipt of public services because of the presence of a cross or Bible verses on the walls? The amendment is dabbling in dangerous territory, and the Government have taken the wise course and left that alone.
The hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon seems to be treating religion or belief less favourably than other characteristics. His harassment test for sexual orientation and for gender reassignment in his proposed new subsections (2A) and (2B) in amendment 231 is an
“intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive”
environment, but for religion in subsection (2C), the test is
“intimidating, hostile, degrading or humiliating”.
“Offensive” has been left out. That seems a little inconsistent.
Dr. Harris: I must take issue with the hon. Gentleman. Actually, the amendment would provide protection for religions. He gives the example of a cross or another religious symbol in a school that is used on polling day. That should not be forced to be covered up just because another public service is being delivered there. In fact, I would find it hard to argue that it was offensive. That is why my definition leaves out “offensive” from the idea of being harassed on religious grounds—to protect the religious freedom of other people. In fact, the motivation is opposite to that which he suggests.
John Mason: I can deal only with the words that the hon. Gentleman uses, but I am happy to accept his reassurance about the intention. He also used the term “thin-skinned”. I think that he was perhaps referring to religious or similar people. The word “bigoted” has already been used—again aimed at religious people. I find both difficult. If I was using those words about other people, people would rightly be offended, but there we go.
I am grateful that the Minister has said that she does not want to create a hierarchy of rights. I hope that she will reject amendment 231 for that reason. I do not agree with harassing anyone, but we have to be wary of turning schools, if this is what is intended, into a battlefield for competing world views. The Government seem to realise that there is too much scope for causing division, hence clause 80(1) specifically excludes the religion—
The Chairman: Order.
10.25 am
The Chairman adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).
Adjourned till this day at One o’clock.
 
Previous Contents
House of Commons 
home page Parliament home page House of 
Lords home page search page enquiries ordering index

©Parliamentary copyright 2009
Prepared 19 June 2009