Dr.
Harris: Before the Solicitor-General finishes—she
is coming to a summary of her conclusions—I want to deal with
the question of schools. I note her point on homophobic bullying and
how it is potentially different and could be treated differently from
harassment on the basis of sexual orientation by a member of staff. I
also note her point that a difference in treatment of a pupil by a
member of staff would be
discrimination. I
refer the Solicitor-General to the findings of Stonewall’s 2009
teachers’ report, which, in respect of homophobic staff, report
that more than two in five secondary school teachers and three in 10
primary school teachers have heard homophobic language or negative
remarks about gay people from other school staff. Also, half of gay
pupils have heard homophobic remarks from teachers and/or other school
staff and 30 per cent. report that adults have been responsible, for
instance, for homophobic bullying in their schools. There is then
reference to some teachers being homophobic.
Does the
Solicitor-General not accept that there is some evidence that does not
count as discrimination, because it may not be demonstrated in
differential or detrimental treatment, although it shows that there is
a staff-to-pupil problem in some attitudes? Indeed, would she count as
harassment the idea of children being told that gayness—and
their parents, if they are gay—is innately or objectively
disordered and
sinful?
The
Solicitor-General: I do not know of a school that I have
come across that talks to its children in that way as a matter of
course in any event. What we are looking at is truly legislating where
there is a need, not legislating where there is no
need. The
hon. Gentleman refers to Stonewall, but Stonewall, as he heard, gave
evidence to us only about a week ago to the extent that it has no
evidence of the need to extend protection against sexual orientation
harassment in schools. We will legislate if it is there, but it is not.
Stonewall must be the expert, and it says it is not. I hope he will
withdraw his amendment.
Ms
Diane Abbott (Hackney, North and Stoke Newington) (Lab): I
have listened carefully to my hon. and learned Friend’s
arguments, and I will support the Government on this matter. However, I
want to say a word about the question of homophobic bullying, because I
think she perhaps does not take it as seriously as she
should. One
has to be a parent of an adolescent child who is in school to
understand the reality of homophobic bullying, because to my certain
knowledge it occurs in London schools. It is a paradox: for grown-ups
it has become less and less acceptable to engage in casual homophobia,
but homophobic abuse of the sort that one hears quite normally in
primary and secondary schools, certainly in London, is something I
never encountered when I was going to
school. Furthermore,
physical and verbal homophobic abuse do not occur in a vacuum. They
occur in a school society where “gay” is a common term of
abuse. A child can attract the term “gay” for a range of
activities,
including wearing their school blazer, putting up their hand in class,
doing their homework, admitting to reading a book or taking what is
deemed by their peers an undue interest in educational matters. All
those things get boys in London schools labelled
“gay”. Some
teachers, perhaps older teachers, see that as a joke, but I believe
that it contributes to an atmosphere where boys—particularly
working-class and black boys—feel inhibited from exhibiting
anything other than what may be described as stereotypical male
education-hating
behaviour. Such
an atmosphere—where “gay” is a term of abuse and
all sorts of behaviour that we, as middle-aged, liberal, educated
people, may consider normal—is smeared as “gay”,
which can be difficult for pre-adolescent boys and can lead to specific
physical and verbal abuse of individuals. I believe that creates an
intolerable atmosphere for many boys and some girls in our
schools. I
do not accept my hon. and learned Friend’s assurances that
legislation covers it. It is not my experience, as a parent and someone
who goes into schools, that we are doing enough to say that such an
atmosphere, such language and such physical abuse are not acceptable.
It is all very well to talk about schools having codes of conduct on
bullying—every school in Hackney, North and Stoke Newington has
a code of conduct on bullying—but I cannot tell her that every
school does not have a problem with bullying. A code of conduct is a
long way from instilling in children a way of
behaving. The
other day I read in the newspaper about a little American boy—12
years old, good looking and charming, by all accounts—who hanged
himself because he was consistently abused at his school and accused of
being homosexual. We cannot look at the physical act of bullying as an
isolated act. We cannot understate the manner in which a toxic,
homophobic culture has taken grip in many
schools. The
earliest race relations legislation did not result in a wave of
prosecutions, but created a climate and signalled society’s
attitude to such behaviour. Anything that the law can do—not
just to enable individuals to be prosecuted, but to create a climate
and signal our attitude to such a climate in schools—will help
some very frightened and unhappy boys. They exist at this
time—today, as we
speak,
Dr.
Harris: That is a powerful contribution from the hon.
Lady. I feel exactly as she does. My consideration of this, and
agreeing with her, does not lead me to support the Government, although
I am not as natural a supporter of the Government in all matters as she
is.
Ms
Abbott: That is my
Whip.
Dr.
Harris: From a sedentary position, the hon. Lady tells us
that she is being effectively whipped at the moment. I am not saying
that that is a form of bullying on any grounds, but I hope it does not
continue as it would be a personal tragedy for her and a waste for the
House and the media world if she were kept in line more often than she
is. Moving
on to a substantive point, as I said, my reading of the situation,
given the evidence of harassment in schools on the grounds of sexual
orientation, for example, leads me to argue for a change in the law.
The
fact, if it is the case, that Stonewall does not agree on that is of
interest, but the Minister was on stronger ground when she argued that
law should be based on the evidence of a mischief and whether the law
is an effective way to deal with
it. That
is the basis on which I would be prepared to make my stand
here—and indeed others, at later stages of consideration of the
Bill—rather than saying that because person X or a particular
lobbying organisation does not support a particular proposal, for
whatever reason, that should be the end of the matter. Other
organisations, such as the Equality Network in Scotland, Schools Out
and others, not only recognise the problem—as Stonewall, which
does excellent work, does—but have a different prescription for
the
solution.
The
Solicitor-General: As the hon. Gentleman well knows, we
have evidence from all those bodies—I cannot say from the
Scottish one, but we have evidence from the others. The contribution
from my hon. Friend the Member for Hackney, North and Stoke Newington
was immensely touching and very strong. Much of it would not be covered
by discrimination law if we agreed to the hon. Gentleman’s
amendment. With greater understanding now, we appreciate that there is
a sizeable problem, but we always have to remember the limitations of
what we are doing. This is not the way to solve the
problem.
Dr.
Harris: I do not think there is anybody on the Committee
who cannot recognise the problem. I do not doubt the
Government’s intentions in tackling the wider issue—not
just harassment, but pupil-to-pupil bullying and so forth. I have not
spent long going over examples this morning or now, but it would be
appropriate to do so because we are dealing with specific
legislation. My
point is that the case is made on the terms of a mischief. Without
changing the culture and training and without procedures being put in
place, legislation is never sufficient on its own, but leaving a gap
uncovered sends the message to the providers of
services—including schools—that this sort of bullying and
harassment is not as serious as other forms, such as racial harassment
and bullying. That message relates not to the substance, but to whether
there is a legal obligation. In fact, this form of bullying is just as
serious if not more so, on the basis that it is not always as
universally condemned as—thank goodness—racial harassment
and bullying are. I accept the Government’s point about the
single equality duty on public bodies, which, in respect of sexual
orientation, is a form of section 28 in reverse. That section was so
bad that there is no reason why it should not be reversed. We will
debate that later, but the Liberal Democrats do not believe that it is
sufficient in these terms.
To respond to
a couple of points that the Minister made on the substantive basis of
the amendments, I accept that they are complex. I wanted to deal with
the issue in an amendment, but it was difficult to do that in the way
that the clause is laid out. I am glad that she was able to understand
what was covered, and I agree that if something similar ever comes to
fruition during the passage of the Bill, we will have to find a neater
way of doing it.
The amendment
makes the point that the provisions need to be extended. Even if we
eliminate a form of discrimination and detriment that occurs in this
country, we would not repeal the law even though the mischief
has gone. Therefore, one does not have to look too hard, where the
principle of the case is made out, for evidence of something that would
be covered by a harassment division and not direct discrimination. In
her reply, I think that the Minister made it clear that, by definition,
not all cases of harassment involve discrimination and, if the comments
or conduct do not amount to different treatment per se but just create
that environment, they would not be covered. There is a
huge gap in the provision of public services and in schools, as well as
for religion and, indeed, sexual orientation. The House will need to
come back to this matter. I have clearly not yet persuaded the Minister
of that point, but I do not feel that there is any virtue in dividing
the Committee on the complex set of amendments that I have tabled. On
that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Clause
24 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause
25 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
26Application
of this Part
Mr.
Mark Harper (Forest of Dean) (Con): I beg to move
amendment 10, in
clause 26, page 19, line 3, leave
out paragraph
(a).
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 196, in clause 26, page 19,
line 3, at end insert ‘, so far
as relating to any goods or services which are not provided by or on
behalf of a public
authority’. Amendment
156, in
clause 26, page 19, line 4, leave
out paragraph (b). This
amendment extends protection against discrimination in the provisions
of goods and services because a person is married or in a civil
partnership. Amendment
197, in
clause 26, page 19, line 4, at
end insert— ‘(c) sex, except
for any goods or services which are provided by or on behalf of a
public
authority.’.
Mr.
Harper: It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair this
afternoon, Lady Winterton. I will speak to amendment 10 and
my hon. Friend the Member for Weston-super-Mare will hope to catch your
eye to speak to amendments 196 and 197.
Amendment 10
is probing. One of the organisations that support the age
discrimination legislation applying in whole to those under 18 got very
excited and fulsomely supported my amendment. However, it will be
disappointed when it finds out that the amendment is intended to probe
and to provoke a discussion on the appropriate scope of the Bill and
why the Government have taken such
decisions. 1.30
pm
For the
benefit of those who do not have the clause in front of them, it is
intended to amend age discrimination provisions and
states: “(1)
This Part does not apply to the protected characteristic
of—
(a)age, so
far as relating to persons who have not attained the age of
18;”.
The amendment would
remove that age restriction. I want to make the point to the Minister
that a number of outside organisations have highlighted the fact that
discrimination against young people takes place. I expect that we will
discuss that in more detail when we consider some of the other age
discrimination parts of the Bill. Young people may experience
discrimination on the basis of their age. With older people, there is
what we could call—for the purpose of the debate—good
discrimination and bad discrimination. We say that young people should
and should not do a wide range of things, and we put age limits on when
they can and cannot do certain things, based on protecting
them.
Providers of
other services might also make judgments, aside from those statutory
rules, to set age limits that they feel are appropriate, based on the
enjoyment of services for other customers. For example, some
restaurants and all sorts of other providers have age limits that are
not necessarily to do with alcohol supply, but with the age of children
in that environment, such as insisting that parents accompany their
children.
I understand
the sense of some of the issues raised. Some young people are perfectly
capable of doing certain things at one age, whereas others of the same
age might not be. The difficulty is in setting an objective test, or
way of putting that into legislation. That may be why the Government
have decided to exclude those under 18 from this part of the Bill. The
amendment’s purpose is to test that and enable the Minister to
set out the Government’s thinking in more detail, so that it is
on the record and we can probe it to see whether any of the examples
given by those organisations hold
water. Lynne
Featherstone (Hornsey and Wood Green) (LD): I rise to
support amendment 10. I, too, want to probe the Minister’s
thinking about the exclusion of under 18s from the protection of the
Bill. The commission wishes us to probe the Minister’s thinking.
It strongly supports the amendment, because it believes that the clause
would introduce discrimination to under-18s. It says that the amendment
would bring that age group within the full scope of the proposed public
sector equality duty set out in clause 143. I share the concerns of
some of the organisations that have contacted
me.
Mr.
Harper: May I make it clear that the provision will not
exclude young people from the protection of the Bill? It relates just
to services and public
functions.
Lynne
Featherstone: I thank the hon. Gentleman. I am talking
about goods and services. He used the example of a restaurant, where
people want to be quiet and do not want children running around.
Surely, the issue is how a child behaves; the point is that there
should be no noise or running around. The clause should not provide a
blanket exception for children if we want an inclusive society in which
they play a full part. I am sure that many Members have been to
continental Europe, where children play more of an integral part in
society and behave perfectly well when taken out with adults to
restaurants. I want to explore the Minister’s thinking on how we
are targeting an age group, as opposed to the behaviour of the
individual. On
goods and services, indirect discrimination might be experienced by a
child. I do not know how many members of the Committee have been into
the ladies in Parliament.
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