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Dr. Harris: I know what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Perhaps there is a philosophical disagreement between us in that I do not think it is right that there should be an uneven playing field between the public and private sectors when providing services. While I am not totally ideologically opposed to the private sector providing services—they do so very effectively with care services, and the same applies to charitable sectors—there has to be a level playing field. Although I will not go into great detail, there is far too often not a level playing field. For example, independent treatment sectors were given huge advantages over the poor old NHS—for a start, they did not have to train anyone—and there is an outrageously uneven playing field. If something is a good thing to do when delivering of public services—I believe this is, and I think the hon. Gentleman believes it is, although I am not sure what his view is about the clause overall—it should apply to everyone.
This is not the same as opening the box and saying, “How are you delivering welfare to work?” There will be consultation on specific duties, but this is saying, “Are you doing the things that your public sector competitors are doing?” If the hon. Gentleman is a believer in a fair market, as I know he is, I urge him to see things not in terms of Government interference in how something is done, if he thinks that the outcome is all that matters, but in terms of the fact that an unfair competitive advantage should not be given to private sector organisations. There is already a great deal of unevenness. If, as generally happens, the public sector trains people, they can then be used by the private sector free of training costs. That happens in many care organisations, for example, and we should not make that unevenness any worse.
Mr. Boswell: I have some sympathy with the hon. Gentleman’s comments. I have experience of cases in which there has been outsourcing in the health service and a row about the obligations of training. To help the debate along, would he not concede that if there is to be a duty on those persons—we await the Solicitor-General’s comments—it might be reasonable to look at the fulfilment of that duty slightly differently depending on the scale of the organisation and what it is doing? A large charity such as Leonard Cheshire Disability would be in a different position from one that was small and specialist and perhaps should not require exactly the same level of HR function as a bigger organisation or a public authority discharging the same duty.
Finally, I am delighted that the Government accept that there is a difference when delivering public functions as far as the positive duty is concerned. I have already indicated that my party will seek to return to this issue at a later stage of the Bill’s proceedings. We will argue that for people in receipt of public services, as opposed to other services, there is a stronger argument for some of the protections that are not being offered—protection from discrimination on grounds of religion, for example, or protection from harassment on grounds of sexual orientation.
Clause 143(2) sets out a specific recognition that when public services are being delivered, the situation is different, because public funding is often involved. There is an expectation that the people concerned, particularly the users of those services, are a captive and often vulnerable population who deserve more protection than the ordinary person in the marketplace trying to book into a hotel or lodging house.
Amendment 280 was tabled by the hon. Member for Stroud for the EHRC. I have a great deal of sympathy with it, but it slightly misses the point. The hon. Gentleman argues that a local authority, for example, should have a positive duty to have regard for the need, inter alia, to
“eliminate hatred and hostility towards members of different groups”.
We know that gay people in schools might well be victims of that sort of hatred and hostility. Would it not be better for gay people in schools to be covered under clause 143(1), which states:
“A public authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due regard to the need to...eliminate...harassment”?
For reasons that I cannot understand, protection from harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation is excluded from schools, as is protection from harassment on the grounds of sexual orientation and religion for people seeking to receive public services. I cannot understand on what basis there would be any need to harass people receiving public services on the grounds of religion, but that is not covered by the Bill.
If the amendment were to be accepted, there would have to be regard to the need for public authorities to protect freedom of speech. An amendment relating to that subject is in the next group, so I will not take that matter further, although it kind of ties in, and I meant to table it as a response to the sort of debate that we are having on this group of amendments. It is difficult to get public authorities to start eliminating hatred, as that would automatically lead them to not allow someone to book a room if they believed that that person hated certain groups of people. It is not a crime to hate certain groups of people, although I deprecate it enormously. I have campaigned for more than two decades against racism, but it is not the job of a public authority to say who has free speech within the law. I urge the hon. Gentleman and the EHRC to look towards the law.
My hon. Friend the Member for Hornsey and Wood Green and I tabled amendment (a) to amendment 21 to set out on the amendment paper an argument that the hon. Member for Weston-super-Mare might wish to consider. That was a bit of a waste of time if he is saying that the Minister can respond to my criticism of his amendment. There is no need for the Minister to deal with amendment (a) to amendment 21, as I had hoped that the hon. Gentleman would. However, as I said in an intervention, it might be better to be even more specific about what the reporting requirements are, rather than just having regard. The Minister said that that would be picked up by the specific duties, which I welcome, and I do not think there is anything more to say on amendment (a) to amendment 21.
We support the measure, with the caveat that we will deal with in the next group. We wish it well, but we think that it could be improved, as we will set out specifically during our next debate.
John Howell: It is a great relief to be able to give my undivided attention to this Committee. The Finance Bill Committee has been running in parallel for the past few weeks but, mercifully, it has now ended, which allows me to devote my attention to this Bill for the remainder of our sittings.
In my first contribution to the Committee, I mentioned my experience in relation to the public sector equality duty during my time in a local government role, because I saw that as a chance to move the debate on to outcomes. I welcome the Solicitor-General’s comments about the shift towards an outcome focus. I also welcome the positive-action orientated wording in clause 143(1), such as “eliminate discrimination”, “advance equality of opportunity”, and “foster good relations.” A lot is set by words and that wording paints a good picture.
When I came to producing and delivering the public sector equality duties, as they were, in a local government context, I looked at not only the issue of fairness—of course—but what one might call enlightened self-interest. One of the last things I signed off in that role had the words:
“by ensuring we do not exclude we ensure that as an employer, we tap into the talents and abilities of all our people and the users of our services benefit on a lasting basis.”
It is perhaps early in one’s parliamentary career to be quoting oneself, but it was a great pleasure to bring that to bear. That picks up the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Daventry about the general benefits of customer service that come from focusing on equality duties and improving services overall.
I was also interested in the earlier discussion about whether there was any evidence that the existing equality duties had worked. There are some indications of success and that equality issues have been forced into a position of higher priority—indeed, a small amount of mainstreaming has also taken place. In both the Schneider-Ross report and the Work and Pensions Committee’s report, I was struck by the fact that those results were still difficult to tie down and prove in terms of metrics. There was no link between the metrics that were there and the outcomes.
Perhaps one good example of that issue is contained in the January 2007 Ipsos MORI report on the disability equality duty, which revealed that 72 per cent. of public authorities covered by the audit that had taken place had published a disability equality scheme and that at least 54 per cent. had published a scheme that contained evidence that the authority had involved disabled people in its production. Those statistics are encouraging, but they do not tell us, or measure, what difference was achieved as a result. Of course, we really need to understand that aspect when considering the clause. It is impossible to discuss the merits of the clause without a better understanding of the monitoring and compliance regime that will underpin it. My feeling is that existing monitoring and compliance are inadequate and more about process than outputs. It is one thing to change the focus to outcomes, but if the measurements are still about outputs, the process will not be taken any further.
During the Work and Pensions Committee’s inquiry into disability, which was aimed at the Bill, I was keen to pursue the matter with several organisations, one of which was the TUC. It was covered in question 86 in the evidence volume to the Committee’s third report of the 2008-09 Session, which was entitled “The Equality Bill: how disability equality fits within a single Equality Act”. When I asked where the current disability equality duty was working, the TUC said that there were some excellent organisations, but it was interesting that even it could not refer to any specific bodies, and that none immediately jumped out as good examples that could be used as case studies. The TUC admitted that there were an enormous number of “laggards”, but more importantly then confirmed that the EHRC was investigating 170 bodies for failure to comply. It talked about the need for “pushing and shoving”. We are familiar with the use of “nudging” as a means of delivering policies, but the suggestion was somewhat more forceful than that.
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Mr. Harper: My hon. Friend had a previous role in delivering such things and he mentioned the important duty of improving the customer service of organisations. Given that many organisations are not doing it well, is there an approach that it might be helpful for the Government pursue? If they could get organisations to understand that adopting those duties, particularly engaging with different groups, made them better at delivering their core business—the issue that they think about each day—that might be a way in which to get organisations not only to take the matter seriously as an add-on, but to make it a central part of what they do each day.
John Howell: I thank my hon. Friend for his remark. He is absolutely right. The way in which I approached the matter was twofold. First, it was not seen as something that was separate. I committed my local authority to being the first English county council to go for a charter mark for the organisation as a whole. Therefore, there was a context and a process in which it could sit. In parallel to that were a series of workshops with groups that represented all those with the protected characteristics that met regularly to look at how different aspects of the organisations were working. We asked them to tell us what outcomes they wanted and to say how we could integrate them in a more fundamental way. There are some extremely good examples of what my hon. Friend was saying, such as by taking an holistic view of an organisation and not making the issue too separate, a lot could be achieved within the organisation by mainstreaming it.
I return to a bit of pushing and shoving. As a practical example of the difficulty, Citizens Advice commented, “With a little bit of pushing and shoving, the public duties are effective, but the problem is that pushing and shoving does not occur a lot of the time”. The difficulty of the EHRC monitoring so many organisations and the difficulty of read-across between them came out in several pieces of evidence that have been delivered both to the Committee and to the Select Committee. The example that I cited earlier came from the public interest research unit, which referred to a public authority that was excellent in promoting equality, but which did not undertake impact assessment so it is in breach, against an authority that assesses all its policies and procedures, but is appalling in terms of delivering equality.
There were ticked boxes around the current schemes, which is probably the description that has been used most by those who have looked at them. It is certainly something that we need to move away from, but we need to understand what it is in terms of the monitoring of compliance that underpins the delivery of what the clause sets out to achieve.
 
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