Mr.
Boswell: In the example that the Solicitor-General cited
about the Redcar half-marathon, is it not the case that as there was no
differentiation in the competition
itself—it was one race—the concern, quite rightly, was
about the differentiation in the prize money between the genders? Will
the Minister clarify whether such activity would be, and should be,
precluded by the Bill? To add to that, I shall make the general
comment, which I may advert to again in relation to age, that the more
we can break down particular patterns of services or situations, the
more activities we may find to make gender-neutral, or other
condition-neutral, thereby confining those that are condition-specific
to a
minimum.
The
Solicitor-General: I agree. I am not sure whether
the Redcar half-marathon position would have been unlawful under the
current law, but happily it did not come to that. If a sponsor says
they will not pay unless the terms are changed, the terms are usually
changed, and that is what happened. I agree that we should make what
progress we can and encourage the availability of sport to children and
adults of both sexes. We should break down barriers and make it clear
that things that were thought to be an impediment to sport in the past
may not be so now.
For example,
we used to say that girls should not play rugby. Redcar rugby club has
a thriving young girls’ rugby team now. We also used to say that
women should not do fencing because of the dangers. All that happens
now is that a woman wears some sort of padded chest protector and they
can fence just as well as the guys. In fact, sometimes women are better
because fencing is a bit like ballet, which is about being dextrous and
nimble on one’s feet. We need to look at each sport where there
is a gender imbalance and knock away the props of bigotry that support
the
distinction. I
hope that I have satisfied the hon. Member for Oxford, West and
Abingdon that the Minister for the Olympics is doing her best. As I
started to say, she has been asking for support from the British
Olympic Association and the national sport governing bodies to identify
and try to bring on those sports where a major gender imbalance exists,
and where we could realistically achieve changes by 2012. The IOC
acknowledges that it is in transition and that there is a job to do to
move itself further toward equality. The hon. Gentleman has rightly
raised the issue, but I invite him to accept that it is being dealt
with in another area and that it would not fit into the
Bill. 1.15
pm
Dr.
Harris: I am grateful to the Solicitor-General. I restrain
myself from speaking about my own sporting prowess, which extended only
to playing the Minister of State, Government Equalities Office, in a
chess match 20 years ago when I played with a team in Liverpool and she
played for Formby Ladies. She was better than me, but I was fortunate
enough to win through a swindle. But that makes the point that there
are some sports, of which chess is one, where there is no reason why
women should not play. It should be promoted more as a sport, but that
is a different
issue. In
brief, I am grateful for the Solicitor-General’s response,
particularly her acceptance that there is a need for the Government to
do what they can to put pressure on and work with the British Olympic
Association, Sport England and other national sport governing bodies to
make the IOC recognise that there is a difference
between having a medal event that is only for men because generally only
men do it, and having more medals for men than women in a sport where
there is no basis for that any more because the levels of achievement
and athleticism are identical. I hope that we will be able to take this
forward on a cross-party basis outside this Committee with the
Department for Culture, Media and Sport. With that, I beg to ask leave
to withdraw the amendment. Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Harper: I wanted to raise a constituency issue that
relates to subsections (5) and (6) about selection criteria for sport
based on nationality or residence. I wanted to check whether what is
happening in this case is lawful. If it is lawful, it is still quite
mad, but we should establish whether it is actually lawful. This is a
cross-border issue. I ask the Committee to forgive me for troubling it
with this matter, but it goes directly to subsections (5) and
(6). The
Gwent Football Association is trying to enact a new ruling that will
prevent players—when I say “players”, I am
referring to young children, those eight years old and above—who
live in England from continuing to play in the East Gwent league, which
they are currently able to do. I have 53 children in my constituency
who are currently able to play junior football in the East Gwent
league, but it is proposed by the Gwent FA that they will not be able
to do so come the autumn. They will be able to start playing at under
six, but when they get to eight they will not be able to play for one
of those Welsh clubs if they live in England. The particular club I
refer to is Chepstow Garden City junior football
club. That
matter was raised with me by the chairman of Tidenham parish council,
and as the Solicitor-General would expect, I raised it today with the
Gwent FA and have also written to the Minister in the Welsh Assembly
Government who deals with sport, but I just noticed that the clause
states that the subsection applies only
when “selecting
one or more persons to represent a country, place or area or a related
association, in a sport or
game”. What
does “represent” mean in such cases? The football club is
Chepstow Garden City. Chepstow is a town in Wales, but the area that it
covers—its environs—stretches to both sides of the Welsh
border. People who live in my constituency in Sedbury, Beachley and
Tutshill very much look to Chepstow as their nearest town. It is the
place where they shop and work. It seems perfectly sensible that
children who live in the areas where Chepstow is the closest town would
look to it, and to that particular football club, to play
football.
Mr.
Boswell: My hon. Friend’s argument is very
cogent—it is not as if the East Gwent Association was required
to select people to play for Wales or even for the local community when
they came from across the border. The issue is simply whether they can
participate in the sport.
Mr.
Harper: That is exactly my point. If someone is
representing their country—Wales, for example—it is
sensible to require a connection with it and that someone is born or
lives there. But it strikes me that this rule is
completely mad. [Interruption.] Children would be
able to play in Welsh schools football and could play in Cardiff, their
parents could play for senior football clubs in Gwent, but a rather
silly rule has been picked for junior
clubs.
The
Chairman: Order. I am sorry to interrupt, but there is too
much background noise.
Mr.
Harper: I am grateful, Mr. Benton.
May I ask the
Minister what “represent” means? Based on the admittedly
limited facts that I have been able to furnish, is what Gwent FA is
doing lawful? If she confirms that it is, I contend that it is not
sensible. In a letter that I have written to the club I have urged it
to allow some common sense to prevail, so that the 53
children already registered with that football club and their brothers,
sisters and friends who want to play for it can continue to do so.
Given that we coincidentally happen to be considering clause 188 at
more or less the time I was alerted to the problem, I would be grateful
to explore what the law says on the
subject.
The
Solicitor-General: Of course, my legal advice is usually
incredibly pricey, even when I do not know the answer, which is the
situation now. I am really not sure. I have not looked at it in
sufficient depth to venture a view. The hon. Gentleman will have to
contend that it does not represent the area. The difficulty might be
whether it is a related association. The discrimination, as it were,
which is licensed in the clause, allows for the selection of someone to
represent either a place or a related association in a sport or game of
a competitive nature. My first instinct was that it was
lawful—if mean—to do what the club had done, but it is
probably a question of fact whether the club represents the place where
it is, which it might, or is a related association. So I think the hon.
Gentleman needs to contend that it is not lawful because it does not
represent the area, and see what comes
back.
Mr.
Harper: I am grateful to the Minister for that advice. I
will prevail upon Gwent FA to see sense. If it fails to do so, I might
pursue my line of argument and persuade the club that its actions are
unlawful, or that it does not wish to risk the issue turning into a
battle. I am grateful for the Minister’s advice—provided
to the Committee for
free. Question
put and agreed to.
Clause 188
accordingly ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause 189
ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule
23General
exceptions
John
Mason: I beg to move amendment 58, in schedule
23, page 235, line 20, leave out sub-paragraph
(2). Allows commercial
religious bodies to benefit from exceptions covering religion and
sexual orientation, so long as they also fit within paragraph
2(1).
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: Amendment 295, in schedule 23, page 235, line 20, leave out
‘sole or
main’. Amendment to
probe the question of whether organisations which have a commercial
sideline are free to discriminate in that commercial
activity.
Amendment 296,
in
schedule 23, page 236, line 5, at
end insert— ‘and, (c) where
the service provided is not a commercial
activity.’. Amendment
to probe the question of whether organisations that have a commercial
sideline are free to discriminate in that
activity. Amendment
59, in
schedule 23, page 236, line 18, leave
out sub-paragraph
(10). Religious groups that
provide services on behalf of public authorities (e.g. Roman Catholic
adoption agencies) are allowed to discriminate on grounds of religion
but not sexual orientation, the amendment would allow religious groups
to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation where they can show
their faith requires
it. Amendment
305, in
schedule 23, page 236, line 18, leave
out from ‘anything’ to
end. This is to prevent
organisations discriminating on the grounds of sexual orientation when
performing a public function in the provision of premises or in
Associations. Amendment
251, in schedule 23, page 236, line 19, after
‘orientation’, insert ‘or religion or
belief’.
John
Mason: I thank you, Mr. Benton, for the
opportunity to be a part of the Committee under your chairmanship. I
will be speaking to my final amendments in the area of religion, so
hopefully we will not have many more
debates. Schedule
23 deals with exceptions from the ban on discrimination in the
provision of goods, facilities and services. There are exceptions for
acts of the Executive in paragraph 1; organisations relating to
religion or belief in paragraph 2; single-sex accommodation in
paragraph 3; and training for people from outside the European economic
area in paragraph 4. There is no dispute over the need for exceptions;
the question is how far they should
go. My
amendments 58 and 59 aim to widen the scope of the exceptions in
paragraph 2 to include some religious organisations that would
otherwise be excluded. Like other exceptions, paragraph 2 is hedged
about with conditions that religious bodies must fulfil before they can
benefit from the exception. According to paragraph 2(1),
they must exist
to “practise...
advance... teach... a religion or belief... or...
foster... good relations between...
religions”, or
to enable people to receive services “within the
framework” of that belief. Limitations on religious grounds can
be imposed, under paragraph 2(6), only if it
is “because
of the purpose of the
organisation” or
to avoid religious offence. Limitations on sexual orientation grounds
can be imposed, under paragraph 2(7), only
if “it
is necessary to comply with... doctrine... or... avoid
conflict with strongly held religious
convictions”. That
is a lot of hoops to jump through, but is probably wide
enough. My
amendment 58 deals with a further restriction that paragraph 2 of
schedule 23 imposes. Under sub-paragraph (2), a religious organisation
that passes all the other tests needs only to be deemed mainly
“commercial” by a court to be deprived of all the other
exemptions available within the confines of paragraph 2. The
UK is home to many such organisations; for example, Christian books,
music and DVDs supply a vigorous market, and Christian bookshops,
publishers, holiday
camps and conference centres have been around for decades and fulfil a
religious mission, but at the same time could be considered to be
commercial to a greater or lesser
extent. Amendment
59 deals with a similar restriction, deleting sub-paragraph (3), which
allows a religious organisation that provides services on behalf of a
public authority to be sued for sexual orientation discrimination. Just
as many religious bodies engage in commerce, many faith bodies provide
public services. Often they supply buildings, staff or volunteers at no
expense whatever to the public purse, although the services may be
publicly funded. They find themselves in the odd situation that they
can continue to make decisions about service provision based on
religion—sub-paragraph (3) does not affect that—but if
they take account of sexual orientation they can be sued. I find it
hard to see why sexual orientation is singled out in that way. That
reaches further into the internal affairs of religious organisations
than religious discrimination law. I see that amendment 251
seeks to resolve that inconsistency in a way that is even more
detrimental to religious organisations, depriving them of the ability
to discriminate on either
ground. For
most people, the existence of the religious exemptions is not
controversial. Beyond those two areas, the Government accept that to
apply discrimination law as an unqualified absolute would lead to
injustice for religion or belief organisations, because such
organisations operate according to a particular set of beliefs that
constitutes their whole reason for existing. However, I would be the
first to accept that exemptions can also be too wide, and society needs
to draw a line somewhere, within which all religions are allowed to
operate. The
whole point of the paragraph 2 exemptions is to grant religious
organisations freedom to operate according to a particular ethos by
limiting the membership, the use of their buildings or the terms of
their service provision. If any organisation has funded its building
largely itself, it should have control over it and not be expected to
hire it out to another organisation opposing its belief. Obviously, if
public money has been taken to fund the building, strings would clearly
be
attached. My
contention is that existing exemptions for religious organisations are
inadequate in the two areas of commerce and public service, because
sub-paragraphs (2) and (10) completely deprive certain religious
organisations of such protection against being forced to compromise the
very beliefs that constitute their reason for being. Yet that
requirement for protection of an ethos is particularly engaged in those
fields of service provision. The principle of a commercial organisation
or publicly funded service provider having freedom to resist endorsing
views that conflict with its own ethos seems perfectly
reasonable. Ironically,
the law has little issue with strongly held points of view that do not
happen to fall within a protected characteristic. For example, an
eco-friendly printer, run on green principles, is quite at liberty to
reject a request to print a prospectus for a multinational oil company.
Similarly, the management of a community centre not wishing its
facilities to provide a platform for the British National party can
refuse a BNP booking, because political belief is not a protected
ground. The same principle underlies the exemptions in paragraph 2.
To require a religious organisation by law to provide a platform for
views fundamentally opposed to its own seems very
strange. Obviously
some commercial or publicly funded activities of religious
organisations would not by their nature involve any danger of
contravening their religious beliefs. For example, I am sure that a
Muslim restaurant that adhered to halal principles would gladly serve
any customer and that a church that receives public funding to run soup
kitchens would distribute the soup to absolutely anyone. In such cases,
the client’s religion or sexual orientation will be of no
consequence. 1.30
pm
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