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Mr. Hoban: I am grateful to the Minister for his response, particularly for his comments on how HMRC will look at hard cases. However, the Government clearly set out their intention to apply the changes from the start of the tax year and it was reasonable of taxpayers to assume that that would be the case. Solely for political reasons, with the delay of the Budget, taxpayers lost out. They did not lose out through their own activity, but because of the decision taken by the Chancellor to timetable the Budget for after the G20 summit. The Government should reflect on that, because they have—“misled” is not the right word—given the impression that something would happen from the start of the tax year. That has not happened for political reasons, rather than for any other good fiscal reasons, and that point should be taken on board by the Government.
In the light of remarks made by the Minister regarding the treatment of hard cases, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 19, as amended, agreed to.

Clause 41

Loan relationships involving connected parties
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Hoban: I have just a couple of comments on schedule 20, which the clause introduces. First, a word of praise, which does not come very readily from my lips on these occasions, but there has been some very positive comment on the consultation for clause 41 and schedule 20. That consultation has worked well and improved the schedule. However, one or two issues have been raised with me.
Companies have used the late interest rules to get a tax reduction for interest expenses when they have needed it. That has particularly been the case with part equity-backed businesses. If an interest reduction cannot be used in the current year, it will be carried forward as a non-trade debit that can be offset against non-trade credits. That was not felt to be particularly useful, so companies would therefore trigger the debit when they could use it or needed it. The schedule takes the flexibility away on timing for finance costs.
The Government’s counter-argument might be that, as the legislation has been partly introduced for anti-avoidance purposes, that might well be the purpose of removing that flexibility. However, companies could still obtain tax relief when the interest is paid using companies’ non-qualifying territories—for example, Jersey. That means that they cannot refer an accruals basis for tax relief when they need to. Will the Minister comment on the interaction between the schedule and the debt cap rules? Some clarity is required and I would be grateful for his thoughts on how that clarity might be introduced.
Ian Pearson: First, I acknowledge the comments made by the hon. Gentleman on how the consultation was handled. I am sure that that statement will be welcomed by my officials who have undertaken the consultation exercise. He is right to point out that there is widespread recognition for what the Government are doing; there were only some minor points raised regarding the issue of loan relationships involving connected parties.
He pointed to the issue of private equity companies. As he is aware, the legislation contains an election to enable a company to stay on a pay basis for a year after the change. That should give companies time to rearrange loans if they think they need to. The private equity industry has raised some practical difficulties with HMRC, where interest is payable to a company controlled by a number of private equity investors. Those are matters that we believe are best dealt with in guidance and HMRC is discussing them with the private equity industry.
Mr. Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con): In the current economic circumstances, was any consideration given by the Treasury to extending the period of 12 months? The Minister will be aware that, particularly given the potential difficulty of acquiring funding, it may well be that that period, which might normally seem quite a sensible transition period, will not prove long enough for the reorganisation of finances for private equity companies in this difficult economic situation.
Ian Pearson: Well, we always consider these matters carefully. It is our judgment that a period of 12 months is a reasonable period of time to allow companies to rearrange loans if they need to do so.
The point was made about whether or not an election should be allowed for private equity groups to deduct interest on a paid basis, if they want to. In response, I would say that allowing companies the choice to deduct interest, either when it accrues or when it is paid, would go against one of the key principles of the corporation tax rules on the taxation of interest. Interest is taxable and relievable as it accrues in the accounts. We are not persuaded that an exception needs to be made for private equity. However, HMRC will work with the industry in improving its guidance in this area.
The point about the interaction with the debt cap was made by the hon. Member for Fareham. Specifically on that point, I can say to him in response that ordinary loan relationship rules, such as late interest, are applied before the debt cap applies. That is another matter that we will cover in the guidance.
As I have said before, HMRC is in discussions with the private equity industry about these matters and we believe that they can be satisfactorily addressed through guidance. The industry is happy with that.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 41 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 20 agreed to.

Clause 42

Release of trade etc debts
Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.
Mr. Hoban: I wish to raise an issue about the clause. The changes in the clause enable transactions between rated parties so that, where there is a waiver of a property or trade debt, these releases will not be taxable in the debtor company nor will there be a tax relief in the creditor company. So, within the group these changes are tax-neutral.
However, there are other inter-company balances that arise other than through trade or property debts. It has been suggested that it might be helpful to enable long-standing inter-company balances to be written off and relief to be given, so that there is no taxable transaction taking place in the debtor company nor is the tax relief given in the creditor company. I just wonder whether the Government have thought about extending the relief to companies in those circumstances.
Ian Pearson: I am not sure that I have a direct answer to the hon. Gentleman’s question at this point in time. He will be aware of what we are trying to achieve through the clause. He will also be aware that the clause covers trade and property business debts. He asked why there could not be releases of any money debts between group members and he specifically made the point about the period of time. Covering other sorts of debts, such as those relating to the management expenses of investment companies, would have made the clause considerably longer and more complicated, and the representations that have been made to the Government have not suggested that, in practice, such debts cause as many problems as trade debts. However, we have not ruled out the possibility of further changes in the future. We believe that we have covered most of what needs to be done, but we would be happy to receive further representations from business and the professions about any real life problems involving money debts that are not within the clause’s scope.
Question put and agreed to.
Clause 42 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Clause 43 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 21

Foreign exchange: anti-avoidance
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Twenty-first schedule to the Bill.
Mr. Hoban: I have just one question about schedule 21. Paragraph 2 states that
“the arrangements cause the company or any other company to gain a tax advantage (other than a negligible tax advantage).”
Schedule 21 introduces anti-avoidance provisions, but why is there not a more traditional motive test? Paragraph 2 offers a very broad definition, but when anti-avoidance is involved, one normally expects the more traditional wording where the main purpose involves tax avoidance. Paragraph 2 might cover a much broader range of transactions than would normally be covered by a targeted anti-avoidance measure.
Ian Pearson: This is an important schedule in relation to targeting anti-avoidance. It is designed to stop schemes that involve abuse of the tax rules for what is known as forex matching. A number of such schemes have been disclosed to HMRC, and have been widely used in practice. It is estimated that stopping such avoidance will bring in additional corporation tax of £20 million a year and prevent further losses to the Exchequer of approximately £120 million a year. It is therefore important that we introduce legislation.
The hon. Gentleman has asked why the legislation does not contain a purpose test. Existing provisions in the tax rule for loans and derivatives deny relief for losses where the loan or derivative has a tax-avoidance purpose. Although those provisions may deny relief for losses generated by forex matching schemes, they can involve some very difficult and long drawn-out arguments between HMRC and the businesses concerned. The Bill aims to put it beyond doubt that such schemes do not work, even where they are designed to reduce the risk of a purpose test challenge. The tax avoidance purpose rule would therefore be counter-productive. It would not give certainty to compliant companies, because experience suggests that such companies are likely still to be concerned about whether their purposes could be perceived as unallowable. It might also provide avoiders a loophole through which they could escape, where contemporaneous evidence of a company’s purpose is lacking. We considered a purpose test, but there are clear reasons why we deliberately rejected it. Our approach is more robust.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 21 accordingly agreed to.
Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 22

Offshore funds
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Twenty-second schedule to the Bill.
9.30 am
Mr. Hoban: I have just a couple of questions about the schedule. The first relates to the clarity of the guidance that has been issued so far on the matter. My second and more substantive concern may seem a curious one for me to raise given my earlier remarks about the way in which the rules on the debt cap and dividend exemption seem to be driven by the EU, and the fact that the Government have assured us that they were robust to challenge. However, it has been suggested that the rules on schedule 22 may not be robust and may be challenged on whether or not they comply with EU rules.
Let me deal with the guidance point first. There is concern that although some guidance has already been issued by HMRC it does not address all the questions raised by industry during the consultation on schedule 22. The grandfathering rules that apply until 1 December 2009 are helpful, but they should address immediate industry uncertainty.
The characteristics-based definition is potentially so wide-ranging that instead of providing greater certainty, it is likely to make the position even more unclear. It is suggested that there may be a range of offshore arrangements that are not, in substance, funds, but that may be subject to the rules. There is concern regarding interpretation around offshore companies’ fixed lives, shared buy-back arrangements and liquidation exit routes as well as special purpose vehicles under partnership. It may be the Government’s intention to ensure that such areas are not caught by schedule 22, but, as they stand, the broad nature of the rules catches those entities.
This schedule introduces into legislation the definition of an offshore fund. It can be
“a mutual fund constituted by a body corporate”
or
“a mutual fund under which property is held on trust for the participants where the trustees of the property are not resident in the United Kingdom”
or
“a mutual fund constituted by other arrangements that create rights in the nature of co-ownership”
where those arrangements are affected by non-UK law. The schedule then sets out some conditions that a mutual fund might need to satisfy to then be defined as an offshore fund. Therefore, some certainty is required. Uncertainty does not only impact on UK investors; it also creates additional complexity and administrative burdens for the offshore asset management industry, which already has quite a lot to do in getting its funds in shape to meet the rules.
The second issue goes back to the breadth of the funds that might be caught. The offshore funds’ tax regime does not comply with the UK’s obligations under agreements that create the European economic area. Previous legislation linked the definition of offshore funds to the regulatory definition, as in sections 235 and 236 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, and was unlikely in practice to apply to mainstream retail investments. However, the proposed definition set out in schedule 22 appears to bring a far greater range of investments within the definition of an offshore fund—that was the comment I made in the first part of my remarks about trying to have greater clarity. The definition is so broad that the question of the regime’s non-compliance with EC law arises in practice.
I have been given the following example, in which a UK bank offers, as a retail investment,
“a debt security which redeems at any time after a minimum holding period of, say, 12 months by reference to the FTSE 100 (though any chargeable asset, or index of chargeable assets, for capital gains tax purpose would provide the same result).
In the absence of complicating factors, such an investment should be regarded as a capital gains asset for tax purposes, with any gains, made on disposal of the investment subject to tax at 18%. The offshore funds rules will not apply because the mutual fund is constituted by a UK resident company.”
However, if the same debt security is
“issued by a French or a Luxembourg financial institution under the proposed new definition”,
that definition is sufficiently broad to cause that identical investment to be subject to different rules, which would result in any gains being treated as income and therefore taxed at the higher rate. Therefore, if the Government introduce their plans for a 50 per cent. tax rate, those gains could be subject to tax at that rate, whereas the same security issued in a UK resident fund would be taxed as capital gains at 18 per cent. There appears, therefore, to be a difference between UK issuers of investments and non-UK issuers of investments, which constitutes discrimination. That, it is argued, then constitutes a restriction in the free movement of capital from UK resident investors to financial institutions resident in other EEA member states, which would be unlawful. I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on whether the Treasury believes that that differential treatment renders the rules in breach of EU law.
 
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