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The Chairman: I believe that others wish to speak, so it would be more convenient to save your point for the stand part debate.
Mr. Gauke: Thank you, Mr. Atkinson.
Amendment 68 would put in statute a period of 30 days for the third party to comply. Again, for clarification, we recognise that that is a reasonable point to make, but I believe that it can be safely left to guidance. HMRC has published draft guidance stating that it will usually allow not less than 30 days for a reply. Although in most cases, 30 days would be long enough to provide simple information, such as an address that differs from that on a notice, in exceptional cases a longer or shorter period might be appropriate. HMRC wants the information, not the penalties, and will be open to representations to extend the period if particular requests cause difficulty. Leaving the time period in guidance is in line with schedule 36 to the Finance Act 2006, which operates in a similar way.
The probing amendment, 69, would allow the third party to appeal on the grounds that it does not have the information sought by HMRC. There is no need to appeal. Confirmation by the third party that it holds no contact details that differ from those provided by HMRC is enough to satisfy the notice. Again, that is set out in the draft guidance published by HMRC.
Mr. Binley: I am concerned about vulnerable people who could be approached by the Inland Revenue for information. Will the Bill give leeway to the Department, for example in a situation in which an 80-year-old mother is the third party? Will there be some compassion over the whole business of application? What guidelines will be given to achieve that?
Ian Pearson: We have published extensive guidance through HMRC. HMRC tries to act compassionately in cases such as the hon. Gentleman describes. It is unlikely that an 80-year-old woman will have information that HMRC cannot secure through other means, but if she did, every effort would be made to secure that information in an appropriate way. We want the information, not the penalties. We want to work with people and believe that the system will be voluntary. The third parties that have such information are not likely to be 80-year-old women, but banks, other financial institutions, tax agents, landlords, letting agents and other professionals. There might be an octogenarian letting agent, but such circumstances will be rare.
I understand that third parties will want assurance that in providing the contact details, they will not be liable for the disclosure under data protection law. I do not consider that amendment 70 is necessary to achieve that. The clause will create the lawful means by which third parties can provide information to HMRC. The Data Protection Act 1998 states that when disclosing personal data, it must be lawful and fair to do so. This provision will provide that lawfulness.
HMRC considered statutory protection for the third party carefully in development and concluded that no further protection was needed. That view is supported by the Information Commissioner’s office, whose website includes published guidance on dealing with requests under tax legislation. It states that
“if you are required to disclose personal information under HMRC legislation, it will not breach the Act”,
meaning the 1998 Act. There is no comparable provision in other HMRC information powers and that has not caused problems to date. Many organisations already provide such information voluntarily when asked to do so. I am sure that they will continue to do so.
I recognise that the amendments are probing and hope that my assurances and clarifications will enable the hon. Member for South-West Hertfordshire to not press them.
Mr. Gauke: The Minister is right that the amendments are probing. I am grateful for his responses and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Forty-Ninth schedule to the Bill.
Alison Seabeck (Plymouth, Devonport) (Lab): It is a pleasure to speak for the first time under your chairmanship, Mr. Atkinson.
I have a brief query for the Minister to do with how the schedule relates to the Child Support Agency. It touches on the point made by the hon. Member for Northampton, South. The guidance suggests that Departments, friends, neighbours and relatives do not fall within the power, but where does the CSA come in all this? It is moving to a position where private contractors will do a lot of its work and debt collection, but it clearly holds an awful of information that would be of use to HMRC. I would welcome my hon. Friend the Minister’s advice on where the CSA sits and whether HMRC can use the information the CSA holds and its expertise to pursue debt.
6.15 pm
Mr. Gauke: It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport. May I make a not entirely dissimilar point? Paragraph 1(3) states:
“This Schedule does not apply if—
(a) the third party is a charity and obtained the details in the course of providing services free of charge, or
(b) the third party is not a charity but obtained the details in the course of providing services on behalf of a charity that are free of charge to the recipient of the service.”
As the hon. Lady rightly points out, there are similar provisions in relation to local authorities.
I should be grateful to hear what the situation is for those who are part of a non-charity not-for-profit organisation that provides assistance to people. One can envisage that certain organisations that might fall within that definition could well find themselves not receiving the protection contained in paragraphs 1(3) and 1(2). Has any consideration been given to broadening out the measure, for example, to volunteers who work for a local authority or non-charity not-for-profit organisation? In addition, has any consideration been given to extending that carve-out along similar lines to those suggested by the hon. Lady? Will the carve-out be too narrowly defined for some of the circumstances that could apply?
Ian Pearson: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Plymouth, Devonport for her comments. In general, HMRC can obtain information from other Departments under the appropriate information gateways. The terms of those obviously vary, but HMRC will make use of such gateways before considering using this power. That could apply to the Child Support Agency, but I do not think that it necessarily applies under this specific clause. However, the Child Support Agency should be able to provide information to HMRC if it is needed for HMRC to perform its duties.
The hon. Member for South-West Hertfordshire raised the issue of whether charities should be excluded. Charities are excluded where they obtained the contact details in the course of giving free advice to the debtor. The exclusion also protects those who staff helplines on behalf of the charity, even if they are carrying on business elsewhere. The power will not be widely available and will be used only by specialist staff in the most worthwhile cases. HMRC will use the power only if there is or has been a business relationship between the debtor and the third party. I hope that clarifies the point for the hon. Gentleman. He also raised a point specifically about local government employees, and I think that might well depend on whether there is a business relationship.
Mr. Gauke: I am concerned about the matter more in the context of not-for-profit organisations that might not be a charity, rather than in relation to charities. They do not appear to benefit from the protection contained in paragraph 1(3) and, indeed, I am not sure whether volunteers working for a local authority benefit from the protection contained in paragraph 1(2). Will the Minister say something specifically about that?
Ian Pearson: My understanding of the policy intention is that there should be a business relationship between the debtor and the third party. That is unlikely to be the case for not-for-profit advice given on the types of case that the hon. Gentleman is talking about. I give an assurance that HMRC will treat voluntary bodies that acquire addresses in the course of providing free advice to the debtor alike, whether they are a charity or otherwise. I hope that provides the reassurances that he seeks.
Mr. Binley: May I press the Minister a little further?
Ian Pearson: No; I have sat down.
Mr. Binley: What a pity.
The Chairman: If the hon. Gentleman wants to speak in the debate, he can.
Mr. Binley: No thank you, Mr. Atkinson.
Question put and agreed to.
Schedule 49, as amended, accordingly agreed to.
Clause 97 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 50 agreed to.
Clause 98 ordered to stand part of the Bill.
Schedule 51 agreed to.
Clause 99 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Schedule 52

Recovery of overpaid tax etc
Mr. Gauke: I beg to move amendment 71, in schedule 52, page 377, line 23, leave out ‘, or ought reasonably to have known,’.
Let me say first that this schedule addresses the recovery of overpaid tax. Amendment 71 deals with those circumstances where the commissioners are not liable to give effect to a claim if particular circumstances apply; there is a list of those circumstances in the Bill. Specifically, amendment 71 relates to cases where the claimant
“could have sought relief by taking such steps within a period that has now expired, and knew, or ought reasonably to have known, before the end of that period that such relief was available.”
The particular words that we have concern with are:
“or ought reasonably to have known”.
Essentially, this is an objective test that may exclude from claims those taxpayers who should have realised that they had an opportunity to act but did not do so. Consequently, the people most likely to be affected by this particular provision are the less sophisticated and unadvised. They may well be caught by this restriction and would therefore not be able to recover overpaid tax. I would be grateful if the Minister explained why that is justifiable. For the sake of completeness, the “ought reasonably have known” test applies in one other place in this schedule—in paragraph 2(6). I will turn to that in a brief stand part debate, but I would be grateful if the Minister explained the purpose of the objective test in these circumstances.
Sarah McCarthy-Fry: The provisions are intended to provide a final opportunity for taxpayers to reclaim overpaid tax. They modernise a system originally enacted in 1923, which has increasingly been criticised by the courts as anachronistic and inconsistent with a rights-based culture. The provisions simplify the recovery of overpaid income tax, capital gains tax and corporation tax by providing taxpayers with a single route of claim. Claims will be possible only if no other statutory steps can be taken to reclaim an overpayment. External commentators have recognised that that is an area of law that would benefit from clarification. The proposed changes have been exposed informally to external stakeholders, who responded positively to them.
Amendment 71 would widen the scope for taxpayers to make claims still further by relaxing the restrictions relating to matters that the claimant could have appealed. However, taxpayers are already entitled to make a late appeal if they have a reasonable excuse for not having appealed within the normal time limit. The tribunal also has discretion to permit a late appeal when it is fair and reasonable to do so, and HMRC has discretion to allow late claims, elections and notices when appropriate, and to give full effect to the consequences of the claim. The amendment would enable taxpayers to reopen a matter that could have been dealt with on appeal, when they do not have a reasonable excuse for failing to appeal in time and when the tribunal does not consider it fair and reasonable to allow a late appeal. The amendment goes too far and would compromise the effectiveness of the appeal process as a means of determining disputes, so I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.
Mr. Gauke: I note the Exchequer Secretary’s comments on the appeal process when a taxpayer has a reasonable excuse. That provides some comfort, but there is concern with such a test—we have seen it elsewhere—that it may leave the unadvised, least sophisticated taxpayer in a difficult position. I am sure that the Government and HMRC are aware of that, and that it is a legitimate concern to raise. I accept the point about the practical difficulties if the exclusion were widened too much, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Question proposed, That the schedule be the Fifty-second schedule to the Bill.
Mr. Gauke: I want to highlight two other areas where the commissioners are not liable to give effect to claims. One is paragraph 2(6) of new schedule 1AB to the Taxes Management Act 1970, which is another occasion when the “ought reasonably to have known” test applies. The other is paragraph 2(7), which requires a little clarity, and refers to case F, which
“is where the amount in question was paid or is liable to be paid—
(a) in consequence of proceedings enforcing the payment of that amount brought against the claimant by”
HMRC, or
(b) in accordance with an agreement between the claimant and”
HMRC
“settling such proceedings.”
I think that seeks to prevent claims from being made when HMRC has begun proceedings to recover tax debts—for example, when tax was due under self-assessment. We have been advised that that is likely to have quite a wide effect, and that quite a large number of taxpayers will be excluded as a consequence of the provision. I should be grateful to hear from the Minister whether that interpretation is correct, and whether this is quite a significant carve-out.
 
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