Q
108Paul
Holmes: To renew an order after the first 48 hours, you
need to go only to a magistrate rather than to a Crown court, is that
adequate judicial
oversight? Mick
Creedon: I think so, yes. Guided as they are in
court, magistrates should be able to give
that.
Q
109Paul
Holmes: On the question of extradition, what do
extradition requests to you or requests that you make elsewhere
typically cover? There was a big joke on Second Reading that requests
could involve pig rustling in Poland. Is that serious? At what level do
you arrest someone or request extradition? Are people extradited for
going back to another European country having not paid £50-worth
of parking fines in London and or vice versa?
Allan
Gibson: It varies. In a second, Murray will chip in.
Different countries use extradition requests in different ways. We
grade them as high, medium and low risk according to the seriousness of
the offence for which we are arresting them. Murder, rape, kidnap,
firearms offences and so on are at the top end and theft and fraud are
at the bottom end. The high-risk figures that I have before me range
from 94 per cent. from Albania to 15 per cent. from Poland, 13 per
cent. from Hungary and 9 per cent. from the Czech Republic. That gives
you an indication. The higher the risk, the more serious the offence
is. Use
of the European arrest warrant varies tremendously. Poland is the
biggest user—for comparison, between 13 May 2008 and
23 January 2009, Poland issued 270 requests and
Germany issued 23. That reflects the
Polish constitution, whereby they are obliged to follow through the
judicial process. Under the framework agreement, they circulate the
warrant in Poland and can then make use of the European arrest warrant.
Germany takes the same approach as the United Kingdom, where we
consider how serious the offence is, if extradition would be
proportionate and whether we want the costs to the public
purse. Murray
Duffin: It is the proportionality issue. All of the
old—for want of a better word—European countries consider
proportionality. If an officer wants an EAW issued by the CPS and the
magistrates, proportionality has to be addressed. In the high-profile
cases that you are talking about, such as piglet rustling, the
UK’s view is that we will not go through everything involved in
an EAW, such as issuing it, making the arrest, keeping the person in
custody for two or three weeks while the extradition is ordered and
dealing with the returning issues and all the costs that that implies.
The Poles’ view is steadfast in that if they have a case and a
suspect, they will prosecute it to the nth degree. In some regards, you
must admire their tenacity. When we make an arrest, they will always
collect and go to the effort of taking the person
back. The
Polish flights that Mr. Gibson has alluded to are carried
out at their request. Their aircraft come over to Biggin Hill every
three or four weeks and take back a number of their nationals. There
have been a number of bilateral meetings between the UK and Poland to
address the disproportionality. The Poles say that they are following
the rules and that is the way it is. Different countries interpret
proportionality in different
ways.
Q
110Paul
Holmes: Because we did not sign up completely to the
Schengen agreement and still have our own border controls, we do not
get access to the full exchange of
information. Allan
Gibson: We will do from 2010. Draft clauses that I
have seen say that it will be in November 2010 by the earliest. That is
when we will have the bolt-on to the police national computer. By then,
it will probably be the police national database. It will feed directly
so that when you search the police national database, you will also be
searching the Schengen information system. The two will be
merged. Paul
Evans: Other relevant databases are the Interpol lost
and stolen passport database, which is a primary indicator of the
misuse of identity, and the Europol information system, to which we are
in the business of connecting police sources in the same way as Allan
has described for the Schengen system by 2010. These are complex
systems, but they must be delivered because they will simplify the
process. In doing so, they will simplify the administrative overheads
that have been described today. The paper-based system is not what we
need in the 21st
century.
Q
111Paul
Holmes: In all cases with the European arrest warrant, a
prima facie case must be presented. Famously, with the American
agreement, they do not have to present one to us, but we must present
one to them. Do you have any observations on
that? Allan
Gibson: I can understand why that is a cause of
discontent. However, that is the agreement and we work within it. It is
not for us to negotiate those agreements.
Q
112Paul
Holmes: Is that completely untypical among extradition
agreements with other
countries? Allan
Gibson: Yes, they are usually
reciprocal. Paul
Evans: There is a distinction between the role of the
Serious Organised Crime Agency, which operates the EAW system on behalf
of UK plc, and the UK central authority and the Home Office, which
operate cases with countries outside the
eurozone.
Q
113Miss
Julie Kirkbride (Bromsgrove) (Con): How many extradition
cases have there been involving British citizens and the
USA? Allan
Gibson: I can give you the number for the last
six-month period. There were 15 between 13 May and 23
January.
Q
114Miss
Kirkbride: For what kinds of
offences? Allan
Gibson: All the American cases will be for high-level
offences. Most of the part 2 countries, which are those outside Europe
that we have an extradition arrangement with, will not make a request
unless it is a high-profile case. It must be deemed to be serious
within their jurisdiction. We may not see the crimes as serious, but
they are serious offences for the requesting
country.
Q
115Miss
Kirkbride: Does that include gambling
offences? Allan
Gibson: I do not
know. Murray
Duffin:
No.
The
Chairman: No gambling
offences.
Q
116The
Minister for Security, Counter-Terrorism, Crime and Policing
(Mr. Vernon Coaker): Good afternoon. Thank you
for your time. May I summarise what has been said? There appears to be
a consensus that this Bill is building on the success of the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002. The real problem has been with retaining property
pre-charge. Has that been a core difficulty with the operation of the
Act with property dissipating before we can restrain it, Mr.
Creedon and Mr.
Evans? Mick
Creedon: Yes; in our consultation with all the forces
of England and Wales, this was one of the significant problems that was
raised. As you are well aware, the gap between the value of
confiscation orders and the actual value enforced is worryingly large.
This is an attempt to close that gap by recognising that we can take
more early on, this will realise at the point of confiscation more in
line with the valuation of the order—clearly a vehicle will lose
value, as properties are now. This was a strong feeling. Other elements
are important—there is some regularising and some ambiguities
that are being cleared up—but the point you make about that gap
is a significant
one. Paul
Evans: Our cases are different; they are qualified by
the nature of our investigations. Our investigations tend to have a
long, intense covert phase followed by an overt phase, by which point
we would have generally profiled the financial affairs and assets of
the subject of the investigation; we are therefore in a slightly
different position. We can see where ACPO is coming from: it is too
easy for criminals to realise that they are facing capture and to
dissipate, give away, pay away, or gift an
asset in their possession without really gifting it—they know
they can get it back later. We tend to go after a better class of
criminal.
Mr.
Coaker: One of the points that is often put to me when I
have raised this is that this is completely unnecessary; restraint
orders do the
job. Mick
Creedon: No,
again.
Mr.
Coaker: That is a point that is often put to me. It is
said that we have no need for this and it is an unnecessary step; that
we are unnecessarily infringing the rights of individuals because
restraint orders will do all that needs to be
done. Mick
Creedon: Tristram works with this more than I do
day-to-day, but from a policy perspective and the national feedback,
that is not the case. There is a huge volume of confiscation orders and
confiscation activity compared with the very low number of restraint
orders. They do not match up because it is not straightforward to get a
restraint order. Within a restraint order is the provision for that
person to have necessary lifestyle expenses, which can be quite high,
depending on the lifestyle they manage to profile. The orders do not
alter the fact that they can damage, remove, hide or give away their
property. I do not think that restraint orders are the answer. The Bill
gives us a parallel power that will ensure that we do not have to rely
on
them. Tristram
Hicks: It is worth saying that this legislation is
still quite new in its operation and we are still discovering how much
property there is that may be linked to the proceeds of crime. It is
difficult to estimate the amount of property that we are not seizing
because, by definition, we are not seizing it. An illustration may be
gained from the fact that the Met police obtained 13 restraint orders
before the Act in 2002 and this year will be looking at something like
350 restraint orders. This is an illustration of the scale of assets
that we believe are at risk of dissipation—which is how we
obtain the restraint orders. There have been many instances where, even
with a restraint order, criminals have attempted to sell property and
move what may be considered to be fixed items, such as kitchens, in
order to escape the penalty of a restraint order. The evidence shows
that, even with restraint orders, there is a dissipation of assets. As
I have said before, the enforcement of confiscation orders depends on
tangible assets being seized and retained if we believe that they will
be
dissipated.
Q
117Mr.
Coaker: It is extremely important for me to ask you to
comment on this. As we have seen from some of the comments about the
proposals in the Bill, people are necessarily worried about the human
rights and civil liberties implications of what we are doing to the
individuals concerned—but we can see the benefits to the broader
community, if we concentrate on that. It would be helpful if you said,
between you, something about the importance that you attach to the
judicial safeguards that are in the Bill and about the use of these
powers—whether you consider them appropriate, for example. It
would also be helpful if you stated on the record whether you believe
that the codes of practice that will go alongside the provisions need
to ensure that this power should be used only where it is necessary and
proportionate to do so.
Mick
Creedon: The starting point for policing, of course,
is that human rights underpin what we do. There may be commentators who
would say otherwise, but the reality is that human rights are implicit
and feature in our operational audit and operational planning. Human
rights are fundamentally important. We would not want this power if the
oversight was not in
place. You
are well aware that the new change in policing involves, among other
things, a simple test of the public trust and confidence in policing in
terms of dealing with local problems with local partners, and so on.
Nothing will undermine that more easily than if we are seen to abuse
our powers in a public way. However, from a chief constable with an
ACPO lead, there is no fear of that
whatsoever. The
measures that are put in place vary, but one part of the process
includes the judicial oversight, the necessary senior officer’s
authorisation and the independent overview. But the more important part
is in respect of the codes of practice and the guidance that will go in
parallel with that, along with the quite proper inspection. Rest
assured that HMIC will inspect and make sure that forces are doing what
needs to be done. The Independent Police Complaints Commission is there
and people will complain to it, should they think that things have not
worked out as they would have wished. There is a combination of
measures and there has been a commitment from ACPO to ensure that we
use those
properly. I
started earlier by saying that this measure will not be used in a
cavalier way by a police constable on the street who may think,
“Well, I can just take that and keep hold of it.” This
will be rolled out gradually through specialist units and financial
investigators working within the confines that the Act, as it will be,
will
offer. Paul
Evans: Just a general point from me, Minister, if I
may, and then something about the process of managing this
control. We
welcome the scrutiny that the Bill provides. We want to get this right
each time and every time. Not to get it right will, as Mick rightly
says, undermine public confidence. That applies to proceeds of crime
powers, civil recovery powers, intrusive surveillance powers or
property interference
powers. On
a process point, the system that has been set out here to scrutinise
decision making within the agencies and the police service is almost
identical to that in place for other surveillance. So organisations are
geared up to processes that rigorously check, in an independent sense,
the decisions being made by officers on the ground, including those
made by the senior officer. The system is supplemented by annual
inspection regimes and the ability for members of the public to make a
full and frank complaint about our behaviour either to the court or to
the
IPCC.
Q
118Mr.
Coaker: Commander Gibson, I understand that you are saying
that, generally, you welcome the provisions in the Bill, but that you
are raising some of the practical problems arising from the increasing
numbers of people subject to European arrest
warrants. Allan
Gibson: We welcome the Bill. It contains practical
solutions that are all very sensible. The issue that I refer to is a
consequence of the decision to implement Schengen II, not the
provisions in the Bill. I do not have any problems with the Bill at
all.
Q
119Mr.
Coaker: What is your view of the provision to extend to a
judge the power to grant an additional 48 hours to a requesting
country, should that be necessary for the relevant EAW papers to be
provided? Paul
Evans: First, can I say that the occasions on which
we would expect to use the additional 48 hours are extremely rare?
Indeed, the pre-arrest aspect of the operation of the EAW system has
been used a handful of times—probably less than
10—although I do not have a precise figure here. With the
benefit of hindsight we would, perhaps, have placed 96 hours in the
original Extradition Act 2003. It is to cover this eventuality: the
receipt of a request on a Saturday when there is a bank holiday in the
court on a Monday. It is in those circumstances, and those
circumstances alone, that we will apply to the court—I should
emphasise that this will be a decision for the judge not for the
officers in the case—for that
extension. There
are cases of real, significant, indicative risk to the public. To give
the broad outline of one recent case: a person was wanted for murder in
a European jurisdiction. His sister lived in Bristol and intelligence
there indicated that he was going there to harm. The arrest warrant
arrived on a Friday and it was a bank holiday Monday. We got in
position to make the arrest, but just within the 48 hours. We were up
to the wire. I would not like to be in a position where we had to
replicate that or, worse, release someone who then goes on to harm
someone else. Minister, to reassure you and colleagues, this would be
used in circumstances where there would be significant risk to the
public and therefore a proportionate use of the
power.
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