The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: new clause 2— Composition of police
authorities— ‘For
section 4 of the Police Act 1996 (Membership of police authorities etc)
substitute— “Composition
of police authorities (1) Where
a police authority has the same boundary as a local council, that
council will be the police
authority. (2) Each police
authority established under section 3 shall consist of 17
members. (3) Where a police
authority boundary and a local council boundary are not coterminous,
two-thirds of the members of the police authority shall be directly
elected by Single Transferable
Vote. (4) The members of the
police authority subject to clause (3) above shall be elected once
every four years on the same day as all or most of the local government
elections in the force
area. (5) Elections per clauses
(3) and (4) above shall be voted on by all members of the population
over the age of 18 who reside within the relevant police authority
boundary and whom are eligible to vote in local government
elections. (6) Where subsection
(2) above applies, one-third of the members of the police authorities
shall be nominated from local councillors within the police force
area. (7) Under subsection (1)
or (2) above, police authorities may co-opt extra members to ensure
diversity, experience and
expertise. (8) In
subsection (4) above, co-opted members may
be— (a) magistrates,
or (b) any person deemed
appropriate by the existing members of the police authority to which
outside members are being
co-opted.”’.
New clause
4—Responsibilities of police
authorities— ‘(1)
Each police authority will have the ability to determine its own local
precept agreement with the relevant local council or councils as
appropriate to its individual
requirements. (2) Each police
authority will have the ability to determine its own fiscal priorities
in accordance with its individual
requirements. (3) The Secretary
of State may not give unsolicited directions to police authorities on
local precepts, minimum budgets or fiscal
priorities. (4) Each police
authority has a duty to consult with the Secretary of State, and to
take account of national policing
authorities. (5)
The Police Act 1996 is amended as
follows. (6) In section 6(2)
(general functions of police authorities), leave out paragraph
(a). (7) In section 6(2)(c)
leave out “whether in compliance with a direction under section
38 or otherwise”. (8) In
section 6 subsection (3) is
omitted. (9) For section 37A
(setting of strategic priorities for police authorities)
substitute— “Policing
objectives Each individual
police authority must determine objectives for the policing of their
own local area.” (10)
For section 38 (setting of performance targets)
substitute— “Where
an objective has been determined under section 37, the relevant police
authority shall establish levels of performance (performance targets to
be aimed at in seeking to achieve the
objective).” (11)
Section 39 (Codes of Practice) is
repealed. (12) Section 41
(Directions as to a minimum budget) is
repealed. (13) Section 44
(Reports from Chief constables) is
repealed. (14) The Local
Government Act 1999 is amended as
follows. (15) In section 31(9)
(major precepting authorities: further recognition), after
“1992”, insert “, but excluding police authorities
and the Metropolitan Police
Authority”.’.
Mr.
Ruffley: The clause is interesting because of what it does
not say. The previous debate indicated that it was a limited reform of
police accountability—a very modest change. Of course, however,
that was not what Her Majesty’s Government promised us, or
indicated that they wanted to do, last summer. Sir Nicholas, you will
recall the publication of the policing Green Paper in the middle of
July, just before the House rose. It was an important document that
borrowed from, but did not follow too closely, the final Flanagan
report of February
2008. Sir
Ronnie Flanagan was surely right, as was the Home Secretary last July
when she introduced the Green Paper, in thinking that, to quote Sir
Ronnie: “If
a body of citizens is dissatisfied with the service they receive or the
scrutiny of it, they have little means of
redress” under
the current arrangements. He went on to say in paragraph 7.23 of his
final report, which, as I say, informed the Green Paper that was
published last
July: “the
most critical shift which needs to occur is to enhance the
responsiveness and answerability of policing services in local
communities. To achieve this, we must bring about an acceleration in
fully adopting a citizen-focused approach to policing; putting customer
service and the interests and needs of local people at the core of
priority
setting.” It
was worth reading that out, because it was not a politician saying that
there needed to be improved police accountability, but Sir Ronnie
Flanagan, a massively
distinguished serving officer in Northern Ireland and, of course,
“the head of profession”, as many police officers would
describe the position of Her Majesty’s chief inspector of
constabulary. This is not prating, complaining or grumbling by lay
people or politicians. I certainly
believed until last summer, when I heard what Ministers were outlining,
that they broadly agreed with the thrust of what Sir Ronnie was saying.
Of course, the means of achieving such greater accountability will be
different, depending on one’s political party and political
taste, but I thought that there was at least an understanding that
something had to be done.
It was not
just Sir Ronnie Flanagan who flagged up the problem with the amount of
accountability that the public have in respect of police performance in
their area. The crime and communities review conducted by Louise Casey,
a Government official, made the point even more effectively than Sir
Ronnie’s excellent review, because she gave statistics. The
Casey review, which was also published last summer, found that 67 per
cent. of people did not know who to complain to if they were not happy
with how their local area was being policed. According to that
review—the Government’s own review—only 7 per
cent. of people understood how police accountability worked in
practice. The review also found that 68 per cent. of people agreed or
strongly agreed that there should be a person elected by local people
to hold the police to account on behalf of the community, which is an
argument for direct election of some kind.
I repeat that
although the Conservative proposition would be a single elected police
commissioner, the Government have certainly contemplated an element of
direct election to a body that would hold the police to account. As we
know, there are county councillors on police authorities at the moment,
but they are indirectly elected. Those elected county councillors are
nominated on to the police authority and thus serve
indirectly.
The Home
Secretary went into some detail in the policing Green Paper on how the
accountability gap diagnosed by Ms Casey and Sir Ronnie would be
solved. In paragraph 1.71 of the Green Paper, she set out something
very pertinent to our debate about the clause—I observe the fact
that you are a strict taskmaster in this respect, Sir Nicholas. In the
paragraph, which mentions legislation, the Home Secretary
said: “We
will legislate to reform police authorities, making them more
democratic and more effective in responding to the needs of the local
community. We will retain the crucial role that independent members
play, and they will be appointed as they are at
present.” She
went on to
say: “The
majority on each police authority will, however, no longer be formed
from local councillors...Instead, people throughout England and
Wales will directly vote for individuals, known as Crime and Policing
Representatives (CPRs), to represent their concerns
locally.” I
have quoted the Green Paper verbatim because it will assist our
deliberations on the
clause. 11.45
am At
paragraph 1.73, the Home Secretary said that the CPRs, which are to be
directly
elected, “will
sit on their local CDRP (England) or CSP (Wales), ensuring that local
issues are being addressed through existing partnership
structures...One of the CPRs in each area will also chair the
CDRP/CSP. Second, they will sit on the force’s police authority,
and, amongst their other duties, will ensure that local issues are
reflected at the force level. Police Authorities—newly
constituted—will retain their current responsibilities
particularly around ensuring forces are working together to address
regional and national
issues.” That
was the vision of direct election that, last July, the Home Secretary
said that she would legislate for. She did not say that she might
legislate for it, or that the Government would review certain detailed
prescriptions—she said that they would legislate. It was
therefore somewhat surprising to discover in the autumn that all that
was to be set at nought, and that the Government had changed their
mind. That is certainly one of the first questions to which I would
like the Minister to respond. Given the wealth of detail that I have
just mentioned, given the work that was clearly being done in the Home
Office on directly elected representatives, and given the detail of the
proposition, will he tell us why it has all been
junked? That
proposal did not find favour with everyone. ACPO indicated, among its
many objections, that such a system would not enable the delivery of
strategic protective services. It was concerned that collaboration, and
other arrangements to close the level 2 gap, to use the shorthand,
would not be properly addressed. It made comments to the effect that
there would be an unhealthy local populism—in other words, that
directly elected representatives would pay too much attention to parish
pump politics and local crime, and lose the big picture, for example,
of what was happening in serious organised crime across the region. I
disagree with the ACPO argument, because it did not give enough due to
democratically, directly elected representatives, whether under the
Green Paper model of Her Majesty’s Government or our model. More
respect has to be given to elected representatives and their ability to
do the right thing, whereas ACPO has argued that they would not pay
attention and not do the right thing regarding the more high-flying,
strategic jobs that local forces have to do in delivering more
joined-up responses on protective
services. The
Association of Police Authorities did not much like the initial
Government proposals, which were set out in detail in the Green Paper
and which the Government said they would legislate for in this Bill,
either. The association did not much like the idea of direct elections.
Some of its objections were well made, but one struck me as being a
non-sequitur. In its response to the Green Paper during the
consultation phase, APA
said: “Direct
elections would not increase the opportunity for greater equality in
police authority appointments and diversity in the
membership.”
I wonder why the APA
takes such a dim view of directly elected representatives, suggesting
that they would have no interest in greater equality in police
appointments. What possible evidence base is there for anyone to say
that directly elected representatives would not care about those
things?
The APA went
on to talk about the potential for the politicisation of police
authorities. It is incumbent on me at this point to say that the
Conservative party believes that the best reform—I shall not go
into detail, because I do not wish to be out of order—would be a
single, focal point of police accountability. In the words of my right
hon. Friend, the Leader of the Opposition, it would be a person whom
people knew and had seen; one person to whom they could complain to get
something done if policing was not as it should be in a police force
area, and they would be able to kick that person, that
elected commissioner, out at the ballot box every four years if he or
she did not deliver an improved service through their scrutiny of a
chief constable’s work. The new
clauses state their own view of how to inject more direct democracy
into the current arrangement, but can we just agree on something? It is
a modest plea. For the APA and others to say that nefarious and
improper politicisation will take place is to argue against democracy.
We do not say for a single second that one man cannot oversee Greater
London, which is one of the greatest metropolises, if not the greatest
metropolis, on planet Earth, with several million citizens. We do not
say, “We can’t have a directly elected mayor, as it would
be wrong. How could so much power reside in one man?” Parliament
passed an Act stating that there would be a directly elected mayor,
and, since then, we have had Mayor Livingstone and Mayor Johnson. No
one said, “The direct election of one person could result in a
British National party individual becoming Mayor of London.”
Arguments for democratising police authorities must not morph into
criticisms that reform might turn up left or right-wing extremists,
because that is an argument against local council elections if ever
there was one.
We should
move on, but first I want to go through the list of critics of the
Government’s original proposals, including the APA and ACPO. The
Police Federation, in its response to proposals for crime and policing
representatives in the Green Paper,
said: “We
are unconvinced that directly elected members would ensure greater
representativeness of the local communities that a police authority is
there to
serve.” Nevertheless,
even when those critical views were made known, the Government said
that they would press ahead with directly elected CPRs. As recently as
5 November 2008, the Home Secretary said in a
speech:
“We
are committed to greater accountability at neighbourhood level through
neighbourhood policing. It is right that we also provide a direct link
to the public within police
governance.” All
the indications were that legislation would be introduced in a police
Bill, and I, like those who are interested in police reform, should
like to know when the Home Secretary suddenly decided that directly
elected CPRs were a bad idea, because, in the first week of November,
she still seemed to be in favour of it.
The new
clauses were tabled not by me but by the Liberal Democrats, but it
might be useful if I comment new clause 2. New clause 2(3) refers to a
police authority’s representatives
being “directly
elected by Single Transferable
Vote.” The
argument about politicisation, which has been made many times, is not a
silly one, and I am not saying that it should not be made. The idea is
that direct elections in any form—whether Liberal Democrat,
Conservative or the original Government form from last July—will
lead to the election of extremists, whether on the left or right. The
British National party is normally mentioned in connection with the
right, but obviously the argument does not apply to extremists on the
right only—there are extremists on both wings of the political
spectrum. A single transferable vote, rather than the popular
vote—the first past the post vote—is more likely to lead
to representation from extremists. I wonder, therefore, why the Liberal
Democrats have drafted subsection (3) in that way. I know that they
have a long-standing, touching attachment to a new voting system of
proportional representation, which in various versions relies on
STV.
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