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Paul Holmes: I have two or three brief observations and questions. We all know that there are great difficulties in getting enough people for the post of chief constable. The problem is related not only to the police; it applies to head teachers’ jobs throughout the country, too. However, I am not quite clear how amendments 50 and 49 relate to improving the flow of applicants. The Association of Police Authorities and Liberty separately raised the same concern about making the senior appointments panel a statutory body, rather than non-statutory. I should welcome the Minister’s comments on why the Government feel the need to make it into a statutory body and how that would improve its performance, as opposed to what has happened so far. The Bill states that the panel should consist of representative members made up of three groups of people: those nominated by the Secretary of State, by ACPO and by the APA, although it does not go into detail about actual numbers and relative balances. I would also welcome the comments of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds on that.
Amendments 50 and 49 go down the road of giving more central power to the Secretary of State by saying that the senior appointments panel would have 10 representatives. Unlike the Bill, they define the figure and say that the members would definitely be appointed by the Secretary of State, rather than a mixture of sources.
Mr. Ruffley: If it assists the Committee and the hon. Gentleman, I want to explain that the amendments are probing in nature. The purpose of the amendment concerned with 10 persons is to tease out the cost and manpower implications. I was at pains to explain that the purpose of amendment 49 was to tease out the statutory basis of the membership.
Paul Holmes: I accept that, as probing amendments, they will not be put to the vote, but I remain alarmed by provisions that would give more direct power to the Secretary of State, and alarmed that she would have the sole power to appoint the representatives—10 persons, under the amendment—to the senior appointments panel. It is a movement of power in the opposite direction from the one for which we have been arguing: we should be devolving and decentralising power, and creating more independence within the police force and police authorities. Under the amendment, the power would be centralising and that would be in the wrong direction.
How does the Minister regard the number of representatives from the three different bodies mentioned in the Bill? How would that turn out in numbers, and what would be the balance between the three groups? What is the Government’s reasoning for saying that we need to move the senior appointments panel on to a statutory basis, as opposed to the current, non-statutory basis?
Mr. Coaker: I start by thanking the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds for his general welcome and support for the clause. It is important to clarify that point. I am not sure whether the hon. Member for Chesterfield took the same approach, but I shall respond to a couple of the points that he made. The reform is important. Mr. Bayley, is it all right if I curtail my remarks a little? We are having a clause stand part debate later, so I shall keep some of what I want to say generally until that debate, while answering some of the questions asked by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds. Would that be appropriate and helpful? I shall make a few remarks before turning to amendments 50 and 49 and the next set of amendments before the clause stand part debate.
The Chairman: We could have a separate debate on such matters.
5.15 pm
Sir Ken Jones, as ACPO president, has done an excellent job, as have the other ACPO officers who advise me on a range of issues, as well as the general body known as ACPO. It works exceedingly well. What also works well is the tripartite governance of policing, which is part of the debate that we started to have before. I am referring to the balance between the Home Office, ACPO and the APA. That tripartite policing governance structure, despite its difficulties and the criticisms that people make of it, works pretty well. We have tried to reflect that—I will come on to this in more detail—in the structure of the clause relating to the reformed senior appointments panel. Those elements are an important part of the existing SAP, which is on a voluntary basis, and the new enhanced statutory set-up for the SAP should reflect that as well. Some of the detail will have to be set out in various arrangements. Hon. Members can read the Bill as well as I can. It sets out that we will do just that.
May I update the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds? I am told that the estimate for the cost is now £500,000. We will keep that under review. He is absolutely right. Sometimes, we spend two or three hours on clause 1, which is a very important debate. This clause is extremely important. If we get it right, no one will disagree when they read the functions, and we shall discuss that.
To answer the hon. Member for Chesterfield, the reason why we have put the SAP on a statutory basis is to try to ensure that we put down exactly what we want it to do and that we help it to be more effective at delivering the things that we all want. We all talk about the need for a greater pool of candidates. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds was right to point out that, notwithstanding the ability of some people who have been appointed to the position of chief constable in this country—Sara Thornton, whom he cited as an example, is an excellent chief constable—we want more people to come forward. We hope that a strengthened SAP is one way in which we can achieve that.
Mr. Ruffley: The Minister was kind enough to say that my question about the cost was pertinent and he helpfully said that the cost estimate had been reviewed downwards from £800 million to £500 million. [Interruption.] Perhaps he could repeat the figures.
Mr. Coaker: The estimate has gone from £800,000 to £500,000, not £800 million to £500 million.
Mr. Ruffley: I am most grateful to the Minister. On what basis has the figure gone from £800,000 to £500,000? It seems to be a very recent renewal of the figure since the impact assessment was published.
Mr. Coaker: That has been done on the basis of an up-to-date assessment of what we think will be appropriate, but I will keep that figure under review and to ensure that it is appropriate in terms of ensuring that the SAP has the resources to deal with the important functions that we are setting out for it. I should like to reassure anyone reading our proceedings that the Home Office will absorb those costs. I want to be clear about that. We will keep the matter under review.
Let me respond to the hon. Member for Chesterfield’s points. We all agree that these matters are important, and we are trying to ensure that we will have a strengthened, improved and more independent SAP, instead of it simply being a sift for senior appointments. We want it to be a more dynamic organisation that can help to drive forward change and other things that we want. That will help to make a difference.
Paul Holmes: The Minister might be coming to this point, but let me ask him about the more independent, dynamic panel that he has mentioned. I have asked exactly what proportion of the representatives it is envisaged will be drawn from the three groupings that are listed. The APA has said:
“The Home Secretary appointees on the panel should not be capable of outnumbering police community appointees. To have credibility it needs to be seen to be a genuine tripartite body.”
How many will come from each of the three legs?
Mr. Coaker: We want a proper balance among the various people who are nominated to the panel.
A significant and important change that has generated debate is the independence of the panel’s chair. The hon. Gentleman alluded to that. One reason why we have asked Ronnie Flanagan to be the interim chair, as we move from the current system to the system that we want, which is subject to the passage of this Bill, is to assuage concerns about the current system.
The hon. Gentleman asked about functions, which are laid out in the Bill. We can debate which are the most important, but he will know that I have been particularly interested in trying to increase the pool of candidates—he rightly raised that issue—as well as the number from different ethnic backgrounds. We are trying to deal with that, and it will be an important part of the work that the panel tries to do. The police service is working hard to change that, and the SAP might look at that work to see what advice it could give to move that issue forward. The hon. Gentleman will note that the Bill contains an important power, under proposed new section 53D, to confer additional functions should that be necessary.
The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds asked about the national college of police leadership. We expect it to have started by March of this year. The college will be at Bramshill and will work through the National Policing Improvement Agency; it is about training people, giving them the skills that they need, and helping them to develop and move forward. The system adopted by the national college for school leadership has been successful, and we think that the new college will be a successful innovation. It will bring together leadership programmes in the NPIA, and it will be headed by a deputy chief constable, with the board chaired by ACPO from March this year.
The hon. Gentleman raised the issue of helping people to consider moving around the country. I do not want to get into semantics or dance on the head of a pin, because I think that I agree with him. We should not be about directing people, but we should be about ensuring that they are aware of all the opportunities and possible advantages that are available to them. If we are not careful, we may get into semantics. I do not think that people should be able to say, “You have to go here or there,” but an important role for the new, involved SAP could be to make people more aware of available opportunities and advantages. The SAP will not necessarily have the power to direct, but it will be able to advise the Secretary of State on any particular matter that it thinks is relevant. Of course, let us remember—the hon. Member for Chesterfield needs to remember this—that the current process is that we have the assessment and strategic command calls, the police authority advertises, then the senior appointments panel looks at that and determines whether they are the appropriate people for the position they have applied for. Then it goes back to the police authority. The fact is, at the end of the day, it is still the police authority that will actually select who they want for the job. The new, reformed SAP process is simply about trying to ensure that there is a greater number of candidates for the posts on offer.
The purpose of amendment 49 is to make the senior appointments panel wholly appointed by the Secretary of State. The ability of the APA and ACPO to nominate members to the panel reflects the tripartite leadership of policing and the balance to be struck in oversight of the senior leadership pool between the national interest of Government, the interests of senior officers themselves, and the interests of police authorities seeking strong leadership of their force. APA and ACPO membership is a key basis of the non-statutory panel which currently exists. Leadership at all levels of the service is crucial to delivering for the public. There is important work for the new panel to undertake in taking a strategic approach to senior leadership, to help ensure that all senior officer posts have an appropriate range of candidates and to provide clarity to potential candidates about the skills and needs of the service. The centralisation implied by the amendment would not, in my view—and I appreciate that this is a probing amendment—command the confidence of candidates considering progression to the senior ranks or police authorities seeking the best candidates.
The purpose of amendment 50 is to limit the number of representative members on the senior appointments panel to 10, and for the Secretary of State to consult with ACPO and APA before making these appointments. We do not envisage a large panel—it is difficult to say exactly what number—but we do not see a particular need to define an upper limit of representative numbers in legislation, especially as the amendment does not define an upper limit for the independent members. We need more flexibility than that. More importantly, the amendment, when taken together with amendment 49, also in the name of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, would have the effect of centralising the appointments process. Again, I do not think that would command the confidence of candidates considering progression to the senior ranks, or police authorities seeking the best candidates. Nor do I believe that it recognises the proper role of police authorities and chief officers in the appointments system.
With the remarks I made before, but more formally at the end, I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.
The Chairman: I am minded to have a clause stand part debate when we get to the appropriate point, and with that assurance, I wonder whether the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds could indicate briefly whether he wishes to press his amendment.
Mr. Ruffley indicated assent.
The Chairman: The hon. Gentleman has indicated that he wishes to withdraw his amendment.
Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.
Mr. Ruffley: I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 2, page 2, line 22, at end insert
‘which shall be published and laid before Parliament.’.
The Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 52, in clause 2, page 3, line 6, at end insert
‘and Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary shall submit an annual report to the Secretary of State on the operation of the Senior Appointments process in each police force area.’.
5.30 pm
Mr. Ruffley: These two amendments go to the question of how the new arrangements will be inspected and assessed. The whole question of independent inspection is one that the Opposition have been looking at for some time. In the Government’s green paper, they discussed a more independent HMIC, reporting to Parliament in a way it does not do at the moment. The concept of having an MPC-style committee as part of the HMIC regime was floated. All those things go to the heart of independence, and the amendments probe how we will independently assess the operation of this new regime. Will there be more people suited to certain jobs applying for key jobs? Will the object of the new regime be delivered and how will we measure its success?
To answer that question we need to go back to one or two of ACPO’s concerns about the change that is proposed in the clause. In relation to the SAP changes outlined in the Green Paper, ACPO said that there should be a key role for HMIC in many aspects of career development of senior officers, in particular the performance development review process. It also said that
“The continuation of SAP under the chairmanship of HMCIC”
is something that it wants to be continued. The clause deals with an independent chairman under the new regime. However, ACPO and others say that it should continue to be a sworn officer, and that the head of the inspectorate—HMCIC—should chair SAP. Its argument is interesting because it says that
“HMIC should continue to lead on PDR completion utilising their professional judgement borne from practical experience and knowledge of the challenges that are faced everyday by Chief Officers within the police service.”
This goes to the heart of my amendments. In relation to the Green Paper, ACPO said that the suggestion that there would be a conflict of interest for HMIC in a new role is spurious. That is to say that the Government believe—as do I—that if HMIC is involved in the PDR process and appointments, it might look a bit odd perhaps for the inspectorate to be inspecting some of the appointments and PDRs for which it was largely responsible. The Government thought that that might be a conflict of interest, and ACPO said that that was spurious.
To use its own analogy, ACPO wants more of a parallel with GP assessments. It says that in the health service, assessments are always done by clinicians rather than those governing the service. ACPO likes the idea of sworn officers of HMIC doing the inspecting. My amendments would have HMIC inspecting the new regime, but not chairing the panel. My understanding is that Ministers want an independent chair so that the alleged conflict of interests to which I have referred does not arise.
We need to have inspection without fear or favour. The Minister might say that it is implied in the clauses, but these two amendments—particularly amendment 52 —spell out that
“Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary shall submit an annual report to the Secretary of State on the operation of the Senior Appointments process in each police force area.”
In other words, through the amendment, HMIC would not chair the panel, but could go in and inspect what the panel does without fear or favour. That inspection should be published and submitted to the Secretary of State. We also suggest that reports are explicitly laid before Parliament.
The role of HMIC will be strengthened anyway. The non-statutory changes—the HMIC reform that I referred to at the start of my remarks—do not require primary legislation, which is why they are not in the Bill, but I understand that they will take place this year. What might this inspectorate be inspecting force by force? There are a couple of things that it might want to focus on. How is the fixed term appointment regime operating? We have heard from Sir Norman Bettison, and others, that the fixed term appointment regime is not an unalloyed benefit for senior appointments. Clause 3 says that new arrangements have to be made for senior officers who want to terminate their service before the end of a fixed term appointment. There is a lot of debate about the fixed term appointment regime. I proffer no particular view myself; it seems to work quite well.
However, suppose that fixed-term appointments of five years were seen to be a bar to flexible movement. Sir Norman said in his evidence last week that that was true in some cases. To paraphrase, he said that a five-year window might not be appropriate for certain high flyers. The implication was that it might be a bit of a straitjacket. The reports that I propose would tackle such issues, so that there is a clear examination of how the regime is working, perhaps even probing current assumptions. It is certainly my assumption that the fixed-term appointment regime is here to stay, but others in the wider policing community say that that is not so.
There are other things that these reports and inspections will need to lay bare. In its response to the policing Green Paper in October 2008, the APA said:
“The concept of fixed-term contracts should be reviewed in order to better reflect those used in other public service organisations.”
That supports what I have just argued. Once again, let us hear ACPO’s response:
“The Green Paper raises the question of constraints upon the development of sufficient numbers of Chief Officers of good quality. However, the Green Paper fails to acknowledge the impact and influence of Fixed Term Appointments (FTAs) of a maximum of five years. FTAs have increased the turnover of Chief Constables so that there is a constant churn of leadership, which ACPO considers to be detrimental to organisational development and partnership building. FTAs, more than any other factor, put a strain on the pipeline of talent.”
I do not necessarily agree with that. Being an honest kind of fellow, I openly admit that I need to reflect on that more, but there certainly seems to be evidence from ACPO that the FTA is not an unalloyed benefit. Surely, the reports, laid bare for everyone to see, could tackle some of the big structural of issues that are being talked about in terms of getting better talent management, better succession planning and the right high-calibre people in the right jobs at the right time, which is what the new panel is supposed to do.
We disagree with ACPO, which believes that the head of the panel should be HMCIC. We believe that the inspectorate should be more independent, and we would achieve that by having a chair of the panel who is not HMCIC. We would also like a force-by-force report to be produced to assess ruthlessly how succession planning is working, year on year, force by force, not just in relation to the chief and deputy chief constable, but in relation to the other senior ranks, too. On that non-probing basis, I end my remarks on amendments Nos. 51 and 52.
 
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