Paul
Holmes: I have two or three brief observations and
questions. We all know that there are great difficulties in getting
enough people for the post of chief constable. The problem is related
not only to the police; it applies to head teachers’ jobs
throughout the country, too. However, I am not quite clear how
amendments 50 and 49 relate to improving the flow of applicants. The
Association of Police Authorities and Liberty separately raised the
same concern about making the senior appointments panel a statutory
body, rather than non-statutory. I should welcome the Minister’s
comments on why the Government feel the need to make it into a
statutory body and how that would improve its performance, as opposed
to what has happened so far. The Bill states that the panel should
consist of representative members made up of three groups of people:
those
nominated by the Secretary of State, by ACPO and by the APA, although it
does not go into detail about actual numbers and relative balances. I
would also welcome the comments of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds
on
that. Amendments
50 and 49 go down the road of giving more central power to the
Secretary of State by saying that the senior appointments panel would
have 10 representatives. Unlike the Bill, they define the
figure and say that the members would definitely be appointed by the
Secretary of State, rather than a mixture of
sources.
Mr.
Ruffley: If it assists the Committee and the hon.
Gentleman, I want to explain that the amendments are probing in nature.
The purpose of the amendment concerned with 10 persons is to tease out
the cost and manpower implications. I was at pains to explain that the
purpose of amendment 49 was to tease out the statutory basis of the
membership.
Paul
Holmes: I accept that, as probing amendments, they will
not be put to the vote, but I remain alarmed by provisions that would
give more direct power to the Secretary of State, and alarmed that she
would have the sole power to appoint the representatives—10
persons, under the amendment—to the senior appointments panel.
It is a movement of power in the opposite direction from the one for
which we have been arguing: we should be devolving and decentralising
power, and creating more independence within the police force and
police authorities. Under the amendment, the power would be
centralising and that would be in the wrong
direction. How
does the Minister regard the number of representatives from the three
different bodies mentioned in the Bill? How would that turn out in
numbers, and what would be the balance between the three groups? What
is the Government’s reasoning for saying that we need to move
the senior appointments panel on to a statutory basis, as opposed to
the current, non-statutory
basis?
Mr.
Coaker: I start by thanking the hon. Member for Bury St.
Edmunds for his general welcome and support for the clause. It is
important to clarify that point. I am not sure whether the hon. Member
for Chesterfield took the same approach, but I shall respond to a
couple of the points that he made. The reform is important.
Mr. Bayley, is it all right if I curtail my remarks a
little? We are having a clause stand part debate later, so I shall keep
some of what I want to say generally until that debate, while answering
some of the questions asked by the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds.
Would that be appropriate and helpful? I shall make a few remarks
before turning to amendments 50 and 49 and the next set of amendments
before the clause stand part
debate.
The
Chairman: We could have a separate debate on such
matters.
Mr.
Coaker: Absolutely. I welcome the support of the hon.
Member for Bury St. Edmunds. I am a big supporter of the Association of
Chief Police Officers. I appreciate his point, so I preface my remarks
by saying that I am not arguing that he is not a big supporter of ACPO.
No
doubt people will say that it is a body limited by guarantee and that
that makes a big difference. Since I have been in my post, it has acted
in the most professional way; again, I know that the hon. Gentleman
agrees. ACPO has given advice and told us its thoughts on policy. It
has challenged the Government. It has said what it thinks, and we have
asked it for help. At times, it has been difficult—in the proper
sense of the word—because it thinks that we are perhaps not
going in the right direction. It will do exactly the same if the
Government change at the next election. If there is a Liberal Democrat
Government or whatever kind of Government, it will do exactly the same.
It recognises that its role is to reflect the interests, as it sees
them, of ACPO and policing in general, but it also recognises, quite
properly, that irrespective of which party is in power, it is for
Governments to govern and Governments will make decisions about what
they believe is the appropriate policy to
pursue. 5.15
pm Sir
Ken Jones, as ACPO president, has done an excellent job, as have the
other ACPO officers who advise me on a range of issues, as well as the
general body known as ACPO. It works exceedingly well. What also works
well is the tripartite governance of policing, which is part of the
debate that we started to have before. I am referring to the balance
between the Home Office, ACPO and the APA. That tripartite policing
governance structure, despite its difficulties and the criticisms that
people make of it, works pretty well. We have tried to reflect
that—I will come on to this in more detail—in the
structure of the clause relating to the reformed senior appointments
panel. Those elements are an important part of the existing SAP, which
is on a voluntary basis, and the new enhanced statutory set-up for the
SAP should reflect that as well. Some of the detail will have to be set
out in various arrangements. Hon. Members can read the Bill as well as
I can. It sets out that we will do just
that. May
I update the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds? I am told that the
estimate for the cost is now £500,000. We will keep that under
review. He is absolutely right. Sometimes, we spend two or three hours
on clause 1, which is a very important debate. This clause is extremely
important. If we get it right, no one will disagree when they read the
functions, and we shall discuss
that. To
answer the hon. Member for Chesterfield, the reason why we have put the
SAP on a statutory basis is to try to ensure that we put down exactly
what we want it to do and that we help it to be more effective at
delivering the things that we all want. We all talk about the need for
a greater pool of candidates. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds was
right to point out that, notwithstanding the ability of some people who
have been appointed to the position of chief constable in this
country—Sara Thornton, whom he cited as an example, is an
excellent chief constable—we want more people to come forward.
We hope that a strengthened SAP is one way in which we can achieve
that.
Mr.
Ruffley: The Minister was kind enough to say that my
question about the cost was pertinent and he helpfully said
that the cost estimate had been reviewed downwards from
£800 million to £500 million. [Interruption.]
Perhaps he could repeat the figures.
Mr.
Coaker: The estimate has gone from £800,000 to
£500,000, not £800 million to £500
million.
Mr.
Ruffley: I am most grateful to the Minister. On what basis
has the figure gone from £800,000 to £500,000? It seems
to be a very recent renewal of the figure since the impact assessment
was
published.
Mr.
Coaker: That has been done on the basis of an up-to-date
assessment of what we think will be appropriate, but I will keep that
figure under review and to ensure that it is appropriate in terms of
ensuring that the SAP has the resources to deal with the important
functions that we are setting out for it. I should like to reassure
anyone reading our proceedings that the Home Office will absorb those
costs. I want to be clear about that. We will keep the matter under
review.
Let me
respond to the hon. Member for Chesterfield’s points. We all
agree that these matters are important, and we are trying to ensure
that we will have a strengthened, improved and more independent SAP,
instead of it simply being a sift for senior appointments. We want it
to be a more dynamic organisation that can help to drive forward change
and other things that we want. That will help to make a
difference.
Paul
Holmes: The Minister might be coming to this point, but
let me ask him about the more independent, dynamic panel that he has
mentioned. I have asked exactly what proportion of the representatives
it is envisaged will be drawn from the three groupings that are listed.
The APA has
said: “The
Home Secretary appointees on the panel should not be capable of
outnumbering police community appointees. To have credibility it needs
to be seen to be a genuine tripartite
body.” How
many will come from each of the three
legs?
Mr.
Coaker: We want a proper balance among the various people
who are nominated to the panel.
A significant
and important change that has generated debate is the independence of
the panel’s chair. The hon. Gentleman alluded to that. One
reason why we have asked Ronnie Flanagan to be the interim chair, as we
move from the current system to the system that we want, which is
subject to the passage of this Bill, is to assuage concerns about the
current system.
The hon.
Gentleman asked about functions, which are laid out in the Bill. We can
debate which are the most important, but he will know that I have been
particularly interested in trying to increase the pool of
candidates—he rightly raised that issue—as well as the
number from different ethnic backgrounds. We are trying to deal with
that, and it will be an important part of the work that the panel tries
to do. The police service is working hard to change that, and the SAP
might look at that work to see what advice it could give to move that
issue forward. The hon. Gentleman will note that the Bill contains an
important power, under proposed new section 53D, to confer additional
functions should that be necessary.
The hon.
Member for Bury St. Edmunds asked about the national college of police
leadership. We expect it to have started by March of this year. The
college will be at Bramshill and will work through the National
Policing Improvement Agency; it is about training people, giving
them the skills that they need, and helping them to develop and move
forward. The system adopted by the national college for school
leadership has been successful, and we think that the new college will
be a successful innovation. It will bring together leadership
programmes in the NPIA, and it will be headed by a deputy chief
constable, with the board chaired by ACPO from March this
year. The hon.
Gentleman raised the issue of helping people to consider moving around
the country. I do not want to get into semantics or dance on the head
of a pin, because I think that I agree with him. We should not be about
directing people, but we should be about ensuring that they are aware
of all the opportunities and possible advantages that are available to
them. If we are not careful, we may get into semantics. I do not think
that people should be able to say, “You have to go here or
there,” but an important role for the new, involved SAP could be
to make people more aware of available opportunities and advantages.
The SAP will not necessarily have the power to direct, but it will be
able to advise the Secretary of State on any particular matter that it
thinks is relevant. Of course, let us remember—the hon. Member
for Chesterfield needs to remember this—that the current process
is that we have the assessment and strategic command calls, the police
authority advertises, then the senior appointments panel looks at that
and determines whether they are the appropriate people for the position
they have applied for. Then it goes back to the police authority. The
fact is, at the end of the day, it is still the police authority that
will actually select who they want for the job. The new, reformed SAP
process is simply about trying to ensure that there is a greater number
of candidates for the posts on offer.
The purpose
of amendment 49 is to make the senior appointments panel wholly
appointed by the Secretary of State. The ability of the APA and ACPO to
nominate members to the panel reflects the tripartite leadership of
policing and the balance to be struck in oversight of the senior
leadership pool between the national interest of Government, the
interests of senior officers themselves, and the interests of police
authorities seeking strong leadership of their force. APA and ACPO
membership is a key basis of the non-statutory panel which currently
exists. Leadership at all levels of the service is crucial to
delivering for the public. There is important work for the new panel to
undertake in taking a strategic approach to senior leadership, to help
ensure that all senior officer posts have an appropriate range of
candidates and to provide clarity to potential candidates about the
skills and needs of the service. The centralisation implied by the
amendment would not, in my view—and I appreciate that this is a
probing amendment—command the confidence of candidates
considering progression to the senior ranks or police authorities
seeking the best
candidates. The
purpose of amendment 50 is to limit the number of representative
members on the senior appointments panel to 10, and for the Secretary
of State to consult with ACPO and APA before making these appointments.
We do not envisage a large panel—it is difficult to say exactly
what number—but we do not see a particular need to define an
upper limit of representative numbers in legislation, especially as the
amendment does not define an upper limit for the independent members.
We need more flexibility than that. More importantly, the amendment,
when taken together with amendment 49,
also in the name of the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, would have the
effect of centralising the appointments process. Again, I do not think
that would command the confidence of candidates considering progression
to the senior ranks, or police authorities seeking the best candidates.
Nor do I believe that it recognises the proper role of police
authorities and chief officers in the appointments
system. With
the remarks I made before, but more formally at the end, I ask the hon.
Gentleman to withdraw his
amendment.
The
Chairman: I am minded to have a clause stand part debate
when we get to the appropriate point, and with that assurance, I wonder
whether the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds could indicate briefly
whether he wishes to press his amendment.
Mr.
Ruffley indicated
assent.
The
Chairman: The hon. Gentleman has indicated that he wishes
to withdraw his
amendment. Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn. Mr.
Ruffley: I beg to move amendment 51, in clause 2,
page 2, line 22, at end insert
‘which shall be published and laid before
Parliament.’.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss
amendment 52, in
clause 2, page 3, line 6, at
end insert ‘and Her Majesty’s
Inspectors of Constabulary shall submit an annual report to the
Secretary of State on the operation of the Senior Appointments process
in each police force
area.’. 5.30
pm
Mr.
Ruffley: These two amendments go to the question of how
the new arrangements will be inspected and assessed. The whole question
of independent inspection is one that the Opposition have been looking
at for some time. In the Government’s green paper, they
discussed a more independent HMIC, reporting to Parliament in a way it
does not do at the moment. The concept of having an MPC-style committee
as part of the HMIC regime was floated. All those things go to the
heart of independence, and the amendments probe how we will
independently assess the operation of this new regime. Will there be
more people suited to certain jobs applying for key jobs? Will the
object of the new regime be delivered and how will we measure its
success? To
answer that question we need to go back to one or two of ACPO’s
concerns about the change that is proposed in the clause. In relation
to the SAP changes outlined in the Green Paper, ACPO said that there
should be a key role for HMIC in many aspects of career development of
senior officers, in particular the performance development review
process. It also said
that “The
continuation of SAP under the chairmanship of
HMCIC” is
something that it wants to be continued. The clause deals with an
independent chairman under the new regime. However, ACPO and others say
that it should continue to be a sworn officer, and that the head of the
inspectorate—HMCIC—should chair SAP. Its argument is
interesting because it says that
“HMIC
should continue to lead on PDR completion utilising their professional
judgement borne from practical experience and knowledge of the
challenges that are faced everyday by Chief Officers within the police
service.” This
goes to the heart of my amendments. In relation to the Green Paper,
ACPO said that the suggestion that there would be a conflict of
interest for HMIC in a new role is spurious. That is to say that the
Government believe—as do I—that if HMIC is involved in
the PDR process and appointments, it might look a bit odd perhaps for
the inspectorate to be inspecting some of the appointments and PDRs for
which it was largely responsible. The Government thought that that
might be a conflict of interest, and ACPO said that that was
spurious. To
use its own analogy, ACPO wants more of a parallel with GP assessments.
It says that in the health service, assessments are always done by
clinicians rather than those governing the service. ACPO likes the idea
of sworn officers of HMIC doing the inspecting. My amendments would
have HMIC inspecting the new regime, but not chairing the panel. My
understanding is that Ministers want an independent chair so that the
alleged conflict of interests to which I have referred does not
arise. We
need to have inspection without fear or favour. The Minister might say
that it is implied in the clauses, but these two
amendments—particularly amendment
52 —spell out that
“Her
Majesty’s Inspectors of Constabulary shall submit an annual
report to the Secretary of State on the operation of the Senior
Appointments process in each police force
area.” In
other words, through the amendment, HMIC would not chair the panel, but
could go in and inspect what the panel does without fear or favour.
That inspection should be published and submitted to the Secretary of
State. We also suggest that reports are explicitly laid before
Parliament.
The role of
HMIC will be strengthened anyway. The non-statutory changes—the
HMIC reform that I referred to at the start of my remarks—do not
require primary legislation, which is why they are not in the Bill, but
I understand that they will take place this year. What might this
inspectorate be inspecting force by force? There are a couple of things
that it might want to focus on. How is the fixed term appointment
regime operating? We have heard from Sir Norman Bettison, and others,
that the fixed term appointment regime is not an unalloyed benefit for
senior appointments. Clause 3 says that new arrangements have to be
made for senior officers who want to terminate their service before the
end of a fixed term appointment. There is a lot of debate about the
fixed term appointment regime. I proffer no particular view myself; it
seems to work quite
well.
However,
suppose that fixed-term appointments of five years were seen to be a
bar to flexible movement. Sir Norman said in his evidence last week
that that was true in some cases. To paraphrase, he said that a
five-year window might not be appropriate for certain high flyers. The
implication was that it might be a bit of a straitjacket. The reports
that I propose would tackle such issues, so that there is a clear
examination of how the regime is working, perhaps even probing current
assumptions. It is certainly my assumption that the fixed-term
appointment regime is here to stay, but others in the wider policing
community say that that is not so.
There are
other things that these reports and inspections will need to lay bare.
In its response to the policing Green Paper in October 2008, the APA
said:
“The
concept of fixed-term contracts should be reviewed in order to better
reflect those used in other public service
organisations.” That
supports what I have just argued. Once again, let us hear ACPO’s
response: “The
Green Paper raises the question of constraints upon the development of
sufficient numbers of Chief Officers of good quality. However, the
Green Paper fails to acknowledge the impact and influence of Fixed Term
Appointments (FTAs) of a maximum of five years. FTAs have increased the
turnover of Chief Constables so that there is a constant churn of
leadership, which ACPO considers to be detrimental to organisational
development and partnership building. FTAs, more than any other factor,
put a strain on the pipeline of
talent.” I
do not necessarily agree with that. Being an honest kind of fellow, I
openly admit that I need to reflect on that more, but there certainly
seems to be evidence from ACPO that the FTA is not an unalloyed
benefit. Surely, the reports, laid bare for everyone to see, could
tackle some of the big structural of issues that are being talked about
in terms of getting better talent management, better succession
planning and the right high-calibre people in the right jobs at the
right time, which is what the new panel is supposed to do.
We disagree
with ACPO, which believes that the head of the panel should be HMCIC.
We believe that the inspectorate should be more independent, and we
would achieve that by having a chair of the panel who is not HMCIC. We
would also like a force-by-force report to be produced to assess
ruthlessly how succession planning is working, year on year, force by
force, not just in relation to the chief and deputy chief constable,
but in relation to the other senior ranks, too. On that non-probing
basis, I end my remarks on amendments Nos. 51 and
52.
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