Mr.
Coaker: No. That is not the reason for this clause, as far
as I am aware—I make that caveat. I have seen no evidence that
more breaks are occurring before the five years of a fixed term
contract are up. It is funny: when I looked at clause 3, I thought,
“I know what the hon. Gentleman will ask: why are you saying
this when you have clause 3?”
Mr.
Ruffley: You were one step ahead of
me.
Mr.
Coaker: I only just thought of it, but the hon. Gentleman
probably thought of it earlier, which is why he asked the
question. In
all seriousness, there is no ulterior motive for the clause. It does
not seek to fix any problem. Given the focus on performance, the
enhanced role of police authorities and the operation of PDRs for chief
constables, which is being looked at by Her Majesty’s
inspectorate of constabulary, it seems appropriate to include in the
Bill the possibility of building in flexibility. Were more terminations
to occur—I do not expect or desire that to happen—the
clause would provide the flexibility for police authorities to act
appropriately and properly with respect to chief officers. It will give
them the opportunity to pay the appropriate compensation to chief
officers, should they choose to leave or should it be agreed that they
leave before the end of their fixed term contract. I hope that those
remarks satisfy the hon.
Gentleman.
Mr.
Ruffley: I am struggling to understand why there are not
arrangements under existing statute or common law in respect of a
senior officer who wishes to terminate his service before the expiry of
the fixed term. I do not know how the system operated before the Bill
was drafted. What problem is the clause seeking to deal with? Did
provisions under statute or certain cases cause difficulty so that such
a clause was required? I am genuinely puzzled about whether such
matters were catered for prior to the
Bill.
Mr.
Coaker: Again, the answer is no. The hon. Gentleman might
be surprised to know that such matters were not dealt with under
statute but, given some of the proposed changes in the performance
framework, the Bill has
provided the opportunity to include a provision so that there is
legislative ability to deal with matters should it be necessary in
future. First, there was not a statutory ability to take such action.
Secondly, a problem has not arisen but if a problem arose in the
future, we will have the ability to deal with it if we wish to do
so. Question
put and agreed
to. Clause
3 ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
4Metropolitan
police force
appointments
Paul
Holmes: I beg to move amendment 59, in
clause 4, page 4, leave out line
22.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 60, in clause 4, page 4, leave out line
31. Amendment
61, in clause 4, page 4, leave out line
40. New
clause 3—Appointment of chief constables and assistant chief
constables ‘(1) The Police Act
1996 is amended as follows. (2)
In section 11(1) (appointment and removal of chief constables) leave
out “but subject to the approval of the Secretary of
State”. (3) In section
11(2) leave out “acting with the approval of the Secretary of
State”. (4) In section
11(3), leave out “ Before seeking the approval of the Secretary
of State under subsection
(2),”. (5) In section
12(2) (assistant chief constables) leave out “and subject to the
approval of the Secretary of
State”. (6) In section
12(5) leave out “ Secretary of State” and insert
“relevant police
authority”. (7) For
section 2 (removal of chief constables etc)
substitute— “(1)
A police authority may exercise its power under section 11 to call upon
the chief constable to retire in the interests of efficiency or
effectiveness. (2) Before
requiring the exercise or the similar power exercisable with respect to
an assistant chief constable, the police authority shall give the chief
constable or assistant chief constable an opportunity to make
representations to him and shall consider any representations so
made.”’.
Paul
Holmes: With a mind to what Sir Nicholas said at this
morning’s sitting about the fact that we had had an extensive
debate and that we wanted to make some progress on the Bill, and with a
view to the fact that in most Committees of which I have been a member
in the past eight years, all too often, we only get through the first
two thirds of the Bill and do not reach the important parts, I shall be
brief about the amendments and new clause 3. We went through all the
arguments that lie behind those provisions this morning and there is no
point in repeating them in detail two or three hours later given that
anyone can read the record of our
proceedings. In
a nutshell, amendments 59, 60 and 61 would remove the power for the
Secretary of State to oversee and have the final say over approval of
the appointment of assistant commissioners of the Metropolitan police.
New clause 3 would do the same, in effect, in respect of the Secretary
of State’s power to have the final say about the appointment of
chief constables and assistant
chief constables the length and breadth of England and Wales. Our
argument is the same as it was in respect of new clauses 2 and 4, which
is that that there should be a major devolution of power away from the
centre—from London and central Government—to local
authorities and local communities. It is hard therefore to understand
why there should be a need for the Secretary of State to exercise power
over the appointment of the most senior police officers, whether in
Derbyshire, Northumberland, Wales or London. All the arguments about
decentralising power that were made this morning apply to the
amendments under
discussion. I
am sure that the Minister will explain in a minute why he disagrees
with my argument. I shall not press the amendment to a Division because
we know that the Labour party and the Conservative party would oppose
it, albeit for different reasons. Before the Minister explains why I am
completely wrong, which we can take as read from this morning’s
debate, will he pick up on a couple of points about the existing powers
of the Secretary of State with regard to senior police officers and
chief constables? We recently had a debate about the position in London
with the Metropolitan police. There is a slightly strange situation, as
both the Secretary of State and the Mayor of London are supposed to
make the decisions about the final appointment of the Metropolitan
Police Commissioner and the dismissal of the person in that post. We
had a two-way debate and hoo-hah about exactly who should be pulling
the plug on Sir Ian Blair, for example. The Mayor took the initiative
on
that. What
exactly does the Minister see as the role of the Secretary of State in
deciding who should be the most senior police officer in London? I
accept that that is complicated by the fact that, unusually, all chief
constables in London are automatically heads of the Government’s
anti-terrorist strategy for the whole nation. With regard to chief
constables throughout England and Wales in general, in the other 42
police authority areas, will the Minister explain why the Secretary of
State needs that power? Why does a central Government Minister need to
decide, yes or no, whether someone should be the chief
constable? There
is also the power to dismiss chief constables. I believe that that was
last used in Derbyshire in 1990, nearly 20 years ago. The power is not
widely used at all, and I am not sure when it was last used before
1990. I would be interested to know why the Government believe that the
Secretary of State should be the person to exercise that power, rather
than the local police authority which, by whatever process—its
members are elected or appointed at the moment—represents its
local community and does the interviews for that senior post, yet can
then be gainsaid and overruled by the Secretary of State from
London.
Mr.
Ruffley: Why in the amendment and in the clause do Liberal
Democrat Members and the Minister not see fit to refer to the Mayor of
London in relation to the appointments? This relates particularly to
the appointments below that of Metropolitan Police Commissioner. I
mention it only for highly topical reasons, which I am sure the
Minister will want to reflect on in his
remarks. Constitutionally,
the appointment of a new Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis is,
under British law as it is currently extant, a matter solely for the
Home Secretary—in this case, the right hon. Member
for Redditch (Jacqui Smith). Of course, that was the case until the
current Mayor of London cleverly and brilliantly in many ways kicked
the door down and got a seat at the table at which the Home Secretary
interviewed candidates for the post of Metropolitan Police
Commissioner. Even though he had no constitutional basis for being
involved, he was involved by the Home Secretary. I think that she was
right to do that. Almost in defiance of what statute says, she
indicated that as a pragmatic move it would be unhelpful if any
Metropolitan Police Commissioner whom she appointed did not get on with
the Mayor of London, so what we have is an extremely interesting
constitutional grey area. The facts are manifest. It is clearly the
case that there has been some derogation of the power of the Home
Secretary solely to appoint the Metropolitan Police Commissioner; and
if there is an interesting grey area in relation to that post, the
Metropolitan police force appointments that are the subject of clause 4
might equally well be at
issue. Has
the Minister given any thought to putting the matter on a proper
statutory footing so that there is devastating clarity on the issue of
Metropolitan police force appointments? I am referring to the
appointments below Metropolitan Police Commissioner under
clause 4, but equally, for the avoidance of doubt, will the
Minister say what the position is now, so far as this Home Secretary is
concerned, when it comes to making an appointment to the position of
Metropolitan Police Commissioner? In the light of those topical events,
it would be useful to hear the Minister’s views on the way in
which what happened in that case impacts on the other, more junior
appointments that are the subject of the
clause.
Mr.
Coaker: The hon. Gentleman makes an interesting point. I
point out to him that Boris Johnson would not be Mayor were it not for
the Government’s reforms, which included making him chair of the
Metropolitan Police
Authority.
The
Chairman: Order. I am drawing a line under the discussion
of the role of the Mayor of London. I ask hon. Members to return to the
amendments.
Mr.
Coaker: The point that I was trying to make,
tongue-in-cheek, was that, of course, the Metropolitan Police Authority
is responsible for the Metropolitan police. Furthermore, on the issue
of Metropolitan police appointments, I would have thought that the hon.
Gentleman welcomed the fact that we have ensured in legislation that
the Mayor of London, whoever they are, chairs the Metropolitan Police
Authority.
6.15
pm
At the nub of
the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Chesterfield is the fact
that they would remove any provision to consult the Secretary of State.
They are good amendments in the sense that they would, for the first
time, give the Metropolitan Police Commissioner a role in the
appointment of some ranks in which he—or she, sometime
in the future, I hope—has not been involved before. With due
respect to the hon. Gentleman, his amendment misses this point: the
three ranks of the Metropolitan Police Service—
commander, deputy assistant commissioner and assistant
commissioner—to which the amendment refers, are equivalent to
chief constable, deputy chief constable and so on. The hon. Gentleman
does not need me to go through all that—they are ACPO-ranked
officers. The Met is
important, because it comprises one quarter of the police service, but
many Met officers, and other senior police officers in the rest of the
country, hold responsibilities not only in the Metropolitan Police
Service, important as that is, or in their own force, but in ACPO for a
number of different things. For example, they have responsibilities for
knife crime and gangs, and national responsibilities for a range of
different things. That point also relates to the national
responsibilities of the commissioner and the deputy commissioner. I
have said this to the hon. Gentleman before, and I do not mean it
pejoratively or nastily, but if he, or the hon. Members for Hornchurch
and for Bury St. Edmunds, were in power and people were appointed to
positions that were not only important to the individual force but had
national implications, they would want to ensure that they had some
role in the appointment.
Paul
Holmes: I have still not heard an explanation why the
Government feel they have to micro-manage the appointment of senior
police officers, whether they are senior officers in the Metropolitan
police, or assistant chief constables and chief constables throughout
the country, as in new clause 3. If professional people are to go for
the posts, having come up through the grooming process of the senior
appointments panel, and they are to be interviewed and appointed by the
relevant police authorities, whether in London or elsewhere, why do the
Government feel that they must micro-manage and second-guess the
process, saying, “No, you’ve made a bad appointment.
We’re not going to accept that person”? It may, or may
not, have happened with Sir Ian Blair recently, with the Mayor moving
in on that appointment, but the last time that it had happened in the
country was 1990 in Derbyshire. Why do the Government feel that they
must micro-manage these individual personnel
appointments?
Mr.
Coaker: In the vast majority—in fact, in almost
all—cases, there is no micro-management, because the
recommendations of the police authority, or whoever it is, are
approved. However, as I have said, the hon. Gentleman’s
amendments would remove any role for the Secretary of State, and many
of these people play important national strategic roles in serious and
organised crime, counter-terrorism and such things. The issue is not
about micro-management, but about ensuring that the Secretary of State
has a reserve power for the employment of those people. It is not about
their appointment to an individual police force. Given the seniority of
the role, it is about reflecting on the contribution that they would
make to the national policing agenda. That is a point of difference
between us. It is certainly not about trying to ensure that we are
involved in every single appointment of a senior police officer in this
country; it is about trying to ensure that we have the opportunity to
be involved where necessary.
In certain
circumstances, it may be necessary for the Home Secretary to take
action directly to secure the removal of a chief officer under section
42 of the Police Act 1996. The hon. Gentleman made that point, and I
want to put this on record: there are cases where efficiency and
effectiveness questions are so severe that the Home Secretary needs the
power to act in the public interest, notwithstanding the actions of the
police authority. Examples of cases where that could have been required
include the need to restore confidence in Humberside police after the
Soham murders and in Sussex police after the shooting of James
Ashley. Although the
amendment would not necessarily affect the power in section 42, it is
clear for the reasons that I have given that the Secretary of State has
a role in relation to the removal of chief officers. That role should
be retained. With those comments, I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw
his amendments.
| 
