The
Chairman: Before the hon. Gentleman replies, let me say
that although the hon. Lady was quite right to say that the clause is
not about funding, she was quite correct to intervene because her
county was mentioned. I trust that if the hon. Gentleman responds, he
will be
brief.
Mr.
Ruffley: I will be brief. I bow to the hon. Lady’s
greater knowledge of Northamptonshire, but she should understand that
my facts come from the police authorities. They have written to me, and
I merely cite what they say [Interruption.] I will
not take a further intervention. I hear what the hon. Lady says but she
should speak to the collaboration board in her region if she
has— [Interruption.] She is talking from a
sedentary position. In good faith, I did not seek to make a party
political point—quite the reverse. I was saying to the Minister
that this does not permit a party political argument. I was repeating a
briefing from the collaboration board and if the hon. Lady does not
like that, I suggest that she write to the board, and look at
Hansard to see what I have said.
[Interruption.] She continues to chunter away from
a sedentary position, which is desperately unhelpful in what has, until
now, been a mature debate. If she has a problem, she should write to
the collaboration
board. I
come now to the second example, which is the collaboration between Kent
and Essex. This is something that is seen to be radical and innovative
in the policing community, I have spoken to Ministers about it, and a
lot of people are looking at
it. Mr.
Simon Burns (West Chelmsford) (Con)
rose—
Mr.
Ruffley: I am happy to give way to the hon. Gentleman, who
represents the fair town of
Chelmsford.
Mr.
Burns: It is in the county of Essex, which my hon. Friend
mentioned. I wish to reinforce what he has said. The work done between
Essex and Kent is extremely innovative. It is going extremely well and
is an example that others should study and contemplate
following.
Mr.
Ruffley: My hon. Friend is entirely right. I have had
occasion to visit his constituency; I have been to his road at least
twice. From my discussions with him, I know that he keeps a weather eye
on the policing in a town that he not only represents, but lives in. He
is very much part of his community. He is right to point out that the
chief constable of Essex, Roger Baker, is a proselytiser of great
ability, who speaks to Members of all parties about how more
efficiencies can be squeezed out of existing police budgets. That is
very much what collaboration, if done well, is
about. As
chief constable, Roger Baker has a policy of, among other things,
ensuring that his officers attend all crimes. That objective is being
delivered on. He also has a policy in the Essex police authority, which
is integral to what he is doing, of opening police stations for
longer. That is not explicitly part of the collaboration agreement, but
the delivery of those two objectives—longer opening hours for
police stations and more police stations open; and more officers
attending crimes—is possible only if there is an increase in
officers on the front line. He and the police authority explain that it
is only because of collaboration that they get more officers back on to
the front line. Resources are freed up from the back office and other
parts of the organisation and can then be redeployed for front-line
activities, to deliver those
objectives. 9.30
am In
the Essex experience, collaboration is a means by which more officers
can be returned to the front line. Collaboration is not some dry, dusty
and dull subject—if done right, it can deliver what we all want.
Whatever one’s political persuasion, however perverse and
muddle-headed a politician might be, who on earth could conceivably
object to more front-line policing, because that is clearly what the
British public want? The man and woman on the street want to see more
visible policing. They want attendance at crimes, if they are
unfortunate enough to be a victim of crime. They want to see a police
officer—they do not necessarily want just have a chat on the
phone with someone when they ring 999, but to see an officer as a
result. The
specifics of the collaboration agreement with Kent constabulary are as
follows. I have had the benefit of discussing what that means in
practice with the excellent chairman of the Essex police authority, as
well Chief Constable Baker, on more than a couple of occasions. In
April 2007, Essex and Kent police authorities and forces agreed to
collaborate in what they described, rightly, as a ground-breaking
initiative to enhance the service to the communities in both their
counties. In order to oversee and manage the collaboration, the two
police authorities established a statutory joint committee and
delegated most of their functions to it to facilitate expeditious and
effective decision making. In any collaboration agreement, decision
making is always at issue. If there are lots of individuals and more
than one force—by definition, a collaboration cannot take place
in one force, but needs two, or five, as in my earlier example from the
east midlands—one can imagine that there will be tensions or
differences of emphasis about how decisions should be made, such as
about serious organised crime, across forces. Each force would have its
particular interests and its own patch to defend, which is
understandable. However, in collaboration agreements, by definition,
there has to be a bit of give and take. When decisions are taken, they
have to be taken effectively. There has to be give and take because, at
the end of the day, only one decision can be taken, so delegation is an
important part of the
process. In
the Kent and Essex collaboration, the purpose of the strategic mandate
for the collaboration programme
is “to
engage in full collaboration on Operational Functions and Support
Services, whilst maintaining operational
independence”. Since
January 2008, 14 reviews across those areas have been completed,
identifying £2.7 million of savings, of which £1.8
million are recurring capital savings. The two forces have agreed to
create a single procurement department, using a collaborative shared
service agreement—the first such venture in UK policing on
that particular scale, I am informed. What do we mean by
“services” and “procurement”? I am advised
that those words can relate to training, human resources and personnel
development, administration, finance, major crime, firearms—a
large number of operational
activities. The
Audit Commission carried out a governance review of the Kent-Essex
collaboration. The findings were extremely
positive: “Essex
and Kent Police Authorities have established a vibrant and effective
collaboration partnership which is providing considerable financial and
performance benefits to both forces. Leadership and governance is
strong, and programme management
robust.” I
shall not detain the Committee with details of the other drives for
efficiency that Essex constabulary and police authority have
established, because the savings that they want to achieve over a
three-year period far exceed the figures that I quoted, which were
specific to the collaborations in hand. A wider programme in Essex is
delivering bigger savings, but as I wish to remain in order I will
confine my remarks to
collaboration. The
two examples that I gave of collaboration are not the only ones, but
they give the Committee a flavour of what is possible. Not all police
authorities and areas are as proactive those two, so why is the
Minister introducing the clause and why are Her Majesty’s
Opposition supporting it? Sir Ronnie Flanagan discussed the need for
new powers last year in his admirable review of policing. In
recommendation 11, he
said: “The
Home Office should include in its forthcoming Green Paper
consultation”— that
refers to the consultation last
summer— “on
the establishment of a service-wide consistency of the implementation
of standard systems and processes. The Green Paper should also
specifically consult on the issue of whether the Home Office should
mandate regional collaboration on issues such as procuring IT systems,
air support, fleet, uniform
etc.” The
necessary levers and incentives to drive forward collaboration are
important and the Government rightly said that they wanted a clearer
legal framework that would underpin joint working and collaboration in
future. In response to Sir Ronnie’s proposal, they sensibly said
that they would bring forward legislation to deliver a new improved
framework. In the Green Paper, the Government
said: “We
will also continue to seek opportunities to reward and recognise
collaboration.” I
particularly want to ask the Minister about that, so my first question
in this clause stand part debate is will he give us a sense of what the
rewards are? In my common-sense reading, that does not refer simply to
the new legislative framework in the clause, but implies that they will
reward and recognise collaboration. Is it a financial incentive? What
kind of recognition are we talking about? It is important, because the
police service says, “This collaboration is all very well,
Mr. Ruffley, and we know that you support the Government in
driving forward collaboration, but there are lots of problems with
it”. I am sure that that point has been put to the Minister by
members of the police
service. I
shall not detain the Committee with a debate about precept
equalisation, which reared its ugly head in the strategic merger
debate. Among the many reasons for the forced strategic mergers failing
is that, in many cases, police authorities with different precept
levels could not agree about how precept equalisation should work if a
constabulary was abolished and merged into a
bigger strategic force. I am not making a party political
point—it is a technical issue that does not permit an easy or
simple solution. In that context, police authority members and members
of the police service ask whether it is worth their while to join
collaboration agreements when the business case might not be
good. Responses
to the Green Paper from outside bodies were interesting. ACPO said that
collaboration agreements should be determined by chief constables and
police authorities with minimum input from Home Office Ministers. It
suggested that mandated collaboration from the Home Secretary, which is
permitted by the clause, should come about only after the trigger of
serious inadequacies in level 2 provision are highlighted by an
inspection by Her Majesty’s inspectorate of
constabulary. When
the Minister and the Home Secretary consider whether to exercise the
power of mandation, must they have regard to an inspection report from
Her Majesty’s inspectorate of constabulary or could they take
the decision to mandate without that evidence? What evidence will Home
Office Ministers turn to, if any, when deciding whether to mandate a
collaboration agreement and set of arrangements in any part of the
country? To ram this point home, we must tease out the basis on which
mandation might occur. What are the parameters within which Ministers
will exercise their powers under the
clause? The
ACPO response to the Green Paper, published in 2008,
states: “Chief
Constables and Police Authorities should be the determinant figures in
the first instance for collaboration opportunities. The assessment of
potential for further regional collaboration should rightly remain as
part of the remit of HMIC, who have a clear role to challenge
inadequate or disproportionate approaches based upon local challenges
and circumstances. This view will need to be taken across regions not
just police forces. It must be risk based and not
formulaic.” The
Minister must answer that point from ACPO. I, too, say that it must not
be formulaic. The response
continues: “For
these reasons ACPO feels the use of powers available to the Home
Secretary should be the exception and only implemented where HMIC
identify clear gaps that are not being
addressed.” It
is not just ACPO that wants the terms of the power in the clause to be
teased out. The APA would prefer what could be described colloquially
as a carrot approach:
“If
partners are reluctant to collaborate this will usually be for good
reason and may not be identifiable through a quantitative analysis, for
example where organisational cultures were deemed to be incompatible.
The preferred approach should remain to encourage voluntary
collaboration through putting in place a package of levers and
incentives”. I
do not agree with the position that voluntary collaboration should be
tried again. It has been in force since the collapse of the strategic
merger project. We need the power to mandate because, in the view of
Ministers and shadow Ministers, voluntary collaboration has not been
proceeded with rapidly enough.
9.45
am I
conclude my remarks—[Interruption.] If the hon.
Member for Stourbridge wants to contribute to the debate or intervene,
I am happy for her to do so rather than have her muttering from a
sedentary position.
When I asked
about collaboration in the evidence session last week, Sir Norman
Bettison pointed out that the first problem is that the current 43
forces have differential and variable costs, so collaborating on an
issue is rarely a fair and equitable discussion. He said that the
second problem is the variability in the vision of priorities. In other
words, forces have different operation and policing priorities. The
third problem that arises in relation to arrangements is what he refers
to as the “net donor syndrome.” In that context, he
said: “Every
individual force and authority imagines that they will contribute to a
collaboration and that they will be a net donor. If I were chief or
chair of a big force, I might consider that my current assets would be
diluted. If I were chief or chair of a smaller force, I might consider
that my contribution would be sucked into the bigger metropolitan
forces.”——[Official Report, Policing and
Crime Public Bill Committee, 27 January; c. 8,
Q8.] We
have an important new power in the clause. Some concerns have been
expressed by ACPO and the APA. They are not ones that I share, but they
raise an important question: what financial levers or inducements might
be available to accompany and supplement a mandation from the Home
Office? Moreover, in exercising such a mandation, what do Ministers
think that they will be considering, and will it be an adverse report
across a sub-region by HMIC that informs their decision to mandate? It
is on that note of questioning and probing that I conclude my
remarks.
The
Chairman: Before I call the next speaker, may I say that
the Chairman of the Committee is a servant of the Committee? He or she
has the responsibility to ensure that all matters are debated. I say to
the Opposition spokesman that I have been advised—unofficially
of course—that we hope to get to the end of part 1 this morning.
We have had a speech that has lasted 48 minutes. We have about 35
minutes before we must adjourn. The Committee must appreciate that all
hon. Members should have an opportunity to participate. If we continue
at this rate, we will not make much progress with the Bill. That is a
comment to all hon. Members and I hope that it is
heeded. Paul
Holmes (Chesterfield) (LD): I will be brief,
Sir Nicholas. Everyone involved agrees that collaboration
makes sense in a lot of circumstances, whether it is back-room
procurement, payroll or the purchase of uniform. I am referring to all
the things in which economies of scale can save money, whether it is on
the joint provision of an expensive service such as the force
helicopter in Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire, or on serious crime
issues and terrorism. Everyone sees the sense of collaboration. Without
going over Tuesday’s debate on this issue, I will say that I am
still astonished that the Government feel that they need to give
themselves the power to interfere quite so much in the process of
collaboration—either to force it to happen or to limit it. The
issue that we discussed on Tuesday was that, if more than six police
authorities want to collaborate on a matter, the Secretary of State
must give permission for them to do so. If seven, eight or nine police
authorities and chief constables decide that they want to work together
on something, why, when all those hurdles have been passed, do the
Government feel that they must have the last say? That seems strange
and I would appreciate some elaboration from the Minister. Do the
Government fear that if 10, 15 or 20 forces collaborated,
there would be a danger of a national police force? That would seem
strange, given the Government’s efforts to force mergers and
create larger police forces over the last couple of
years. I
do not think that this phrase has passed my lips before, but it is
worth listening to the wise words of the previous police Minister in
the debate on the police grant last year. He said of the
Government: “We
made quite a serious mistake throughout the debate on
mergers—which we were halfway through when I took over this
role—when we assumed that we were at ground zero and that there
had not been any real degree of collaboration or significant
cross-force work in the past. There had been, and that should have been
recognised.”—[Official Report, 4 February 2008;
Vol. 471, c. 677.]
As we have heard today
and on Tuesday, there are good examples of collaboration. The Minister
says that the east midlands forces in his area of Nottinghamshire and
mine of Derbyshire are shining examples. Will he give specific examples
of areas that are so far behind the curve that the Government think
they need the power to force collaboration? Will he also give examples
of the grounds on which they would want to stop
collaboration? Magistrates
have raised the concern that if there is more police collaboration on
certain issues across force borders, there may be more instances like
the Redknapp case in which the City of London police issued a warrant
to search properties in another force area. Will that happen more often
if there are more collaboration agreements? Is that desirable? Should
it be the magistrate or district judge in the force area where the
search will take place who issues the warrant as a matter of course, or
could it be done by the magistrate or district judge in the area of a
collaborating force that wants to search out of force
area?
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