Mr.
Campbell: Amendments 69 and 70, relating to a closure
notice by a constable or a closure order by a court, respectively,
would remove subsections (8) and (10) of the proposed new section 136B,
which are to be inserted into the Sexual Offences Act 2003 by
schedule 2 of the Bill. The subsections are intended to
ensure that the premises can be closed when the offences have not yet
been committed, as well as when the offences have been
committed. The
hon. Gentleman talked about the process and the need to demonstrate
reasonableness. The conditions for imposing a closure order or notice
focus on the activities forming part of the offence taking place on the
premises, rather than on whether all the elements of the offence have
yet been committed. An officer may authorise the issue of a closure
notice if they have “reasonable grounds” for believing
the premises have been used for activities related to one or more
specified prostitution or pornography-related offences. An order is
necessary to prevent the premises being used for such activities in the
future—a court must be satisfied of the same before issuing a
closure
order. I
understand that the hon. Gentleman is seeking clarification of the
circumstances in which orders are being used, to convince him and
others that it is a proportionate response and also that there are
tests in place before such closure orders can be taken forward. For
example, if a premises is being used for controlling prostitutes for
gain, it is enough that the officer reasonably believes that the
premises are where the sexual services are being provided. It is not
necessary for the police to have reasonable grounds to believe that all
the elements of the offence of controlling a prostitute for gain have
yet been committed, so they will not have to believe or prove that the
controllers have yet received a gain from their
activities. We
believe that it is necessary to retain the subsections in order to
clarify the meaning of the conditions governing the issuing of a
closure notice or the making of a closure order. In particular, while
recognising the need for safeguards, we also want to make sure that the
police have necessary powers in those instances where there is
agreement across the Committee that the powers should be
used—where they have reasonable grounds for believing, but they
are able to respond rapidly. It is an important element that the police
can respond rapidly to circumstances in which they reasonably believe
that there is cause to do
so. Amendments
249 and 250 would impose an extra condition that must be met before a
court makes a
closure order, in that the court has to be satisfied that the police
officer responsible for authorising the issue of the closure notice,
which must precede an application for a closure order, has satisfied
himself of the identity of the interested parties and effected service
of the closure notice on them. Under the new provisions, one condition
that will have to be met before a police officer, who will not be below
the rank of superintendent, can issue a closure notice, is that
reasonable steps have been taken to establish the identity of any
person who resides on the premises or who has control of, or
responsibility for, or an interest in, the premises. The closure notice
must then be served on the intended people. The
amendments would impose a condition on courts to ensure that the police
have taken the necessary steps to identify people with a relevant
interest in the premises, but we believe that it is clearly necessary
for the police officer to meet such conditions if the notice is to be
served properly. I understand what the hon. Member for Oxford, West and
Abingdon is saying, but I hope that we can assure him that the
amendment is unnecessary to ensure that the police officer serves the
closure notice properly by taking reasonable steps to identify those
with a relevant interest in the premises. If the police have not done
so, they will have failed to serve the notice properly; if they fail to
take reasonable steps, the notice will not have been validly
served. The
hon. Gentleman made a couple of other points. First, his point on last
resort relates to one I made earlier. We hope that the orders are used
proportionately and reasonably, but I hope that last resort is not
necessary a long way down the track. The reality is that, however
strong the measures, it may be necessary for the police to move
quickly. At the same time, the police would nevertheless have to
satisfy the court both of the need for the order and of its
proportionality. Secondly,
the hon. Gentleman asked why 21 days is regarded as appropriate. I am
advised that it is in common usage and that it is understood.
Certainly, I would be happy to look at any proposals that he has on the
matter, but we believe that 21 days is an appropriate
period.
Dr.
Harris: I am grateful to the Minister because he addressed
all the points raised in the discussion. On 21 days, my
point was not that the period is too short. I was asking whether there
were provisions to extend it in specific cases when someone is not
aware that a closure order exists and therefore unable to put their
case that they had a reasonable excuse to use the
premises. I
am grateful that the Minister explained the purpose of the measures to
which I drew attention in the amendments. I beg to ask leave to
withdraw the amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Dr.
Harris: I beg to move amendment 71, in
schedule 2, page 120, leave out lines 13 to
20. The
amendment would omit proposed new section 136Q from the
Sexual Offences Act 2003. The section, which is entitled, “Issue
of closure notices by persons other than police officers”,
states: “The
Secretary of State may by order amend this Part so as to extend the
power to authorise the issue of a closure notice to persons other than
members of police forces”,
and that
an “order
under subsection (1) may make...further amendments of this Part as
the Secretary of State thinks appropriate in consequence of the
extension of that power to persons other than members of police
forces”. I
do not have my note to hand so I would be grateful to know whether any
order would be subject to the affirmative or negative
resolution—[Interruption.] I do not
want to interrupt the important conversation between the Whips,
although I understand that it has to take place, and that it is a chore
to get up. Will the Minister clarify whether it will be an affirmative
power?
Secondly, the
closure of premises, which can include family homes, has serious
implications for the right to respect for private and family life in
the home. Is it not a serious matter if the Government envisage that
that could be carried out by people other than trained police officers?
The closure of a premises is traditionally a judicial function, and
extending it beyond police officers is highly questionable. Given the
nature of the legislation, the training required and the understanding
that this is part of the criminal justice arm involving uniformed
police, those powers should not be hired out to third parties under
contract performance targets and the like. I do not know what the
Government envisage, but if they have a clear proposal, I hope that it
will come forward as primary legislation. For the reasons that I have
given, Liberal Democrat members of the Committee are concerned about
what the Government propose regarding the secondary legislation
envisaged by the provision.
5.45
pm
Mr.
Campbell: This is primarily intended to give the Secretary
of State the power to allow local authorities to issue closure notices,
as they can already do in relation to premises associated with
persistent disorder or nuisance. We have no current intention to extend
those powers beyond the police, but it may prove useful to review the
situation once the provisions are in operation. We have listened
carefully to the points raised by hon. Members. We want to ensure that
the legislation works as we intend it to, and that will involve
reviewing it—that is not unusual. We may then wish to make other
proposals.
In his last
point, the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon said that
extending these powers beyond police officers would be a questionable
move. If we had proposals to extend the powers beyond police officers,
they would have been in the Bill. We have no current intention to do
that. If the Secretary of State decides to exercise the power that we
are seeking, Parliament will have the opportunity to scrutinise the
order that exercises those powers. I confirm that any such order will
need to be laid and approved by affirmative resolution in each House. I
hope that the hon. Gentleman finds that explanation helpful and feels
able to withdraw his amendment.
Dr.
Harris: I am grateful to the Minister for his explanation.
In fact, his explanation stated that no need for this clause is
envisaged at the present time. I am opposed to taking those sorts of
powers just because there might be different circumstances in the
future, but there is little that I, together with my colleague on the
Committee, can do about it as a minority of two. I
know that the House of Lords feels strongly about the taking of such
powers and will look closely at the justification and intention given
by the Minister in respect of the provisions. If no reason to extend
the powers can be envisaged—and there is good reason why they
should not be extended—we should not be legislating on the basis
of maybes.
Given the
point that we have arrived at, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave, withdrawn.
Schedule 2
agreed to.
Clause
21Time
limits Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Dr.
Harris: I am sorry, we have been making such good progress
that we are going faster than I can read my writing. That is a
doctor’s issue rather than anything else. I have a question
about clause 21, which is designed to disapply the time limit in
relation to orders made under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. An
application for such an order is made to a magistrates court. Under
section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, a court is
prevented from hearing a complaint unless the complaint was
made “within
six months from the time when...the matter of complaint
arose.” The
explanatory notes suggest that such orders do interfere with the right
to respect for family life, but because the orders are preventive not
punitive, and given the existing safeguards, those interferences are
justified. However, the change to the current regime has the potential,
as I understand it, to weaken the existing safeguards by—this is
my reading—permitting applications for orders to be made in
respect of events that have taken place more than six months
previously. Potentially, that would allow an order to be made at any
point after the initial conviction or caution, even if that conviction
or caution was from many years
ago. The
position is not entirely clear to me. I would be grateful if the
Government confirmed whether what I have described is their intention
and, if so, whether disapplication of section 127 is necessary. For
example, is there any evidence of cases in which, because of section
127, the authorities have been unable to seek orders because of the
six-month time limit? I hope that that is clear. I am asking for
clarification
only.
Mr.
Campbell: The UK has one of the most robust systems for
managing sex offenders in the world and the Government are committed to
strengthening that system further by ensuring that anyone who poses a
threat to our society or children is dealt with as firmly as
possible. Part
2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 creates a number of civil orders. The
aim of the orders is to protect the public or specific members of the
public from sexual harm. The amendment clarifies the law in relation to
applications for those civil orders. It confirms that the six-month
time limit in section 127 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980
does not apply in relation to such applications.
Let me give
the hon. Member for Oxford, West and Abingdon an example. When the
police apply for a foreign travel order restricting an
offender’s travel abroad, they must show that the
offender’s behaviour since conviction makes it necessary to make
the order for the purpose of protecting children generally or any child
abroad from serious sexual attack by the offender. If section 127
applied, some of the evidence used to show that the offender posed a
risk would have to come from the previous six months. That could pose
problems in relation to certain sex offenders who are in custody or
coming to the UK after being convicted abroad, as there may be little
evidence of any concerning behaviour during the previous six months,
although the police may still be concerned that their past behaviour
indicates that they pose a high risk. Expressly disapplying the time
limit will make it clear that the police can apply for such orders
whether or not they have evidence of relevant behaviour in the last six
months. It
is important that in appropriate cases we can restrict the activities
of offenders who are released from prison or return to the United
Kingdom following conviction abroad for sexual offences without having
to wait for further evidence of risk to arise. We must take the
initiative and be proactive to prevent harm. The change that we are
proposing is supported by the Association of Chief Police Officers and
the Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre, to whose work I
pay
tribute.
The
Chairman: Dr. Evan
Harris.
Dr.
Harris: I was not aware that I had a right of reply in a
clause stand part
debate.
The
Chairman: You are quite right. I was so used to you
replying. Question
put and agreed
to. Clause
21 accordingly ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
22Foreign
travel orders:
grounds Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
Mr.
Ruffley: I rise to pose just one question on the grounds
for foreign travel orders. The clause amends any reference to children
under the age of 16 in sections 115 and 116 of the Sexual
Offences Act 2003 to “under 18”. The effect is to raise
the age at which a child or young person has to be at risk in order for
a foreign travel order to be made, and it alters the criteria
determining which offenders qualify for a foreign travel order to
include those who have committed sex offences against children under
18, rather than offences merely against children under 16, which is the
existing law.
I have just
one question, because foreign travel orders in principle are a good
idea. The vile and disgusting offence of paedophilia is something on
which the full force of the law must bear down in any and all possible
ways, but I have a query on a point of information. The
current powers, which the clause seeks to amend, relate to the age of
the children, under 16, but on how many occasions have such foreign
orders been made under the 2003 Act? I rise not to be critical of the
clause, but merely to secure a better understanding of how rigorously
the existing law, which is remarkably similar to the clause, has been
enforced. If we had a number from the Minister, it would give us some
perspective on how law enforcers are going about the vital business of
cracking down on and discouraging paedophile offenders. My view is that
the clause is necessary, but is the existing law, which it seeks to
improve, being utilised to its full force? | 
