Clause
59Use
of live link in extradition
proceedings Question
proposed, That the clause stand part of the
Bill.
5.15
pm
Dr.
Harris: As I understand it from the explanatory notes, the
Government do not believe that article 6 applies to extradition
hearings—that is, the right to a fair trial. Nevertheless, I
still think it is necessary for the Government to provide on the record
some justification of why it wants to move to giving the judge the
power to provide for live-link directions. I question whether the
Government are certain—given everything we have
discussed—that article 6 does not apply to extradition hearings
in respect of the ECHR and to ask in any event what the justifications
are for this. I am sure the Minister has a justification, which he is
ready to
give.
Mr.
Coaker: Article 6—as the hon. Member for Oxford,
West and Abingdon knows because he knows the answer to the
question—does not apply to extradition hearings.
Clauses 48
and 49 will provide further improvements to the European arrest warrant
mechanism in the UK. It is predicted that access to the SIS II will
enable law enforcement agencies in the UK to make an additional 1,200
arrests per year subject to these warrants, while the improvements to
public safety that these clauses will provide are of great significance
and importance. As the European arrest warrant is subject to judicial
proceedings this will place a greater administrative burden on the
court service. Clause 59 will in part address this problem by enabling
live links to be used in extradition cases.
This
amendment to the Extradition Act 2003 will mean that all initial and
remand hearings can, at the direction of the appropriate judge—I
hope that hon. Members heard that—take place via live link. This
will not only provide greater efficiency when dealing with extradition
hearings but also ensure that those subject to EAW and extradition
requests do not need to make potentially lengthy journeys for very
short extradition hearings. It is important to note that the subject of
the request will continue to attend the substantive extradition
hearing.
Furthermore,
the clause makes it clear that the judge may not direct that the
hearing take place via live link if he feels that the interests of
justice will not be served. The interest of justice, I know, is
something that the hon. Gentleman often wants read into the record, so
I am doing so. The clause will ensure that the mechanism in place in
the UK to deal with the EAW and extradition requests is both efficient
in dealing with rising numbers of judicial proceedings and will ensure
fairness to the subject of the request. I hope that helps the hon.
Gentleman.
Dr.
Harris: I am grateful to the Minister for reading in that
issue about the interests of justice. He makes a very important point,
which I will mention en passant as he did, that although article 6 does
not apply and therefore the Human Rights Act does not apply here, there
are interests of justice that might apply and force the court to make a
different decision. That might also apply to the other parts of this
Bill that we have just discussed. I think the Minister has dealt with
the point I raised and I am grateful to
him.
Mr.
Coaker: I am glad that I gave way to the hon. Gentleman
because I agree with the points he has made. They are now on the record
and are important points that people who read our proceedings will be
able to see.
Question
put and agreed to.
Clause 59
accordingly ordered to stand part of the
Bill.
Clause
60Security
planning for
airports Mr.
David Ruffley (Bury St. Edmunds) (Con): I beg to move
amendment 292, in
clause 60, page 74, line 26, after
‘officer’, insert
‘or a chief officer of another
police force who has lead responsibility for security or serious and
organised operations under any police force collaboration agreement
relating to the area in which the aerodrome is
situated’.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 293, in clause 60, page 76, line 26, at end
insert ‘or a chief
officer of another police force who has lead responsibility for
security or serious and organised operations under any police force
collaboration agreement relating to the area in which the aerodrome is
situated’. Amendment
291, in
clause 60, page 78, line 3, leave
out from ‘who’ to first ‘the’ in line 4 and
insert
‘represents’. Government
amendment
299.
Mr.
Ruffley: Welcome back from Namibia, Sir Nicholas. It is a
pleasure to see you looking so refreshed and chairing the Committee
with your usual verve, and indeed with even more verve after your
recuperatory recess
break. Clause
60 and the clauses that follow relating to aviation security are
important, but they are not without controversy, for reasons I will
move on to in a moment. Clause 60 provides for the establishment,
crucially, of a risk advisory group and a security executive group at
aerodromes. Risk advisory groups will be required to produce a
comprehensive risk report at the outset that will include analysis of
risks to the aerodrome and make recommendations regarding the actions
necessary to mitigate such risks. The membership of that RAG will
include a representative of the aerodrome manager and a representative
of the chief officer of police in that area as a minimum, and the
manager of the aerodrome will have discretion to appoint such
additional members as he considers necessary.
A risk report
will be put together by that group, which will then be considered by a
security executive group. The SEG is a different body in the sense that
it has a different membership. It will make judgments on the security
measures to be taken for the aerodrome and decide which party should be
responsible for executing that security measure. Those decisions will
form the content of the aerodrome security plan—ASP—which
will formally document the security measures to be taken. The
SEG’s membership is different from that of the RAG and will
include, as a minimum, a representative of the aerodrome manager,
representatives of the chief officer of police and the police authority
of the relevant area and representatives of airlines operating at the
airport—such people are not within the RAG.
On the face
of it, clause 60 looks a little bureaucratic. Why do we need two
groups, often with overlapping membership? My understanding is that the
Minister, in
drafting this, thought that there might be a
conflict of interest in a body that on the one hand analyses risk and
on the other hand has to pay for the measures that mitigate that risk.
I assume that the reason for having two groups rather than
one—the Minister may correct me if I am wrong—is that the
risk analysis cannot be short-changed by the people making the
decisions downgrading the risk because they do not want to pay for it.
If my understanding is correct, those two groups are separate for that
reason. The
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Transport (Jim
Fitzpatrick): May I simplify the situation, at the
invitation of the hon. Gentleman? The reason for the two groups is very
much as he has described it. Previously, we often saw analysis and the
design of a plan that was not put into action. The two separate groups
have separate responsibilities: one designs the plan and the other
implements it. In that instance, there is clear responsibility
attributed to each.
Mr.
Ruffley: That was my understanding, and it is an important
point to make, because members of the industry believe that it is
overly bureaucratic. I can see the rationale, and the Minister has
described it.
It is also
important that a plan may specify that security stakeholders make
payments to other security stakeholders in connection with the delivery
of the plan, mitigating the risks that have been identified. That makes
it a controversial clause. As most people do, I always follow the
money. If one does that, one always discovers that people are sometimes
loth to cough up, so there are issues that need to be teased
out. The
explanatory notes on proposed new section 24AE(5)
state: “Although
the police are not directly specified as a stakeholder to whom payments
may be made, this subsection does not prevent an ASP from specifying
payments to be made in respect of the police’s delivery of a
security measure. However, the expectation is that details of such
payments will be contained within a Police Services Agreement
(PSA).” That
is another agreement to which we will have to be advertent, which, the
notes
explain, “is
an agreement made between an aerodrome manager, the Chief Officer of
police and a representative of the police authority for the relevant
area”. The
agreement will include the level of policing provided at the aerodrome;
any payments to be made by the aerodrome’s manager; any
accommodation facilities to be provided by the manager and so
on. I
have already indicated that the measures are controversial. When the
aviation security provisions were aired back in spring 2008, I think
that it was suggested that they would be part of a transport security
Bill. At that time, the Airport Operators Association’s chief
executive warned that the Government should not expect a blank cheque
from business when many regional airports and low-cost airlines were
struggling with the economic downturn and higher fuel prices. That has
been a recurrent theme in all the representations made to members of
the Committee—certainly on our side—prior to our
sittings. The
Sheffield Telegraph reported previous difficulties between South
Yorkshire police and Robin Hood airport, where the
airport “will
be forced to foot the bill for its policing under a new law proposed by
the Government.”
The proposed changes
are, in effect, the substance of the clause under discussion, and the
Yorkshire Evening Post labelled them—I am not saying that
I agree with this language—“a terror tax”. It
reported: “Leeds
Bradford Airport will be slapped with a multi-million pound
‘terror tax’ under a new law proposed by the Government.
Legislation
unveiled in yesterday’s Queen's Speech will see the airport
forced to pay West Yorkshire Police for its growing policing
costs. The
new law will transfer responsibility for ‘threat and risk
analysis’ at regional airports—and for picking up the
bill—from the local police force to the airport
operator.” I
will not continue in such a critical vein, but that gives a sense of
the debate taking place outside the Committee. It is a familiar debate
and one expects such a set of arguments from aerodrome managers and
airline operators who are worried about the transfer of
cost. In
a comprehensive and balanced briefing to the Committee, Manchester
Airports Group indicated three chief concerns with the proposals. One
is cost, the second is value for money, and the third is the balance of
strength in any ensuing negotiations between the two groups covered by
the clause, namely airports and local police services.
On cost,
under the current regime there are designated airports, such as that in
Manchester, that already face a significant policing bill, first
through business rates and secondly through direct payments to the
police authority. MAG estimates that £9 million is paid to
Greater Manchester police in policing costs, and a
further £13 million in business rates. MAG argues that
consideration should be given to the amount that airports currently
cough up for policing costs at aerodromes, with business rates being an
obvious
example. On
value for money, MAG makes a crucial point, which is reflected in the
amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Hornchurch and me.
It
says: “The
police do not provide an adequate breakdown of how the funding is
spent, nor do they fully justify the levels of policing
needed.” That
is a reference to the current regime. But following the logic of the
alleged lack of transparency on the part of police forces who are
currently providing policing services, the argument would seem equally
valid to the new regime in the absence of assurances from
the Minister and any changes to the clause. In short, the allegation is
that there is a lack of transparency and accountability in current
legislation, which is arguably not addressed in the
Bill. 5.30
pm The
third point that Manchester Airports Group makes is on the negotiating
position of the police, which is strong vis-Ã -vis the airports,
and it also relates to the second point about value for money. It
states: “When
the figures are challenged by airports, the police can always cite
‘security reasons’ or ‘ACPO guidelines’ as
being the rationale behind their demands, without having to fully
explain or justify
these.” Before
I come to the amendments, I should like to refer to one other important
point raised by the Airport Operators Association. It challenges the
suggestion that sometimes comes from the Government that a parallel
should operate—an argument by analogy, as it were—between
the policing of private property, such as a football stadium during
football matches, where charges
are levied on the football club or its owners to pay for policing costs
on a Saturday afternoon, and the policing of airports. The suggestion
is that the airports should pay just as readily as a football club for
consuming policing
services. The
Airport Operators Association take issue with
that: “Airports
are different. Larger ones in particular are often referred to as
‘iconic targets’ and Chief Constables, who have a legal
accountability for policing in their constabulary area, often have
strong views about how airports should be
policed.” The
idea that airports are different in kind from football stadiums seems a
very good one. The concern expressed by the Airport Operators
Association is shared by, among others, Virgin Atlantic, which makes a
similar
point. I
turn now to amendments 292, 293 and 291. Amendment 292 relates to RAGs,
which include the chief officer of the relevant force. It makes it
clear that it might also be the lead officer in any collaboration
agreement that is delivering policing services to an airport. We had
many debates on collaboration agreements under clause 5. There will be
situations where there will be level 2 and level 3 crime, which is what
aviation security is all about. Policing services might not be
delivered by the police authority in whose boundary the aerodrome is
situated. To take an example, Greater Manchester police deliver the
services in the case of Manchester airport, which may be near your fine
residence, Sir Nicholas.
Under a
future Government after the Bill has come into force there might be a
collaboration agreement right across the north-west for delivering
airport aviation security services. It might be, for the sake of
argument, that the Greater Manchester police is not the lead force. The
chief constable who is responsible for making the decisions, who would
be on the RAG under this clause, might be a chief constable in a
neighbouring area. Amendment 292 endeavours to say that the RAG should
also include a chief officer of another force who has lead
responsibility for security or serious organised operations under any
collaboration agreement that might be enforced.
In short,
that amendment is a technical one for the avoidance of doubt—it
does not challenge the principle of the clause. It is a belt-and-braces
suggestion because a lead force collaboration chief officer would not
be within the ambit of this clause. It is probing and I am sure the
Minister will want to reflect on whether I am right. I drafted it
rather late as it sprang out at me as I was drinking my late-night
cocoa reading the Bill, as one does. I am interested in the
Minister’s comments as to whether that is covered. The same
argument relates to amendment 293—it is the same
point.
Amendment 291
relates to a different issue, the SEG. At the moment the drafting
says: “The
manager of the aerodrome must nominate as a member of the group an
individual who appears to the manager to represent the interests of the
operators”. It
struck me reading this late at night to ask on what basis the manager
can nominate an individual who “appears” to him to
represent the interests of the operator. My amendment seeks to say
“represents” the interests of the operator. Why is it
“appears” to represent? The drafting is a bit loose and
could lead to confusion. It should be perfectly clear who the operators
wish to have
as the individual nominated to represent them. I was
completely mystified. I do not think the current drafting adds
anything. Why can it not be cleaner with a straightforward
“represents”? It is on that basis of a technical probing
amendment that I will terminate my
remarks. | 
