Mr.
Clappison: I repeat that amendment 3 is designed as a
probing amendment to seek details. At this stage I will not be moving
it to a
vote.
Mr.
McNulty: In that context, I fully understand amendment 3
as a probing amendment. It clearly made no sense on its own terms. But
I apologise—I realise that the hon. Gentleman said
“probing” at the
start. If
the Committee seeks an exhaustive list on the face of the Bill
outlining what good causes may be, that is a fool’s errand. That
is in the sense that, with the greater personalisation and the focus on
individuals, we would hope to be as flexible as possible precisely
because of the very personal nature of that relationship. Of course,
that will include a person’s health and other such matters.
Currently, in terms of sanctions on the new deal, the following
circumstances all constitute good cause, in terms of an impediment to
the individual being able to comply with the conditions: disease or
physical and mental disablement, travelling time, caring
responsibilities, attendance at court, arranging or attending a
funeral, being in a lifeboat crew or a part-time firefighter, domestic
emergencies, emergency duties, continued participation potentially
putting the individual’s health and safety at risk, antisocial
behaviour orders, and community orders or community disposal
orders.
Equally, we
could not have an exhaustive list of health conditions. The hon. Member
for Glasgow, East will know that elsewhere in the Bill we will be
discussing what we can do in the most flexible of terms for individuals
with ongoing disability, fluctuating conditions or—particularly
in the case of later clauses—problematic drug use. So, quite
deliberately, the Bill is drawn as broadly as possible, to be as
all-encompassing as possible in terms of providing the individual with
as much scope as possible for a good cause to be part of the developing
relationship between the personal adviser and the individual. Two years
down the line, at the end of the new deal, after 24 months on JSA, we
think not only that the conditionality should apply—we are very
clear about that—but equally, that it should apply in the most
flexible of circumstances. We should take full cognition of an
individual’s circumstances, and ensure that what is established
in terms of good cause is as broadly drawn as
possible.
11.15
am I
do not accept the contention of the hon. Member for Glasgow, East that
somehow Jobcentre Plus will not be up for this. It has been and will
continue to be. I am glad he did not go down the same road as the hon.
Member for Rochdale and talk about trying to legislate, in all the
circumstances of February 2009, for what will prevail in the future
once we get through the recession. The starting point taken by the hon.
Member for Hertsmere—to tease out more readily what we mean by
good cause—is, on reflection, a perfectly reasonable probing
amendment. I hope that I have sought, at least in part, to answer his
questions. I am grateful that he is not going to pursue amendment 3. I
would add, given what I have already said, that amendments 77, 88 and
89 are therefore not necessary. I also think they are problematic, in
the sense of how they relate to some other parts of the Bill, and some
other parts of what we are doing. They potentially restrict rather than
allow the greatest degree of flexibility, which is central to all that
we are trying to do in terms of the two-way relationship rooted in the
conditionality regime. Mr.
Clappison: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the
amendment.
Amendment,
by leave,
withdrawn.
Mr.
Clappison: I beg to move amendment 4, in
clause 1, page 2, line 40, at
end insert— ‘(8A) A
statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of
State under subsection (8) shall not be made unless a draft of the
instrument has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution
of each
House.’.
The
Chairman: With this it will be convenient to discuss the
following: amendment 7, in clause 2, page 5, line 28, at end
insert— ‘(4A) A statutory
instrument containing regulations made by the Minister under subsection
(4) shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid
before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each
House.’. Amendment
8, in
clause 2, page 5, line 37, at
end insert— ‘(6A) A
statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Minister under
subsection (5) shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument has
been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each
House.’. Amendment
22, in
schedule 1, page 66, line 9, at
end insert— ‘23A A
statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Minister under
Part 1 of Schedule 1 shall not be made unless a draft of the instrument
has been laid before Parliament and approved by a resolution of each
House.’. Amendment
15, in
clause 7, page 13, line 37, leave
out subsection (9) and
insert— ‘(9) A statutory
instrument containing an order under this section shall not be made
unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before Parliament and
approved by a resolution of each
House.’. Amendment
19, in
clause 19, page 25, line 18, at
end insert— ‘(10A) A
statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of
State under subsections (6), (7), (8), (9) or (10) shall not be made
unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before Parliament and
approved by a resolution of each
House.’.
Mr.
Clappison: It may assist the Committee to know that all
these amendments stand in my name and those of my hon. Friends. They
relate to the type of parliamentary scrutiny that regulations should be
subject to under the
Bill. In each case, they require the affirmative resolution procedure as
an alternative to the negative resolution procedure that is in place at
the moment in the Bill.
As the
Committee, and anyone who looks at the Bill, will have gathered, it
contains an enormous number of regulation-making powers. Without
counting them up exactly, I understand that the vast majority are
subject to the negative procedure and only one or two are subject to
the affirmative procedure. It would take up a lot of the
Committee’s time and possibly generate inappropriate debate if
one was to suggest that the negative procedure was taken out in every
case and replaced by the affirmative procedure. In these amendments we
have taken what we regard as some of the more important issues
currently covered by the negative procedure—I will be corrected
if I am wrong about that, but at the moment they seem to be covered by
it—and suggested, as a way of opening up a debate, whether or
not they should be subject to the affirmative procedure. I am afraid
that it will be necessary to leap between a number of subjects and
areas in the Bill.
First,
amendment 4 would require the use of the affirmative procedure under
clause 1(8). That is in the case of hardship payments where sanctions
have been applied for failure to comply with “work for your
benefit” regulations. This is obviously a sensitive issue. We
observe that in the notes on clauses, provision for such hardship
payments is contained in section 20B(4) of the Jobseekers Act 1995. It
may be that the Government envisage the hardship provisions working
here in the same way as the ones that are already established. It is
certainly important to hear a few words from the Minister on this
subject.
Amendment 7
refers to proposed new section 2D. This is a different
subject—that of work-related activity for claimants in receipt
of various income-based benefits, including employment and support
allowance. The regulation-making powers in question, to which this
amendment relates, are very important in the context of what is
required of these claimants by way of work-related activity. I am sure
the Committee will understand that when I say “work-related
activity,” it means not that a person will be required to look
for a job, but that they will be required to undertake activity that
serves as a preparation for finding work and helps to move them nearer
to the labour market. It covers claimants in receipt of a number of
different types of benefit.
So these
regulation-making powers go to the heart of what is required of
claimants. They, for example, prescribe the time and amount of
work-related activity that a person is required to undertake, the
circumstances in which a person is or is not to be regarded as
undertaking such activity, and the imposition of a sanction where a
person has failed to comply with requirements. Those are important
matters, and they stand out from among the other regulation-making
powers as ones where it is appropriate to at least consider whether the
affirmative resolution procedure should be used, rather than the
negative one.
Amendment 8
relates to regulation-making powers to reduce benefit where sanctions
are imposed on a claimant who has failed to comply with requirements on
work-related activity. We regard reductions in benefit and the length
of time for which it is to be reduced as important
matters. We note that, in this context, the Gregg report—the
Committee will be familiar with Professor Gregg, who gave evidence to
us in our sitting two weeks ago—said of the sanctions that are
currently in
place: “Whilst
the current regime is broadly effective and certainly increases
compliance with labour market conditions, there is also widespread
acknowledgment that it is complex and difficult to understand. The
process is also, in some circumstances, time-consuming and costly to
operate. This means that the system is not as clear and crisp as it
could be, which reflects the piecemeal development of conditionality
across different benefits based on different legislation, different
regulations and different case
law.” The
Government, in their December White Paper, admitted that there were
shortcomings in some respects in the way sanctions were
working—although we know that the Government are seeking,
through the Bill, to move benefits together, which will reduce the
number of benefits to some extent. In the light of those criticisms and
considerations, it is important to have a debate about this.
In their
White Paper, the Government suggested that the initial sanction for
non-compliance for jobseekers should be one week’s loss of
jobseeker’s allowance. We wonder whether the Government have the
same amount in mind in the case of non-compliance for work-related
activity.
Amendment 22
relates to schedule 1, which makes various amendments to the Jobseekers
Act 1995. The delegated powers memorandum states that it contains
amendments to the Act, which would provide a framework under which some
people are not required to meet some of the conditions
“but...are
expected to prepare for work in the future.”
It contains detailed
provisions related to conditionality, dealing with requirements to
attend work-focused interviews; powers to direct claimants to undertake
activities relating to finding employments, becoming employable, and
remaining employed; action plans, requirements to undertake
work-related activity and application of sanctions. These are very
important matters. They may apply, in some cases, to lone parents with
younger children; we think it is right to raise the issue once again in
this context, at the level of parliamentary scrutiny which is
appropriate to them.
Amendment 15
relates to clause 7, which gives the Secretary of State the power to
abolish income support. This is obviously a very sweeping
regulation—a very big step. We apprehend that this is the
direction in which the Government wish to travel. We understand that
that will be done once the Secretary of State is satisfied that it is
no longer necessary to prescribe income support to groups of people
because they are catered for elsewhere in the benefits system. As I
indicated a moment ago, the Government are trying to move benefits
together, which was recommended in various reports into this subject.
By saying that this is a big step, I support the proposition. It is
perhaps appropriate to consider whether this should be subject to the
affirmative procedure as well, given that it is a step of great
magnitude in social security policy. At the moment it appears that it
is subject to the negative procedure. We wonder whether there is not a
case for asking whether this step should be subject to the affirmative
procedure when it comes to be
taken. Finally,
in the same vein, we come to clause 19 and benefit sanctions following
a first offence of benefit fraud. This is a different subject—up
to now we have
been talking about jobseeker’s allowance, “work for your
benefit” and work-related activity for claimants—this
concerns benefit offenders who have committed benefit fraud. We will
come to this clause in due course—no doubt we will have a wider
debate on it—but it is the same point about the type of
parliamentary scrutiny that is appropriate. Under clause 19(6) to (10),
which deal with the amounts by which benefits will be reduced, we once
again wonder whether this is an appropriate case for the affirmative
procedure. That is the common thread that runs through this: a concern
for proper parliamentary scrutiny. We think it is entirely appropriate
to ask about that in these circumstances and to raise the issue. We
look forward to the Minister’s
response. Mr.
McNulty: To echo what the hon. Gentleman said, it is
entirely appropriate to table such amendments and there is a consequent
and ongoing tension between primary and secondary legislation. As I
have tried to indicate, this is—not quite uniquely, because
immigration is the same—a whole area of UK law where there is an
entire regulatory framework alongside the primary legislative framework
That is the way that both immigration and benefits law have worked for
some time.
I also accept
that there is a desire to scrutinise aspects of policy surrounding the
Bill. For reasons that I shall come to, I do not accept that this is a
necessarily proportionate way of doing it. There is a balance to be
struck; there are existing safeguards to ensure that the regulations
receive proper scrutiny. For example, we work closely with the Social
Security Advisory Committee on regulation. We have shown with the
employment and support allowance regulations that we are willing to go
beyond what is required of a Department by law and engage
constructively with the Committee. We will also study with great care
the memo from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and
will respond
appropriately. If
I may, I shall briefly discuss each element in turn. As the hon.
Gentleman suggests, Amendment 4 relates to the hardship payments under
the “work for your benefit” regime. I can assure hon.
Members that we intend to apply pretty much the same hardship regime
that is already operating for JSA. It is more an updating of the
regulations than the introduction of anything substantially new. In
that context, I think it appropriate that it is negative—the
Committee will know that negative resolutions are laid and, under the
negative process, hon. Members can pray against them and they can
eventually get their day in court, for want of a better phrase.
Negative does not mean that there is no recourse to a degree of
scrutiny. As
the hon. Gentleman suggests, amendment 7 relates to clause 2 and how
those moving from income support to JSA are treated. Again, we propose
to introduce regulations that are similar to existing ones that relate
to work-focused interviews, action plans and jobseeker’s
agreements, including relevant good cause provisions. They are
therefore appropriately carried out under the negative
resolution. Amendment
15 is strange given that it relates to the abolition of income support.
The key safeguard here, as the hon. Gentleman said, is that the
Secretary of State must be satisfied that there are no groups who still
need it before the benefit is abolished. By the time the negative
resolution is laid, everyone will be clear that there is no
need for income support any more, so it should be abolished. Why that
should not be done under a negative rather than a positive procedure
escapes me; we would only lay that negative resolution when the time is
right for that particular benefit to be
abolished. 11.30
am
I have found
an amendment where the hon. Gentleman was in error: amendment 19 is
unnecessary—I can confirm that the affirmative procedure will
already apply. The regulation-making powers are intended to be the same
as those existing in the two strikes legislation in the Social Security
Fraud Act 2001, because this is inserted in that legislation—but
it will be the affirmative rather than the
negative. The
Committee will be aware that in both the delegated powers memorandum
and the document to which I referred—which is now, I hope,
available—there are copious notes and tables about where
regulation powers are taken and whether they are to be pursued under
negative or positive procedures.
Amendments 8
and 22 refer to the establishment of the progression to work
group—in particular, those who have moved from
jobseeker’s allowance to income support. I appreciate that the
powers seem wide-ranging, but we either build on the existing JSA
regulations or mirror the types of conditionality that will be applied
in income support before people migrate to JSA. I accept the hon.
Gentleman’s point that notwithstanding that it builds on
existing conditionality, we are still developing what we want to take
forward as the Gregg model—for want of a better
phrase.
Although I am
not accepting the amendments—God forbid; I do not do that sort
of thing—I think that the hon. Gentleman does, potentially, have
a point. As we develop the model of conditionality during the Bill,
amendments 8 and 22 may be ones that we should return to given the
import and the substance of those regulations, and the significant
shift that they will make. In that spirit, I still ask him to take the
lot of them away, but with amendments 8 and 22 the hon. Gentleman does
have half a point, at least. I need to reflect on whether it is more
than half a point.
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