Memorandum submitted by Graham Pearce,
Aston University, and Sarah Ayres, Bristol University
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. This memorandum draws upon the findings
of a recent ESRC study into English regional governance. In the
absence of demands for a locally-rooted regionalism the Government
has pursued a centrally orchestrated process of administrative
decentralization in the English regions outside London, including
the appointment of Regional Development Agencies (RDAs). The Agencies
have acquired a key position as strategic power brokers between
Whitehall and sub-national interests. Nonetheless, they lack sufficient
resources to make a significant impact on economic disparities,
operate within complex, competing structures and too little attention
has been given to capturing their impacts. Ongoing reforms set
out in the Sub-National Review of Economic Development and
Regeneration (SNR) and Prosperous Places (HM
Treasury et al., 2007; DBERR and DCLG, 2008) are intended
to extend the Agencies' leadership role, but uncertainties surround
their coherence, how they are to be implemented and their effectiveness
in achieving sustainable development.
2. REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS
2.1. RDAs, Government Offices (GOs) and
Regional Assemblies are the key regional bodies. RDAs are accountable
to the Secretary of State for DBERR and are responsible for formulating
and delivering Regional Economic Strategies (RESs). They are the
latest in a long line of centrally inspired initiatives designed
to remedy regional economic disparities in England. GOs are Whitehall's
key outposts in the regions and over the past decade their role
has been bolstered to improve co-ordination across the agendas
of different government departments and programmes. Whitehall
is also represented in the regions through a multiplicity of Non-Departmental
Public Bodies (NDPBs). The Assemblies are nominated bodies,
comprising representatives of local government and other regional
interests and are charged with scrutinizing the RDAs' activities,
drafting statutory Regional Spatial Strategies (RSSs) and encouraging
strategy integration. Following the SNR, it is intended
that the Assemblies' planning functions will be transferred to
RDAs, which will also become responsible for preparing Single
Regional Strategies (SRSs).
3. MOTIVES FOR
STRENGTHENING THE
REGIONAL TIER
3.1. The Government's regionalization agenda
is designed to:
— Improve service delivery through
modernising central and local government structures,
— Reduce economic disparities by building
on the productive capacity of regions, and
— Enable the development of solutions
that take account of regional diversity.
3.2. Modernising government
3.2.1. It is widely held that UK policy
making is too centralised and, to deliver the high quality public
services required, responsibility for decision-making and delivery
should be directed downwards to a level closer to citizens and
where policies and investment can be synchronized. The Government
has also acknowledged the need for better integration of national
initiatives with a regional dimension; improved understanding
of regional and local issues in the design of national policy
and for service delivery to reflect local circumstances.
3.3. Reducing regional economic disparities
3.3.1. Regional differences in GDP per capita
are greater in the UK than in any other EU country (European Commission
2007). The Government has a PSA target to make sustainable improvements
in the economic performance of all English regions and over the
long term reduce the persistent gap in growth rates between the
regions. It has also taken the view that regions are the natural
territories in which economic development should be promoted through
both institutional and policy innovations. Indeed, RDAs were launched
on the basis of regions and localities knowing best how to tackle
the problems they face through the adoption of innovative and
private sector "friendly" policies. Rather than targeting
less favoured areas measures to build on innate territorial competitive
capacities would be applied throughout the UK.
3.4. Recognising regional diversity
3.4.1. The Government has stressed that
regional or local solutions may prove more effective than those
designed in Whitehall. The English regions are administrative
constructs and there is considerable diversity both between and
within them. While appropriate for services where an equitable
distribution is required, uniform, national solutions cannot respond
to this diversity. Within a framework of national targets, funding
and guidance, territorial flexibility is viewed as adding value
to service delivery and economic performance. Local authorities
may not be best placed to tackle region wide issues. Regions are
also viewed as convenient for the joining-up of policy areas—small
enough to allow for face-to-face contact upon which trust and
partnership working can be built and large enough to permit economies
of scale and scope.
3.5. Continuing central dominance
3.5.1. Ostensibly, strengthening of the
regional tier can be seen as evidence of the Government's desire
to enable sub-national bodies to play an increased role in the
policies affecting their territories. But this is difficult to
reconcile with the view that Whitehall has used its sizeable regional
presence to enhance its control over decision-making and resources.
Indeed, the UK has one of the highest levels of vertical fiscal
imbalance—centralization—in the developed world (Marshall,
2005). Whitehall departments have resisted applying a more nuanced,
region-based approach, impeding efforts to align the proliferation
of regional strategies Furthermore, while some academics and practitioners
have lauded "regions" as appropriate territories for
promoting economic development, it is misleading to imply some
implicit relationship between regional institutional "thickness"
and economic prosperity (Jones and MacLeod, 2004).
4. THE EFFECTIVENESS
OF RDAS
AND THEIR
ADDED VALUE
4.1. RDAs were to mark a genuine decentralisation
of power to deliver an economic dividend and to meet specific
objectives in economic development, social and physical regeneration,
business support, investment and competitiveness, skills, employment
and sustainable development.
4.2. Resources
4.2.1. RDA programme expenditure since 1999
amounts to £10.8billion, rising to £2.30 billion in
2007-08. The DCLG funds nearly three-quarters of the Agencies'
budgets (£1.67 billion), primarily to support the delivery
of its neighbourhood renewal and housing markets/sustainable community's
programmes. Nevertheless, though accounting for only a fifth of
the Agencies' budget (£0.48billion), RDA sponsorship rests
with DBERR and reflects the Treasury's desire to maintain the
Agencies' economic imperative. Other Whitehall departments contribute
about 5% of RDA budgets. Nevertheless, some have bypassed RDAs
in favour of their own sub-national structures or local authorities.
4.2.2. On average each RDA has an annual
budget of some £240 million, but this conceals wide variations.
RDAs in four regions (East, East Midlands, South East and South
West) jointly accounted for less than 30% of planned funding in
2007-08. By contrast the London Development Agency, which serves
a region with the highest unemployment rate, was allocated 19%
of the RDAs' budget (£400 million), even though London's
productivity performance is the highest of the English regions.
In real terms, however, the principle beneficiary was the North
East RDA, which received annual funding equivalent to almost £100
per regional capita, almost five times that of the South East
and significantly more than Yorkshire and the Humber (£63
per capita) and the North West (£59 per capita).
4.2.3. RDA resources are allocated using
a set of nine proxy indicators or "domains". Each is
allocated a weighting and, as McVittie and Swales (2007) have
shown, the regional unemployment rate (44% of the weighting) and
the number of people living in deprived wards (28%) dominate.
By contrast, GDP per capita (the inverse productivity measure)
accounts for less than 10% of the weighting which, given the Government's
stress on improving productivity, is perhaps unexpected. Furthermore,
because of the importance attached to these proxy weightings it
might be assumed that there would be a "clear line of sight"
to regional priority setting. In practice, however, "the
indicators that lie behind the formula do not impact on how each
RDA determines what its priorities should be in light of the RES
for the region and the requirements set by Government through
a Tasking Framework" (HM Treasury et al, 2005, p 28).
4.3. Added value
4.3.1. Ministers have accorded RDAs a special
position in managing economic policy interventions and they have
been granted additional responsibilities and funding. Furthermore,
the Agencies have provided a conduit for the concerns of regional
elites that previously did not always share or communicate, established
a reputation in economic regeneration and gained some discretion
in modifying government policy to meet place-specific priorities.
4.3.2. RDA funding, however, represents
less than 2% of regional public spend (Fothergill, 2005) and the
Agencies are reliant on influencing public expenditure managed
by other bodies to execute their strategies. The stress attached
to aligning funding sources is potentially significant and is
confirmed in the SNR. Its success, however, depends upon
the tacit support of Whitehall departments to permit RDAs and
other public agencies to make explicit their priorities in Regional
Delivery Plans and determine which organizations should take the
lead for different tasks. In practice, efforts to "join-up"
public agencies' activities are often hampered by a lack of understanding
of the need to work to complementary objectives.
4.3.2. RDA self-assessments confirm that
they have met or exceeded central government targets and made
a positive contribution to regional economic performance (England's
RDAs, 2006). Between 1999-2006 RDAs claim to have created and
safeguarded over 770,000 jobs, assisted some 58,000 new businesses,
reclaimed 12,000 hectares of brownfield land and levered £8.2billion
of private sector funding. Nevertheless, the same assessment confirmed,
RDA impact is complex to assess, given their wide-ranging contribution
to regional outcomes, the breadth of their partnership-working
and the long-term nature of their actions. The overall contribution
of RDAs to regional economic performance and their influence on
the macro-economy requires further quantification and is hard
to assess at this stage' and "The evaluation evidence which
would assist this quantification is currently scarce" (p
i).
4.3.3. Impacts are difficult to judge, in
part because of a lack of meaningful measures, but also the persistent
problem of identifying outcomes in policy areas where RDAs have
a limited remit. The East of England Development Agency (2005,
p 24) observed, "There is limited current data on the breadth
of regional economic performance ... Evaluation of policies, programmes
and projects has also been applied inconsistently both over the
period of our existence and across RDAs". This is a disturbing
message and indicates that RDAs lack robust evaluation tools to
link policy objectives to measurable targets and/or that they
have been less than successful in inducing substantive change
in activities and outcomes.
4.4. Regional disparities
4.4.1. RDAs are expected to contribute to
improving regional economic performance and reducing regional
growth rate disparities. However, the scale of the Agencies' resources
is insufficient of itself to make a significant impact. Furthermore,
RDAs are hampered by the Government's rejection of the need for
a spatial development framework for England to counterbalance
the central role the Greater South East in the UK economy. Quite
how it is possible to encourage sustainable economic growth in
all English regions and, at the same time, reverse the economic
growth rates disparities between the Greater South East and the
rest of the country is unclear. Indeed, recent trends in identifiable
regional public expenditure show that spending per capita in the
Greater South East has grown more quickly than in the other regions
(Burch et al., 2008). The 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review
also set out proposals to commit substantial resources to major
projects in and around London, which will widen regional growth
rate disparities.
4.5. Sustainable development
4.5.1. The RDAs' prime responsible is to
deliver a narrow spectrum of national economic targets. Nevertheless,
they also have a statutory duty to contribute to sustainable development.
But few staff are equipped to deal with this emerging agenda.
Moreover, there are no core targets attached to the Agencies'
contribution to sustainable development, making this "requirement
less effective and the performance of the RDAs in this regard
impossible to measure" (House of Commons CLG Committee, 2007,
p 23).
5. RDA CAPACITY
5.1. Concerns about overstretch
5.1.1. There is a sense that the growing
complexity and breadth of their activities have overextended the
RDAs. Their corporate plans are expected to indicate how the Agencies
intend addressing their RES priorities and contribute to the delivery
of national targets on regional economic performance, sustainable
development, national productivity and reducing productivity disparities
in rural areas. RDAs are also expected to assist in delivering
other PSA targets, including increasing employment rates among
disadvantaged groups and levels of inward foreign investment,
helping small firms, tackling social exclusion, securing greater
labour market capacity, achieving a better balance between housing
availability and demand and creating competitive and sustainable
farming.
5.1.2. The National Audit Office (2006)
has observed the complexities surrounding RDA working. It noted
that the North West RES identified 122 "actions" and
45 "transformational measures", of which the RDA had
responsibility for only eleven. Similarly, the South West RDA
(2005, para 9), reported that it "had over 700 live projects
at any one time, which meant that it was difficult to provide
the level of senior management input into stakeholder management
that was sometimes necessary". The balance of staff skills
has attracted attention because, although expected to act in a
strategic role, the Agencies continue to be drawn into delivery,
leading to uncertainty about the RDAs' primary purpose.
5.2. Partnership working
5.2.1. Developments at the regional tier
have generated a momentum for partnerships, collaboration and
cooperation as a way of building a collective understanding of
regional priorities and managing the complexities of preparing
and delivering strategies. Given their limited resources and lack
of control over the key levers of economic development, RDAs are
contingent on such mechanisms. Nevertheless, effective partnership
working commonly requires a considerable investment of time and
energy.
5.3. Performance assessment
5.3.1. RDA Independent Performance Assessments
combined self assessments with National Audit Office (NAO) evaluations
to provide a measure of each RDA's organizational performance
and its capacity to improve (NAO, 2005). Each Agency was "scored"
against their "ambitions", "prioritization methods",
"capacities", "performance management systems"
and "achievements". All RDAs were rated as performing
"strongly" or "well", especially in terms
of "ambition"; their weakest criterion being "capacity",
including the Agencies' ability to assume more activities, communicate
with partners and stakeholders and draw lessons from project and
programme evaluations. The Government concluded "that, while
there are areas for further improvements, RDAs are enhancing delivery
and impact" (HM Treasury et al, 2007, p 27).
6. CONSEQUENCES
OF EXPANDING
THE RDAS'
REMIT AS
PROPOSED BY
THE SNR
6.1. Institutional capacity
6.1.1. Development and implementation of
SRSs will require political, technical and administrative support
at all levels. RDAs are expected be at the heart of the process,
but questions have been raised about their capacity to bring together
the different strands of regional policy within an over-arching
framework. Plans to transfer the regional planning function to
RDAs have prompted particular anxieties. Concerns have also been
expressed that unlike DCLG, few staff in DBERR appreciate the
complexities of the statutory planning system and its implications
for the content of the SRSs.
6.1.2. In their input to Budget 2008 RDAs
did little to allay such concerns, "|.it is critical that
post SNR governance requirements do not undermine the fundamental
principle that RDAs are business led, maintaining the SNR's
focus upon economic improvement" (HM Treasury, 2008). Prosperous
Places acknowledged these difficulties and averred that the
balance of skills and background of RDA boards and staff would
need to change in the light of the Agencies' new remit. The RDAs
also offered some reassurance by stating that, "[the] SNR
will require RDAs to review and enhance their capacity" but
added, "SNR must ensure that the benefits of the business
led RDA model are sustained and maximised" (England's RDAs,
2008 p. 2). These tensions reflect departmental positions in Whitehall;
for example DCLG has lost its battle with the Treasury and DBERR
for local authority majorities on RDA Boards.
6.1.3. As central government's key representatives
in the regions, GOs have considerable experience of managing the
complex interrelationships between the policies of separate Whitehall
departments and policy making within the regions. RDAs are not
yet sufficiently developed to substitute for the GOs' coordinating
role. Unexpectedly, however, Prosperous Places neglected
the GOs' potential contribution. Yet, if the Government's reforms
are to be managed effectively, much may depend on the GOs and
in particular, their potential role in brokering relations between
RDAs and local authorities.
6.1.4. The SNR proposed that Forums,
representing all local authorities in each region, be established
to take strategic decisions, be closely involved in preparing
the SRSs, sign off the draft strategies and help to hold RDAs
and regional delivery partners to account. Most regions already
possess local authority groupings, either separate from or operating
under the umbrella of Assemblies and it can be expected that they
will progressively undertake these new tasks. Nonetheless, authorities
face a number of challenges arising from the enhanced role of
RDAs. Experience suggests that effective local authority leadership
at the regional level will depend on the capacity of authorities
to provide a collective voice on regional issues and the willingness
of leading local politicians to engage in the regional agenda.
Such backing cannot be assumed, however, with potentially important
implications for SRS implementation. Indeed, because the SNR's
focus is on economic prioritization rather than spatial equity,
there are concerns in DBERR that local authorities may choose
not to cooperate, either amongst themselves or with RDAs.
6.1.5. If the proposed SNR reforms
are to be effective government departments and agencies will need
to play a stronger role in supporting regions and local authorities.
There is also the expectation that the SRS process will be underpinned
by clear national priorities, including new national policy statements
on infrastructure, advice on regional GVA and carbon reduction
targets and guidance on regional housing supply requirements.
Nevertheless, as Mrinska (2008) observes, despite the need to
strengthen interdepartmental coordination there are few signs
that the Government is willing to establish a single body within
Whitehall with the authority to facilitate a more corporate approach
to regional issues across departments and to provide a "face"
for communications with the regions and localities.
6.2. Preparing the Single Regional Strategies
(SRSs)
6.2.1. In taking forward work on the SRSs
it is anticipated the RDAs will build on the close working relationships
between partners as a way of securing the necessary "buy
in" to both frame and deliver the strategies. In the case
of RSSs Assemblies are already obliged to undertake extensive
public consultation and each strategy is subject to an Examination
in Public to assess the extent to which the strategy meets regional
economic, environmental and social needs. By contrast, RESs have
tended to be aspirational, light touch documents focused on delivering
measurable economic outcomes and have not been subject to the
same level of scrutiny. RDAs face the challenge, therefore, of
creating decision making structures capable of accommodating two
very different styles of plan-making.
6.2.2. Given the Government's strong emphasis
on strategy formulation being founded on robust evidence and testing,
community engagement and political accountability through local
authorities, its desire that SRSs should be prepared and signed
off within a period of twenty-four months appears unrealistic.
Imposing ambitious time constraints may be desirable, but it raises
the prospect of SRSs becoming so high-level and strategic that
they lose their relevance and traction with those responsible
for delivery (East of England Regional Assembly, 2008). Decision-making
is also unlikely to be trouble-free. It is intended that SRSs
will be jointly signed off by the Secretaries of State for DBERR
and DCLG, but this may prove problematic. Indeed, in the case
of RSSs, there is evidence of lengthy delays in signing off the
strategies in Whitehall (English Regions Network, 2008).
6.2.3. Similarly, under the new system it
is assumed that RDAs will agree draft SRS with Regional Forums.
Prosperous Places indicated that where there is a failure
to agree then RDAs will submit the document to ministers noting
points of difference. This raised the spectre that local authorities
would be marginalized and led to demands for them to be given
a "dual key" over the content of draft SRSs, alongside
RDAs. The outcome has been an agreement between England's RDAs
and the Local Government Association (2008) that strategies should
only be submitted to Ministers when they are agreed; and that
local authorities and RDAs should endeavour to agree regional
strategies in their regions, seeking ministerial intervention
only as a last resort. But whether this accord is sufficient to
mediate future stalemates and avoid Whitehall involvement is debatable.
6.3. Engaging Social and Economic Partners
(SEPs)
6.3.1. The role that regional partners,
representing business and community interests should play in future
regional working is ambiguous. The SNR did not entirely
ignore the need for SEP engagement and Prosperous Places
was keen to stress its importance—"Stakeholder engagement
needs to be meaningful and to contribute to building consensus
around the regional strategy" (op cit., p. 34). Nonetheless,
as Leslie (2008, p. 8) observes, "the forums for this engagement,
and more importantly the basis on which such engagement might
occur, were not detailed". It is envisaged that stakeholders
will be consulted on SRS options, but they will not be party to
the initial stages of identifying issues and opportunities, nor
will they participate in determining strategy direction. Whitehall
is not keen to prescribe how SEPs should be involved, but the
danger is that giving RDAs discretion over arrangements for SEP
engagement, including funding, may be used to bypass unwelcome
policy perspectives.
6.4 SRS delivery
6.4.1. A recurrent difficulty in delivering
regional strategies lies in ensuring that the activities of NDPBs
and major infrastructure providers located in the regions are
aligned with strategic priorities. Prosperous Places offered
a welcome acknowledgement that SRSs,
"should also influence the policies, plans
and investment decisions of central government departments and
public agencies (including the Environment Agency, the Highways
Agency, the Homes and Communities Agency, Jobcentre Plus, the
Learning and Skills Council, the Technology Strategy Board and
Natural England" ( p 28)
To enable RDAs to secure a grip on implementation
the Government is considering incorporating delivery plans into
SRSs, "setting out actions and investment priorities, and
the nature of accountability arrangements for such a plan"
(op cit, p 35). The case for their inclusion is compelling
because "the contribution of national departments and Agencies
to regional priorities is critical to regional success" (England's
RDAs, 2008 p 3). Nonetheless, it is unclear how the better alignment
of existing strategies, "regionally relevant" expenditure
and the activities of key government departments and their agencies
is to be secured (Core Cities et al, 2008). In terms of
vertical coordination, the SNR also envisages the devolution
of much RDA activity to the sub-regional level and should, therefore,
take account of the network of Local Strategic Partnerships and
associated Local Area Agreements. As yet, however, it is undecided
how these mechanisms will connect with the SRS process.
6.5. Securing sustainable development
6.5.1. The SNR's economic "pedigree"
prompted anxieties that business led RDA boards would not be well
suited to the task of developing SRSs in the context of sustainable
development principles. "Each region will be set a regional
economic growth objective. Regions will also be expected to work
with key stakeholders to set out plans for housing growth"
(op cit, p 93). Furthermore, the 2007 Comprehensive Spending
Review, "significantly simplifies the RDAs' objectives, replacing
the current tasking framework with a new outcomes framework defined
by a single growth objective" (HM Treasury, 2007, p 264).
Prosperous Places endorsed the RDAs' role in delivering
a growth target, but this was tempered by the need to achieve
economic growth within the broader parameters of sustainable development.
RDAs have also acknowledged "the core interdependency of
"economic" and "sustainable" development practices
in drawing up SRSs, rather than seeing them as competing objectives'"
and that "this `new approach' must be a fundamental principle
of SNR implementation" (England's RDAs, 2008, p 2).
6.5.2. The Sustainable Development Commission
(2008), however, has described this narrowing of RDA activity
as highly significant and deeply disturbing. While conceding that
Prosperous Places acknowledged the need for an integrated
approach to agreeing economic, environmental and social priorities,
the Commission questioned what this might imply and how economic
growth can be made compatible with environmental and social sustainability.
"Adding the word `sustainable' before `economic growth' simply
is not sufficient to address this" (English Regions Network,
2008, p 10). Moreover, while Prosperous Places repeatedly
referred to the need for climate change mitigation and adaptation,
other environmental issues—water supply, waste, biodiversity,
air and water quality, landscape and the built environment—receive
slight attention and the social dimension is similarly neglected
(Sustainability East, 2008).
6.5.3. It is envisaged that the first step
in preparing SRSs should take the form of "economic assessments"
undertaken by local authorities to provide the necessary evidence
base and intelligence to identify regional priorities. No explicit
reference is made to social and environmental measures and in
their absence it is difficult to see how the promise of "integrated"
regional strategies can be accomplished. In part these tensions
reflect differences between the SNR and Prosperous Places.
While the former had an explicit economic development and regeneration
focus, the latter can be seen to be grappling with the political
and administrative realities of a more holistic approach.
6.4. The regional accountability gap
6.4.1. Reliance on decentralising powers
to a multiplicity of sub-national public bodies, as well as local
and sub-regional partnerships, has created a labyrinth network
of institutional relationships in which it is often difficult
to determine "who does what", "who spends what"
and, equally important, "who is accountable". Assemblies
have limited democratic authority and the RDAs' direct public
accountability has constrained their legitimacy in the regions.
6.4.2. In circumstances where there are
no directly elected regional bodies the SNR asserted that
if responsibilities are to be further devolved clear accountability
and public scrutiny arrangements need to be in place alongside
an inclusive approach to the development of regional strategies
(op cit p 8). In particular, plans to abolish Assemblies
and boost the RDAs' roles have focused attention on the need to
develop mechanisms to secure accountability for regional policy-making
and delivery through existing elected national and local bodies.
Nationally, the Government has endorsed both regional select and
grand committees. At the regional level various models are being
advocated including:
— Regional policy-making bodies, led
by boards appointed by and from local government, with other members
chosen by ministers as a way of internalising the tensions inherent
in achieving sustainable development,
— Regional boards, comprising representatives
from key government bodies, local government and co-opted members,
chaired by regional ministers, to take responsibility for agreeing
a small number of high level regional targets—embryonic
Regional PSAs—whose delivery would be supported by a small
number of regional delivery partnerships,
— Regional local authority grouping,
sitting alongside RDA boards, exercising co-decision making over
the signing off of the SRS and scrutiny of the RDAs' performance.
The relationships involved in such arrangements
are complex. For example, local authorities can be expected to
play parallel roles: providing the "building blocks"
for the SRSs through local economic assessments, working with
RDAs in preparing and signing off SRSs, scrutinizing the Agencies'
activities and also delivering RDA sponsored programmes.
7. CONCLUSIONS
7.1. The SNR and Prosperous Places
are the latest set of proposals aimed at developing a more coherent
and integrated approach to policy-making and delivery in England's
regions. Making RDAs "strategic" regional authorities
responsible for developing and implementing SRSs could reduce
inconsistencies and overlaps between strategies. Encouraging Regional
Forums to engage in SRS preparation and scrutinise the RDAs' activities
can also be regarded as a means of securing the Agencies' regional
accountability, providing a basis for further decentralization
and drawing leading local politicians into regional debates. Furthermore,
strengthening sub-regional working can be seen as a way of assigning
decision-making to a spatial level that more accurately reflects
socio-economic realities.
7.2. A less sanguine assessment is that
implementation of the SNR carries significant risks for
the delivery of key government policies. Apart from disrupting
established joint working arrangements, it is uncertain whether
the reforms will deliver their twin aims of increasing economic
growth and regional accountability. Central government will continue
to retain control over key sub-national policy decisions and resources
and it is unclear how the alignment of multiple policies administered
by a plethora of region-based, government bodies is to be secured.
7.3. Anxieties also remain about the RDAs'
capacity to combine their responsibilities to Whitehall, local
authorities and other stakeholders. The Agencies are primarily
responsible to central government and suggestions that they will
become more accountable to Regional Forums should be treated with
caution. Indeed, the risk is that authorities will be left with
only a consultative role. Moreover, while the focus of Forum scrutiny
can be expected to be on RDAs, how far this might extend to assessing
the performance of other public bodies is undecided. In some cases,
regional ministers have taken the chairs of regional partnership
bodies and while this might be perceived as meeting the regional
leadership gap that RDAs are unable to fill they, too, are responsible
to central government and lack a regional democratic mandate.
7.4. Proposals for SRSs have been broadly
welcomed, but concerns remain about the transfer of the spatial
planning function from Assemblies to RDAs. The SNR perceived
the RDAs' roles as Regional Planning Bodies responsible for drafting
integrated regional strategy being "different and distinct
from their responsibility for overseeing delivery of the economic
growth elements of the regional strategy" (p. 95). In practice,
however, such divisions may become blurred and fears remain about
whether an analysis that gives pre-eminence to economic considerations
in the design of sub-national institutional arrangements is compatible
with delivering sustainable development. This is evident in the
ambiguities surrounding the role of the RDAs; while Prosperous
Places stressed that the Agencies should become responsible
for setting the economic, social and environmental objectives
for their regions, simultaneously, they are promised a simplified
performance framework based on a single overarching growth objective.
Demands that RDAs prepare concise SRSs rapidly could also give
rise to potentially unrealistic expectations and merely transfer
the resolution of policy tensions to the sub-regional level.
19 September 2008
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