Supplementary memorandum from Dr Paul
Benneworth, Newcastle University
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
1. The Business and Enterprise Select Committee
announced a call for evidence on the implications of the recent
publication of the Government response to the consultation around
the Sub-National Review. This falls within the current ongoing
Inquiry into Regional Development Agencies_for which I have already
submitted a memorandum of evidence. This Government response,
entitled "Prosperous Places", is arguably one
of the most important documents published affecting RDAs since
"RDAs as drivers of Regional Economic Development" in
2000. In this memorandum, I offer a brief analysis of four questions
raised by the Committee:-
— Views on the creation of Economic
Investment Boards (EIBs);
— The implications of the increased
role for local authorities;
— The flexibility around Local Authority
Leaders' Boards membership; and
— Whether the proposals allow for sufficient
accountability and consultation.
THE CREATION
OF THE
ECONOMIC INVESTMENT
BOARD
2. The Economic Investment Boards are being
created as a means of allowing local partners to come together
on a voluntary basis and formalise their interaction and co-operation.
In principle, this is an exciting experiment which if successful
could be extended in the future, and I welcome the proposal in
this light. However, it must be recognised that this arrangement
is being created in a light-touch way in an institutional environment
already extremely tangled with statutory local performance frameworks
and agreements. This might undermine the willingness of partners
to participate actively in the EIBs and undermine any potential
effectiveness this innovation may have.
3. A key issue for concern here must be
the voluntary nature of the EIBs, in comparison for example with
the newly proposed statutory Multi-Area Agreements. There are
strong arguments why EIBs should be voluntary, but this reduces
their capacity to deliver "real" joining up of participants'
strategies which are driven by statutory requirements. The requirement
for EIBs to show how their proposed powers do not duplicate powers
already exercised elsewhere appears to be an additional hurdle
that will undermine any momentum or excitement this new opportunity
may generate. BERR should not underestimate the external support
and encouragement local partners will require for this to succeed.
INCREASED ROLES
FOR LOCAL
AUTHORITIES
4. Prosperous Places represents a
clear shift in the involvement of local authorities in the development
of the integrated regional strategy, whilst eliminating their
involvement in the scrutiny and accountability process around
RDAs and the Regional Economic Strategy. The Leaders' Board is
constituted explicitly involving only elected members, will be
a streamlined body (2.29). However, the Leaders' Board will exercise
functions regionally that are exercised individually by local
authorities, who have significant numbers of officers operating
in support of elected members. How will officer-level support
for the Leaders' Boards be provided, effectively representing
elected leaders' collective will within the IRS?
5. The answer is likely to be a mix of from
regional councils' association and former officers of regional
assemblies, within new bodies funded by subscription, and thirdly,
from secondees and placements from member authorities. To be effective,
Leaders' Boards will need to have strong technical expertise in
regional strategy development. This is at odds with the implicit
cost-reductions emphasised elsewhere in the document. Failure
to invest adequately in Regional Strategy capacity (regional planning
and economic development officers working directly to the Leaders'
Board) will significant undermine the effective leadership exerted
by the Boards.
LOCAL LEADERSHIP
BOARDS' MEMBERSHIP
6. The Local Authorities Leaders' Board is being
set up to provide local influence over the construction and implementation
of IRSs. Prosperous Places sets out three criteria for
these boards, namely that they are streamlined, representative
and authoritative (2.29). However, what this does not set as a
principle is that they should be either delivery-focused or consensual.
Put another way, there should be consideration given in drawing
up arrangements regionally to ensuring that they will be able
to agree with one another, and with their RDA, over the form and
content of their Integrated Regional Strategy. Given that the
aim of these bodies is that they should create a cross-regional
planning framework, this omission is a grave oversight.
7. There are considerable practical risks that
if this issue is not addressed at the formation stage, then the
exceptional powers for Government intervention outlined in 2.27
will become regularised as a standard approach to regional planning.
This would led to the regular involvement of national planning
authorities in decisions of primarily a sub-regional or even local
character. The loss of capacity within regions to take hard decisions—enshrining
the `opt-out' option—will significantly undermine regions'
opportunity to maximise their own national contribution.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND
CONSULTATION
8. Following their approval by the House of
Commons on 12 November 2008, accountability for the Regional Development
Agencies and the regional elements of integrated regional strategies
will pass to Regional Select Committees from January 2009 until
the next election. This may be a positive outcome, as prior to
devolution the Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland select committees
established a good reputation for the quality of the scrutiny
of their territorial Ministries. However, there remain unclear
lines of accountability (2.49): BERR will remain accountable for
RDAs, and be held accountable by this committee whilst local authorities
will be responsible for Leaders' Board input, directly responsible
to their own electorates.
9. This creates significant accountability problems,
notably locally. How does "local accountability" function
when Integrated Regional Strategies are drawn up with significant
Central Government involvement, using the powers specified in
2.27? Secondly, how can a local citizen whose authority opposed
the Leaders' Board position express an opinion on the Leaders'
Board's decisions through the (local) ballot box? The location
of contentious facilities such as new housing or waste facilities
are highly politically sensitive, and a failure to allow local
input or accountability around these kinds of decisions will highlight
the continuing regional democratic gap, undermining regional institutions'
legitimacy and effectiveness.
January 2009
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