Policy and delivery: the National Curriculum tests delivery failure in 2008 - Children, Schools and Families Committee Contents


Letter to the Chairman from Dr Ken Boston AO

  As you are aware, I resigned as Chief Executive of the QCA on 12 December 2008. On 31 March 2009 the QCA Board was given Government approval to accept the resignation. During the interval of more than three months I was under so-called "suspension". With the belated acceptance of the resignation, the public silence imposed by that particular form of house arrest is over. I now hope again to contribute constructively to the national discussion of issues relating to curriculum, assessment, qualifications and skills, although regrettably from outside the system rather than from within.

There is however one matter which I believe it is proper to raise first with the Select Committee, rather than in the media.

  In his prepared statement to the House of Commons on the release of the Sutherland Report on 16 December 2008—and in his answers to Michael Gove and David Laws—the Secretary of State for Children, Schools and Families set out to demonstrate (1) that I had been complacent in my management of the delivery of the key stage tests; and (2) that I had repeatedly been pressed for answers by Ministers on numerous occasions, the most recent being 17 June 2008, and had given them strong reassurances that the tests were on track. He drew heavily on paragraphs 4.92 and 4.93 of the Sutherland Report (page 77) and on paragraph 4.137 (page 85). The Secretary of State and the Schools Minister, Jim Knight again relied extensively on these three paragraphs in their evidence to the Select Committee on Children, Schools and Families on 4 February 2009.

  Paragraph 4.92 quotes evidence given to Lord Sutherland by Jim Knight, who says that he met with me and David Gee, the head of the NAA (the assessment division of QCA) on 17 June. Knight's evidence implies that I was complacent and disengaged at the meeting, and left everything to David Gee. Paragraph 4.93 refers to DSCF's notes of the meeting, at which I am alleged to have been present.

  This is fiction. I was not at the meeting Jim Knight arranged with David Gee, nor had I been asked to attend. The DCSF note of the meeting does not in fact list me as one of the attendees. Further, there was no meeting between Jim Knight, David Gee and me, on any date during the period covered by the events into which Lord Sutherland was asked to inquire.

  Paragraph 4.137 (page 85) is about the escalation of risk by QCA to DCSF during the test delivery period up to the time of the failure, which became apparent on 25 June. It was quoted in full by the Secretary of State in the House of Commons, and again two months later in his evidence to the Select Committee and reads as follows:

    "In practice what happened in 2008 was that DSCF observers escalated their own assessment of risks to the DCSF ministers on a number of occasions. On this basis, ministers usually pressed QCA's Chief Executive for answers. At this point, because information was not being escalated within QCA effectively, ministers were given strong reassurances by QCA that all was on track. As late as 17 June when the Schools Minister met QCA's Chief Executive and NAA's Managing Director, they provided reassurances."

  This too is fiction. Not only was I not present at 17 June meeting, but until the delivery failure at the end of June I had had only two meetings with the DCSF Ministers in 2008. David Gee was present at neither of them. On 18 March the QCA Chairman, Sir Anthony Greener and I met with Ed Balls and Jim Knight—at QCA request—to discuss the future of the QCA. The national curriculum tests were mentioned only briefly and in passing, and no specific delivery issues were raised by Ministers. On 2 June, the Chairman and I met with Ed Balls and Jim Knight on a range of matters, including the tests: as I advised Lord Sutherland, I did indeed on that occasion reassure the Secretary of State that earlier problems with marker recruitment, marker training and the distribution of scripts had been overcome, and I did so on the basis of evidence which I believed to be sound.

  I was not asked to meet directly with the Schools Minister in the months leading up to the delivery failure at the end of June, including the critical marking period in the final eight weeks. Nor was I being "pressed" by Ministers for answers on the telephone or by email. There was a flurry of meetings once the delivery failure occurred (2, 3, 24 July and 6, 14 August), but these meetings were about recovering from the failure process, conducting the review of scripts returned by schools because of problems with marking, concluding the contract with ETS and tendering for a new supplier for 2009. They were not about the causes of the delivery failure and the events leading up to it, which were the matters on which Jim Knight was asked to give evidence, and on which Lord Sutherland reported.

  During the test delivery period, QCA was of course closely monitoring the blogs and the many reports in the media about problems with ETS, and working around the clock to resolve every issue which arose. We were in close contact with DCSF officials, who were also monitoring the situation. Many of the problems were successfully addressed by ETS, but some quite major ones could not be resolved. Many allegations proved to be false, such as the assertion that ETS was employing a first year undergraduate to mark Key Stage 2 papers: he had in fact been employed by a school to assist in the review of marked returned scripts.

  The flawed evidence on which paragraphs 4.92, 4.93 and 4.137 of the Sutherland Report is based has been used to portray me as complacent, disengaged, and constantly beleaguered by Ministers with questions I was unable to answer. This is far from the truth; it was not corrected by Ministers or DCSF officials at draft report stage; and it has been used by Ministers to my serious disadvantage.

  All this had no bearing on my decision to resign. Clearly however, the record should not be allowed to stand. The Secretary of State and the Schools Minister owe an explanation to Lord Sutherland, to the House of Commons, to the Select Committee, and to me. And the explanation cannot be that Jim Knight was simply mistaken about the date on which he thought he met with David Gee and me, because there was no other meeting with which it could reasonably have been confused; nor that there were occasions other than 2 June when I was pressed by Ministers for answers, because that is simply not true.

15 April 2009






 
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