Examination of Witnesses (Questions 340-359)
22 APRIL 2009
DR KEN
BOSTON
Q340 Chairman: David Bell said
that he wanted you out by March 2009?
Dr Boston: Before March 2009.
His argument was that he would prefer not to have me identified
with the delivery of the 2009 tests. He was seeking a resignation
before or on the date of Sutherland's report.
Q341 Fiona Mactaggart: From this
Committee's point of view, we do not need to deal just with a
spat, much of which has been properly dealt with by the Sutherland
inquiry. While you might contest some things in it, actually much
of its account is universally accepted.
Dr Boston: I agree.
Fiona Mactaggart: It is accurate, powerful
and teaches us some lessons that we need to learn. The issue that
this Committee needs to focus on is whether it is possible for
Ministers to delegate their responsibility for mission critical
things. One of the things that you have said about Ofqual is that
it is critical that it has a further distance from Ministers.
I shall quote another piece of evidence that Jim Knight gave to
Sutherland, when he said, "if you looked at it theoretically,
you would say that ministers are delegating the scrutiny and challenge
function to the Board that we appoint. We have our observer on
the Board in the form of a Director General monitoring and taking
part in discussions, and then we have regular meetings with the
Chair who we also appoint—and that is a major decision for
us—and that in many ways ought to be it. But beyond that
theory, the reality clearly is that some of these tasks that they
are doing are so mission-critical that we need alongside that
arrangement to be satisfied for ourselves that things are going
well." That is a way of saying that these arm's length bodies,
substituting people like yourself, with professional, long-term
standing in the field of examinations and assessment, for full
ministerial responsibility, just don't work, because people will
always turn to Ministers. One of your contestations is that they
have not done that enough.
Dr Boston: I am sorry. They have
not done what enough?
Fiona Mactaggart: The public have not
pointed the finger sufficiently at Ministers. You are saying that
giving Ofqual greater distance from Ministers will assist with
this purpose, but Jim's point and this discussion show that that
distance will always be a fiction. The public will always require
Ministers to be accountable.
Dr Boston: Yes. I think that is
true. There are occasions when Ministers would be better to push
back and stand back from issues and let bodies such as the QCA
or Ofqual as the new regulator deal with it. One problem that
has emerged from time to time is that Ministers have almost become
arbiters between the regulator on one hand and a body contesting
something with a regulator on the other hand. I can think of various
examples where that has happened with subject associations and
other groups. I think that is a problem for Ministers. They would
be far better to stand back and stand well away.
Q342 Fiona Mactaggart: But is
not that exactly what you are complaining that Jim Knight did?
That he did not keep pushing you and pressing you and so on? That
he actually did what you are saying Ministers should do?
Dr Boston: No, I think I have
said twice at this meeting that if I had met with Jim Knight once
a week for the critical eight weeks of the delivery, the problem
would still have occurred, the failure would still have occurred.
Fiona Mactaggart: Absolutely. You said
in your evidence to the inquiry that you were unaware of any escalation
between 6 and 25 June, which is a critical period.
Dr Boston: I am not saying that
frequent meetings of that sort, or Jim, could have solved the
problem at that point. It was our problem to solve.
Chairman: I am sorry but we have to move
on. Other people need to ask questions.
Q343 Derek Twigg: When I was a
junior Minister for a short period before I moved to another Department,
we discussed this issue of online marking and the marking system,
which you were advocating at that point. As you have outlined,
there were difficulties in moving to that system. I will come
back to that, as it is one of the key points you have raised today.
I want to get one thing clear. Are you accusing Ministers of lying?
Dr Boston: No, I am simply saying
the evidence in the report is wrong.
Q344 Derek Twigg: So, on the basis
of the meeting it could be a genuine mistake, but you find it
difficult to believe because surely a civil servant should have
told the Minister?
Dr Boston: I find it difficult
to believe because there is no other meeting it could possibly
be confused with.
Q345 Derek Twigg: That a Minister
would actually come to a Committee or submit to an inquiry and
tell a blatant lie would be quite amazing, knowing there was no
evidence. So it probably was a genuine mistake, on the part of
the Minister at least.
Dr Boston: Whatever it was, it
was wrong.
Q346 Derek Twigg: Let us get some
dates clear: I am sure it would not have made a great deal of
difference to what happened but in order to get it on the record.
You used a couple of dates. You said you first became aware of
the problem on 25 June and you said that people—presumably
in the Department—knew on 26 June. Jim Knight's letter says
that "the first time QCA notified Ministers that ETS would
not deliver test results on time was 30 June". Which is it?
On one hand, the Department is saying 30 June and you are saying
26 June. I am not saying it would have made a great deal of difference
to what happened but it is useful to have it on the record.
Dr Boston: I am quite clear that
after we obtained from ETS the formal letter it had to provide
us with under the contract, which is called a duty to warn, which
we received on 27 June, the director general Jon Coles was briefed
on that day.
Q347 Derek Twigg: So it is 27
not 26 June now? You said 26 before.
Dr Boston: The 26th was the day
we wrote to ETS and sent an e-mail saying it had to reply to us
in terms of this duty to warn. I understand that there was a telephone
conversation with the Department on that day telling it that that
had occurred.
Q348 Derek Twigg: The 26th or
27th?
Dr Boston: The 26th. Then on 27th
there was further contact when we had the letter from ETS.
Q349 Derek Twigg: So you are clear
it was the 26th not the 30th?
Dr Boston: Yes.
Q350 Derek Twigg: You have rightly
and openly set out that you accept responsibility, but actually
you want to take someone else with you, for whatever reason that
may be. As far as I can tell, based on what you have said, the
key point—you will correct me if this is wrong—is
that there were always going to be problems with the manual system,
although we have had it for God knows how many years and we have
not had this situation occur. However, you believe that moving
to an online marking system was the key point in terms of trying
to solve this problem of uncertainty over delivering these results
on time. Am I correct in saying that?
Dr Boston: Onscreen marking.
Derek Twigg: Onscreen marking, right.
You alluded to the point that the Ministers were somewhat reluctant
to adopt onscreen marking, on the basis that it was a risk; 2006
seemed to be the key point, and you said you might have resigned
at that point. If you do not mind me saying so—again, correct
me if I am wrong—there was a slight insinuation that we
were more bothered about the results not being as good if we went
to the new system, and therefore affecting the league tables and
the general Government policy about improving education, than
about those technical problems and the risk in moving to the new
system. Which was it, in your view?
Dr Boston: It certainly was not
the case that there was risk in the system; this is proven technology
and it is used widely throughout the world for school marking.
It is used here extensively, with the general qualifications.
It was not the risk. As far as I was concerned, the clear stumbling
block finally was the unpredictability of what might happen and
the fact that the results would be different. They might be better,
or worse, but the one thing that you could be certain of was that
they would not be the same.
Q351 Derek Twigg: When did you
have the final conversation about this issue, in terms of a decision
by Ministers? You mentioned 2006 as being a key part for you,
and a time when you could have resigned.
Dr Boston: I do not have the date
of the final decision, but it would have been late summer and
certainly before the ETS contract was finally let. I say that
because one of the things that we wanted ETS to do, if the delivery
had been successful and we had kept ETS on contract, was the phased
introduction—potentially—of onscreen marking over
a period of time, if we could get ministerial agreement for it.
It was actually built into the contract that there would not necessarily
be manual marking for five years; manual marking could transform
into other forms of delivery. Of course, ETS is a major international
player in that field.
Q352 Derek Twigg: I just want
to confirm that you believe that that was the key to stopping
the problem occurring?
Dr Boston: The key to avoiding
this problem in the future is exactly what Lord Sutherland has
recommended: end-to-end testing of systems of onscreen marking.
Q353 Annette Brooke: As you have
been talking, Ken, I have been reminded of the Foster report regarding
the Learning and Skills Council, which found fault with the Department
for Innovation, Universities and Skills, as I recall, and also
identified complacency and so on in the Department, as well as
finding major faults with the LSC and the way that it had handled
the capital programme and capital bidding. So it seems to me that
the point that you have made this morning is absolutely critical,
which is that everything follows on from the very limited terms
of reference for the Sutherland inquiry—the very fact that
the Government were left out of that inquiry. I think that your
evidence has confirmed that. I am not at all clear what these
DCSF observers had to do and I cannot see how they got left out
of the equation, because I presume that they have been hearing
everything that has been going on. Could you give me a little
more information on the status of the observers? Do they just
sit and listen, and not go and report anything back? I realise
that that question is a little difficult for you to answer. None
the less, it seems to me that the nub of this issue is that you
are accepting your bit of the responsibility, but the Government
and the officials have not actually had the questions really asked
of them.
Dr Boston: Lord Sutherland has
also put his finger on this, in that he is calling for clarification
of the role of observers. In practice, what happens is that observers
are there to represent Ministers and the Department. They take
part in discussions. There is an exchange of views and that is
very helpful in the main. It is good to have that exchange and
to have that interaction. The problem arises, as I have said,
when they are conveying ministerial impressions and we get to
the point where we are actually negotiating the QCA's advice with
them, rather than listening to what they have to say, challenging
it, pushing it hard and getting everything from them we need so
that we can then say, "Well, we will write this advice so
that the Ministers know what we think they need to hear, rather
than simply what you think they might want to know." It varies
so much from committee to committee and from role to role, and
I am quite uncertain what the observers do when they go back to
the Departments. Do they sit down and brief Ministers and write
notes for them, or do they brief other sections of the Department,
which would probably be very helpful? In short, there needs to
be clarification of their role. Frankly, although Ofqual has talked
about having observers at various levels on its committees, and
indeed on its board, my advice would be that it is making a mistake
right from the start. We do not want organisations that are distant
and apart, but a good exchange of information between them. But
we do not want to be too cosy if finally Ofqual has to assert
true public independence and accountability to Parliament.
Q354 Annette Brooke: That openness,
transparency and clarity seem to be really important, and there
are lessons to be learned. You have used the terms "sexed-up
evidence" and "flawed evidence", and we can play
around with the dates and with who knew what, but you actually
go on to say that it was used to portray you as complacent, disengaged
and constantly beleaguered by Ministers. If that is the case,
it seems to me that the outcome is more serious than playing around
with the dates on who said what and when. I would like you to
confirm that you feel that, as a consequence of some misinformation
being put into the system, you have suffered in the way you described
in your letter.
Dr Boston: I find the remarks
offensive because they are untrue, but I am a resilient old bugger
and at the end of the day it does not matter all that much, but
it needs to be corrected.
Q355 Mr Pelling: You answered
Graham Stuart by saying that you felt the Minister should resign.
Why do you think he should resign?
Dr Boston: Did I say that?
Mr Pelling: That was the impression I
got, but perhaps you did not.
Dr Boston: I did not say that.
Chairman: You did not say that in those
terms.
Dr Boston: I do not have a view
on that. People make up their own minds, and I made up mine. Presumably
Ministers are also, from time to time, confronted with difficult
decisions.
Q356 Mr Heppell: I am a little
worried. I think that one of my colleagues said that they thought
your letter was intended to divert attention away from discussion
of what actually happened—I am not sure whether that was
its intention, but it certainly has diverted attention from what
is relevant. I share Lord Sutherland's view that it does not really
make any difference to what the final result would be. I am not
quite sure about your use of emotive language such as "sexed-up",
because even though you have not said that the Minister lied,
just as you did not say that he should resign, there is almost
an implication in the things you have said to the Committee that
would suggest that. I would like to clear up a couple of things.
Are you saying that DCSF observers would report to you as well
as to the Department?
Dr Boston: No, I do not think
that they would report to me at all, or to the QCA. On your first
point, I agree, as I have said to the Committee, that had 4.137,
4.92 and 4.93 not been in the Sutherland report, I still would
have resigned. There is no question about that. On the other hand,
at the end of a 45-year career in education, I do not wish to
be portrayed by a Minister as complacent and as unengaged—disengaged—when
it is absolutely untrue and unfair and based on absolutely false
evidence. I believe that needs correction and it needs correction
publicly.
Q357 Mr Heppell: I think you are
right. I think that you have a right to be annoyed that you never
received a copy of the letter that actually did correct that.[10]
That was not made public at the time, and I think that is something
that most members of the Committee would accept, but I would like
to move on beyond that if I may. One of the things you said to
us—and it really worries me—was about walking the
high wire act and that this is such high risk. I just found it
impossible to believe that we need to accept the idea that, just
about a week before the thing was to finish, you had not realised
that it was going to fail almost completely. You say, "Well,
we were looking at things, we were spotting the problems and we
were doing things to try to put them right." But to actually
say that you had not recognised that this was going to fail when
there was just a week to go—I just cannot believe that.
I mean if that is the case, we might as well not have you at all.
Part of your role is to identify where there is something wrong
and, actually, the idea that the Minister was pestering you—I
have had these arguments before. People say to me, "Get in
touch with us when you need something," and I say, "Well,
I won't know if I need something until you tell me when there
is something wrong." So the Minister was not going to pester
you until you knew something. Effectively, what you are saying
is that it was a week before the thing was finished and you still
did not know there was a problem. There must be a system where
you could be better informed than that.
Dr Boston: We have gone over this
in the Sutherland report and in our submission to the Sutherland
report and so on. The management information we were getting was
poor and it was conflicting. We had the situation where on 3 July,
when we knew it had failed on the 25th/26th, the president of
ETS America was sending us an e-mail saying, "We are going
to make it. We are going to get there by the 8th," while
his local guy was presenting us with data which clearly showed
that it was impossible that that was going to be achieved.
Q358 Mr Heppell: I recognise what
you are saying about conflicting stuff, but surely you should
have had a system in place that actually spots that something
is going wrong?
Dr Boston: The series of daily
meetings we had on the detail of all of this, given the evidence
that we were getting from ETS, indicated that we were on course.
You are right to point to what seems—what clearly is—a
major problem: that right up until the end of June, 25 June, as
the guy running the place, the information that I was getting
was that we were going to make it safely.
Chairman: We have got to cut you there
Ken, because Edward has not had a chance of a question. Sorry,
John.
Q359 Mr Timpson: I shall try to
hold a positive note. It has been a very illuminating session
and I think what has come out of it is that from the time that
you were aware of failures within the QCA delivery, you have acted—from
what I have heard and read—honourably through that process
and taken a lot of the flak for the failure of many others, not
just yourself. I know that you are also keen to continue to contribute
to the educational system, particularly where it comes to qualifications
and curriculums and so on. To that end, what advice have you got
for the Committee on how the procurement process—for the
delivery, for the service provider, for 2010 onwards, of testing—should
take place to ensure that we do not end up in this position again?
Dr Boston: I would simply say
that the key things that we need to look for are to move immediately
and sharply into onscreen marking and increasingly into taking
the tests by computer, onscreen—working with the tests,
delivering the tests—and with the sort of diagnostic feedback
that onscreen marking can provide to schools, which is immensely
important in shaping their further programmes and interventions.
That is the key thing that we should be looking for.
Chairman: Ken Boston, we have had a good
session. I hope that you feel you have had a fair hearing. I hope
that you feel you have been asked some searching questions. I
know that you intend to stay in the education sector, making a
contribution. This Committee would very much value a considered
piece of work if you have the time to do it. Your original comment
when you took over the job was that we are still in a cottage
industry using quill pens and ink. We have not in those six years
moved very far from that, as you said in your evidence today.
This Committee would very much like, before this inquiry is finished
and we write it up, some piece that is not about what happened
but about how you would get us from that cottage industry to the
system that you would like. I would also like you to consider
that this Committee in its former report said that there was too
much testing and assessment, and one small victory we have had
is that we do not have quite as much testing and assessment as
we had last summer. Thank you very much for your attendance.
Dr Boston: Thank you very much,
Mr Chairman.
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