Examination of Witnesses (Questions 360-379)
RT HON
ED BALLS
MP, RT HON
JIM KNIGHT
MP AND DAVID
BELL
20 MAY 2009
Q360 Chairman: I welcome the Secretary
of State, the Schools Minister and the Permanent Secretary to
what will be a quite brief session. We have two sessions today,
both of which are important. Secretary of State, it is customary
for you to say something to open up the proceedings.
Ed Balls: I will
do that. I start by thanking you, Mr Chairman, and the Committee
for allowing us to appear before you today, following our discussion
in February about the findings of the Sutherland inquiry and in
light of Dr Ken Boston's[1]
subsequent evidence. I wish to say from the outset that I am very
grateful for the public service given by Dr Boston during his
time as chief executive of the Qualifications and Curriculum Authority.
He made a number of important contributions that we should recognise.
I always had good relations with him during our time working together.
As Lord Sutherland's report made clear, it is also the case that,
while the primary responsibility for the delivery failure in last
year's national curriculum tests lay with the contractor, ETS,
there was also a failure on the part of the QCA to deliver its
remit. Lord Sutherland was clear in his report that QCA demonstrated
insufficient oversight of the management and risks associated
with the delivery of its biggest contract. I wish to address briefly
four issues raised by Dr Boston in his evidence. First, as the
Committee knows, the Schools Minister did, in error, conflate
two meetings with QCA management in his evidence to Lord Sutherland:
a meeting on 17 June at which Dr Boston was not present and a
meeting on 2 July when he was. The error was first brought to
the attention of the Minister on 6 February after our appearance
here. The Schools Minister immediately wrote to you, Mr Chairman,
to apologise and to Lord Sutherland. The letter and the reply
from Lord Sutherland were placed in the Libraries of both Houses
on 12 February. There was no attempt in any way to conceal or
to mislead and, importantly, in his reply of 12 February, Lord
Sutherland stated that that "clarification does not substantially
alter the points that were made" and "does not affect
my findings".[2]
Secondly, Dr Boston states that, contrary to Lord Sutherland's
findings, he was not pressed by Ministers on whether marking was
on track. In fact, as I said in the House last month, I personally
raised the issue with Dr Boston on a number of occasions: on 19
May when I asked my office to contact the office of Dr Boston
to seek, and get, reassurance that marking was on track; on 2
June at a meeting with Dr Boston; and on 6 June when I wrote to
a constituent and said that I had personally asked Dr Boston to
write to him, which Dr Boston did on 16 June. It is true that
Dr Boston did not attend the meeting on 17 June called at the
request of the Schools Minister. Instead, his subordinate, Mr
David Gee, did attend and provided similar reassurances to those
that I received directly from Dr Boston. Thirdly, Dr Boston expressed
concerns that the remit given to Lord Sutherland for his inquiry
was too narrow. In his statement on 22 April, Lord Sutherland
said, "I believe the terms of reference for my inquiry were
drawn up in a way which gave me ample scope and every opportunity
to examine the processes, roles and responsibilities of all the
key players, and that was not only QCA and ETS, but Ministers
and officials at the DCSF. I reject entirely any suggestion that
my activities during the course of the inquiry were constrained.
I am glad that Ken Boston recognises that my report was fair.
I was clear in the report that the prime responsibility lay with
ETS, but that there were significant failures in the QCA. I stand
by it strongly. I was informed in writing by Jim Knight of the
error in his evidence. As I said in my response to his letter,
the error did not materially affect any of the key findings in
my report." Fourthly and finally, Dr Boston told the Committee
that last year's failures could have been avoided if onscreen
marking had been used and that Ministers and officials had blocked
its introduction in 2006. That is emphatically not correct. While
it is true that Dr Boston was clearly in favour of onscreen marking,
it was the QCA itself that decided on the basis of trials that
were carried out in 2005 not to proceed. Indeed, in his statement
about the onscreen marking trials conducted during the 2005 test
cycle, it was Mr David Gee who said publicly, "Following
analysis, I have concluded that it is inappropriate to introduce
onscreen marking for either maths at Key Stage 2 or English at
Key Stage 3 in 2006." We have always been clear that last
year's failures let down teachers, parents, pupils and markers.
We are determined to ensure that that does not happen again. That
is why we have acted to ensure that all Lord Sutherland's recommendations
are implemented in full. We are very pleased to have the opportunity
to come and discuss this again with you today.
Q361 Chairman: Secretary of State, thank
you. Can you give us some more background on the relationship
that the Department and you had personally with Ken Boston? Ken
Boston was viewed by many people not only as a very competent
head of QCA, but someone whose reputation was broader than that.
He was a well-liked public servant. People thought that he had
come into the QCA at a very delicate time in its history. If you
remember, there had been a previous problem with a former Secretary
of State and in came Ken Boston as a really rather refreshing
force in QCA. He made a lot of friends, so people are asking what
went wrong when a leading public servant who had given great service
to education in this country falls out of favour and ends up not
only being treated in a very strange way by being put into purdah
for three or four months, but being very angry about his treatment.
What went wrong?
Ed Balls: In the 18 months when
we worked together, I never had a cross word or difficult exchange
with Dr Boston. From the beginning, we worked closely together
on issues around standards in the run-up to our announcement on
Ofqual, issues around the Williams maths report, which we commissioned
at the time, and then through the autumn, in particular, and the
establishment of Ofqual. I never had any difficulties with him
at all. I had a great deal of respect for the contribution he
made. It is certainly the case that there were past times before
I was Secretary of State when there were some individual clashes
over issues, but there was no policy issue over which there was
a clash between me or other Ministers or senior officials in our
Department and Dr Boston during those 18 months. It is also true
to say that Dr Boston and the QCA were responsible for managing
the clearly unsuccessful contract with ETS. There were significant
management and oversight errors on that contract—the biggest—which
were clearly documented in the Sutherland inquiry, and for which
Ken Boston has taken responsibility. The decision to suspend him
was taken by the QCA board and not by Ministers, and a final settlement
is being reached with Dr Boston. I understand that he is not happy,
but it very important for me to set the record straight.
Q362 Chairman: But in evidence to
this Committee, we got the very strong opinion that it was your
arrival at the Department that sparked off some of his discontent.
Dr Boston believed that you thought that he was a sort of turbulent
priest who wanted too much independence—a more independent
role—for the QCA. He specifically mentioned the discussions
about splitting the QCA into two new bodies and whether Ofqual
would really be independent. He gave this Committee the impression
that you were very worried about too much independence and that
you did not like him standing up for a more independent QCA and,
subsequently, a more independent Ofqual.
Ed Balls: That does not accord
with my impression of the facts, and I do not think it accords
with the evidence that Dr Boston gave to the Committee, in which
he clearly said that he supports the establishment of Ofqual as
an independent regulator—he thought that that was the right
thing to do. And the new QCDA will be established on the same
non-departmental public body basis as the QCA. As I acknowledged,
there were past times when there were difficult words between
Dr Boston and Secretaries of State over comments that had sometimes
been made by Dr Boston's senior staff about aspects of Government
policy. But I have to say that no such occasions arose at all
while I was Secretary of State, and there was never a point at
which I had to call, speak to or meet Dr Boston to disagree with
him over policy or the handling of it. But, of course, there was
a significant management failure last summer by the QCA.
Q363 Chairman: Dr Boston's view was
that there was a specific meeting where the future of QCA, QCDA
and Ofqual was discussed where he believed that there was a disagreement
between you and him.
Ed Balls: That meeting was not
attended by the Schools Minister; it was attended by the Permanent
Secretary and me. I actually think that those who were at that
meeting will tell you that the conversation between the Chair
of the QCA, Dr Boston and me was amicable and friendly, and that
I said that there had not been a moment during my time as Secretary
of State when there had been a disagreement. I said that.
David Bell: That is absolutely
correct. The discussion was about the detail of what was being
proposed, and, as the Secretary of State says, Dr Boston was very
clear about the value of the new independent regulator. He asked
questions and sought clarification over the role of the QCDA,
but it would be wrong to characterise that as an aggressive or
confrontational meeting.
Q364 Chairman: Let us move the personalities
to one side and come back to what Ken Boston suggests is a kind
of systemic problem. The systemic problem that he seemed to be
getting at was that it may have looked as though the QCA was independent,
but all the time there were very powerful departmental presences
at many of the meetings, and that was crucial. So what he is suggesting,
in a sense, is that, up front, it might look as though you were
allowing the QCA a high degree of independence, but actually the
men and women from the Ministry were at every meeting, reporting
back and pretty much keeping control over what his staff were
doing.
Ed Balls: I understand that, but
I feel no need to put the personalities aside, because, as I said,
at no point did I have a personality disagreement, clash, angry
word or difficult meeting with Ken Boston. Secondly, the Bank
of England is independent of the Treasury and reports directly
to Parliament. Ofqual, which we are establishing as an independent
regulator, reports directly to Parliament, independent of Ministers.
However, the QCA is a non-departmental public body. It is not
independent; it reports to Ministers, who are then accountable
to Parliament for the national curriculum and the delivery of
tests. Ken Boston was not an independent decision maker or commentator
on Government policy. At no point did he seek to do so when I
was Secretary of State, nor did any of his staff, although there
had been issues in the past. What is clear, though, is that the
QCA, on behalf of Ministers, is responsible at arm's length for
managing the national curriculum test process. It would have been
quite wrong for us to attempt to intervene in the detailed management
of those contracts; instead, Ken Boston and his senior team, with
management expertise, were paid substantial sums to deliver those
tests to that remit. As Lord Sutherland says, although primary
responsibility lay with ETS, Dr Boston and his senior staff did
not succeed in meeting that remit. We are accountable to Parliament
for that failure, but the failure was that of the QCA. That is
why Lord Sutherland made the recommendations that he did.
Q365 Chairman: It is refreshing to
hear you say that Ofqual will be as independent as the Bank of
England. That is good news to the Committee. May I take you up
on one particular point that you made—a factual one? Rather
than it being the decision of the QCA board independently to suspend
Ken Boston, we understand that it did so on the recommendation
of your Permanent Secretary.
Ed Balls: You will need to put
that question to the Permanent Secretary and accounting officer.
I am happy to say firmly on the record that at no point did I
ever seek, directly or indirectly, to make any direction to the
QCA board. Those were matters for the QCA board to decide.
Chairman: That is a different point.
I think that the record will show that you said that the QCA made
that decision independently. That is the information that we have.
Ed Balls: The QCA board? I did
say that.
David Bell: Obviously, I am not
going to divulge all the details of that confidential board meeting.
The decision to suspend the chief executive of the QCA lay with
the QCA board.
Chairman: Right. Let us leave it there;
and we will drill down on it in a moment. Derek, will you open
the questions on the Sutherland inquiry?
Q366 Derek Twigg: Just to be clear,
if I heard you rightly you said that the decision not to go on
with onscreen marking was based on the QCA's recommendation.
Ed Balls: Yes.
Q367 Derek Twigg: We had Ken Boston
here; he clearly suggested that Ministers did not go ahead because
it would have changed the results. That could have been better
or worse, which was a risk that they were not prepared to take.
He was very clear on that. You say that the organisation of which
he was chief executive made that recommendation. Why do you think
that he would come here and not say that?
Ed Balls: It is not for me to
comment on Ken Boston's evidence or motive. I cannot answer that
question. All I can do is tell you the facts. On 27 March 2008,
Ken Boston wrote to me, informing me of the way in which the QCA
was going to proceed with the marking of the 2008 tests. It proposed
online marking capture, online standardisation and online benchmarking.
At no point in all my dealings with Dr Ken Boston did he ever
make the case to me for online marking—in writing or verbally.
On 3 November 2005, David Gee, a subordinate to Dr Boston, made
a public statement entitled "Statement on the use of onscreen
marking: the 2006 NCT cycle". He said, "As I confirmed
at an earlier NCT board meeting in October, the NEA has received
the evidence from Pearson responding to the criteria set out in
the reassurance trial. Following analysis, I have concluded that
it is inappropriate to introduce onscreen marking for either maths
at Key Stage 2 or English at Key Stage 3 in 2006. The primary
driver of this decision was the impact on schools, in particular
achieving the safe return of the original scripts to schools to
time and to budget. I can therefore confirm that we will continue
with conventional marking for all key stage subjects in 2006."
That was announced by the QCA in 2005. It was the QCA's decision,
based on its analysis of the evidence. To my knowledge, there
was no ministerial involvement in that statement, but, as I said,
since I became Secretary of State in the summer of 2007, at no
point did Ken Boston raise with me or put to me the case for moving
to online marking.
Derek Twigg: At any point?
Ed Balls: At any point.
Jim Knight: I think that predecessor
Ministers had some discussion about onscreen marking.
Derek Twigg: I did when I was a Minister.
Jim Knight: But there was a very
clear statement from David Gee at the QCA that that was its decision.
Q368 Derek Twigg: Can we move on
to the letter issue? In your letter of 9 February to Lord Sutherland,
you stated that the evidence you gave to the inquiry, "was
absolutely correct in all but one regard", which was that
Ken Boston was not at the meeting, as previously stated, on 17
June.[3]
Why did you not copy Ken Boston into that correspondence?
Ed Balls: In retrospect, had we
known that Ken Boston was going to appear before the Committee
and make those points, we would have told the QCA to ensure that
he was copied in. At that time, the QCA had suspended Dr Ken Boston.
We received a submission from our staff, following, I believe,
our appearance before the Select Committee on 4 February, saying
that they had seen the error. They brought it to our attention
on 5 or 6 of February. We immediately decided that our priority
was to tell the Select Committee and Lord Sutherland straight
away, and then to ensure that it was in the public domain by placing
in both Libraries of the House our letter and Lord Sutherland's
response. In our view, it was for the QCA management and board
to pass it on to the suspended former chief executive. As I said,
in retrospect, had I known, I would have told my office to ring
the QCA and say, "You must make sure that this gets to Ken
Boston."
Q369 Derek Twigg: The difficulty
is that it was material to him, therefore he was incredulous that
he had not been copied in, and it seems strange that he was not.
Ed Balls: I understand that, but
from our point of view the imperative was that Lord Sutherland's
report was in the public domain. We had responded to his recommendations
and given evidence to you, and we wanted immediately to ensure
that Lord Sutherland and you knew, and that Lord Sutherland's
view of it was in the public domain. That is what we did. "In
the public domain" meant available to all. In retrospect,
I wish that we had also contacted the QCA board and said, "Make
sure you get this to Dr Ken Boston," but to be honest, our
assumption was that that was what they would do. Our imperative
was to make sure that it was made public. Do you want to add anything,
Jim?
Jim Knight: I think that Ken said
in evidence to the Committee that he realised in December that
I had made an error, and I regret that he did not tell me then,
and I could have corrected things sooner. Equally, I regret that,
because we told Sutherland and every member of the Committee,
and because it was on the Sutherland website and the QCA knew,
we did not directly tell Ken. Naturally, I regret the error. In
Ken's evidence to you, it looks like he thought that I was at
the meeting on 18 March that was very tense, and I was not. People
do make mistakes when recalling meetings. It is unfortunate, and
as soon as you know, you need to put the record straight. That
is what I did.
Q370 Derek Twigg: In retrospect,
if you had your time again, would you have sent him a copy of
that letter?
Ed Balls: It is not clear that
it was our responsibility to send it to a suspended member of
the QCA board. Certainly, in retrospect we should have ensured,
as well as coming to the Select Committee and making things clear
in Parliament and in public, that the QCA board sent the letter
to Ken. Therefore, I am happy to say—
Q371Chairman: We did not get an answer
from the Permanent Secretary when I asked—not a direct answer—if
he instructed the QCA to suspend Ken Boston. Let me give you a
parallel. Recently the chief executive of the Learning and Skills
Council resigned. As you know, there was a problem over capital
funding, and he went. Ken Boston's frustration was that you, and
certainly the QCA, suspended him for about three and a half to
four months, which made him unable to come to this Committee and
give evidence. He was in limbo and could not give evidence or
speak to anyone, because he was not on gardening leave—he
was suspended. We contacted him and said, "Will you come
to the Committee?" He said, "I can't, I'm suspended."
Added to that, when he eventually comes to the Committee, he finds
this letter that he had no knowledge of. So, it does look like
a bit of a conspiracy, doesn't it, when David Bell won't really
tell us whether he instructed QCA to suspend this man indefinitely?
Ed Balls: Let me ask David to
answer that in a second, but let me say first of all that the
first Ministers knew that there was an error was when Ken Boston's
subordinate, who works for him, came to a meeting, which Jim conflated
with another meeting—the first we knew about that was on
6 February. We immediately did what we thought was the right thing
to do, which was to make sure that Parliament and the Committee
knew about it—and Lord Sutherland, who has said that it
does not affect his conclusions or findings. Any suggestion that
there was any attempt to mislead or conceal is untrue. We immediately
made this known to you and then to the general public, by placing
it in the Commons Library in February. That we tried to conceal
is not true and, secondly, the idea that this was in any sense
a deliberate attempt to mislead Lord Sutherland is untrue.
Q372 Chairman: Secretary of State,
we are not saying that—we accept your explanation that it
was unfortunate that Ken Boston never got the letter. However,
set in that context, why was he put into suspension for three
and a half months and unable to talk to anyone?
Ed Balls: That is a different
point, entirely unconnected to this particular issue of the report
on the 17 June meeting. I think you will find that the Permanent
Secretary is happy to answer any questions you want to put to
him about the whole process.
Q373 Chairman: We never got a straight
answer to the last question, Secretary of State, which is why
I asked you.
David Bell: To be clear, the discussions
at that confidential personnel-related board meeting are not for
public consumption.
Q374 Chairman: It is not confidential
when one of the people there gives evidence to the Committee about
it.
David Bell: It is very clear.
The QCA had a confidential board meeting to discuss a significant
matter. What I said to you was that it was the decision of the
QCA board to suspend Dr Boston.
Chairman: Listening to your advice.
David Bell: I contributed to the
discussion, but I did not say, "You must suspend Dr Boston."
Q375 Chairman: But you are the big
boss, you are the Permanent Secretary. If you picked up the QCA
and expressed an opinion, are you telling me that it is not going
to kowtow to you?
David Bell: This, in a sense,
takes us back to previous discussions that Dr Boston referred
to. I made it very clear that the decisions regarding Dr Boston's
employment, which include disciplinary matters, rest with the
QCA. They do not rest with the Permanent Secretary. That is a
matter of fact. Any decisions made by the QCA board are made by
the QCA board.
Q376 Chairman: In any other part
of the world, in any other business, in any other sector, if you
were sitting there making a decision about someone's future, a
top member of your personnel, and the big boss was there—come
on, Permanent Secretary, we weren't born yesterday—if you
were sitting there and you articulated a view, are you telling
me that they wouldn't have said, "Yes, sir. That is the Permanent
Secretary, you are suspended for three and a half months."
David Bell: No, it would have
been quite inappropriate for the QCA to have made decisions that
were not its own. The QCA board had to make a decision regarding
suspension. In fact, I made it very clear in earlier correspondence
that any decisions regarding disciplinary matters were for the
QCA board, and the QCA board alone.
Q377 Chairman: But Ken Boston had
offered his resignation. Why didn't you just accept it?
David Bell: It was not for me
to accept.
Chairman: But you were there.
David Bell: It was the QCA board's
decision not to accept Dr Boston's resignation, not mine. I had
no locus in that matter.
Q378 Chairman: And you didn't think
it strange that taxpayers' money was going to be paying a man
for nearly four months for doing nothing.
David Bell: Well, we have proper
and well-accepted procedures that when you suspend individuals
you suspend them on full pay, pending the outcome of a disciplinary
investigation. That is what happened with Dr Boston. The QCA suspended
him on full pay and then carried out an investigation into his
conduct. That is entirely appropriate and you would find that
happening in almost all walks of life.
Chairman: Derek, sorry, I cut across
you.
Q379 Derek Twigg: A key part of what
Dr Boston said, in terms, was that basically the evidence against
him in the report was sexed up. He specifically said that your
statement, Secretary of State, was complacent and disengaged,
and that he was constantly beleaguered by Ministers with questions
he was unable to answer. I think he said that you stated that
he, Ken Boston, managed the test delivery process at arm's length
from the National Assessment Agency. What is your response to
those accusations, in terms of you misquoting him, not putting
the correct evidence and trying to blame him for the whole thing?
Ed Balls: The remit for delivering
the national curriculum tests was a remit from the QCA, of which
Ken Boston was the chief executive, and it was managed within
the QCA by David Gee, the managing director of the NAA. I think
one of Lord Sutherland's points is that ambiguity in the oversight
of Ken Boston of the work of David Gee was an issue for the QCA.
On 19 May these issues were raised in the House of Commons and
I contacted Dr Ken Boston's office to seek reassurance that the
marking was on track, and received that reassurance.I had a meeting
with Dr Boston on 2 June at which the first agenda item was marking,
because obviously we were concerned with some of the feedback
from the marking world. We were told in terms by Dr Boston that
any issues around training had been sorted out and that because
ETS was doing things in a different way, that was bound to lead
to some noise in the system, but things were under control. The
Schools Minister became more concerned in the next week or so
by reports and therefore asked for a meeting with the QCA, but
it was David Gee who attended that meeting and gave the same reassurances.
During that period Ministers regularly pressed for reassurances
and received them. It was not until 30 June that the QCA position
suddenly and substantially changed, and it was on that basis that
we moved into a different phase.
1 See also supplementary evidence to this session
from Dr Boston: Ev 73-77 Back
2
See Ev 77-79 Back
3
See Ev 77 Back
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