2 Delegation of responsibility from
DCSF to QCA
13. The Government insisted that QCA manages the
testing system on behalf of and at arm's length from DCSF. Both
the Secretary of State and the Minister for Schools and Learners
emphasised at different times that they thought it would be inappropriate
for ministers to be involved in the administration of the testing
process. They thought that to do otherwise may lead to suspicion
that they might be influencing results on the basis of which the
Government's record in education is judged.[23]
The Secretary of State explained to us the lines of responsibility
and accountability within the testing system:
It is Ministers who are accountable to Parliament,
directly and through the Select Committee, for the operation of
our schools system, including the testing regime, so in the end
the accountability comes to Ministers. …
… We are accountable for the funding of the
regime and the way that it operates. We ask a non-departmental
public body, the QCA, to deliver the tests on our behalf at arm's
length from us. The QCA then contracts independently of Ministers
with the people who do the practical delivery of the tests. So
the accountability is as follows: ETS is accountable to the QCA
for the delivery of its contract; the QCA is accountable to us
and more widely for ensuring that that contract is effectively
delivered; and I am accountable for ensuring that the QCA fulfils
its responsibilities and for the overall operation of the regime.
…[24]
14. Lord Sutherland also gave us his view of the
responsibilities of DCSF and QCA:
The DCSF set the policy, and it provides the resources—that
is its responsibility. It has to ensure that delivery is possible,
which means it must have an appropriate mechanism. It believed
it had, and on the basis of the two or three previous years it
did have, because delivery was made. Below that, we come to QCA,
which has a set of responsibilities, and so on, down the system
it goes.
In my understanding, the DCSF is responsible for
policy, resource and setting up the overall mechanism. The kind
of mechanism that is set up relates to how well it might work.[25]
15. An important part of the framework set by DCSF
within which QCA had to work is to be found in the remit letter,
issued by DCSF and accepted by QCA in March each year.[26]
This letter covers the areas for which QCA will assume responsibility
and sets out the funding to be made available. In fact, the letter
itself does not go into great detail. The letter sent by the Secretary
of State in March 2008 specifies in relation to National Curriculum
tests only that they:
…are delivered successfully in May 2008, with
an improvement in key metrics over 2007, such as quality of marking,
reduction in number of lost scripts, and an improved service to
schools. Secure timely preparation for 2009 delivery.[27]
16. The significance of the remit letter can perhaps
be viewed in terms of its symbolic nature: it is the point at
which QCA formally agrees to work within the framework of formal
and informal instructions set out by DCSF for the next year. The
Department maintains that, as a result of the issue and acceptance
of the remit letter on an annual basis, responsibility for the
matters contained in it passes from DCSF to QCA (although accountability
is arguably a different issue).[28]
Lord Sutherland noted the prevalence of the model of central
government delegating delivery responsibilities to non-departmental
public bodies and agencies. He also noted that the model of delegation
is "predicated on the sponsor department's confidence in
the NDPB's capacity and capability to deliver what is asked in
the remit letter".[29]
17. The remit letter, then, is intended to demarcate
the responsibilities of DCSF and QCA. However, there did appear
to be some confusion in relation to the degree to which QCA is
separate from DCSF in the context of policy execution. At one
point, the Secretary of State told us that:
… Ministers are accountable to Parliament for
the overall delivery of our schools policy, including the national
testing regime. It is my responsibility to ensure that that happens,
and I do so in an arm's-length way through an independent body,
the QCA, which contracts with ETS.[30]
However, he later told us that:
… the QCA is a non-departmental public body.
It is not independent; it reports to Ministers, who are then accountable
to Parliament for the national curriculum and the delivery of
tests.
Ken Boston was not an independent decision maker
or commentator on Government policy.[31]
18. Similar inconsistencies were expressed by Dr
Ken Boston. In the context of a discussion about the level of
Government control over the details of the testing system, he
said that:
The QCA's problem has been that it is not at arm's
length—to use the Government's term—yet it can end
up carrying the blame for a whole set of decisions over which
it had no control.[32]
On the other hand, in the context of test delivery
he later stated that "Ministers were not getting involved
in the detail of it at all".[33]
19. Although we do not wish to make too much of these
apparent inconsistencies—they are, perhaps, explicable in
context—it does highlight the broader issue of the extent
to which DCSF did, in fact, have a hand in the details of the
management of the testing system.
20. Ken Boston has emphasised the many areas over
which the Government had and retained control:
… the Government, through the DCSF, determine
the nature of the tests to be procured, the pupils who are to
be tested, which subjects they are to be tested in, how and when
they are to be tested and how much money has to be spent on testing.
The interval between the date of the test and the date for results—the
eight weeks' interval—is set by the Government. They also
determine whether the tests are marked manually or onscreen; which
results data are collected and how they are collected; the form
in which the data are required; and how the results are returned
to schools. In those core elements of test development and delivery,
neither the QCA nor the supplier has any discretion—decisions
are made by the Government alone. The development and the delivery
of these tests are not at arm's length from the Government; the
Ministers and the officials are at arm's length only from the
detail of the test questions, and from the marking and level setting.[34]
Many of the details to which Dr Boston referred in
this passage were not set out explicitly in the remit letter.
This highlights the fact that the framework within which QCA is
required to operate is actually a complex series of formal and
informal, written and oral instructions and policies issued by
DCSF over a period of time and not in one letter in March each
year.[35]
21. Questions arise where the remit offered to QCA
appears to be incapable of performance, the budget appears unreasonable
or both. Lord Sutherland expressed the view in his evidence to
us that it was always open to the leadership of QCA to resign
if they thought that the offer from DCSF was unreasonable and
its performance likely impossible.[36]
The fact was that they did not do so. Lord Sutherland later conceded
that resignation would be a "nuclear option" and that
alternatives would be public statements or a letter from QCA to
DCSF stating that the QCA was being asked to do too much. However,
he found no evidence of such a letter.[37]
22. Dr Boston himself told us that he had come to
regret not resigning in 2006 on the basis that he thought the
remit could not be achieved.[38]
He said that decisions made by ministers and officials in 2006
had a "marked impact" on the failure in 2008.[39]
We asked him why, when delivery of National Curriculum tests
had failed in 2004 and come close to failure in subsequent years,
he did not raise the matter publicly when he failed to make any
progress with ministers. He told us:
That is a good question, and it is one that I have
asked myself. I have frequently spoken publicly about different
approaches to testing and the problems with this particular approach
and how it was administered. I have also pressed privately for
reform with Ministers and officials—there is no question
about that. Over the past few months I have asked myself why I
did not resign in 2006. At that point it was clear to me that
I was not going to get Government buy-in to necessary reform.
I continued through 2007 and 2008 to run an organisation that
was faced with close to an impossible task, which I had seen go
belly up in 2004 and had the prospect of doing so again. Probably
my greatest regret in all of this is that I was not more honest
with myself at that time and did not simply say, "It can't
be done."[40]
23. We are reminded of a report of our predecessor
committee on Individual Learning Accounts (ILA) which detailed
the "considerable shortcomings" of another contractor
in the delivery of the ILA scheme, as well as the failings of
the Department for Education and Skills itself.[41]
In that case, the Department retained "even the smallest
details of policy design" and missed an opportunity to transfer
to the private contractor fuller responsibility for the management
of the scheme. As a result, it was unclear who was responsible,
the Department or the contractor, for specific outcomes of the
ILA project. The Committee concluded:
We do not under-estimate the difficulty of getting
right the balance between policy and delivery, but we question
whether the DfES could have been bolder and given Capita a wider
brief to deliver the desired outcomes of the ILA project.[42]
The relationship between DCSF, QCA and ETS is, of
course, quite different from the relationship between the DfES
and the contractor in the ILA case. However, there is a broader
principle here which is that, if Government is to sub-contract
certain projects, it must not attempt to micro-manage the details
of that project, for example, by over-specifying the means by
which it wishes to see delivery made or through the mechanism
of observers. The role of departmental observers within QCA will
be considered in greater detail below (paragraphs 28 to 35), but
they have essentially acted as mediators of information flowing
between DCSF and QCA.
24. We
maintain the view of our predecessor Committee, that the difficulty
of establishing the correct dividing line between policy and execution
should not be underestimated. However, we are concerned that DCSF
appears to be specifying in considerable detail the ways in which
it wishes to see its policies executed. The DCSF achieves this
both formally, through the QCA's remit letter, and informally,
through regular contact with its agency and through the mechanism
of observers.
25. We agree
with the Secretary of State that he is accountable for ensuring
that the QCA fulfils its responsibilities for the overall operation
of the testing regime. However, he is also accountable for the
policies and other decisions of his Department, including the
terms of the QCA's remit letter; and he is responsible for ensuring
that the directions issued by DCSF are capable of being carried
out by the organisations tasked with their execution.
26. If significant
areas of Government policy are to continue to be delivered by
non-departmental public bodies and other agencies, the leadership
of those bodies should be prepared to demonstrate their professionalism
by challenging the Government if they consider that the impossible
is being asked of them. Appropriate mechanisms should be put in
place to allow them to make such a challenge. We recognise that
this should never be used as a means to hold the Government to
ransom or to impede the execution of legitimate public policy.
Nevertheless, there needs to be a formal and transparent dialogue
between the Department and its agencies.
27. In anticipation of new legislation, the QCA's
regulatory function has already been split from its core activities
and hived off to the regulator, Ofqual, which is still technically
part of QCA but is operating largely as if it were already independent.
If the Apprenticeships, Skills, Children and Learning Bill is
passed, what remains of the QCA will be transformed into the Qualifications
and Curriculum Development Agency (QCDA). The Director General
of the Schools Directorate at DCSF has told us that the Government
intends for Ofqual to be entirely independent, whereas QCDA will
be "significantly less" independent and is being established
specifically as "a delivery agency of Government".[43]
28. In the light
of the repeated problems we have identified, we consider that
DCSF should, in an updated Memorandum of Understanding or equivalent
with each public body, set out more clearly how it will conduct
its relationships with those bodies. We urge the Government to
adopt a far less prescriptive approach when issuing instructions
to the new Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency. If
it is considered appropriate that policy should be executed by
an agency rather than by the Department itself, the potential
benefits of such an arrangement are significantly diluted if the
Government fails to trust the expertise and experience of the
professionals chosen to run such agencies. It is clear that micro-management
from the Department would introduce a degree of confusion into
the lines of responsibility and accountability, as previously
happened in the case of Individual Learning Accounts, investigated
by our predecessor Committee, and the mistake has been repeated
with arrangements for the delivery of National Curriculum tests.
23 Q 193; Q 364 Back
24
Q 118 Back
25
Q 251 Back
26
The remit letter for 2007-08 is at http://www.qca.org.uk/libraryAssets/media/Alan_Johnson_27_03_2007_-_Remit_ltr.pdf;
the remit letter for 2008-09 is at http://www.qca.org.uk/libraryAssets/media/Ed_Balls_to_Sir_Anthony_Greener_12032008.pdf.
Back
27
http://www.qca.org.uk/libraryAssets/media/Ed_Balls_to_Sir_Anthony_Greener_12032008.pdf Back
28
Q 364 Back
29
Report of the Sutherland Inquiry, para 3.104 Back
30
Q 126 Back
31
Q 364 Back
32
Q 326 Back
33
Q 332 Back
34
Q 311 Back
35
There is also a Memorandum of Understanding between the former
Department for Education and Skills and QCA, but this does not
appear to have been updated since the creation of DCSF; http://www.qca.org.uk/qca_4979.aspx Back
36
Q 300 Back
37
Q 301 Back
38
Q 325 Back
39
Q 311 Back
40
Q 325 Back
41
Education and Skills Committee, Individual Learning Accounts,
Third Report of Session 2001-02, HC 561-I, p3 Back
42
Ibid., para 155 Back
43
Uncorrected transcript of evidence taken before the Children,
Schools and Families Committee on 8 July 2009, HC 353-vi, (2008-09)
Q 489 Back
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