Conclusions and recommendations
The inquiries into the 2008 test delivery failure
1. We
endorse the work carried out by Lord Sutherland in exposing the
detail of the many factors contributing to the failures in the
delivery of the 2008 National Curriculum tests (Paragraph 6)
2. This inquiry provides
a good illustration of how a select committee can use its authority
and powers in a timely manner to investigate problematic incidents
as soon as they arise. Our swift action in this matter has enabled
us to put on the public record both written and oral evidence
from a party to the incident, ETS, which was not available by
the time the official inquiry was fully operational. The Sutherland
Inquiry was then able to rely on the evidence we had secured when
it became clear that ETS would not engage with the process. (Paragraph
8)
3. It is not clear
to us that the DCSF having issued parallel terms of reference
prevented Ofqual asking Lord Sutherland to inquire into the DCSF's
role, had Ofqual considered that appropriate. Lord Sutherland
chose not to consider the Department's role beyond its oversight
of the particular circumstances of the delivery of the National
Curriculum tests in 2008. However, this Committee is able to go
further than he did and comment in more general terms on the line
between policy and execution. (Paragraph 11)
Delegation of responsibility from DCSF to QCA
4. We
maintain the view of our predecessor Committee, that the difficulty
of establishing the correct dividing line between policy and execution
should not be underestimated. However, we are concerned that DCSF
appears to be specifying in considerable detail the ways in which
it wishes to see its policies executed. The DCSF achieves this
both formally, through the QCA's remit letter, and informally,
through regular contact with its agency and through the mechanism
of observers. (Paragraph 24)
5. We agree with the
Secretary of State that he is accountable for ensuring that the
QCA fulfils its responsibilities for the overall operation of
the testing regime. However, he is also accountable for the policies
and other decisions of his Department, including the terms of
the QCA's remit letter; and he is responsible for ensuring that
the directions issued by DCSF are capable of being carried out
by the organisations tasked with their execution. (Paragraph
25)
6. If significant
areas of Government policy are to continue to be delivered by
non-departmental public bodies and other agencies, the leadership
of those bodies should be prepared to demonstrate their professionalism
by challenging the Government if they consider that the impossible
is being asked of them. Appropriate mechanisms should be put in
place to allow them to make such a challenge. We recognise that
this should never be used as a means to hold the Government to
ransom or to impede the execution of legitimate public policy.
Nevertheless, there needs to be a formal and transparent dialogue
between the Department and its agencies. (Paragraph 26)
7. In the light of
the repeated problems we have identified, we consider that DCSF
should, in an updated Memorandum of Understanding or equivalent
with each public body, set out more clearly how it will conduct
its relationships with those bodies. We urge the Government to
adopt a far less prescriptive approach when issuing instructions
to the new Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency. If
it is considered appropriate that policy should be executed by
an agency rather than by the Department itself, the potential
benefits of such an arrangement are significantly diluted if the
Government fails to trust the expertise and experience of the
professionals chosen to run such agencies. It is clear that micro-management
from the Department would introduce a degree of confusion into
the lines of responsibility and accountability, as previously
happened in the case of Individual Learning Accounts, investigated
by our predecessor Committee, and the mistake has been repeated
with arrangements for the delivery of National Curriculum tests.
(Paragraph 28)
QCA and DCSF observers
8. We
have some serious concerns in relation to the role of observers
and question whether, in many cases, they are necessary. In appropriate
cases, departmental observers may perform a useful function in
helping ministers remain accountable for policy delivery in a
meaningful manner. However, formal advice to ministers from a
public body should not be negotiated through departmental observers;
nor should observers exert undue influence over the decision-making
of a public body. (Paragraph 35)
9. We concur with
Lord Sutherland's recommendation, accepted by Government, that
the role of departmental observers should be clarified. We believe
that the Memorandum of Understanding or equivalent between DCSF
and its non-departmental public bodies should, in each case, set
out clearly the appropriate role for departmental observers so
that the public can be reassured that observers are not acting
inappropriately to influence the work and decisions of public
bodies. (Paragraph 36)
Ofqual and DCSF observers
10. We
expressed our concerns in relation to the potential for departmental
observers to exert undue influence on the advice from and decision-making
of public bodies. Whilst we are content that such observers should
continue to have a role within bodies such as QCA with appropriate
safeguards, we are opposed to the presence of departmental observers
in the context of an independent regulator. The independence of
Ofqual should be put beyond question and that requires contact
between DCSF and Ofqual to be put on a much more formal footing
than is suggested by the presence of observers on Ofqual's Board.
(Paragraph 43)
National Curriculum test delivery post-ETS
11. In
line with our recommendations in our Report on Testing and Assessment
of May 2008, we welcomed the abolition of mandatory national testing
at Key Stage 3 when it was announced in October 2008 and we remain
convinced that the decision to reduce the burden of national testing
was a good one. (Paragraph 47)
12. We repeat our
warning, set out in our Report on Testing and Assessment, that
new tests should not be introduced nationally with undue haste.
We are concerned that, if single-level tests are rolled out as
a replacement for end of Key Stage testing, there is potential
for significant complexity in the logistical arrangements for
sending out, marking and returning a large number of single-level
test scripts twice each year. Evidence from the pilot studies
so far is not encouraging and demonstrates that there remain serious
problems to be overcome. We remind the Government that we are
opposed to an increase in the burden of national testing generally;
and we warn that the Government must be quite sure that the logistical
arrangements for single-level tests are robust before they are
rolled out nationally. (Paragraph 50)
13. We remain concerned
about the consequences attached to high-stakes testing. We consider
that, if children are to sit national tests, they should derive
the maximum benefit from that experience. We noted in our Report
on Testing and Assessment the benefit of receiving question-level
data for diagnostic purposes and consider this to be a valuable
step forwards. However, it seems to us that separating the marking
process from data capture risks a repeat of the delivery problems
experienced in 2008 and must surely lead to an increase in opportunity
for human error. We believe that any significant future reform
of National Curriculum testing must include an evaluation of on-screen
marking from which question-level data can automatically be derived.
(Paragraph 56)
| 
