The Balance of Power: Central and Local Government - Communities and Local Government Committee Contents


Examination of Witnesses (Questions 400-419)

PROFESSOR GEORGE JONES OBE AND PROFESSOR JOHN STEWART

8 DECEMBER 2008

  Q400  Mr Olner: Local authorities would have acted differently as regards health delivery than primary care trusts.

  Professor Jones: Primary care trusts to me are quangos. They are not democratically elected bodies which is why we support a major role for local government in the Health Service. There are various steps that one can take to achieve this; ideally the local elected authority—the local government—should be the commissioning body for health. Sir Simon Milton, when he was at the LGA (Local Government Association), suggested other means for strengthening the power of the elected council over health, appointing certain key people and perhaps being the funnel or the channel through which grants have to pass before they go into the health system or the PCT. Ideally I would like to see local authorities, as I think Sir Paul once argued, being the commissioning entity for health.

  Q401  Sir Paul Beresford: Without saying where I stand on this, would a minister not say that having listened to you they have the opposite example in child abuse and child protection recently with some pretty appalling cases where the Government has had to step in because local government has shown those failings.

  Professor Stewart: And the health authority has shown its failings.

  Q402  Sir Paul Beresford: Predominantly it starts with the social services.

  Professor Stewart: Predominantly it starts with the doctors inspecting the child. There are failures in every public body. Just to go back to the postcode lottery, I regard the words "postcode lottery" as very misleading. It is not a lottery, it is a postcode choice; it is a choice made by people as to the standard of service, the difference being the choices made in the case of local government services where people are responsible to local people and in the Health Services it is made by people unaccountable to local people.

  Q403  Chair: We have rehearsed in earlier sessions the issue of the relationship between the Health Service and local accountability and it is clearly something we will have in our report.

  Professor Stewart: It does connect with the postcode lottery.

  Chair: Indeed it does.

  Q404  John Cummings: I address my question to the two witnesses, Professor Jones and Professor Stewart. In all your vast experience in the matter under discussion, what do you believe have been the key positive developments and the retrograde steps in the relationship between central government and local authorities over the last decade?

  Professor Jones: The most positive step I think is included in the Local Government Act 2000 which gave local authorities the power of well-being to promote the economic, social, environmental well-being of their areas. It gave them a duty to prepare a strategic community plan—it is now a sustainable community plan—and this to me was a ray of hope. Here was a chance for local authorities to exercise leadership without, I thought, a set of narrow, niggling constraints. I still think that potentially that is important. Local authorities are, in many areas, starting to use those powers with imagination and ingenuity and I think that was the one positive step that I would attribute to central government in enhancing the power and discretion of local government.

  Professor Stewart: I can come in on the negative side. The negative side seems to me to be the general approach of Government, excessive legislation. The Bill that has just been presented to Parliament has been quoted where the Government is proposing to legislate on petitions submitted to local authorities. Why it requires legislation is not clear. Nobody knows; there has been no real research done on how local authorities deal with petitions. If the Government wish to emphasise the petition thing, then they could use all sorts of statements by ministers, but to legislate and lay down a complex bureaucratic procedure seems to be unnecessary. Secondly, where there is legislation, excessive prescription; I often say the committee system of local government lasted for a hundred years or more on the basis of one clause in an Act and one regulation. Now we have 190 pages of guidance; we have 15 regulations, five directives and a very detailed Act. The net effect is to cut back the scope for innovation and experiment, different authorities adopting different approaches within an executive model. It is that practice of excessive legislation and excessive prescription. The third thing is the growth of targets and their effects on the working role of the local authorities have been counter productive leading to gaming by some bodies, distorting practice in order to meet the standards required; it can distort priorities because the best way to meet a priority is to neglect other activities and services. It has become a sort of tick-box approach. If you meet the target you are all right; if you do not, you have failed. It is a very narrow form of performance management. Most of the literature on performance management suggests that your target and your performance relationship is the basis for discussion and analysis. In fact it may be that what is wrong is that you have met the target.

  Q405  John Cummings: Do you think civil servants in a department could do with perhaps spending a year in local government?

  Professor Jones: Increasingly I have come to the conclusion that the fault for much of the centralisation that John has described lies with the Civil Service. I do not think I am going to blame ministers as much as civil servants because it is civil servants who are involved in drawing up this legislation; it is civil servants who put in all the details and the over-prescription. I can understand their attitude. They are conscientious, they want to work hard and do what they think their minister wants and they of course feel that they are superior to local government officials; they think they are more competent but in fact I doubt that because the local government officials are there on the ground close to where the problems are happening, close to the people. I would much prefer to trust the local government officials than remote control by bureaucrats in Whitehall.

  Sir Paul Beresford: Ministers can say no.

  Chair: Can we bring back John because he was mid-question.

  Q406  John Cummings: I would like Professor Stewart to make a contribution as well.

  Professor Stewart: I was going to answer your question on whether I was in favour of civil servants gaining experience in local government. The answer to that is yes. I would not necessarily want to lay it down as a law or as a regulation but I believe that anybody who has any dealings with local government should have some experience of working in it. Those people who have, have told me it was one of the most revealing experiences of their working life, first of all to be impressed by much of what they found and secondly to be surprised at the sheer range of things that a senior local government officer would have to deal with as opposed to somebody in an equivalent position (apart from the permanent secretary and the very highest officials) who has a much more limited remit.

  Professor Jones: I hope you will not be led up the garden path of a unified public service. Some of the people giving evidence to you may put this. I fear that that would lead to a set of officials dominated by central government. I believe there is great value in each local authority having its own staff, loyal to it and not to some entity called the unified public service.

  Q407  John Cummings: Do you believe that we need radical or incremental change in the relationship between central and local government?

  Professor Stewart: Radical change. We have had incremental change; radical change is needed. If we believe that the balance is distorted and out of kilter then it is not going to be helped by minor changes; it needs fundamental changes in the relationship which also would involve changes in the internal way of working in central government itself.

  Q408  Sir Paul Beresford: To take you back to your answer on retrograde steps you listed examples which I agree with, do you think that those negative steps and effects on local government have been partly or to a large degree responsible for the increase in the council tax over that period?

  Professor Stewart: I am sorry? Responsible for what?

  Q409  Sir Paul Beresford: Do you think that negative and retrograde bureaucratic control has been at least in part responsible for the increase in council tax over the last decade? The cost in other words.

  Professor Stewart: I think that a lot of the things that I spoke about have had a harmful effect on local authorities, first of all by curbing innovation and secondly they have taken up the time of senior officers and senior councillors. I reckoned, purely impressionistically, that about 50 per cent of the time of senior officers is spent dealing with the plans required by Government, dealing with forms and reports, dealing with inspections and so on and so forth. That naturally takes their attention away from the running of the services. I do not know whether 50 per cent is right, but nobody does know. Central government itself should know the impact of its actions. The LGA has not done any work to actually find out how much time it actually takes. Whether or not that has led to an increase in the council tax due to an increase in expenditure or, in some cases, has led to worse services being provided, I am not certain. However, if you talk about the relationship between service and the cost; naturally with all it impacts upon the situation, it has had a harmful effect upon that.

  Professor Jones: Sir Paul has raised a very important question.

  Chair: Professor Jones, we are very time-constrained not least because we have a vote coming up at the end of the session after this one and therefore I am very conscious that we need to move on to some other questions that members want to ask, otherwise the next lot of witnesses will get squeezed down. I know that is unsatisfactory but can I ask the pair of you not to necessarily each answer and to try to keep your answers short and to the point. If you think you have not been able to say everything, send something in in writing afterwards.

  Q410  Andrew George: Do you think that the dynamics of political and media discourse in the UK at the moment would ever create the favourable conditions for a meaningful decentralisation?

  Professor Jones: That is very difficult. We are a small country. The media are a national media; they are plugged in much more to national events and national politics. You only have to look at the way the media, particularly broadcasting, treat local elections. Who are the people they have on their programmes? National politicians; ministers, shadow cabinet people commenting on the significance of these local elections. We do have a very highly nationalised media. We also have MPs who, despite their experiences in local government, once they get to Westminster seem to switch their perspective and seem to be supportive of central government.

  Q411  Andrew George: To give you an example, say we get an extreme child welfare issue which hits the national press. It is arguably a local authority issue but inevitably ministers are then asked to appear to be decisive and relevant on those occasions and therefore call for certain actions to be taken. It is that kind of discourse that I am talking about, the need for ministerial intervention on issues which appear to be at least decisions and services delivered at local authority level.

  Professor Jones: Ideally ministers should say, "This is not my responsibility; this is the responsibility of the local authority" and stand up to that.

  Q412  Andrew George: They will not say that.

  Professor Jones: If our recommendations had been accepted and the choice for local government responsibility had been made, then ministers would be much more easily able to say "It is not my responsibility, go to that authority or that authority, they are to blame". It gets back to Sir Paul's question about who is responsible for council tax. I know you have asked other people giving evidence. What is wrong with our present system in the relationship between central and local government is that it is impossible to answer the question "Who is responsible for council tax increases?" because each side blames the other and they make a plausible case because the financial arrangements are so devised that responsibility is shuttled from one to the other. Each blames the other. We are saying—and Lyons did and Layfield did—that there must be a choice and you must have a financial system that supports that choice so you will be able to say who was responsible.

  Q413  Andrew George: May I ask Professor Stewart do we presently have a local government structure or are they merely agents of central government?

  Professor Stewart: We have a local government structure but to a degree they become agents of central government but not entirely. Local authorities still have the substantial discretion, if they care to use it; they have the new duties, the new powers. One of the things that actually happened is that the impact of what has been happening in the extent of guidance, in the extent of prescription, in the setting of targets and so on and so forth, the confidence of many local authorities has been destroyed. This is a point made strongly by Michael Lyons and an important part of his analysis. One of the mistakes at the moment is that local authorities are so in the habit of getting detailed guidance that they now—some of them at least—automatically ask for guidance. If you ask civil servants why they give so much guidance they will say that local authorities ask for it. One of the results of that is the impact of all the Government action. There have been some statistics just recently that showed that a local authority had been asked to reply in September and October to 30 different pieces of consultation. Clearly that is going to absorb the time of the senior officers. In a sense we begin to establish a habit of looking up centrally rather than looking down locally.

  Q414  Andrew George: You still both say that local government is better at effective service delivery than is central government. Can you give examples or evidence to prove that that is clearly the case?

  Professor Stewart: The evidence would lie in the comparison between the capacity studies of government departments—which are not even done by an independent body but by civil servant bodies themselves—and the results of inspections of local authorities. The results of the inspections of local authorities suggest that the standard of service provided and the organisation is good. I have criticisms of the inspectorate; I have criticisms of the belief in their infallibility. There is a doctrine of not papal infallibility but inspector infallibility. I think I would rather see inspectors as partners in shared learning.

  Andrew George: Do you think the local people feel the same way? Are they champions of a more local democracy or do they not really follow the distinction between a PCT and a local authority?

  Q415  Chair: Professor Stewart, can I just piggyback on this? When you are comparing capacity studies of government departments and local councils, for the most part government departments do not deliver any service at all so you are comparing apples and pears. What about if you compare local authorities with PCTs where they are indirect service delivery?

  Professor Stewart: I would say that when you are comparing you are comparing the efficiency of management and the efficiency of management is there whether or not you are running a service or whether or not you are managing the situation, so I believe the comparison is valid. I have not actually studied the figures comparing PCT inspections with local authorities; it might be worth the Committee looking at it.

  Q416  Mr Betts: Last week three members of the Committee went to Denmark and Sweden to look at how they operate in terms of their local and central relationships. All the politicians we met could not get their heads round the Baby P approach in this country; they could not understand how national politicians who, even second hand could not be aware of what was going on in a particular local authority's children's department, wanted to take ultimate responsibility for those actions and the need to put it right. They have a very different relationship there which is embodied in the constitution. I just wondered what your thoughts were about trying to get a more formal constitutional position for local government, bearing in mind Scotland and Wales now have devolutionary positions which are agreed by this Parliament but there is no way that this Parliament would seek to fundamentally change those now without the agreement of the Scottish and Welsh people presumably through a referendum. There is a different constitutional position to be taken and I just wondered whether there is anything we can do in terms of local government that would embody local government in a more formal constitutional arrangement.

  Professor Jones: We recommended that the Concordat be beefed up. I look on the Concordat as very much a first step in devising a constitutional settlement that would encompass the relationship between central and local government. Michael Lyons called for this settlement and I think explained to you how diluted was the Concordat compared to what he had in mind. We envisage a statute—not a written constitution but a statute—that lays out important aspects about the relationship between central and local government. For instance, local government's role is to be responsible for the government of its area and the development and well-being of that area. The local authority should be primarily responsible to its own local voters and not to central government departments. There are a certain number of features that could be put into a statute and the value of having a statute is that it would not be altered except by an explicit Act that was debated and considered by Parliament. Too much of the relationship between central and local government is determined in the inner recesses of Whitehall without much public or MPs' knowledge. We are calling for a constitutional settlement embodied in a statute.

  Q417  Mr Betts: One piece of law is very much like another and if Government comes along and legislates on something to do with housing or education that is in conflict with that previous statute about the relationship between central and local government, well Parliament passes it and that is it. You do not have to pass anything special, do you, to alter it in practice?

  Professor Jones: I think we have reached the view on having a statute that that is certainly better than the present Concordat about which both local and central government seem to have totally forgotten. It is not ever prayed in aid; it has been forgotten. You could not forget if there were a statutory provision. We have reached that position also because we are sceptical about the time it would take to write a constitution, to have a full scale codified constitution that is entrenched which is what these other countries have. We are not going to get that here.

  Q418  Mr Betts: Would this statute then be something that all future legislation involving local government would have to be tested against, a bit like the human rights test on legislation which is weak but at least it is there.

  Professor Jones: We also envisage, as you know, that the central/local relationship should be monitored by some sort of independent body either an independent commission or a joint committee of the two Houses. There should be a body monitoring what is going on and if there was an incompatibility between that basic statute and some more recent bill they would be there making a statement as well as giving to Parliament and the public an annual review of the state of central/local relations.

  Q419  Mr Betts: Going back to something you said before, Sweden clearly has a more devolved local government where there seems to be a general consensus across all the political parties that that is what it should be, but central government does lay down minimum standards and people seem quite relaxed about that as though it is reasonable to have certain minimum standards across the country which local authorities can then go beyond. You seem to be against minimum standards almost per se. They said that central government thought that mental health services were not up to scratch in some areas so they laid down some minimum standards but they gave local authorities the money to meet them and everyone felt quite comfortable about that sort of arrangement. Is that something you still would not want to see?

  Professor Jones: Personally I do not think we want to see minimum standards. We have already suggested our scepticism about the minimum standards approach. You cannot really at the centre devise a minimum standard for every aspect of every service and again there are difficulties of enforcing it. We do not believe that the centre can really guarantee a minimum unified standard. We have already quoted the Health Service as showing the worst, most vivid examples of the postcode lottery. However, on your first aspect, to achieve our constitutional settlement requires cross-party agreement on these rules of the game. It is absolutely essential that this issue does not become a battle between the parties. I would hope that this select committee, as a cross party committee, would, as it were, start the campaign to get cross party agreement on the need to rebalance the relationship between central and local government.



 
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