The Balance of Power: Central and Local Government - Communities and Local Government Committee Contents


1  Context

Why this matters

1.  The debate about the balance of power between central and local government can appear rather abstract. However, we are convinced that the balance of power matters. It matters because at its heart is the challenge of improving the lives of local people and local communities, and determining where the decisions that affect them directly should be made.

2.  Even more fundamentally, it matters because the strength of Britain's famously unwritten constitution depends upon a strong democracy, and a strong democracy requires two important elements: popular participation at the local level; and popular participation at the national level. The two are interconnected. If popular participation at the grass roots continues to decline in this country, then ultimately the national body politic will not be immune from the consequences. Flourishing grass roots are only likely where local people understand what local government is responsible for in terms of both policy and resources, where they can hold to account local government for its performance, and where, crucially, they believe that local government can make a real difference.

3.   Accordingly, we have concluded during the course of this inquiry that the case for greater decentralisation is strongest when it is linked to the potential for local improvement that could not be achieved as well, or at all, by central direction, and where it increases local accountability. For Birmingham City Council the debate

starts from the issue of what we are trying to achieve—we are not interested in constitutional or structural changes for their own sake. Our case for more autonomy and devolution is simple: the UK will benefit economically and socially from returning to local government some of the powers and independence it has lost over the last century.[1]

Birmingham City Council argued further that greater autonomy in raising finance "will mean that investment is sensitive to the needs of the locality", that local management of fund raising and projects "will accelerate investment", that local political leadership "can galvanise public support and focus on delivery", and that "devolution fosters innovation—allowing us to find fresh new ways to work with the private sector to create new economic opportunities. Centralisation leads to standardisation and drives out the risk takers and the innovators".[2]

4.  One of our witnesses, Professor Vernon Bogdanor CBE, Professor of Government, Oxford University, possibly put it most strongly when he argued that decentralisation can "stimulate a sense of local patriotism which can lead to real improvements in public services. In a decentralised system of government, each local authority will strive to ensure that its own performance is better than that of its competitors".[3] Another witness, and our specialist adviser for this inquiry, Professor Tony Travers, Director of the Greater London Group, London School of Economics,[4] made the additional point that shifting the balance of power in favour of local government is an important part of enhancing local democracy, and that local democracy is important because, "if local government and local democracy were to wither and die—or were to wither too much—it is inconceivable that it would not affect Parliament, because they have the same roots."[5]

5.  During the course of this inquiry we have come to recognise the potential benefits of greater decentralisation in terms of outcomes both for local people and communities and for the democratic process. We also believe that central government would benefit too. Government departments would have more time to set strategic guidelines and to review performance if they intervened less at the tactical level, except in exceptional circumstances. Even more fundamentally, we feel there is much for the centre to gain from a vibrant local democracy, and such gains are more likely to occur where local government is seen as commanding its own destiny. We will explore later the areas where we see most benefit in greater decentralisation.

6.  We also recognise, however, that there are serious challenges which any government intent on local government reform would encounter. If these challenges are to be overcome, they must be recognised and understood. To begin with, any report addressing the relationship between local and central government must acknowledge the extent to which the recent history of local government reform shapes the current challenges.

A brief history of local government reform

7.  England has for centuries had a tradition of decentralised power. Following the birth of modern local government in the nineteenth century, local government led the way in establishing and delivering services and tackling the problems facing the local community: for instance by developing gas and electricity supplies, building schools and hospitals, and providing better public facilities. Perhaps the most famous example is Joseph Chamberlain's Birmingham.

8.  Joseph Chamberlain was elected Mayor of Birmingham in 1873. In three years of relentless activity, he turned a somnolent, insular council into a paragon of municipal virtue. Under Chamberlain, the council bought the local gas and water works companies as a means of improving the lives of Birmingham citizens. Landlords were obliged to connect to the town water supply, streets were paved and lit, six public parks were opened, public transport was introduced and a town hall was built. Chamberlain's last project, before he departed for national politics, was to plan the regeneration of the town centre using retail development down Corporation Street as the main driver—a policy which still resonates today.[6]

9.  Today, however, England is one of the developed world's most centralised democracies. The centre controls virtually all taxation, and power has followed money. Over the period since 1945 power and authority have moved upwards within the English political system, as expectations of government responsibilities for improving individual lives have risen with the advent of the welfare state, and as parliamentary and governmental attention has turned from governing overseas territories to directing domestic policy.

10.  Across a whole swathe of issues with a strong local dimension, including health, education, housing, planning, and regeneration, post-war governments of whatever political hue have wholly or partly taken responsibility away from local government. Appointed bodies ("quangos") have proliferated and they, schools, non-governmental agencies and private companies have all come to have a part in the delivery of public services. There has been an increase in oversight and regulation. Schools' funding has been ring-fenced. The non-domestic rate has been nationalised. Local domestic taxation has been capped. In many areas housing associations and arm's-length management organisations, rather than councils, have assumed responsibility for social housing.

11.  In sum, local government powers and responsibilities have been pushed both upwards to central government, and sideways and downwards to the regional arms of central government and to other local bodies. There has been less emphasis on local government having a unique local role. As Professor George Jones OBE, Emeritus Professor of Government, London School of Economics, put it to us during oral evidence, "what has been happening for the last 30 or so years is that increasingly the central government has seen local authorities as their executive agents, no different from other parts of the central government departments".[7]

12.  The vast majority of our witnesses have argued that this growing centralisation of power, and confining of local government roles, has had far-reaching negative consequences for individuals, for local communities and for democracy. Latterly, successive governments have attempted to move power and decision-making away from the centre and towards localities. However, any government of the day must take account of public and media expectations that demand that it "do something" about almost any issue of public policy. Moreover, there are additional expectations about fairness and service regulation that cannot be ignored.

13.  Our inquiry has sought to determine whether the current balance of power is optimum and the benefits which might accrue from changing it. In doing so, it takes account of two previous investigations into the relationship between central and local government, and reflects on the raft of local government-related reforms introduced by the current Government.

Lessons learned from Layfield and Lyons

14.  In 1974, the government of the day appointed Frank Layfield QC to chair an inquiry into local government finance. Although Layfield's recommendations were not accepted, his report, published in 1976, remains relevant, its arguments still framing much of the debate today. Several witnesses referred to it in evidence to our inquiry, and Sir Michael Lyons, in the executive summary of his own report into local government completed some 30 years later, observed that "I follow firmly in the footsteps of Sir Frank Layfield."[8]

15.  The enduring influence of the Layfield Report stems from its comprehensive nature, and specifically from the manner in which it placed financial reform within the wider context of the relationship between local and central government. The Layfield Committee postulated two models for local government: the "centralist" model, under which central government would have the main responsibility for local government expenditure; and the "localist" model, under which local authorities would have the main responsibility for the level and pattern of expenditure on local services. It advised the then Government to choose between the two models, and to develop a system of local government finance that would support the chosen model, with the balance between central funding and locally raised funding reflecting where the main power and responsibility lay.

16.  As Professor George Jones and Professor John Stewart, Emiritus Professor of Local Government and Administration, The Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham, who both served on the Layfield Committee, explained in their evidence to our inquiry, the Committee made clear its preference for a localist solution, and concluded, therefore, that local authorities "should be able to control local expenditure and local taxation, and to be accountable for those spending and taxing decisions"[9] because "a decentralised model of governance could not be sustained if central government grant was the predominant source of local government's revenue".[10] Accordingly, the Layfield Committee made recommendations to the Government, in 1976, to devolve powers to local government, including taxation. Significantly, the then Government opted for a "middle way" which in practice confirmed much of the centralist status quo and did not involve any major changes to the financing arrangements for local government, effectively rejecting Layfield's localist ideas.

17.  The Lyons Report is the other key reference document for our inquiry. In July 2004, the Government appointed Sir Michael Lyons to re-examine the local government finance system. In September 2005 his remit was extended to consider the strategic role of local government. The long-awaited Lyons Report, Place-shaping: a shared ambition for the future of local government, was published in March 2007. The recommendations made in the report are a result of three years of work, with extensive consultation, and are backed up by a 400-page report.

18.  Sir Michael Lyons coined the phrase "place-shaping" to describe what he saw as the core role of local government in the 21st century. In contrast to the more traditional focus on the role of local government as a provider of specific services, he promoted "a wider, strategic role for local government," which he termed 'place-shaping'—"the creative use of powers and influence to promote the well-being of a community and its citizens".[11] He saw two benefits arising from local government taking on this 'place-shaping' role. First, it would enable decisions to be tailored to the needs of local areas, leading to an enhanced service to the public. Second, it would enable local people to have a greater say in decisions that directly affect their lives.

19.  Despite reaching similar "localist" conclusions, Sir Michael Lyons' tone was more cautious than Frank Layfield, particular with regard to financial reform. Sir Michael Lyons advocated a "developmental approach", suggesting that "as short-term reforms take effect, the Government should consider building on them to further increase local flexibility and choice and consider longer term and more radical reforms to the funding system".[12] This difference probably reflects in part the negative government reaction to the more radical Layfield report: Sir Michael Lyons was, it appears, playing close attention to the art of the possible. It is also because, whilst Sir Michel Lyons placed a similar emphasis on freeing local authorities' ability to spend money according to its own priorities, he placed less emphasis on local authorities raising a greater proportion of their finance locally. As Sir Michael Lyons himself explained to us during oral evidence:

[…] I thought the preoccupation with local government having freedom to raise more money was a distraction from the most urgent presenting problem, in my judgement, and that—and I did not change this view over the life of the work I did—was actually the flexibility to use the money that it had […] the last thing that local government needed was the ability to raise more money that it did not have the freedom to explain how it was going to spend. It is a question of the sequence of these things. Yes, the balance of funding comes on to the agenda but not before the issue of flexibility.[13]

Yet, notwithstanding Sir Michael Lyons' caution, within hours of the Lyons Report's publication the Government issued a press release rejecting Sir Michael Lyons' recommendations to remove capping and for a revaluation of domestic properties for council tax, and has not responded formally to his other recommendations.

20.  A number of the written submissions we received were critical of the Government's handling of the Lyons report. Sunderland City Council, for example, observed that the manner in which the Government had rejected some of its recommendations (e.g. abolition of capping) and shelved others (e.g. council tax banding reform) "does not bode well for the future";[14] the Association of North East Councils commented that "it is disappointing that there has been so little action on Lyons' recommendations (except to reject the abolition of capping) and we believe that the Government should now set a timetable for considering them."[15] When we pressed the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, Rt Hon Hazel Blears MP on this point during oral evidence, she confirmed that the Government had no intention of responding formally to Lyons.[16] It appears, therefore, that the Lyons report will share the fate of its predecessor; to be more influential with academics and with local government than with the government that commissioned it.

21.  We have drawn two key lessons from the Layfield and Lyons Reports. First, these last two government-commissioned investigations have both recommended shifting the balance of power between central and local government in favour of the latter. The evidence submitted to our inquiry has led us to the same conclusion. Second, the government response to both reports serves to highlight enduring government resistance to a radical enfranchisement of local government. In each case, the government's response appears to us to be a missed opportunity to benefit from a more substantial move towards greater local autonomy.

The situation today

22.  Table 1 below illustrates the series of local government reforms which the government has introduced a over the last decade, creating a new framework for the interaction between central and local government.
Table 1: Key recent events in the relationship between central and local government
DateEvent Devolutionary impact

+++ = significant change

++ = moderate change

+ = little change

0 = no change/too early to say

April 2009The new Comprehensive Area Assessment (CAA) comes into force. 0
January 2009The Government introduces legislation to grant upper tier local authorities the power to raise and retain additional business taxation through a 'Business Rate Supplement'. ++
June 2008Negotiations are concluded between central and local government on the new local area agreement targets. ++
April 2008The new three-year settlement for local government begins. +
December 2007The central-local concordat is published. +
October 2007Royal Assent is granted for the Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act 2007. The Act contains provisions on structure, executive arrangements, and local area agreements. ++
October 2007Royal Assent for the Greater London Authority Act 2007 is granted, providing enhanced powers for the Mayor and London Assembly. +++
July 2007The Sub-national economic review is published. The review recommends abolishing Regional Assemblies and introducing a duty on local authorities to promote economic development. 0
March 2007The Lyons Report is published. 0
March 2006The Government publishes a White Paper, Strong and prosperous communities, which includes measures to increase community empowerment and the simplification of the performance framework for local government. ++
September 2005The remit of the Lyons Inquiry is extended to cover the strategic role of local government. 0
July 2004The Balance of Funding Review publishes its report into all aspects of local government funding. The Government commissions the Lyons Inquiry to look in more detail about options for reform of local government finance. 0
July 2000Royal Assent for the Local Government Act 2000 is granted. This Act introduces the cabinet system in local government and powers for local authorities to undertake any action for the social, economic and environmental well being of their area (the 'well being' powers). ++

23.  In the Government's view, these changes amount to a very dramatic swing of the pendulum in favour of 'localism'. The Secretary of State told us that "the whole architecture of the relationship between the centre and the locality has changed and will continue to change", and that "I think you are seeing a radical shift […] a real shift in the balance of power between the centre and the locality"[17]. This is, however, a minority view. Other witnesses have judged the impact overall of government change in this area to date to be far less dramatic than the Secretary of State suggests. For example, the recent reduction in the number of performance indicators simply reversed earlier government decisions which increased their number.

24.  Certainly, some witnesses have pointed to changes that have been genuinely 'localist' in both intent and impact. Sir Michael Lyons, for instance, highlighted to us government adoption of his 'place-shaping' concept and the enhanced powers to enable local government to carry out its local leadership role contained in the 2007 Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Act.[18] Professor George Jones acknowledged the 2000 Local Government Act, which introduced powers for local authorities to undertake any action for the social, economic and environmental well being of their area (the well-being powers) as "the one positive step that I would attribute to central government in enhancing the power and discretion of local government."[19] A number of local government and academic witnesses also highlighted the potential for Local Area Agreements (LAAs) and Multi Area Agreements (MAAs) to provide local authorities with more space in which to act. Lancashire County Council, for example, welcomed in its written evidence to our inquiry "the freedom to decide our own priorities with our local partners through the new Local Area Agreement". [20] LAAs, launched in 2004, and put on a statutory basis in 2007, aim to join up public service delivery at the local level through an agreement between local and central government, whilst MAAs, first mentioned in the October 2006 Local Government White Paper, similarly aim to join up public service delivery but across council boundaries at the regional and sub-regional level.

25.  Few witnesses, however, see this as the whole picture. James Morris, Chief Executive of Localis, was not alone in drawing our attention to contradictions in government policy:

[…] during the last ten years we have had this movement towards very much top-down approaches to both regional and local government at the same time as there being rhetorical lip service paid to decentralisation of power. So the example of planning powers being placed into the hands of democratically unaccountable regional development structures, for example, I think is an example of policy tensions which still exist in the central/local relationship, and one could go through a whole series of them around education, health, even the provision of welfare, which are still very current.[21]

26.  Witnesses have also pointed to the heavily prescriptive nature of the audit and inspection framework for local government begun in 2002—the Comprehensive Performance Assessment (CPA). At one stage local government was subject to well over 1,000 performance indicators. Although the government has reduced the number of performance indicators substantially—albeit to a still not inconsiderable 189—and a lighter touch inspection regime is promised from 2009—the impression persists that the monitoring of local government by central government remains pervasive. As an example of the Government's continuing prescriptive tendencies, the Association of Northern Councils noted that the Licensing Act 2003 "specified, in primary legislation, the composition of a local authority Licensing Committee", and observed that "details of internal organisation really should be left to individual local authorities."[22]

27.  Arguably of most significance, central government continues to hold the purse strings. Local government relies on central government grant for some 75% of its total expenditure. Although the government has moved away from the use of specific ring-fenced grants, this is not the case for education, for example. Here, the introduction of the dedicated schools grant in 2006-07 resulted in local government having less autonomy on education expenditure, as the funding is now "passported" directly to schools, effectively bypassing elected local government. Even where the Government has moved in principle to increase local authorities' ability to spend their money as they see fit, with the adoption of "area-based grants" in place of ring-fenced funding, it has proved unable fully to let go. Lancashire County Council, for example, complained to us that "central government continues its attempts to influence the choice of indicators and related funding in area-based grants even though such funding is not supposed to be restricted in this way,"[23] and West Sussex County Council commented that "when funding is granted, it often comes with so many strings attached that the flexibility to fit in with local arrangements becomes impossible."[24]

28.  There is clearly a wide division of opinion between the Government's view of recent developments and the views of the majority of our witnesses, many of whom believe that central direction and control remain unchanged or even that they have increased. The Government's record appears to us to be mixed. There remains a sizeable gap between the newly empowered local government that the Government believes it has established in principle, and the actual impact as witnessed at the local level. Against this background, our report assesses the scope for a more untrammelled devolution.

The European context

29.  England is not alone in wrestling with intractable local government issues, but there are alternative balance of power models available which may better facilitate the delivery of responsive public services and the strengthening of democracy at the local level. In theory all member states of the Council of Europe share a common set of principles for local democracy and local self government, expressed in the European Charter of Local Self-Government.

30.  The UK Government formally signed the European Charter of Local Self-Government in May 1997, and ratified it the following year. Jeremy Smith, Secretary-General of the Council of European Municipalities and Regions, explained in his evidence to this inquiry that the Charter has been ratified by all member states of the Council of Europe apart from three micro-states, "and can be said to lay down a common set of principles for local democracy and local self-government for the whole of Europe".[25] The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government told us the Government was making "quite significant progress"[26] on implementation.

31.  In principle, the Charter bolsters and protects the role of local government. Article 2 asserts that "the principle of local self-government shall be recognised in domestic legislation, and where practicable in the constitution." Article 8(3) asserts that "administrative supervision of local authorities shall be exercised in such a way as to ensure that the intervention of the controlling authority is kept in proportion to the importance of the interests which it is intended to protect." Article 9(4) asserts that the resources available to local authorities should be of a "sufficiently diversified and buoyant nature to enable them to keep pace as far as practically possible with the real evolution of carrying out their tasks" and Article 9(7) asserts that "as far as possible, grants to local authorities shall not be earmarked for the financing of specific projects."
Visit to Denmark and Sweden

During the course of this inquiry, the Committee undertook a useful and informative visit to Denmark and Sweden.

In general, we were struck by the consensual nature of the political culture in both countries, underpinned by their proportional voting systems.

In Denmark we learnt that:

  • Reform of local government has recently been completed to create larger municipalities—equivalent to English local authorities with responsibility for most local services in Denmark including social services, primary education and primary health care—with more scope to deliver specialist services and make efficiencies.
  • The number of Danish municipalities has reduced from over 200 with an average population of just under 20,000 to 98 with an average population of just over 55,000.
  • Municipalities have substantial revenue raising powers—60% of total revenue comes from local taxes.
  • Central government focuses on macro-economic stability and the setting of minimum acceptable standards of service, leaving local government considerable space to operate within overall expenditure limits and priorities in selected areas.
  • Agreement of overall local government expenditure limits, within central government's overall macro-economic strategy, is by negotiation between the Finance and Welfare Ministries for central government and the Danish local government association (Local Government Denmark) acting on behalf of local government. Local Government Denmark plays a pivotal role, negotiating with central government to agree the overall total for local government as a whole, and with individual authorities to determine individual local authority spending within this overall total.
  • Danish local government is empowered to devise and deliver local services and priorities without reference to or interference from central government.
  • As a result of the recent reform, the second tier of Danish local government—previously five County Councils, now five Regions responsible chiefly for secondary healthcare—has lost authority, losing their ability to levy taxes. It is possible that, in future, the regions will be phased out with hospital Boards taking over their healthcare role.

In Sweden we learnt that:

  • High importance is attached to the ability of local authorities to raise a high proportion of their revenue locally.
  • Both tiers of Swedish local government, Municipality (responsible for most local services) and County Councils/Regions (responsible for healthcare), raise around 70% of their revenue through local taxation.
  • High importance is also attached to equalisation—whereby additional funding is transferred to the poorest municipalities. This is achieved partly by central government grant and partly by transfer of municipal local income tax. The process is transparent, in that individual citizens can see on their bill how much of their local income tax is transferred to other municipalities as part of the equalisation process.
  • Central government is limited in its ability to control municipal spending, but does have the ability to freeze the local income tax rate temporarily—a power it has used, in the early 1990s.
  • As with any system of local government, there are tensions, particularly related to the redistribution of resources away from Stockholm under the equalisation system, and the level of legal prescription regarding the services that local services must provide.
  • For the most part though, there is a relatively high level of co-operation both between parties and between tiers of government in the Swedish system.

32.  We shall consider in a later chapter the extent to which the Government is compliant with the letter and, more importantly, the spirit of the Charter. For the moment, it is important to note that, whilst the precise balance of power between central and local government is pitched differently across Europe, by most measures the English model appears at the far centralist end of the spectrum. We can see this in three key areas: constitutional protection for local government; financial arrangements; and intervention from the centre.[27]

33.  Local government in England has far less constitutional protection than most of its European counterparts. In Germany, for example, Article 28(1) of the Basic Law guarantees the existence of elected councils for counties and municipalities, and Article 28(2) guarantees "the right to regulate all local affairs on their own responsibility, within the limits prescribed by the laws." It also guarantees their "self-government" within their areas of competence, and applies this principle to "the bases of financial autonomy". These are significant safeguards. Similarly, article 1 of the French constitution states that "it [the Republic] shall be organised on a decentralised basis." Article 72 defines the various "territorial units" and incorporates a form of the subsidiarity principle:

territorial units may take decisions in all matters that are within powers that can best be exercised at their level.

The French constitutional system also covers financial arrangements, offering the possibility of access to a variety of sources of tax incomes, and making it clear that when new responsibilities are given to "territorial units" suitable funding should also be transferred or made available.

34.  The local government figures and representatives whom we met in Denmark and Sweden left us in no doubt of the importance they attached to constitutional safeguards that served as a basis to oppose the centralising tendencies of national government. Whilst the Danish constitution makes the bare-bones statement that "the right of municipalities to manage their own affairs independently under State supervision shall be laid down by statute", the Swedish constitution is more precise in giving equal weight to the importance of both central and local government in the democratic process. Its first article locates the origin of public power in the people, "realised through a representative and parliamentary polity and through local self-government." The Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions (SALAR) further explained to us that the constitution specified that local authorities may levy taxes in order to perform their tasks. We discuss the implications of the relative paucity of constitutional protection for English local government in more detail in a later chapter.

35.  Our hosts in Denmark and Sweden were also clear that the strong position of local government in their countries owed much to the high degree of local government financial autonomy. Danish municipalities raise 60% of their revenue from local taxes (mainly income tax), and a further 14% from charges for services. They are dependent upon central government for only 27% of their funding (12% reimbursements for social expenditure and 13% block grant including an equalisation equation).[28] Similarly, Swedish municipalities raise 69% of their revenue from local tax (mainly income tax), and only 15% in the form of government grant.[29] The local government representatives we spoke to in both countries felt that the clear link between local tax payment and the delivery of local services led to a strong engagement in local democracy. In England, the financial situation is reversed. Local government raises, in total, only 25% of its revenue locally—mainly through the council tax. It is dependent upon central government for the vast majority of its revenue.

36.  Local government, of whatever political persuasion and however autonomous, is liable to complain about the level of central government intervention. Local government in Demark has a wide range of functions, and considerable autonomy as to how it fulfils them. We heard, however, from Danish opposition MPs that over the last few years central intervention had increased as the Government had passed more legislation specifying minimum standards, and had become stricter on imposing taxation limits. We also heard from Stockholm City Council how much of its activity is mandated by law, meaning that its freedom of action is more circumscribed than might initially appear to be the case. It was accepted, though, that the municipality retained considerable flexibility as regards how services are delivered.

37.  Tension between central and local government over the degree of central intervention is therefore by no means unique to England. Nevertheless, there remains a difference of degree between central government's standard-setting legalistic interventions in Sweden and Denmark, and the extent of central government presence and direction at the local level in England. We have noted previously the extent to which central government agencies and quangos influence the delivery of services at the local level in England. Add to this an elaborate performance management system—with still around 200 national indicators—and the level of government intervention in England still looks high compared to its European counterparts. In France, for example, improvement remains a matter for local authorities themselves. The overall attitude has been expressed by one Mayor thus:

Nobody from the national state would ever dare to intervene in the effectiveness of local services. This is unheard of. If people aren't satisfied they don't vote for you next time.[30]

It is inconceivable that an English council leader or mayor would say the same.

38.  The relationship between central and local government in England deviates from the European norm in at least three areas—the level of constitutional protection, the level of financial autonomy, and the level of central government intervention. All serve to tilt the balance of power towards the centre. In the next chapter, we analyse possible reasons why successive governments have retained centralising tendencies, identifying three key challenges which any government considering change must face.


1   Ev 122 Back

2   Ev 123 Back

3   Ev 303 Back

4   Professor Travers declared the following interests: Board Member (unpaid) Centre for Cities, Honorary Member (unpaid) CIPFA, Honorary Member (unpaid) IRRV, irregular research and consultancy undertaken for a number of public and private sector bodies - non permanent (paid), regular (paid) contributions to a number of national and regional publications - including the Times, Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Evening Standard, Local Government Chronicle, and Public Finance. Back

5   Q 425 Back

6   Information about Joseph Chamberlain taken from New Start March 09 edition. Back

7   Q 398 Back

8   The Lyons Inquiry, Final Report, (London 2007) Executive Summary, para 1. Back

9   Ev 132 Back

10   Ev 132 Back

11   The Lyons Inquiry, Final Report, (London 2007) Executive Summary, para 14. Back

12   The Lyons Inquiry, Final Report, (London 2007) Chapter 10 Para 41, recommendation 10.1. Back

13   Q 24 Back

14   Ev 232 Back

15   Ev 183 Back

16   Qq 596-598. Back

17   Q 604 Back

18   Q 2 Back

19   Q 404 Back

20   Ev 138 Back

21   Q 53 Back

22   Ev 182 Back

23   Ev 141 Back

24   Ev 148 Back

25   Ev 214 Back

26   Q 662 Back

27   More detailed analysis of these themes can be found in a Localis publication: Roger Gough, With a Little Help From Our Friends-International Lessons for English Local Government, (London 2009), sponsored by the Local Government Association. Back

28   Equalisation is covered in more detail in the next chapter Back

29   In addition, fees and charges make up 7%, rents and charges 7%, sales of services and contracts (1%) and other revenues 5%. Source: SALAR. Back

30   Quoted in Roger Gough, With a Little Help From Our Friends-International Lessons for English Local Government, (London 2009) page 43. Back


 
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