Memorandum by West Midlands Local Government
Association (BOP 36)
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Thank you for the opportunity to respond
to this call for evidence. This response is a high level regional
response and is intended to supplement the responses of individual
local authorities in the West Midlands.
1.2 The responses are broadly grouped into
the categories set out by the Committee, however as you will appreciate
there is a considerable inter-relationship between the issues.
2. CONTEXT
2.1 West Midlands Local Government Association
is a cross party organisation comprising all 38 local authorities
in the Region. It represents the broad range of local government
interests at a regional level, promoting and supporting constituent
authorities as well as influencing regional policies which affect
the "economic, social and environmental well being"
of their communities.
3. THE BALANCE
BETWEEN THE
CENTRAL AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
3.1 We recognise the difficulty in determining
the correct balance between central and local government responsibilities,
but nevertheless a balance does have to be struck.
3.2 Fundamental to this is government recognising
that local government is an important part of the same system
of governance. However, the connection between central and local
government has become disjointed and less equal. Disjointed governance
is damaging for democracy and our communities.
3.3 Both central and local government share
the distinction of the democratic mandate. It is of course right
that government determines national priorities, as this is their
legitimate mandate. However, local government's legitimate mandate
for local matters has been weakened by over-extended national
prescription.
3.4 As Lyon's identified in his Inquiry,
local government has the key place shaping role to co-ordinate
and join-up local activity. National government needs to recognise
most delivery is local and that to be most effective local delivery
has to be responsive to local circumstances and prioritisation.
3.5 We also recognise that local government
has in part contributed to the current imbalance. It as done this
by seeking comfort in central government regulation and guidance,
where it might have been more self confident in testing the limits
of powers such as the power of well-being and using them in a
more assertive and creative way.
3.6 With the right balance between national
and local there is a responsive relationship that works both ways,
with central government supporting and joining-up across Whitehall
to support local government in delivering local as well as national
objectives.
4. FURTHER AUTONOMY
4.1 Government is overly concerned with
the perception of variation, often negatively portrayed as a "postcode
lottery". While there may be instances where variation is
inappropriate, it is important to recognise the reasons for variation.
Local differences that arise from effective needs analysis, prioritisation
of resources and bespoke service delivery should be applauded
and encouraged by government.
4.2 However, government's disproportionate
concern about variation has resulted in a stream of policy and
initiatives, and inappropriate micro-management to control them.
The consequence of this is an inefficient and bureaucratic central
government which can become bogged down in minutiae and a local
government sector that is unreasonably distracted from delivering
effective local solutions.
4.3 Government should concentrate on setting
broad national outcomes and remove prescription and minimise guidance
unless there is a pressing legal need. Local Area Agreements and
the National Indicator Set are welcome steps in this direction,
but further progress is needed. There is concern that in practice
limited additional freedoms and flexibilities have resulted from
negotiations with central government.
4.4 Councils should have the confidence
that provided they are working within this framework decisions
will not called into question or required to go through time-consuming
and resource hungry procedures when the outcomes from these processes
are questionable or, frankly specious.
4.5 The ability for council decisions, for
example over relatively minor planning decisions to be resurrected
and revised by non-accountable bodies is indicative of the way
in which government has continued to reduce local discretion and
distinctiveness. Appeal processes such as this which concludes
on democratic decisions as well as process is a clear undermining
of councils place-shaping mandate.
4.6 More fundamentally, a more balanced
relationship would allow councils to have greater freedom to determine
their own governance structures and operational arrangements.
5. OTHER PUBLIC
SERVICES
5.1 While the Local Area Agreement process
is only a small part of local partnership activity, the Duty to
Co-operate is an important if incremental step in the recognition
that local authorities should have greater influence over the
local delivery of other public services.
5.2 Many local authorities have very good
working relationships with other public services. However, the
extent to which these other services are able to be flexible to
meet help meet local priorities is also over-prescribed by their
Whitehall departments.
5.3 Councils have responsibility for their
communities and are held to account for this by them. In supporting
communities it is essential that there are strong relationships
between health and policing and council delivered services.
5.4 Health for example, is greatly influenced
by housing, economic well-being, education, leisure and cultural
provision and other local government services. It is therefore
important that organisations that purchase health care do so on
the basis of local circumstance and the views of local people
as well as clinical evidence.
5.5 Similarly, police activity is inextricably
linked to community safety, youth justice and neighbourhood cohesion.
Whitehall departments need to recognise these issues and work
collaboratively to support localities' delivery in this wider
context.
5.6 However, at present, Whitehall overly
focuses on siloed targets for each agency. Instead, interagency
activity should be encouraged and integrated services meeting
local outcomes rewarded.
5.7 A strengthening of the cooperation duty
to a duty to deliver outcomes in an integrated way would
be a further advance. This should be further backed-up by leaner,
targeted risk-management which would replace the current approach
of universal, micromanaged targets.
5.8 Moreover, greater use of the Area Based
Grant vehicle by other agency and public service funding streams
should be allowed. This would enable resources to be used in more
imaginative ways, allowing monies to be moved to agents able to
deliver innovative solutions.
6. DEMOCRATIC
ACCOUNTABILITY
6.1 The need to link across agendas would
make it inappropriate to establish parallel, directly elected
offices for police and health. Single issue representatives would
not be able to take the broader view on all the issues which affect
local residents nor sufficiently influence the other relevant
services.
6.2 Being accountable through the ballot
box is significantly different from other organisations who at
best, only have to give account of their actions. The simplest
way to introduce local democratic accountability would be to use
and strengthen the existing democratic structures and give councils
direct involvement. This would improve the management and balancing
of tensions between competing interests and provide the critical
linkages to the wider service delivery.
6.3 Recognising both the mandate of elected
councillors over local matters and that most service delivery
is local, central government departments should be judged on their
performance in supporting localities. Their focus in relation
to local government should be on national outcomes, leaving the
means of delivery to local discretion, but actively supporting
those decisions. Such an approach is likely to encourage greater
confidence and innovation, which will be of national benefit.
7. FINANCIAL
AUTONOMY AND
THE LEVEL
OF NATIONAL
PRESCRIPTION OVER
LOCAL SERVICES
7.1 The ability to exercise local discretion
and decision-making including making best use of existing powers
is, as Lyons said "crowded-out" by plethora of national
initiatives and directives.
7.2 Currently, the balance is too far with
national government in determining not only what services are
to be provided but also how. The level of prescription varies
depending on the service, for example education is heavily determined
by DCSF. This severely limits the ability of the Local Education
Authority to plan strategic provision in the interests of the
wider community. The control is less so for, for example environmental
services where there is more local flexibility.
7.3 While welcoming the general thrust of
LAAs and the national indicator set, there is concern that in
practice pressure is being exerted to direct choice with some
indicators effectively mandatory for certain locations. All of
which reduces the objective of local prioritisation.
8. COUNCIL TAX
8.1 Councils in the West Midlands are fully
committed to the improvement and efficiency agenda and providing
value for money for the tax payer.
8.2 Despite their mandate and the belief
of the public, authorities have little flexibility on setting
their council tax, and consequently are limited in presenting
choice to their communities. When the capping was briefly lifted
a few years ago, it was clear to see that councils took into account
local issues in setting the appropriate rate.
8.3 There is a critical relationship between
the ability of local authorities to provide real choice and accountability
to their communities and the corresponding ability to determine
their own levels of council tax, set charges and retain locally
raised revenues. At present people do not have the choice as to
whether to spend more on services and pay slightly more council
tax or less, with lower level of services.
8.4 Government has hidden behind the council
tax issue to highlight local taxation and has obscured the fact
that is subject to heavy central control.
8.5 Circumstances have changed significantly
since the introduction of capping and government should trust
both local authorities and the electorate to make rational decisions.
Doing so would be a clear indication of the maturity of relationship
between central and local government.
8.6 Nonetheless, council tax is a much less
significant, although a highly visible element compared to central
government funding. This is particularly the case in smaller authorities
where the tax base is limited.
9. FEES AND
CHARGES
9.1 In many cases, fees and charges can
provide more income than council tax. However, these are also
often tightly prescribed centrally. The amount that councils can
charge, for example in planning fees or building regulations,
often doesn't reflect the actual cost of delivering the services.
9.2 Where Councils are obliged to deliver
services which aren't fully funded by government, there should
be greater flexibility to determine where there should be full
cost recovery.
9.3 At a broader level, there needs to be
greater clarity about what it is government wants local government
to do and how it is funded.
9.4 This clarity is not just a matter of
raising more money. At present there are too many complexities
and funding often takes a circuitous route which breaks the link
with the locality, for example the Housing Revenue Account and
business rates.
9.5 While it is understandable there should
be some degree of equalisation, the principle should be that unless
there is clear national advantage, revenue should stay in the
locality. Where there is a need to subsidise particularly authorities,
this should come from general taxation rather than from other
localities.
10. GOVERNMENT
INITIATIVES
10.1 It is of course right that government
set national priorities. However, where it requires local government
to deliver non-core functions that are not local priorities, such
as concessionary fares and free swimming, government should fund
the additional costs in full.
10.2 In these circumstances, it might be
useful to think of councils as being in a contractor relationship
with central government. As such, councils should be able to assess
the full cost of delivery in the context of local circumstances
and seek recovery.
10.3 At present there are risks that prescription
on specific initiatives will have perverse outcomes, diverting
money from local priorities to pay for central government initiatives.
Before setting out new initiatives like these, government needs
to have open discussions about what it is they are seeking to
achieve. It is possible that they can be achieved in a different,
more locally sensitive way and therefore avoid costly and reputation
damaging mistakes.
11. STABILITY
OF FUNDING
11.1 Local area agreements' greater flexibility
to pool resources and the increased stability resulting from three
year budgets are welcomed. However, many key funds are still provided
in the short term and greater reductions in ring-fencing would
improve matters further.
11.2 The use of bidding mechanisms for funding
adds complexity and uncertainty to budgeting. Where competitive
they risk being targeted not at the most appropriate areas, but
where authorities are able to navigate complex and often overly
bureaucratic processes. In many cases these are for relatively
small sums of money. The recent reductions in the amount of money
available for the Local Authority Business Growth Initiative (LABGI)
being a case in point for both this and the limited link there
is between locality and the benefits of enhanced economic activity.
11.3 It is important that this link is strengthened
and the ability of councils to support economic activity is enhanced
through for example, initiatives such as the Barnet Bond or extending
the ability to exercise prudential borrowing.
11.4 Similarly, locally active government
agencies need to be brought increasingly under the ambit of local
democratic accountability. In acknowledging the importance of
local delivery and priorities, their performance should be managed
by their parent departments as much against local as national
objectives.
11.5 Regionally determined strategies such
as spatial and economic strategies and the proposed single regional
strategy also have significant implications for localities. While
councils are often viewed as deliverers of national policy, recognition
needs to be given to their role as shapers of regional strategy.
Where these strategies have been endorsed by the region's councils,
Whitehall should actively work across departments to deliver them.
This might be formalised through a Multi-Departmental Agreement.
11.6 Government also needs to devolve control
of the decision-making/administrative processes to regions where
they can be faster and more responsive to local circumstances,
for example in relaxing control for RDA delegation or project
appraisal.
12. CENTRAL—LOCAL
CONCORDAT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
12.1 The Concordat was welcomed as a step
in the right direction, setting out as it does a basis for shared
understanding. Signed in December of last year it is perhaps too
early to detect a fundamental difference but we were hopeful it
would provide a platform for a stronger, more responsive two way
relationship. It was therefore it was disappointing to see government
introduce Clause 28 to the Planning Bill almost immediately,
without consulting with local government.
12.2 The way the constitution has developed
means that local government's responsibilities are scattered through
legislation. Often councils are considered as an after thought
and in the context of delivery.
12.3 As part of the same governance structure
for the people of England, local government should be more central
in the constitutional debate that government is initiating. This
is important if we are to reconnect and reinvigorate public interest
and involvement in democracy.
12.4 The focus on Parliamentary democracy
has eroded local government, despite the fact that this is where
most citizens' day to day contact with the state lies. National
decision-making is therefore concentrated on a few Parliamentarians
and does not recognise or utilise local government's fundamental
position and proximity to public.
12.5 Giving local government representation
in the reform of House of Lords provides an opportunity to provide
a more formal link between Parliament and councils.
12.6 Regardless of the constitutional position,
working relationships and trust are as important as the legal
status. In this context national government should set out to
involve leaders and other senior councillors in developing national
policy.
12.7 While being careful to appreciate the
different mandate of Parliamentarians and councillors, this will
help connect the two strands of democratic governance. Perhaps
more importantly it would also improve the correct identification
of issues and assist in making sure delivery is realistic and
sensitive to local issues. This interdependence between tiers
of governance could also be manifested in a single workforce type
relationship for civil servants and local government officers.
12.8 Government and future legislation should
work to the principle of subsidiarity. It needs to acknowledge
that national micro-managed interventions cannot be as responsive
to local circumstance or likely to be as cost effective in delivering
outcomes as locally controlled delivery.
12.9 New legislations should set out what
is sought to be achieved then, on the basis of a good understanding
of the national and local implications, set out the balance of
responsibilities for national and local government. Government
will then need to be clear about how this will be funded and who
will pay for it.
September 2008
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