Memorandum by NORA (the National Organisation
of Residents Associations) (BOP 49)
INTRODUCTION
Over the last 30 years or so there has been
a steady erosion of the power in the hands of local authority
as more and more power has been assumed by central government.
It was initially based on the need to control expenditure so that
the proportion of the Gross Domestic Product spent at local level
could be controlled. This was justified by the belief that local
authorities might be profligate with the assumption that central
government would be prudent, now perceived to be erroneous. This
control was exerted initially by reducing the proportion of the
annual central government grant to local authority budgets. But
this was not a sufficient mechanism, since some local authorities
just raised their own rates to meet the needs of their local areas,
so the next step was to impose limits on annual increases under
the title of capping.
The overall effect of these central government
controls was to place a barrier of lack of trust between local
and central government. Councillors, wanting to improve their
own areas and to add services they considered necessary to meet
the demands of their electorate, were disenchanted. This had led
to a steady decline in the calibre of local councillors, and in
many parts of the country it is difficult to attract high calibre
candidates. Whereas in the past retail traders, professional people
and entrepreneurs were keen to become local councillors, they
are rare phenomena now.
Financial controls were the initial step in
alienating the public. Then came an avalanche of legislation affecting
local authority policies. This covered key matters of strictly
local importance such as housing, planning, licensing, highways
funding, refuse collection, etc., in which the power of decision
over local matters was assumed by central government and local
authorities were firmly obliged to obey central diktats. Each
year the diktats increased, and all too often no extra funding
was provided to pay for the proposals that consequently ate into
fixed local budgets.
This sequence of events continues inexorably
and accounts for much of the disillusionment in the democratic
process felt by the electorate, the councillors they elect and
the officers employed in local government.
POWER OF
DECISIONS
What makes democracy a successful institution?
1.1 Democracy is government for the people
by the people and by their elected representatives, who are elected
by the people all with equal rights. It has been violated by elected
representatives, who exceed their mandate, in almost every so-called
democratic state since time immemorial, and our present elected
representatives are no angels in this respect. Democracy is only
regarded as successful when the people can replace those they
elected with others they prefer. Sadly political party power often
subverts this principle.
1.2 Democracy is a successful institution
only because no better system offers such political freedom and
provided the people continue to have confidence in their ability
to procure change and influence decisions that affect their lives.
Which powers merit delegation for local decisions?
2.1 People know their locality better than
central authorities. Accordingly matters, that are primarily local,
merit delegation for local decisions.
2.2 This comprises planning, housing, refuse
collection, public convenience provision, licensing of premises,
traffic management, local transport services, primary and secondary
education, library and museum services, and health and social
services. They may require to be obliged to meet minimum national
standards, but the power to make the definitive decisions should
be local.
Which powers need central decisions?
3.1 Matters that have more than a local
significance obviously transcend local interests. That means they
could be regional rather than central, but such regional authorities
need to have a strong element of elected representatives of their
constituent authorities and not be over-run by vested interests
either of larger authorities or by entrepreneurs.
3.2 Regional authorities should have the
power over police and fire authorities and major planning issues.
3.3 This leaves central decisions to apply
to the armed forces, national networks such as power supplies,
national transport services, tertiary education, prison service
and legal services among other facilities.
Which elements of financial control can be delegated
locally?
4.1 The problem of how funds are allocated
has been crucial. If local taxation is to be supported by a major
grant of nearly two thirds of the budget, this sum needs to be
arbitrarily fixed and not be varied by government decree. The
funding needs to be fixed for the duration of any particular government
so that the electorate helps to make that decision. In turn this
means that locally collected taxes are controlled in effect by
the electorate.
4.2 Accordingly local authorities should
be allowed to seek outside funding when the local electorate has
voted for schemes that require it. Treasury control should be
removed in the interest of local democracy.
Which elements of finance need central control?
5.1 The costs of the services managed by
central government are clearly the responsibility solely of central
government.
5.2 Interference in local authority funding
would constitute interference in local democracy.
Which services merit local control?
6.1 Paragraph 3.1 covers this.
Which services demand central control?
7.1 Paragraph 3.2 covers this.
What deters citizens from becoming councillors?
8.1 When the power of decision is reduced
so much that local affairs of significance are taken by central
government, citizens of discernment are not interested in becoming
councillors. The time and effort involved in elections followed
by hours of sitting in committees to little effect will not attract
citizens of the right calibre.
8.2 The imposition of government policies
that conflict directly with local democratic wishes is a strong
disincentive. A good example of this is the imposition of Unitary
Authorities against the wishes of the local electorate. It removes
a whole layer of democratic government and concentrates what little
power has been left to local government even more remotely from
the electorate. As an unintended consequence this reduction in
democratic involvement acts as a strong deterrent for socially
minded responsible citizens to putting their names forward for
election to Parish and Town Councils instead of District and Borough
Councils, when they realise their power of decision is restricted
to relatively minor matters such as street lighting and refuse
collection rather than, for example, planning and licensing matters.
8.3 When central government decisions on
key issues, for example number of dwellings in an area, are in
direct conflict with the wishes of the local electorate, what
incentive is there for anyone to take part in what amounts to
a remote and authoritarian government?
September 2008
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