Memorandum from Sheffield City Council (BDH 44)

 

 

1 What lessons can be learned from the DH programme and equivalents in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland?

 

Worked well

 

· The national DH programme was properly launched and quickly built momentum. It gave confidence to Council tenants that they were valued and could have pride in their homes and communities

 

· It was helpful to have a clear financial model and be able to plan for a long programme which is affordable and won't change. Most 'rules' were understood by all parties.

 

· Added value in the Sheffield programme of Construction Job Match, market testing, and using benchmarking and scheme continuity through the original 7 year framework partnership to drive down prices.

 

Could have worked better

 

· The standard sample survey methodology that was used in Sheffield to determine stock condition and estimate programme costs needed to be bigger and more detailed. A small percentage error could produce a large shortfall in estimated costs.

 

· More time was needed to plan and mobilise programme. In Sheffield we had to start on site very quickly because of the ALMO funding draw-down timetable - and subsequently spent some time afterwards getting the programme and delivery partnership onto the best footing, after inevitable teething problems at the start.

 

· The continuing problem of working with annual local authority budgets, and bi-annual ALMO funding decisions from CLG, has hampered the programme.

 

· Not enough national consultation with tenants on priorities at the start, when the standard was adopted. Many tenants had different priorities - including environmental and communal upgrade works (security, waste disposal etc).

 

· The 2010 deadline was unclear - and interpreted in different ways. Was it the end date for a programme of work, or the date by which all stock should meet the national standard (and stay at that standard). 100% or 95%? However, the very public deadline did focus minds and gave the programme a sense of urgency.

 

· Later ALMOs had more flexibility with funding and developed local standards in consultation with tenants. The different treatment between ALMOs across bidding rounds 1-6 started to become divisive in later years. Rounds 3-5 had higher funding through supported borrowing, and greater certainty about completion.

 

· Greater national acknowledgement of the acceptability and reasons for different local standards (above the national baseline) would have helped with the messages to tenants and leaseholders.

 

· Funding sources/streams have not been joined up in the past decade in a way that would best help with co-ordinated programmes, maximise efficiencies, and involve local communities in integrated regeneration initiatives.

 

· There is no sustainable funding to maintain Decent Homes once the programme has finished - either to local standards or the national standard. The programme should have been the kick start for fully-funded long-term Asset Management Strategies.

 

· Because Local Authorities had to 'match fund' ALMO resources, there was very little flexibility or scope to fund priority non-DH work. This carried a risk of the Decent Homes programme sucking in all the resources at the expense of other priority calls on capital programmes.

 

· Guidance on inflation assumptions in the Building Cost Model was 'heroic' and never credible. Real inflation exceeded the guideline level and distorted affordability modelling. This was in addition to efficiency saving driven by 'Gershon' reductions in allocations in some years.

· In Sheffield we underbid for ALMO funding (with hindsight) but no opportunity to go back to CLG. There was no opportunity to secure additional funds from the CLG when it became clear that the collapse in Right to Buy levels was adding huge pressure into programmes - fewer homes sold and more requiring improvement, but less capital receipts to finance the works.

 

· The national Decent Homes standard is very low and the guidance is both confusing and contradictory.

 

2 Where targeted housing fails to reach the DH criteria by 2010, how should this backlog be addressed.

 

· All stock should be brought up to - and kept at - the locally agreed standard (ref TSA consultation on standards and priorities) through a fully funded local Asset Management Strategy.

· The backlog after 2010 should be cleared by an extension to the DH programme to be completed within a specified period, to ensure that some tenants are not left behind, or feel left behind.

 

3 Should minimum acceptable social housing standards be amended to take account of environmental standards, fuel poverty and the estate?

 

· Yes

 

4 Do the management organisations - councils, including via ALMOs and housing associations need to change? Will they have sufficient funds?

 

· Organisations do not need to change providing they are fully funded.

· There is a case (made well by the NFA) for ALMOs to borrow in their own right.

 

5 What are the implications for decent housing standards of the Government's proposal, currently out for consultation, to move to a devolved system of council housing finance?

 

· The proposals are positive - but depending on further modelling and consideration of options may or may not be sufficient to maintain decency and tackle other priority investment.

 

· Retention of rental income and receipts in the local authority will increase resources, enable longer-term planning and greater programme efficiencies, and strengthen 'democratic accountability' - with tenants seeing where their rent goes to improve homes, communities and services.

 

· Breaking from annual short-term budgeting to medium -term planning will increase efficiency gains by smoothing peaks and troughs.

 

· Real opportunity to strengthen the roles of tenants and leaseholders at the heart of decision making.

 

6 How should the DH target for private sector homes occupied by vulnerable people be taken forward?

 

· There should have been a tenure-blind DH programme to maximise the impact and make greatest use of the economies of scale on large programmes - especially to benefit vulnerable private sector residents.

 

· DH work to the private sector should be allocated to ALMOs to deliver.

 

· The private sector target should be fully funded (including equity release and other mechanisms in the funding menu).

 

7 Are adequate arrangements in place for the future regulation of minimum acceptable housing standards?

 

· No, not at the moment - TSA role.

· Regulation will fit with the TSA who will need to make sure standards are set and maintained through tenant scrutiny and the Audit Commission.

 

· In Sheffield, tenant scrutiny could would involve the policing of many standards (vacant property repair/cleaning), estate 'mystery shopping' etc.

· Definition of what a 3 star service looks like found in the Audit Commission KLOEs following years of consultation with tenants and service users - that should set the standards.

· In terms of language - 'minimum' is not good, we should aspire to raise standards.

 

· The whole approach to social housing management and investment needs to be more inspirational.

 

· Social housing needs to be seen where possible as accommodation of choice and not the last resort.

 

8 Are there local examples of innovative best practice with wider post 2010 applicability?

 

· Construction Job Match

 

· Regional joint procurement

 

· Supporting community enterprises

 

· General promotion of construction skills

 

· Performance Management Framework and Evaluation Model (Viewpoint, Panograph)

 

· 'Stay Safe' campaign (schools)

 

· Engendering community spirit through contractor engagement (and through corporate social responsibility initiatives)

 

· Partnership culture project.

 

September 2009