Memorandum from
the Investment Management Association (IMA)
(LAI 38)
Summary
l The
necessary framework is in place to guide the administration and investment of
cash by local authorities.
l Good
governance could be improved by the employment of outside advisers and managers
in all but the largest authorities.
l There may some merit in amending
the rules on limiting investment to say a maximum of five percent with any one
entity and addressing the length of the term
of investment.
l Given
the current economic climate any tightening of the rules to limit counterparty
exposure might only enhance the liquidity problems in the money markets.
l Pooled
investment vehicles offer many advantages and are likely to be used
increasingly.
Who we are
1. The IMA
represents the asset management industry operating in the UK. Our members
include independent fund managers, and the asset management subsidiaries of
banks and life insurers, as well as managers of occupational pension schemes.
2. They are
responsible for the management of over 3 trillion of assets, which are
invested on behalf of clients globally. These include authorised investment
funds, institutional funds (e.g. pensions and life funds), private client
accounts and a wide range of pooled investment vehicles. We estimate over 200
billion of those assets are held for local authorities; predominantly as
pension scheme assets. This evidence does not address pension scheme issues,
but only cash management, or Treasury, operations.
3. Member
firms, which are regulated by the FSA, manage significant sterling cash
portfolios for clients, including within segregated cash portfolios for local
authority clients. We would expect any
firm to have a disciplined approach to managing such portfolios and undertake
rigorous analysis of institutions and others who offer cash instruments for
investment. This includes a consideration of rating agency opinions; though
importantly credit ratings should not be used as a replacement for adequate
credit risk management.
4. In this
regard and given comments on the over-reliance of credit ratings below and
elsewhere, the Committee may wish to note that we published in December 2008,
with EFAMA and the ESF, Guidelines on the Over-reliance of credit ratings by
asset managers. These are attached for ease of reference in case some of
the principles might assist the Committee's considerations.
Present arrangements
5. Whilst
others will no doubt give similar evidence, as we are asked about the adequacy
of the current framework we have set out a brief summary of how we see it.
6. We
understand local authorities currently to manage their cash on a day-to-day
basis. Like any organisation receiving
and disbursing money, cash flows are uneven and, therefore, it would be prudent
to invest such daily surpluses over periods of time related to the known cash
requirements of the organisation.
Furthermore, government restrictions on the use of capital receipts
from, for instance the transfer of local authority housing stock to a housing
association, generates funds that can be invested for a considerable period of
time. It is, therefore, in the interest
of the local council taxpayer to secure a market return in interest payments;
though obviously this seeking after yield should not be at any cost. This was a
lesson from a bank failure long pre-dating the current crisis.
7. Certain
constraints had been placed on the investment of such cash by regulation
following investment in BCCI, a bank offering exceptional short term returns,
which failed. Those regulations limited
the duration of investment and allow investment in certain instruments only
without losing flexibility of future use of the cash when returned to the local
authority e.g. certificates of deposit, short gilts and supranational
bonds.
8. The
advent of the regulations saw the birth of advisers to local authorities, now
including Sector Treasury Services, Butlers, Arlingclose and Sterling
International. These advisers help local authorities in the drawing up of an
authority's Annual Investment Strategy, recommending on how to invest cash,
reviewing the instruments in which to invest and as appropriate advising on the
selection of professional managers who are typically given a mandate to manage
the cash for a period of three years against an appropriate benchmark. A number
of our larger members have significant cash management activities for local
authorities.
9. The
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) also created a
panel to examine and recommend on best practice and publish a document (and
regular updates) which makes recommendations on treasury management practice
which is, by and large, followed by local authority treasury managers. This advocates prudent investment and
advises local authorities to diversify their investments across a range of
investments and institutions.
10. The
production of the Annual Investment strategy has had the effect of focusing on
what is done each year, looking to the future and helping local authority
directors of finance form a view of potential income to support the rate and reduce
the burden of the local council taxpayer. However, the perception is that this
has not always led to the strengthening of an authority's treasury management
team. Responsibility for such
investments is frequently undertaken as part of a wider-ranging job. The advisers referred to above do however
help to fill this gap in expertise.
Change
and the Future
11. Given the
regulations currently in place, sound advice on Treasury Management promulgated
by CIPFA, input from several well-regarded investment advisers together with a
number of well-established investment managers in the field, there is a robust
framework already in place. The key is
to make the structure work better.
12. We
address (some themes overlap):
external assistance in identifying the right investments
the ability to react to change
the risk of over-reaction
External
assistance
13. Local
authorities produce annual investment strategies for their cash investments;
merely to do so more frequently could be counter productive. The strategy reviews investments and cash
flows and tries to predict income to support the rate. In normal times, this can be quite
significant depending on the cash resources currently held by the authority. The income projections are often calculated
with help from the advisers and based on predictions of professional cash
managers if employed.
14. It has
been suggested to us that less than half of the local authorities in the UK use
advisers and significantly less than half use professional cash managers. It
being said that this figure was much higher but lack of volatility in markets
between 1997 and 2007 after the establishment of the MPC and early warning of
Base Rate changes meant that many local authorities took managing their money
back "in-house".
15. Our
members' experiences are that many local authorities have a Treasury investment
policy with a stated lending list, which for some has been quite complex, but
has now become very conservative. Without the depth of resources, experience
and expertise to use all available instruments, there is a fear that the policy
has limitations driven as much by name recognition as by quality.
16. In our
view, the primary aims for local Authorities' cash investments should be:
l Preservation of capital;
l Diversification of credit risk;
l Liquidity
17. Local
Authorities' requirement for yield and investment income should always be
secondary to the above aims. Whilst
acknowledging that yield is an important consideration, the priority of Local
Authorities' Treasury Management departments must always be the preservation of
council tax payers and pension funds' capital.
These aims are set out in CIPFA's Code.
18. The
Icelandic bank failures have attracted much attention. Despite the sums that
some local authorities invested in Iceland were large they were usually less
than ten percent of total cash funds invested by that authority in the market
and it could be argued that that is not inconsistent with a reasonable
diversification. Furthermore, criticism
may not always fully reflect the fact that some of the funds had been invested
for long periods e.g. three years with no recourse to recall, so it was
difficult to do anything as the credit ratings of the Icelandic banks grew
steadily worse. Nevertheless there remains an issue as to more recent
investment despite warning signs. It was not unknown for Icelandic banks to
have been excluded from lists by some professionals about two years ago.
19. Having
noted the above qualifications, with over 100 Local Authorities suffering
capital losses through investment in Icelandic banks, serious questions remain
about the pressure felt by many authorities to achieve the greatest returns
possible and the extent to which external advisers can assist internal treasury
staff to balance that pressure.
20. A
proposal for the future might be to limit the maximum amount of cash placed by
a local authority with any entity to, say, five percent of the total available
for investment, with the exception of cash placed for management by
professional managers or upon external advice.
21. Aside
from Icelandic banks still being on lists seen by firms last year, other
comments have highlighted the prevalence of errors in identifying the ultimate
ownership of banks. This is an issue not limited to local authorities; evidence
given to the Treasury Select Committee on deposit protection has noted the
difficulty of identifying even which banks are in the same group. Work could be
done here to assist local authorities.
Reacting
to change
22. The
permitted investments are already controlled by regulation so freedom of action
is already limited. It is the ability
to react to changes in circumstance within these permitted investments that may
need to be reviewed. For example,
should investments be limited to a maximum of say eighteen months; this might
not eliminate all losses similar to those experienced in Iceland but it might
have reduced.
23. In the
absence of assistance from advisers, authorities may be slow to pick up news on
counterparties/institutions, particularly downgrades. We are not in a position
to identify the factors behind this and the extent of cost this may bring to
authorities that do not use external consultants.
24. The
framework for effective and efficient management of local authority cash is
already in place. Despite the risk of it being seen as self-serving we do think
it could be prudent for all authorities to consider the use of advisers such as
Sector, Butlers et al and professional investment managers as a matter of
course because they are experts and spend all their working time reviewing investments.
Given the resources they deploy they are inevitably more able to react to
adverse market events. Authorities will wish to consider having robust
arrangements to consider conflicts of interests that arise from using fee-based
advisers; recent guidance from the Pension Regulator on the use of external
consultants and conflicts may provide useful pointers for local authorities.
IMA strongly supported this more detailed and robust guidance; and we have
issued case studies on conflicts to assist pension trustees.
The risk of over-reaction (and dealing with the
Committee question about investment in Government stock)
25. Should
limitation of access to receipt of interest cease, or be too severely limited,
the effect on local authority budgets could be critical in balancing
budgets. The current febrile state of
the market will, at sometime in the future, return to a more predictable
normality. Local authorities have
already adapted and have reviewed where they are placing their money e.g. with
DMO. Because of the banking crisis
lending is being kept very short and risk minimised, but this action only
exacerbates the current problem. There is at present a 1% yield pick up between
1 week and 1 year on the UK yield curve; lending very short means authorities cannot
access this.
26. If local
authorities were required to invest only with the government it would limit
liquidity available to the banks in normal times and it would increase
dependence on the government. We are
not best placed to comment on the effect on council taxes, but poor or
sub-optimal returns ultimately must have a negative impact for the council.
27. There is
a risk that the losses from this crisis will push local authorities to
lower/zero risk assets, which may allow them to confirm that the assets are
safe, but is not necessarily in their best interests. Holding Government Stock
is a sensible option for Local Authorities, and some currently invest in both
gilts and treasury bills. Unfortunately
the day to day price fluctuations in Gilts are not conducive to the valuation
and reporting requirements of Local Authorities. Member firms consider that new
skills would have to be learned to trade a gilts book. This reinforces the need
for external assistance but also leads to a consideration of pooled vehicles
below.
Central government's role
28. Central
Government's role in providing financial advice and guidance is achieved
through the Prudential Code for Capital Finance. We believe that this provides an appropriate financial framework
for Local Authorities.
Protection of investments
29. It should
not be necessary for the Government to protect local authorities in the same
way it protects individuals. Local
Authorities are currently classified as "Professional Clients" under current
FSA definitions. We believe that this
is appropriate, and that they should not receive further protection from the
Government. The framework is in place for local government to protect itself.
To do otherwise would risk incentivising decisions not to seek external
assistance.
Other comments - pooled vehicles
30. Local
authorities can now invest in Government Stock via pooled, unitised investment
vehicles providing liquidity, appropriate yield and ease of administration
whilst meeting their reporting and valuation requirements. It is our expectation that Local
Authorities' use of such funds will grow over the coming year, in response to a
tightening up of their treasury management practices to meet their primary
capital preservation requirements, and we understand firms to have received much
direct feedback to that effect.
31. Legislation
was passed in 2002 to allow local authorities in England and Wales to invest in
money market funds (SI 2002 No. 451 and 2002 No. 885). Similar legislation has
not been passed in Scotland (although we did understand that it was on the
agenda for 2008).
32. Whilst a
matter for the Scottish office we think this legislation should be passed.
Money market funds offer the benefit of diversification which is provided by a
pooled investment (and is a key differentiator when compared with a deposit
account), they provide professional cash management and independent credit
analysis (e.g. our information is that no UK-managed MMF was invested in
Icelandic banks). This should in theory be an ideal type of vehicle which local
authorities should use for short-term cash management.
33. Consideration
could be given to the establishment of longer term pooled funds which would
give a better rate of return for local authority cash and which would minimise
losses to individual authorities if an entity were to fail.
34. Member
firm's experience in relation to corporates is that they are now much more
likely to use pooled vehicles like money market funds (either variable or
constant net asset value funds) than attempt to make these decisions themselves.
35. This
range of products run along the risk/return spectrum offering the flexibility
that Local Authorities may require, whilst offering realistic market yields.
Some funds will offer higher yields in exchange for reduced liquidity and some
will offer higher yields for increased credit risk.
January
2009