|
Memorandum
from
1. This submission draws on ISCRI's recent
academic work[1]
specifically on the Preventing Violent Extremism agenda in
§ Alienation of Muslim communities by the single-community focus of Prevent § Counter-productive effect of increasing vulnerability to radicalisation of such a focus § Unreliability of religiosity as an indicator for radicalisation § Need for accelerated work on community cohesion and identity as a viable tool versus discrimination and radicalisation § Factors in some individuals' vulnerability: discrimination, socio-economic disadvantage, intellectual radicalisation § An invigorated drive
to tackle deprivation and disadvantage reflect changes in the thrust of § Need for intervention by trusted local social capital - both religious and community with street credibility § More meaningful use of credible local social capital which is also capacity built and supported § The state, local authority and their partners should provide community with advice and support but avoiding a dominant lead in mobilising community contributions § Treat and present the problem of violent radicalisation as part of the wider crime and community safety agenda around which all communities share common ground and those vulnerable can be targeted more effectively by credible community intermediaries § Focus by the police in Pursue rather than Prevent
2. Evidence is provided from two principal
sources. First, a detailed and major
research-engagement programme (Community Engagement Pathfinder Programme) in
3. The review acknowledges how Prevent seeks to achieve substantial and productive interaction and engagement with citizens for the purposes of prevention, as part of the government's wider counter terrorism strategy, which is articulated in Contest (HM Government, 2009).
4. However, ISCRI research and review would indicate that in important respects this has been flawed in its inception and unsuccessful in both design and implementation. The Prevent strategy has proven unpopular and indeed, counter-productive in alienating the very community that it seeks to engage and influence positively, unwittingly heightening potential vulnerabilities to radicalisation by terrorist propaganda.
5. Evidence from the ISCRI managed research
programme in
6. ISCRI led this programme in 2007-08 in five London Boroughs in order to get a better understanding, particularly of Muslim and other faith communities in the capital, their needs and concerns around issues of policing, crime and community safety. In-depth qualitative primary data was gathered from over 1,100 local people from Black and minority ethnic communities, conventionally deemed as 'hard-to-reach' by authorities but who took part enthusiastically in the project through ISCRI's model of engagement; the cohort of respondents' average age was under 30 years with a roughly 50:50 male-female split. Respondents highlighted violent extremism as a particular concern and in-depth testimony was gathered on this specific issue, using community peer-led research methods, with a model of engagement pioneered by ISCRI, from 10 different Muslim ethnicities. In leading and supporting the research programme, ISCRI had to overcome significant obstacles in providing communities with the confidence, capacity and willingness to participate in what they considered at the outset as an especially sensitive and controversial field of enquiry for them and concerns about involvement in a police originated project. This serves to highlight the richness and value of the evidence derived from those directly affected by Prevent and as a source to inform policy.
7. Community respondents provided opinion individually and anonymously both on factors that underpinned vulnerability to recruitment/attraction to causes of radicalised violence; and their recommendations for mitigating and preventing that recruitment/attraction. Muslim respondents acknowledged the problem of Al-Qaida influenced terrorism, at the same time as universally condemning it.
8. Their testimony pointed to how no single causal factor predominated and that there was no simple stereotype of a terrorist recruit - factors can influence different individuals in different ways but with a similar outcome. Contributory factors to vulnerability included:
§ Long-standing structural factor of deprivation § Persistent experience of discrimination § Increases in Islamophobic attacks and hate crime § Causes were not always around issues of poverty or poor integration in mainstream society § Frequent mention was made of two specific tools used by extremist recruiters: a focus on perceived injustices associated with western foreign policy; and, a focus on a perceived distortion of the Islamic faith to suit personal and political agendas
9. The ISCRI programme had a strong solution focus to the engagement programme and community participants offered the following as recommendations for mitigating and preventing recruitment into causes of violent extremism:
§ Consistent support for an all-community approach to the problem rather than one which even implicitly focused predominantly on the Muslim community(ies). § A focus on commonly held values of tolerance, citizenship and cohesion was one which demanded an all-community rather than a singular-community emphasis § The threat from violent extremism was a criminal act that needed diffusing from what respondents saw as inappropriate religious connotation and one that affected society as a whole § The challenges and causal risk from discrimination and Islamophobia demanded an all-community response § The challenges and causal risk from deprivation and lack of social/economic opportunity also demanded an all-community response § Advocacy for citizenship and cohesion to be promoted in Islamic contexts rather than as secular concepts and consistent with the dynamics of Muslim communities § Faith-based interventions to challenge extremist messages according to different community preferences § Facilitation of internal debate, discussion and involvement for all communities § Genuine engagement of grass roots community infrastructure with trust and access to provide safe space and opportunity
10. The report was strongly critical of police intervention as a tool for prevention of violent extremism. The testimony stressed how trust and confidence in the police was low, largely unmitigated by the albeit emergent 'safer neighbourhoods' programme for neighbourhood policing and too great to be a productive or welcomed Prevent instrument, whilst everyday community concerns about safety and policing styles and performance still remained poorly addressed.
11. The findings also highlighted significant weaknesses inherent in local authority, police and community safety partnership structures for achieving meaningful and effective engagement of Black and minority ethnic communities in the capital in the conduct of crime and community safety policy and initiatives. Existing structures lacked genuine representation from minority groups and were seen as mechanisms to impose top-down agendas rather than meet communities' own determined needs and priorities.
12. Respondents readily acknowledged the problem posed by Al-Qaida influenced terrorism but expressed despair at how Prevent represented public sector victimisation of Muslims as a whole faith community, that further fuelled feelings of isolation, vulnerability and was, hence, counter-productive.
13. Consideration of sources more widely reinforces the thrust of these findings and their importance for a re-assessment of Prevent policy.
14. The spectrum of opinion on community engagement to reduce the terrorist threat is described in Birt (2009) as alternating between two main schools of thought: a 'values based' approach that sees the Al-Qaida threat as the promotion of theological error which needs to be delegitimised by the promotion of partnership with Muslim moderates, stressing the compatibility of mainstream Islam with mainstream liberal/secular values; and, second, a 'means based' approach that seeks to isolate the impact of Al-Qaida as a socio-political movement by closer engagement with the vulnerable by partnering those who can most credibly work with them. The second approach highlights personal social, emotional and psychological factors that can attract young people to Al-Qaida. This 'twin track' analysis presents an interesting interpretation, though the two approaches should not be considered mutually exclusive.
15. Muslim community disaffection with and muted support for Prevent as an unpopular intervention by the state is well documented (e.g. Cantle, 2009), as are reservations from other non-Muslim communities and some local authorities (e.g. Khanna, 2009).
16. Turley (2009) contends the strategy is counter-productive in heightening the vulnerability of individuals to being radicalised by fostering community alienation and a recurring theme in sources is the disadvantage of a strategy that has fuelled notions of an undifferentiated 'suspect', and so demonised, Muslim community. This reinforces feelings of alienation which in turn prepare a 'hunting ground' for terrorist recruiters (McDonald et al, 2008a, p. 7) from evermore withdrawn, defensive and disaffected communities.
17. The validity of treating religiosity as a reliable indicator of radicalisation or a lack of patriotism are also notions challenged by recent international research (e.g. Alvensleben von, 2008; Change Institute, 2008; Gallup Inc, 2009). Similarly, Hillyard (1993) and Sen (2006) have reinforced the damage from single-community approaches and limiting, narrow definitions (often faith-assigned) of community identity.
18. The need for Prevent to move away from an exclusive focus on the Muslim community towards a greater focus on community cohesion is a theme tracing through the progression in the recent literature (e.g. Cantle, 2009; McDonald et al 2008b; Turley, 2009). The preference for accelerated cohesion activity (e.g. Thomas, 2009) is based on a number of factors.
19. These include:
§ disquiet by some (including Muslim and non-Muslim communities and local authorities) at an inherent moral injustice of a single community focus; § public policy contradictions (e.g. Thomas, 2009; Turley, 2009) of a Muslim-specific focus in Prevent within a longer-standing community cohesion agenda; § the unintended stimulus a single-community focus gives to discriminatory attitudes against Muslims, and fuelling hate crime, Islamophobia and right wing extremism (e.g. McDonald et al, 2008a).
20. Community cohesion is seen as a relevant, focused and sharp tool in the reduction of those vulnerable to extremist radicalisation and recruitment. One of the consequences of such a change in emphasis would be for less exclusive concentration in Prevent on Muslim youth and more on accelerated community cohesion work with all communities. Addressing hate crime across all communities would also be a measure to tackle extremist radicalisation.
21. The rationale for an emphasis in Prevent on a single 'suspect community', and resulting attempts at what is seen as clumsy social engineering, have been challenged in various sources[3]. The 'values based' approach (Birt, 2009) is sometimes seen as unjustified religious/civil interference with communities, based on flawed assumptions about vulnerability through their Islamic faith per se (see para17).
22. However, critiques variously acknowledge that some individuals are indeed vulnerable in Muslim and other communities. Three factors interlink and help explain this vulnerability:
§ discrimination: Islamophobia has already been mentioned earlier in this submission; other communities can also be affected by a singular focus in Prevent on the Muslim community, hardening attitudes amongst white communities (e.g. Thomas, 2009); § socio-economic deprivation and disadvantage: the emphasis needs to focus on recognising and identifying genuine need and tackling disadvantage, marshalling[4] efforts in education, training, skills development, access to employment for purposes of social justice rather than for purposes seen as disproportionate, intrusive community surveillance § protection against intellectual radicalisation: commentaries agree on the influence of a persuasive ideology in the radicalisation process (e.g. Burke, 2007) with Al-Qaida's objectives couched in religious language and imagery. Sources assert the uncertainties about identity, shared especially by Muslim young people, as a risk factor in vulnerability to radicalisation and terrorist recruiters. Antidotes lie both in the provision of opportunities to debate, explore and understand issues about faith and identity and also to discuss controversial foreign and social policy in inclusive community contexts (e.g. Thomas, 2009).
23. Recent announcements from the addressing...upstream factors [economic, social, political] is ultimately not a military operation but a political, economic and social campaign to meet basic needs and legitimate grievances of ordinary people (Brennan 2009, p. 8)
24. Addressing these factors as tools against violent extremism came through strongly and consistently in ISCRI's Pathfinder Programme, funded by the MPS (McDonald et al, 2008). Islamophobia and hate crime featured as notable community concerns, nurturing resentment and vulnerability to radicalisation, were persistently under-reported and ineffectively communicated to the police and authorities because of community perception of flaws in and the concept of third-party reporting mechanisms, for example.
25. Sources variously stress the value of virtuous religious intervention in intellectual discussion and de-radicalisation processes. Indeed, the need to engage and foster the Islamic faith and a better understanding of the religion in these processes is seen as a pivotal remedy.
26. Such intervention is dependent on the involvement of local community figures with religious and street credibility (e.g. Lambert, 2007); the use of trusted community intermediaries rather than organisations and groupings that may alienate the same communities by their status as being created and controlled by the state, centrally or locally (e.g. Ghannoushi, 2008); and an opportunity to debate and share issues of concern on an all-community basis. The 'means based' approach to Prevent, outlined in Birt (2009) finds expression here.
27. The use of genuine, grass-roots social capital of communities, including the Muslim community, is crucial in confronting threats of radicalisation. International studies (e.g. Change Institute, 2008) assert the generic value of vibrant 'civil society organisations', themselves providing alternatives to violent radical narratives, and often enjoying understanding of the issues and access across dense, local, horizontal, social networks. The autonomy of such civil organisations is crucial to their community credibility and effectiveness. McDonald et al (2008b) also assert the value of such organisations and individuals articulating to Muslim audiences issues of cohesion and citizenship in the context of Islamic teaching.
28. This can be undermined by 'risk averse' authorities who have turned away in the main from engaging with progressive yet stigmatised local groups (e.g. Lambert, 2008) who actually themselves condemn terrorism (e.g. Salafi and Islamists) in favour of those deemed 'moderates' but who lack credibility and the knowledge (often religious) to counter Al-Qaida propagandists. Work with communities by trusted grass roots practitioners, including women and young people, is crucial.
29. Aspirations by local authorities to acquire more influential roles (e.g. Turley, 2009), to lead initiatives, to control agendas and deploy funding to augment their own internal capacity, rather than that of credible and more effective community organisations, work against efforts to engage wider community support against radicalisation.
30. Consideration needs to be given to community preferences for a different balance in partnerships: state bodies such as local authorities and their partner agencies should provide support and expertise in advisory but not in lead capacities that are so obviously dominant (e.g. McDonald et al, 2008). This imbalance in the community-state power relationship has been a factor in the unpopularity of the Prevent strategy and programme with such communities hitherto.
31. Finally, and importantly, the process of violent radicalisation needs to be treated as an act of criminality perpetrated by individuals who may be either, vulnerable, malevolent or both; rather than as a social deficit of a whole community deemed to require disproportionate, social engineering by the state. Rather, the problem should be seen as one important issue of crime and community safety amongst several community issues - an issue that can be identified by the community itself (e.g. Keane, 2008) amongst other concerns and needs, and around which all communities can find common ground.
32. From review and consideration of a wide range of sources,` Prevent as currently constructed, remains a government programme, conceived and applied centrally without community consultation or mandate and which is inherently contradictory in its objectives and methods to engage community support in the prevention of violent radicalisation. Such a centrally imposed programme steepens the spiral of silence whereby a Muslim community, often already disaffected and withdrawn, is made to feel even more isolated and disengaged from mainstream civil society, thereby increasing its vulnerability to the risks of violent extremist propaganda and sympathy.
33. Indications from government to widen Prevent's brief to include forms of extremism other than Al-Qaida influenced terrorism (e.g. RICU, 2009) are positive steps forward but evidence as presented points to the need for other significant changes too. Tensions persist between 'values' and 'means based' approaches and how they have been applied but careful consideration now needs to be given how to better appreciate and engage the integrity and contributions which can and need to be made by Muslim communities:
trusting the talents, know-how and insights of British citizens who happen to be of the Muslim faith will prove to be invaluable (Birt, 2009, p. 57)
34. The brief from CLG Committee requests reference to be made in submissions to seven specific questions. In light of the detail provided above, our summary response to these would be as follows:
i) Robustness of government analysis of factors leading to recruitment into violent extremism: The causal link between recruitment and underlying socio-economic conditions leading to vulnerability seem to have been included but not emphasised adequately by government in its approach, preferring to focus on security and religion. Problems of discrimination, hate crime, deprivation, identity and the impact of an unpopular foreign policy need greater emphasis. All these factors make the vulnerable more susceptible to ideologies of violence and add to feelings of disconnection from the state and a government failing to meet needs.
ii) Effectiveness of government strategy in community engagement: Rarely do genuine and trusted local community groups, who can reach and influence those most at risk and the young and vulnerable, appear engaged. Instead, the strategy appears to communicate through a 'values based' approach with the whole Muslim populace as an undifferentiated and stigmatised social grouping (causing resentment); or, it establishes, or is guided by 'arms length' entities the government itself has created but which in the main have poor local credibility and lack genuine community understanding and relevance. Despite often good intentions, bodies such as the Young Muslims Advisory Group, Muslim Women's Advisory Group, Quilliam Foundation and Sufi Muslim Council all share these disadvantages.
iii) Advice and expertise availability to local authorities on implementation and evaluation: The social capital of trusted local community groups needs to be engaged and supported more intensively. Evaluation through NI35 fails to deal with Prevent interventions that in the main struggle to reach the truly vulnerable, rather than the 'whole' community.
iv) Effective communication of Prevent to those at who it is aimed: Communication about Prevent tends to be construed as a government initiative that unfairly and disproportionately targets the 'Muslim' community as being 'suspect' about which intelligence needs to be gathered overtly in projects or covertly through the recruitment of informants.
v) Government benefiting from appropriate advice: See point (ii) above. Advice seems to have derived from those with poor local community understanding and credibility, often promoting their own kudos, personal reputations or agendas.
vi) Effectiveness of the programme: See point (iv). and generally. It is accepted that engagement of communities is needed to tackle the terrorist threat and cannot be tackled by military means alone. However, Prevent has not hitherto been effective in recognising and engaging the integrity of domestic Muslim communities in these efforts which will be crucial to success.
vii). Differentiation between Prevent, cohesion and integration: Terminology is not merely decorative but crucial for the development of a successful approach which can more effectively address the upstream factors that underpin future risks of violent radicalisation:
§ Improvement can be achieved by treating such risks as part of a crime and community safety agenda (alongside other concerns by many communities affected by, e.g. gun crime, gang crime, drug related crime etc). This can be an effective approach in targeting policy at vulnerable young people, at risk of being criminalised (e.g. BASIAN, 2009); § The labels of PVE and Prevent are largely unhelpful and the problem of radicalisation into violence needs articulating more in terms of crime and safety, rather than as an assumed (and unproven) social deficit within a so-called single community; § Accelerated work on community cohesion, addressing discrimination and hate crime would help counter risk; emphasis on tackling socio-economic deprivation should also be reinforced but, as with cohesion work, not as part of a Prevent agenda (or using its terms and perceived objectives to gather intelligence as part of a hidden agenda) but as one trying to meet genuine community needs and aspirations on a just and equitable basis; § Some aspects of Prevent, especially the identification of individuals at risk, would be more helpfully articulated as Pursue objectives. This would mean the police moving away from Prevent work where their roles are viewed suspiciously by communities, seen as seeking to recruit informants and gather intelligence and, hence, counter-productive in alienating the very community whose support the Prevent strategy seeks to achieve. Conflation of the police's role in Pursue with Prevent may also damage the police's neighbourhood policing efforts and integrity.
35. Such adjustments would allow local communities themselves - their social capital - to contribute much more effectively to addressing some of the causes of such intentions and acts of criminality, and with greater fairness and enthusiasm. An approach is needed that recognises genuine need for certain individuals to be protected from violent radicalisation, alongside addressing structural socio-economic problems of broader vulnerability, acknowledging the integrity of the wider Muslim community(ies) and engaging their social capital (religious and community) properly in the strategy without stigmatisation.
REFERENCES
Alvensleben,
Bruno von (2008). Homegrown Terrorism: breaking the vicious
circle of marginalisation and radicalisation. The European Weekly: New BASIAN
(2009). Personal communication by email 31 July 2009. Birt, Y
(2009). Promoting Virulent Envy?
Reconsidering the Breen Smyth , M (2007). 'A Critical Research Agenda for the Study of Political Terror' European Political Science (6) 260-267 Brennan,
John (2009). A New Approach to Safeguarding Americans. Available at:: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-John-Brennan-at-the-Center-for-Strategic-and-International-Studies/ Accessed 11 September 2009. Burke, J
(2007). Al-Qaeda. Cantle,
T (2009). 'The Prevent Agenda and
Community Cohesion'. Overview paper for the Capita National Conference, Change
Institute (2008). Study on the best
practices in co-operation between authorities and civil society with a view to
the prevention and response to violent radicalisation. Gallup
Inc (2009). The Ghannoushi, Soumaya (2008). The Blears fallacy: Islam cannot be controlled by the state. Guardian.co.uk. Available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/july/25/isalm.religion/print. Accessed 11 November 2008. Hillyard,
P. (1993) Suspect Community: People's Experience
of the Prevention of Terrorism Acts in HM Government (2009) The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering International Terrorism, TSO Khanna, A. (2009). 'Eastern Eye's Aditi Khanna interviews Rt Hon John Denham MP, Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government on PVE Programme. 7 August 2009 Jackson, R (2007) The Core Commitments of Critical Terrorism Studies. European Political Science: 6 Keane, N (2008) National Community Tensions Team. National Police Improvement Agency, Neighbourhood Policing Programme. Available at http://www.acpo.police.uk/NCTT/default.asp. Blog accessed 10 June 2008. Lambert
, R (2007). Reflections on Counter-Terrorism Partnerships in Britian. Arches Quarterly Embracing diversity not
clash 5 (1), pp 3-6. Lambert
, R (2008). Salafi and Islamist
Londoners: Stigmatised Minority Faith Communities Countering al-Qaida.
Arches Quarterly European East and West: Conflict and Continuum 2 (1), pp
35-41. Macpherson,
Lord (1999). The Stephen Lawrence Enquiry.
McDonald
, B., Collins , C, Mir, Y. and Crompton , N.
(2008a). Narrowing the Gap: Problems and Processes, Community Engagement
Pathfinder Programme Report 1. McDonald
, B., Mir, Y. and Crompton , N. (2008b). Narrowing
the Gap: Solutions, Community Engagement Pathfinder Programme Report 2. Research,
Information and Communications Unit RICU (2009)
Prevent Funding Update August 09 Sen,
A. (2006). Identity and
Violence: The Illusion of Destiny (Issues of Our Time). Thomas
, P (2009). Between Two Stools? The
Government's 'Preventing Violent Extremism' Agenda. The Political Quarterly 80 (2): Turley,
A. (2009). Stronger Together. A new
approach to preventing violent extremism.
September 2009 [1] References are cited in this submission to provide supporting evidence of key points which we hope prove helpful, rather than a distraction to the flow of the narrative.
[2] Reports enclosed with submission to CLG Select Committee. [3] The flaws in a single community focus also find echoes a decade ago in the Macpherson report (Macpherson, 1999) and its concerns about racist stereotyping and discrimination within state services, together with the statutory requirements of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 by public authorities to promote good race relations and combat institutional racism. [4] Often referred to as 'mainstreaming'. |