Memorandum from the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (PVE 35)

Summary

· The Prevent strategy is an experimental and pioneering approach to reducing the potential for acts of political violence by those residing in the UK.

· The strategy suffers from wide negative sentiment on the part of the public and significant scepticism among many of those it is aimed at and delivered by.

· The core weakness of the approach is a lack of conceptual clarity regarding what constitutes vulnerability to violent extremism and the appropriate means by which resilience to violent extremist messages can be built.

· Considerable positive progress has been made in building relationships between the statutory partners engaged around Prevent objectives and many credible community-based partners have been engaged.

· There are significant barriers to Prevent in respect of wider Government policy and other forms of violent extremism that need to be addressed.

 

1. Overview

The Prevent strategy has worthy aims which represent a genuine desire to help protect vulnerable individuals and wider society on the part of those that develop and deliver policy at the local level. The UK is a pioneer in the development of policy in this field and is looked to by many other Western nations for guidance in the development of their own activity. While it faces significant, potentially terminal challenges, any judgements should be made and considered in the context of the pioneering and experimental approach to Prevent policy the Government has adopted.

 

2. Rethinking the Approach to Mainstream Prevent

2.1 The Prevent strategy must obtain a lower profile in the discourse around counterterrorism to aid in distancing it from the negative associations of 'harder' elements of CT strategy and wider international activity. In many cases the closeness of Prevent objectives to wider social cohesion and integration objectives make it appropriate for Prevent considerations to be incorporated into these wider areas where possible. This will aid in lowering the profile of Prevent and ensuring that it is correctly interpreted as nothing more sinister than social work aimed at protecting vulnerable individuals and wider society. Such integration will further provide force multipliers in terms of funding and potential partners, widening the scope for delivering Prevent objectives.

 

2.2 For example, in terms of counter-radicalisation, which is used here to indicate approaches that aim to increase the resilience of individuals and groups to violent extremist messages, there is a huge overlap with an array of educational and social activity at the local level. Such activity should not be re-created under a Prevent banner, rather Prevent objectives should discreetly and legitimately be integrated as part of, for example, efforts to promote inter-faith understanding or informed discussion of international politics.

 

2.3 In regard to de-radicalisation efforts which focus on individuals that have, to varying degrees, adopted the ideology of violent extremism, these will always remain closer to counterterrorism efforts owing to the need to risk assess approaches to potentially dangerous individuals. However, these situations are comparatively rare and can be implemented and communicated separately to the wider agenda. This division is important as Prevent becomes mainstreamed to avoid the perception that every Prevent-related initiative is an effort to de-radicalise or explicitly counter terrorism.

 

3. Establishing Vulnerability in Relation to Violent Extremism

3.1 This remains the primary flaw of the Prevent approach at present. It is clear that the Prevent strategy was developed and continues to operate with very rudimentary indicators of what might lead individuals to become involved in violent extremism. This limited guidance is not sufficient and may result in flawed and inappropriate judgements being made about groups or individuals.

 

3.2 There is a growing dataset of cases that can provide guidance on the factors that may lead individuals to become involved in violent extremism. However, much of the most useful and recent information is restricted and consequently the analysis is dependent upon the limited resources that civil servants with appropriate clearance devote to it.

 

3.3 Furthermore, what is currently known about those who have been involved in violent extremism and those that have been part of or referred to Prevent projects does not lead to clear, limited indicators. A wide range of actual and suggested early motivations or vulnerabilities are in evidence, from specific political grievances to vulnerability as a consequence of multifarious social circumstances. This makes the sub-strategic approach of Prevent problematic and in part explains the large diversity and experimental nature of many Prevent projects.

 

3.4 A consequence of the lack of guidance provided on vulnerability has been for local level officials and community partner to develop their own interpretations and definitions. This may and likely has provided useful feedback to policy-makers. However, it is an unsustainable approach and potentially damaging if local policies are inadequate or inappropriate.

 

3.5 It is likely that even more developed analysis of the circumstances of those past and present who have become involved in violent extremism will only expand rather than reduce the factors that solely or partly contribute to an individual's involvement in violent extremism. In this case the Government needs to consider whether communicating detailed and highly nuanced indicators is a realistic approach. Correspondingly, it should be cautious about communicating overly simplified and potentially misleading key indicators.

 

3.6 The most significant implication of an inability to usefully determine factors that make individuals vulnerable to involvement in violent extremism is the need for a fundamental reassessment of the scope and viability of Prevent. If adequate indicators that also form the basis for evaluation frameworks are not developed then there is little potential for activity to demonstrate success beyond structural and organisational developments.

4. Implementation by Local Authorities

4.1 As a consequence of the very limited guidance of what constitutes vulnerability to violent extremism, Local Authorities have experienced difficulties in determining the most appropriate partners with whom to engage and projects to fund.

 

4.2 The most significant advances by Regional Government, Local Authorities and Police Forces have been structural. Relationships and lines of communication that were previously non-existent or underdeveloped have been created. These often have utility beyond the Prevent agenda and should be regarded as a positive incidental outcome.

 

4.3 Locally based Prevent activity has tended towards the softer end of the Objectives. For example, education and arts-based or social projects with an element of faith-oriented activity has been common. It has been easier for local funders to direct efforts to existing providers in these areas that have credibility and a track record of delivery. Again, central Government guidance is required to address this.

 

4.4 The introduction of NI35 has provided those LAs that have chosen to adopt it with an outline framework for assessing their Prevent activity. However, the focus of NI35 is predominantly on organisational achievements, 'number counts' of activity and accordance with vague objectives. Many LAs have found it difficult to understand the outcomes of their funded projects and thereby demonstrate value-for-money..

 

5. Communication and Reception of the Prevent Agenda

5.1 The war paradigm prevalent during the US Bush Administration was incompatible with the approach required for Prevent. It's polarising effect placed any counterterrorism related initiative in the same broad category of policy responsible for the Iraq conflict, torture, rendition and extra-judicial killings that defined the US-led 'war on terror'. Only now, as the US moves further towards an international law enforcement paradigm for its counterterrorism activity is there scope for presenting the nuanced, subtle and progressive approach that is Prevent. In a very real sense this shift provides the conditions to facilitate public communication of Prevent policy.

 

5.2 The Prevent agenda is currently bound to a counter-terrorism strategy that has been the subject of enormous public scepticism and dissatisfaction. Those most likely to be sceptical and/or dissatisfied are in many cases some of those most critical to delivering Prevent at the local level.

 

5.3 Community reactions to the Prevent programme are highly variable but share, for the most part, a scepticism of varying degrees. Some have found the very concept of a Preventative programme aimed solely at Muslims offensive. Others have recognised the need for such work but are sceptical about the Governments understanding of the problem and long-term commitment to objectives.

 

5.4 Community-based projects delivering Prevent activity have experienced difficulties relating to their credibility in the community when their Prevent work has become known. Efforts have been made in some areas to minimise the overt contact between those organisations and the Local Authority and Prevent-focused police officers. Efforts to disguise contact clearly have the potential to damage perceptions further should this be subsequently disclosed.

 

6. Other Barriers to Prevent

6.1 A key obstacle remains a need to identify and, if possible, address grievances (Objective 5). Though an identified area in the Government's Prevent strategy it has so far been neglected. The inability of Government to explicitly recognise the impact of foreign policy on domestic radicalisation has impeded progress. This political denial, which some ministers have come close to recognising, destroys credibility wherever it manifests. Beyond this, identifying real grievances will aid local statutory partners in engaging with sceptical communities.

 

6.2 A key grievance is related to the far-right and its growth across Europe. This cannot be ignored in attempts to counter violent radicalisation in Muslim communities. In the UK, the activities of far-right groups have been recently assessed as presenting an increasing violent threat. Their views encourage extremist views in their target communities. This tension is exploited by radicalisers in their propaganda as an example of state persecution of Muslims. Notwithstanding the relative threats presented, it is clear that a sole focus on the Muslim community in relation to terrorism is self-defeating, lacks legitimacy and inhibits cooperation.

 

6.3 A particular problem is the growth of conscious and unconscious discrimination in the minds of some officials. This is seen in the effective racial profiling of individuals in public places, disproportionate attention at airports and ill-considered use of stop-and-search powers. All of these cause resentment, undermine Prevent and feed the propaganda of radicalisers. These practices and attitudes must be eroded through better training and elimination of the permissive policies that allow them.

 

7. Evaluating and demonstrating success in Prevent

7.1 The Government has made progress towards evaluating existing Prevent activity. Evaluations have provided useful guidance on the organisational delivery of Prevent. However, they have also identified conceptual problems that are yet to be addressed.

 

7.2 While plans evidently existing to enhance the Governments understanding of concepts and what delivering Prevent means in practice, implementation of this has been slow. Consequently, Prevent activity is largely unproven in terms of effectiveness and the frameworks for assessment suffer as a result of the comparatively weak conceptual state of Prevent.

 

8. Core Recommendations

8.1 The profile of Prevent should be lowered and its objectives integrated where appropriate into wider social cohesion and integration activity.

 

8.2 A developed understanding of the factors that make individuals vulnerable to violent extremist messages is urgently required. It is unlikely that the Prevent agenda will survive political change and public criticism and scepticism if it cannot provide this

 

8.3 Identifying and reconciling other areas of counterterrorism policy with Prevent is necessary to ensure that initiatives are not undermined.

 

8.4 Expanding the focus of Prevent to include other forms of violent extremism is essential for the agenda's credibility and longevity.

 

September 2009