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Memorandum from the National Muslim Women's Advisory Group (PVE 36)
The following is a collation of all the responses received from members of the National Muslim Women's Advisory Group (NMWAG), which explains the varying writing styles throughout the document, so as to ensure authenticity and fair inclusion of every response. The following were the frequently repeated responses to the questions posed for the inquiry:
1. Lack of overt police responsibilities and sensitivities in respect of minority communities undermine community liaison work done under the prevent agenda. Such as the permission given by the Police during the holy month of Ramadan to hold an anti-Muslim protest outside Harrow Central Mosque on Friday 11 September 2009.
2. The bias of civil servants, departmental advisors and local authorities (LA) undermine the prevent initiatives taken by the less 'favourite' stakeholders and organisations, who are also excluded from consultative meetings with decision-makers, Ministers and Councillors.
3. The funding decisions is not always transparent and often repeated for preferred organisations which deters new ideas to assist the prevent agenda particularly when favoured existing organisations have not necessarily achieved the requisite results to justify the repeated funding. Also, the funding application process is perceived to be a show-case exercise.
4. Minority Muslim groups, with track record for large output but without the backing of the favoured organisations (such as the MCB), are more often than not ignored and marginalised from funding opportunities and access to decision-makers and Ministers.
5. The indignity of travellers at airports (for instance women having to remove their outer garments) undermines community cohesion which in turn undermines the prevent agenda - more consideration needs to be given on how to meet the requisite security requirements.
Is the Prevent programme the right way of addressing the problem of violent extremism, or are there better ways of doing it?
6. There needs to be a clearer conceptual distinction between policies designed to prevent extremism and those to build community cohesion − even if some of the vehicles and levers for change might overlap. Indeed, some genuinely well-motivated attempts to foster a sense of belonging in British society by glossing over differences of outlook or ideology are in danger of fostering attitudes which could lead to more rather than less extremism.
7. This challenge is particularly acute at local authority level, where many leaders and chief executives of local councils have been reluctant to single out and challenge the ideology of one group of people living in their community. We needed to be clear about the purpose of any intervention, dialogue or funding and evaluate them against clear criteria.
8. There needs to be an effective kind of engagement with Muslim and other minority ethnic communities especially as traditional religious institutions and organisations have failed to connect with young people and deal with their sense of alienation from British society. The state could not rely on 'gatekeeper' organisations to speak for Muslim communities and government has to appreciate that the dealings they have with both individuals and groups can act to 'legitimise' or 'delegitimize' those individuals or groups as well as help build capacity therein. Therefore it is absolutely imperative that due consideration is given when selecting partners to implement programmes.
9. The above needs to be handled in a manner that does not exasperate the already perceived implementation of faith based identity politics. British Muslims need to be more effectively encouraged to play their continued role in enhancing British society. The current programme appears to be adding fuel to the rise in popularity and growing support for far right wing fascist organisations.
10. Local partnerships still do not understand the agenda fully and do not want to go beyond their usual working practices.
11. Most of this agenda has been addressed by being added onto people's normal day jobs, which has diluted the impact.
12. The funding has been spent on things which only very loosely address 'Preventing Violent Extremism' (PVE) because local authorities have not traditionally engaged with Muslim communities or understood their issues and concerns.
13. A lot of the funding has been spent on the extensive so called 'Islamic experts' industry which has been artificially created, often in collaboration to promote favoured ideologies.
14. Expectations have been raised in some areas, which invariably will not be met, which in turn will lead to the problems of tomorrow.
How robust is the Government's analysis of the factors which lead people to become involved in violent extremism? Is the 'Prevent' programme appropriately targeted to address the most important of those factors?
15. There seem to be many contradictions in
application of analysis. Some examples of these are based on the decision to
work with organisations that share at the senior levels the same shared values
that all
16. There is a focus on Violent Extremism and not Extremism. There seems to be quite a significant amount of analysis into ideologies that are fundamentally the fuel for violent extremists and yet many organisations that have these same identified ideologues are not only being supported, but in many cases funded as well.
17. Yes and no because a lot of time was wasted initially in the complete denial of the role of foreign policy and the need to address grievances (which has now changed but people still do not have the tools or skills to address political grievances when they occur) and the denial has had a lasting impact particularly by ideologues who wish to refer to past examples.
How appropriate, and how effective, is the Government's strategy for engaging with communities? Has the Government been speaking to the right people? Has its programme reached those at whom it is-or should be-aimed?
18. Effectiveness is compromised went the individuals selected to be the departmental advisors and the civil servants leading on projects are favourable to particular Muslim organisations who have historically not been affective with the grass-roots.
19. When appointments go to historical "friends" and their sympathisers due to their lobby power and other Muslims irrespective of competence and knowledge are marginalised then the prevent agenda is necessarily compromised as it ceases to have legitimacy with the grass-roots and the policies and projects become ineffective and too politicised which is contrary to the objectives of prevent.
20. Government must not engage with people or organisations that give a platform to, deny, or are apologists for crimes against humanity, including all genocide even that perpetrated by Muslim countries or organisations.
21. Government must not engage with groups or individuals that present a threat to rights and freedoms protected by the ECHR and discriminate or advocate discrimination on the basis of religion, religious sect, race or gender in any aspect of public life or public policy.
22. Government must not engage with groups or individuals who support or condone terrorism anywhere in the world.
23. The programme must incentivise "good behaviour" and disincentivise bad behaviour (as per shared values which need to be clearly set out rather having them as vague notions).
24. There is very little data that has been issued by government as to who they are engaging with other than the organisations that seem to shout the loudest within the media.
25. A lot more work could have been done which would have ensured a much wider reach into the diverse Muslim communities with wider engagement rather than their favourites.
26. The entire labelling by PVE continues to set a negative context and agenda.
27. PVE funding often does not reach the organisations that apply for it - once local authorities are approved or allocated the funds they have on some occasions used it for other purposes.
28. Independent bodies that have been established to advice on the PVE agenda are often not given enough support to be effective within a reasonable amount of time as the bureaucratic process causes extensive delays.
29. Voluntary community groups are not well informed on prevent agenda/strategy, the work they are carrying out is from a purely voluntary basis, needs led, these community groups experience difficulty securing funding to deliver community cohesion projects.
30. More respect, acknowledgment and financial support would initiate community champions to work with the statutory sector to deliver the prevent agenda.
Is the necessary advice and expertise available to local authorities on how to implement and evaluate the programme?
31. When Independent bodies are given support, such as for e.g. marketing/communications team, they are restricted in relaying their objective and honest opinions when and if this does not compliment the government's agenda. The purpose of having independent advisors is sometimes to hear the honest and frank comments, as uncomfortable as they may be.
32. The plan to tackle extremism at local regional levels seems to be one that makes sense, however the skills advice and expertise is not available at local authority level to implement the programme.
33. There has been a recent mentoring programme run by IDeA that has seen the accreditation of peer mentors to advice on how local authorities can create their own plans and implementation programmes. However, there is very little real expertise within the peer mentor community on causes of radicalisation and how to prevent them. Also the accreditation process does not measure in any format the prospective mentors' understanding of Prevent.
34. Many local authorities are not clear on their own understanding of the programme and some do not have the motivation to work on the Prevent agenda per say and are free to spend the finances allocated in whatever manner they see fit - hence we have some councils allocating the funds to projects that do not fulfil the prevent objectives.
35. In some places the expertise and advice is available but is not usually taken or understood because local authorities are just paying lip service to this agenda or funding their preferred agenda through their preferred organisations rather than the most competent to deliver.
Are the objectives of the 'Prevent' agenda being communicated effectively to those at whom it is aimed?
36. No, because there is still a tendency to talk to the so called 'community leaders' who in reality are so far removed from their communities that they would not be in position to relay the relevant information. This is particularly evident at stakeholder meetings.
37. Feedback from individuals, community groups and professionals supporting Muslim families concur that the terminology of Prevent has been a barrier, it reflects a negative image of ordinary hardworking settled Muslims and newly arrived Muslims striving to settle in the communities. Language of Al- Qaida promoted by fundamentalists has led to the 'Blacklisting' of Muslims. Government needs to find new language that effectively refers to violent extremism that is not linked to Islam or Muslim communities.
38. Finding the balance to promote the agenda positively for better community cohesion across all races, ethnicities and faiths is yet to be identified.
39. Communication between the prevent partners and the Muslim communities remain closed rather than open.
40. Muslim communities from their experience feel statutory agencies cannot be trusted due to previous communications when these communities have highlighted a problem to senior professionals on local matters and their concerns have been ignored without conducting a full inquiry into their concerns.
41. Mosques with dedicated committee members need support from statutory agencies in order to initiate and deliver community led Mosque activities. MINAB has failed to be the answer Government had envisaged for rendering such support and empowerment to mosques.
42. Mosque Management Committee members need legal guidance when confronted with 'rogue' committee members. Such support is lacking. MINAB has failed to win confidence at grassroots level irrespective of their propaganda, too often, by the same old community leaders with vested political interests.
43. Engaging with Muslim communities for instance in Hertfordshire is currently at 'light touch' stage. Ideally it would be more positive if high profile ministers visited Muslim communities, with low literacy, low income, as they are not well informed on the work of the CLG or any other department.
Is the Government seeking, and obtaining, appropriate advice on how to achieve the goals of the 'Prevent' programme?
44. There appear to be stakeholder meetings asking for advice however most of them discuss items of policy after they have been decided and many of these meetings appear to be an exercise in "selling the ideas" - showcase consultation meetings with "old favourites".
45. Again, advice is sought but not always taken into consideration when making policy decisions.
46. From consultation feedback it appears that professionals are finding it extremely difficult to engage with Muslim communities as they do not have the links with strong community leaders. It is necessary to find and promote strong community leaders.
47. For instance, very little if any advice is sought from NMWAG on policies and the Prevent agenda - yet we are promoted by Government to its stakeholders as advisors. NMWAG members often learn of Prevent policies and agenda once they have been formalised.
48. The prevent agenda remains hidden in white Middle class localities, rightly or wrongly there are arguments from both sides, promoting the agenda can create hostility between the indigenous population and the Muslim communities.
How effectively has the Government evaluated the effectiveness of the programme and the value for money which is being obtained from it? Have reactions to the programme been adequately gauged?
49. There appears to have been a flurry of activity that has been undertaken with regards to Prevent with very little or in most cases no data to look at the effectiveness of the outcomes.
50. All Prevent-related activity must be subjected to rigorous 'Equality Impact Assessments', which consider the activity by their impact on society as a whole.
51. There are a number of intervention centres that have been initiated and funded by government but there is little or no real data as to their effect and effectiveness. Work needs to be carried out to establish whether we are getting value for money. Perhaps a way forward is to look at attitudinal changes within the respective communities and the government bodies.
52. As long as we rely on local partnerships to self evaluate, we will never get a true picture because local authorities cherry pick the respondents who are likely to support their views.
53. "I think the label PVE is still causing grief and making those who want to request funding unhappy and uncomfortable - it has to be changed."
54. Funding is all too often allocated based on the ability to present slick funding applications even though those applicants requesting funding have never delivered or worked with the marginalized group they are requesting the funding for and have no links or understanding of the needs of that minority group. Funds are then allocated with the stipulation that the organisation must work with the organisation which is directly linked with providing support to that marginalized group. The result is that most of the funding allocated is then usurped by the middle man being the funding applicant and lost to the group they advocate to be supporting.
55. Advisors would be better employed looking at such funding applications and, regardless of the applicant, look towards providing funding to those directly involved in the delivery of similar services and who have a good track record in support and delivery so that it goes directly to those funding is allocated to assist.
56. We have found that the success of the PVE agenda has depended upon it being initiated and led by the Muslim community.
57. There has been a lot of suspicion and to overcome this we have consulted widely with emphasis on asking the Muslim community candidly what they feel the vulnerabilities in the community are and addressing those through projects that we are main streaming through the council in partnership with the different organisations. This, I have found cuts out the politics of funding and make the projects more attractive and accessible to a wider community. It also bypasses the 'gatekeepers'. This has been particularly successful with women and young people. These projects need to be long term and sustainable. We have changed the name of the funding to 'building the bridge'- this has made a difference to how it is perceived. Although there is a great deal of suspicion around the agenda.
Is there adequate differentiation between what should be achieved through the Prevent programme and the priorities that concern related, but distinct, policy frameworks such as cohesion and integration?
58. Differentiation can only be achieved if organisations and grass roots understand and buy into the Prevent programme. It is here that the government has failed - to provide an effective differentiator and motivation at grassroots' level to achieve this.
59. No, because a lot of people do not even understand what is cohesion and the fact that different Government departments are giving contradictory messages (i.e. OSCT and CLG) is just confusing practitioners.
60. The indigenous population along with Muslim communities need more appropriate education to alleviate fears and anxieties relating to integration and cohesion.
61. Government needs to address the extremism from the Far Right /Fascists to BNP without repercussions on Muslim communities.
62. Muslim communities need guidance and advice in how to tackle such backlash, how and from whom to seek support. Statutory agencies need to listen and act upon concerns raised by Muslim communities with urgency and not make Muslims feel 'unheard' or 'outsiders'.
September 2009 |