Memorandum submitted by Jonathan Steinberg
I
understand your Committee has been commissioned to review (inter alia) the
Conditional Fee Arrangement aspect of the costs rules and wanted to give some
input into areas where there is potential for abuse which I am reliably
informed weren't considered when the costs aspect of the Court Rules (CPR 48)
was being drafted.
I have been admitted to the UK bar since 1976 and to the New York bar (as well
as to the Federal bar) since 1983 and was for a lengthy period the only member
of the UK bar to practice in litigation and commercial law both in a
structured as well as in a fused legal system; and where contingency fees have
'always' been permissible. As such I have experience of how practitioners have
become accustomed to having the CFA in their arsenal as well as how they can be
used and possibly abused. I should also mention that I am an active
member of the American Society of Journalists and Authors, - an
organisation membership in which is carefully vetted by numerous internal
committees according to strict criteria.
My experience was so significant that I have been authorised to speak for the
UK government to the media in the US and been recommended by British Consulates
to local law firms looking for input into the law behind cases being fought in
local courts.
After the Woolf Reforms to the legal system, I made some recommendations
which were adopted by the Lord Chancellor which had the effect of making the
Court System more user-friendly. I was also asked by the Lord
Chancellor's Office to prepare a report which I sent to His Lordship's office
for Sir David Clementi and I am pleased to note that the White Paper itself
went considerably further than the Clementi proposals: The law which was ultimately
implemented was in fact to a considerable extent based on the points I set out
in my report on paragraphs 66-70 of the underlying Consultation Document
"In The Public Interest'.
There are a number of costs points I feel ought to be brought to your attention
on the subject of conditional fee arrangements:
1. There is a considerable imbalance which is probably impermissible under the
European Convention (as well as under the level playing field rules of CPR 1)
whereby litigants of different classes can recover fees at different levels
under costs orders. It is critical that any consideration of the
conditional fee arrangement look into how any legitimate litigation undertaken
by anyone who isnt wealthy or a largish corporation could conceivably get started?
1a Notably, legal aid is generally not available for defamation
cases. I use the word generally because it can still be made available in
theory in appropriate cases by ministerial fiat. However whatever the
ministerial fiat, and even if there is an HRA aspect of the case, what isnt
generally known about the system is that the Community Legal Services is so
unused to funding legal aid cases in defamation that they can easily override
any ministerial designation to grant legal aid in any particular case;
and in practice there is nothing which can be done about such
refusal. Indeed the refusal then comes within the ambit of a general enquiry
which will be outside the remit of your Committee: Certain judges in the High
Court have been designated to review such decisions and those judges appear in
the past to have had instructions NOT to take Human Rights arguments into
consideration in judicial review of the CLS's administrative decision. I
have cases on record where they have said this. They simply do not write
embarrassing judgments on the facts presented to them which will direct the CLS
to grant legal aid. The conditional fee arrangement is therefore the only
way a member of the public can start litigation (or indeed defend it) without
ruining himself or his company.
1b I utterly discount the suggestion that a member of the public can take
action himself or herself as a litigant in person. Such litigants can be
and often are the subject of inherent abuse by the system and in practice it is
extraordinarily difficult to get any judge of the High Court to take litigants
in person seriously at any hearing or in any application they might make.
Hearings with litigants in person usually take place as a dialogue between the
judge and the counsel for the represented party with the litigant in person
being largely an emasculated observer.
It is not difficult to see a solicitor representing a newspaper taking action
to run up the costs and render the litigation so difficult to pursue that
ultimately a large number of justifiable cases can be defeated by a sort of practical
solicitor abuse: The legal system treats solicitors as being in a completely
different class of litigant from any other litigant and very significant
percentages of judges simply will not accept any evidence which suggests that
the solicitor is just trying to abuse the system to prevent his opponent from
succeeding in litigation. Actually this is hardly surprising where the
solicitor is acting in the course of his everyday employment whereas the
litigant in person will normally be like a 'fish out of water' in engaging in
action through the court system. The solicitor's conduct is inevitable
explained away by claiming that he is just fearlessly representing the
interests of his client. Infra, I will give an example in extremis
of how this works in practice so that you can see that the Steel & Morris
case was completely anomalous (and only applies where the litigant does not
mind being declared bankrupt as a result of the litigation):
2. Your Committee for its own purposes should know precisely how this position
is skewed in favour of parties who are represented by looking at how solicitors
are themselves treated by the Courts because there is this further ill which
some form of no-win-no-fee system combats: I am drawn to wonder how it
can conceivably be justified that (for example) when representing themselves in
litigation, solicitors can pay themselves their costs at their
opponent's expense often at around three hundred pounds an hour under costs
orders whereas litigants in person can only recover £9.25 under an
identical costs order in the same case. This is particularly pertinent in
view of a final paragraph said in the Court of Appeal by Lord Justice Goldring
only this week, commenting on how little judges do to alleviate this form of
abuse:
1. A final observation
33. What happened in this case exemplifies much that is wrong with our
civil justice system. The costs involved dwarf the damages. The trial took far
too long. It was virtually 12 months after it began that it finished. The
advocates appear to have lost all sense of proportion in their conduct of it.
Mr. Moffett, for example, cross-examined Mr. Peakman for some two days (albeit
the judge himself appears to have asked many questions during the course of
that cross-examination). The judge should not have allowed such a
cross-examination to take place. He should not have permitted the case to take,
in all, 8 days. I am afraid that it is clear that overall the judge failed to
exercise that degree of control over these proceedings which he should have.
The CPR gives him wide powers in that regard. Unfortunately he did not exercise
them.
I don't think it states the position too strongly that it is almost unheard of
for a judge to exercise any degree of restraint over costs and I
have had cases where in extremis, judge have themselves drawn out the costs to
punish one litigant who they didn't like: By drawing out the case prior to
making no ruing on the facts or law of hearings they had caused to run over
numerous days by demanding argument on which they weren't going to rule.
(Obviously no Master exercising his case management powers can have any control
over this. And -on this point- I have had cases where there was flagrant practical
abuse by solicitors in, for example, filing large numbers of full
ring-files of papers for 5 minute case management hearings where there could
have been no conceivable reason for doing so save to allow them to claim costs
of preparing those ring-files). Please note my continued use of the word
practical. By this I mean such abuse as could not possibly be the subject of
any complaint to any regulatory authority.
2a. But there is considerable scope for general abuse in these
rules independently of how the judge governs his court room procedures: A
solicitor can represent himself in litigation solely for the costs he can
recover out of the case when work is a bit slow in his office because he knows
that he will be able to argue that his opponent can only recover at such
a ludicrously low figure. I make this statement for two reasons: firstly
the Costs Office does not in practice usually allow litigants in
person to recover their costs at much more than the £9.25 figure whatever
losses they can show; secondly because there is an equally HRA-impermissible
'costs capping' rule which says that whatever the actual financial loss, even
if it be proven beyond all reasonable doubt to the Costs Office, no amount can
ever be recovered at a rate which is more than two thirds of what the Costs
Master thinks a solicitor would have charged.
While this concept may have been justifiable before the Woolf Reforms which
were designed to make justice accessible to all litigants, one wonders what
possible justification can there be for such a rule today? I can see that
before the CPR, it was arguable that a litigant should have obtained the
services of a solicitor rather than spend his own time on the case if he
charges his time at more than a solicitor; but surely this argument no
longer exists if the reforms were intended to make court more accessable
to litigants in persons. It is absolutely critical that lay clients and counsel
have in their arsenal unrestricted access to conditional fee arrangements to
combat this potential abuse on the part of solicitors representing either the
Press or any client who could be prejudiced by this.
Also please note that this applies whether the case arises in the general
defamation arena or otherwise. If there is going to be any review of the
CFA system as the Press now seems to want, it has to be reviewed in the light
of necessary and politically unacceptable solutions
which involve extension (extensive extension) of legal aid to correct the
imbalance between litigation involving the wealthy/large corporations and those
who cannot afford to pay the huge costs involved.
2b. There is a further problem with the CPR which has not often surfaced
which can be seen in the example to which I have referred. When it has,
it has carefully been brushed under the carpet in cases where it was not raised
as a major issue in the case: As the example of an instance where I
encountered it, I once had occasion to write to Master Gordon Saker in a case
in which I was not involved in any capacity.
It had been brought to my attention that an unscrupulous solicitor had
identified a former client who had revealed to her solicitor that she was in
financial difficulties arising as a result of her employment situation.
She had of course originally consulted that solicitor for this very
reason. The firm of solicitors had been negligent in advising her and was
keen that she not notice this or hold the firm to account and that she just pay
their bill and go away. She was reluctant to pay for negligent advice.
So they instituted proceedings against the former client, using the
confidential information gained while they were in a position of fiduciary
towards her that she was impecunious and couldn't afford to defend those
proceedings. This particular firm 'uses' a former partner solely to extract
fees and costs out of clients.
He then, rather than let the proceedings take their course and risk a
counterclaim for negligence, started to ramp up the costs and threaten her with
the usual arguments about 'knowing every trick in the book' in litigation and
suggesting that if she didn't stop the proceedings by paying up immediately and
in full and now including all costs he had incurred, he would ruin her.
He was of course correct in knowing that this was an overpowering argument
because he knew she was unemployed! It was at this stage
that the researcher brought the case to my attention and (seeing an MO in the
solicitor's conduct), I wrote to the Master.
Instead of ignoring the letter or telling me I had no locus standi (which I of
course didn't) he noticed what was happening and that the victim was being
victimised and that his Office was being used, possibly illegally, to
further this end. He asked his staff to put the defendant in touch with me, -
before one particularly expensive hearing, - while the solicitor was busy
building up his billable hours for which he could obtain costs orders in the
SCCO. Ultimately the situation was resolved (when she did go to see another
solicitor).
3. But it is troubling that the government is now taking action to look
into precisely how conditional fee arrangements work to see if they should be
limited in some way where damage awards are already low enough in UK courts.
Even more troubling is the fact that the committee which has been commissioned
to look into this is a largely academic committee with little or no real
world experience of how the system works in practice and which seems to be
relatively impervious to outside ideas; while the press is so insistent
on protection by the government from the vicissitudes of the CFA system that in
addition, your Committee has been commissioned to look into specifically how
the CFA system can work against media outlets which have infringed on
civil liberties or human rights! (I assume your Committee has no interest in
instances where the media outlet has not so infringed as those cases will
presumably be won by the media outlet whether it be fought under a CFA or
otherwise?)
Conclusion
There are a number of problems with the costs rules which exist independently
of the general rule that the winning party pays the losing party's costs and I
think it appropriate that you be apprised to them in any general review of the
system. Thankfully a reform for which I had been fighting for a lengthy period
(the institution of the CFA system) has now rendered the legal system more
accessable to the public, as opposed to only to a small number of parties
who can afford to litigate.
Nevertheless it is important to remain vigilant to the shortcomings in a system
where those exist. After all, the CFA does do a considerable disservice
to certain classes of litigant, - large corporations and the wealthy;
who have always considered the Courts to be their domain and
can afford to threaten their opponents with bankruptcy. It will remain in
peril while (as Ron Thwaites QC put it in an article recently)
'finance-enabled' litigants control the media and are in a position to keep
gnawing at any government with their agendas. I am glad to note that a
Committee is being set up to review whether the present system serves the
public interest or ought perhaps to be extended to cover instances where legal
representation still isn't available to parties prejudiced by any aspect of
media law.
My recommendations which were adopted by the Lord Chancellor (pursuant to the
Clementi Report) because the Law Society had shown that it was incapable of
self-regulation went as far as suggesting a government body to regulate the
legal profession. One wonders if it is necessary for the PCC to either be
replaced by a new body with proper enforcement powers. Or whether if it
is shown that it's investigations are diligently carried out, it should
be given enforcement powers of its own which can in certain instances supplant
the powers of the Courts: This would prevent any argument that the CFA doesnt
work in the interests of the media from succeeding? I don't
seriously think that there is any argument that CFAs don't work in the
interests of the public.
I can well understand that newspapers will have considerable difficulties where
members of the public who wouldn't have access to the Court System suddenly do
find themselves able to (for example) protect their reputations from
organisations whose primary interest lies in selling newspapers or garnering
advertising revenue from Internet sites.
To put it bluntly and while seeing the situation from both sides, if a
hypothetical newspaper has fired their sub-editors (who should be doing the
fact checking for them) through loss of normal circulation income, I can well
see that they wouldn't want 'just anyone' to take action against them if legal
problems arise as a result of this supposed 'economy'.
I am not sure that the solution to this problem is (for example) abolishing or
abridging the CFA system to prevent people or companies prejudiced take action
to redress damage which results.
My personal view is that the public should be empowered to take action
by promulgation of even more enabling legislation to spur solicitors to take on
more cases under CFAs so that (not just) defamation cases can be pursued where
appropriate.
November 2008