Memorandum submitted by the Association
of Certified Chartered Accountants
SUMMARY
The financial crisis was a product of poor governance
rather than poor regulation. If anything, it should teach us that
regulation is no substitute for sound commercial practice and
trust. Although the state of the economy might make regulation
more appealing, it has not made it more useful. Regulatory reform
can remain relevant if structured around real improvements in
the business environment, rather than arbitrary outputs such as
administrative "savings".
The government needs to explore the potential
of regulatory reform to complement fiscal policy by reducing burdens
on business. But reform itself may benefit from some measure of
business support. Improving SMEs' ability to cope with new requirements
could make regulation more effective and less onerous.
Calls for a "balanced" approach to
regulation may reflect a false dilemma of increased burdens for
business v. increased levels of public risk. Instead we should
focus on achieving the best possible public benefit for the resources
consumed by regulation. This hinges on a better appreciation of
risk, better regulators, guidance and communication, and better
co-ordination with Europe. But it also depends on a deeper understanding
of business. Some improvement is possible if the Impact Assessment
process can be strengthened through improved methodologies and
better access to grassroots information.
INTRODUCTION
1.1 ACCA is the largest and fastest-growing
international professional accountancy body with 131,500 members
and 362,000 students in 170 countries, whom we support
through a network of 80 staffed offices and centres around
the world. ACCA has its headquarters in London and 54,000 of
our members and over 60,000 of our students are UK-based.
1.2 The expertise of our senior members
and in-house technical experts allows ACCA to provide informed
opinion on a range of financial, regulatory, public sector and
business areas, including: taxation (business and personal); small
business; pensions; education; and corporate governance and corporate
social responsibility.
EVIDENCE
2. Regulating in difficult times
2.1 ACCA is concerned that a poor economic
outlook can create the conditions for a surge in new regulation.
Regulation is a form of taxationa use of private resources
to achieve government objectives.[1]
It will become more attractive to policymakers as the government's
fiscal options become constrained by the deteriorating state of
public finances. It may also become more acceptable to the public
as it becomes more risk-averse and increasingly looks to government
for solutions.[2]
But the case for regulation outside financial
services has not changed. Trust in the wider UK business community
has not been compromised.[3]
The financial crisis has not exposed a world where workplace injuries,
employer misconduct or lapses in food standards are more frequent
or damaging than previously thought. The nature of the underlying
risks has not changed, nor has our understanding thereof improved
in any way. The risk of non-compliance rising among struggling
businesses has been highlighted,[4]
but were this to materialise, it would justify stronger enforcement,
not additional burdens on compliant businesses.
ACCA's SME Committee has warned that regulatory
reform could become less relevant in the current economic climate
if pursued in terms of outputs such as regulatory savings.[5]
Insofar as there is a link between regulation and productivity,
it will become weaker in a recession. Regulatory "savings"
achieved by cutting red tape are less likely to translate to increased
output or profit. Crucially, time saved by entrepreneurs, a key
component of these savings, is less likely to be invested in the
business as risk-aversion rises and the productivity of additional
work is reduced.[6]
If evaluated against wider outcomes, however,
the case for regulatory reform is stronger than ever. Perceptions
of regulation can influence the rate of business start-ups and
employment decisions, which will be central to halting the rise
in unemployment.[7]
Additionally, reduced regulatory burdens could contribute to higher
rates of business survival by reducing distraction among SME owner-managers.[8]
Finally, the competitive impact of regulation could become more
acute in the current adverse credit environment,[9]
as any regulation requiring high levels of investment is more
likely to raise barriers to entry. The ensuing concentration cannot
later be reversed by simply removing the regulations that created
it.[10]
2.2 Learning from the financial crisis
The circumstances and regulation of financial
services are unique in many ways, and thus any parallels drawn
between financial regulation and the wider regulatory agenda must
be treated with caution. ACCA's view is that the financial crisis
was caused primarily by a failure of governance, and only facilitated
by the inadequacy of regulation or oversight.[11]
Nevertheless, we agree that some of the lessons from the recent
financial crisis could be adapted for the benefit of the wider
regulatory agenda.
Businesses cannot deal with risk they do not
understand. Even when risk is actively addressed by the business,
high profitability can paralyse its control mechanisms. Therefore
those who take ownership of risk need to be both able and inclined
to override income generators. Finally, the regulatory system
must recognise that the relationship between a business and its
customers should be characterised by trust. Regulation must aim
to support, but not supplant, this trust.[12]
The credit crisis has also underscored three
important themes in compliance behaviour: that compliance does
not equal the absence of risk; that the way businesses choose
to comply can vary, and finally; that their choices can have unexpected,
even negative, consequences.
2.3 Beyond a "balanced approach"
to regulation
Part of the renewed appetite for regulation
stems from a belief that the process of consultation and the regulatory
reform agenda are skewed toward the interests of business.[13]
However, independent survey evidence cites regulation as a bigger
obstacle to succeeding in business than any private sector factors,
especially competition. This should, in our view, constitute at
least a red flag. By this measure, small and micro enterprises
may very well be over-regulated.[14]
But it is pointless to consider regulation and
regulatory reform as a zero-sum-game in which a supportive business
environment must come at the price of placing the public at risk.
We also appreciate that benchmarks of "over-regulation"
might be too simplistic as regulation can have strong enabling
effects for businesses.[15]
Rather than ask whether the government's approach
to regulation is balanced, it would be more appropriate to consider
whether regulation is offering the best possible public value
for the private resources it consumes, and whether it is using
these without jeopardising long-term economic competitiveness
and growth. We have argued in consultation that scrutinising this
value-for-money relationship should be the role of the Better
Regulation Executive.[16]
We believe that much of the infrastructure for
good regulation is already in place. At the strategic level the
UK's regulatory reform programme is world-class. In practice,
however, there is much room for improvement.
2.4 Achieving value for money in regulation
A value-for-money approach to regulation must
first of all be guided by an appreciation of the risks faced by
the public and businesses. A risk-based approach not only identifies
and ranks the areas where regulation can make a difference but
also highlights its potential benefits.[17]
An ongoing process of impact assessment (IA)
must shape proposed regulations from inceptionassessing
both their effectiveness and the costs they impose on business,
and examining how alternative measures might perform. Internal
and external scrutiny of IAs has been shown to motivate high-quality
assessment.[18]
Recognising that regulation is a form of taxation,
Government needs to treat it accordingly: accounting regularly
for the full burden that it will impose and the benefits it anticipates.
To reduce uncertainty and facilitate adaptation, government should
publish its regulatory plans in the medium-term, taking care to
set the total regulatory burden at a level, defined by explicit
commitments, that does not compromise macroeconomic goals such
as growth and competitiveness.
In this context, "better regulation"
is independent of, and complementary to, deregulation just as
achieving value for money in public spending is independent of,
and complementary to, fiscal discipline.
Finally, a balanced approach acknowledges that
only part of the effectiveness and impact of regulation results
from the characteristics of regulations themselves. The rest is
determined by perceptions among businesses and the public,[19]
as well as businesses' internal resources and compliance behaviours.[20]
Regulators need to maintain a solid understanding of these factors
and monitor how they are changing.
2.5 Priorities for better regulation
Better understanding of riskWe
strongly support the basic concept behind the establishment of
the Risk and Regulation Advisory Council (RRAC): that a better
understanding of public risk by all parties can both reduce the
burden and improve the outcomes of regulation.[21]
We are, at this time, unsure of the influence and ambition of
the RRAC. We hope, however, that past the scheduled end of its
mandate in April the RRAC agenda will be internalised by government
departments and regulators.
Better regulatorsWe share the
Regulatory Reform Committee's concern that regulatory reform is
not as embedded or valued a part of the civil service career path
as it ought to be.[22]
The lack of regulatory reform capabilities is likely exacerbated
by the dearth of public sector financial expertise recently highlighted
by the Public Accounts Committee.[23]
As the reform agenda becomes more ambitious, these skills gaps
will become increasingly problematic and the resulting reliance
on a small number of better regulation "champions" may
be close to exhausting its usefulness.[24]
Better guidance and enforcementAcross
the public sector there is a need to foster an account-management
mentality, whereby regulated parties are treated as customers
and authorities can keep track of their dealings with individual
businesses. Examples of good practice, including Companies House
and HMRC, should be emulated as widely as possible.[25]
Taken together, the regional better regulation agenda and the
recent independent review of guidance led by Sarah Anderson CBE
set out a vision of enforcement at the local level using inspectors
trained as sector generalists. We have supported this move and
hope that it signals a long-overdue shift to using established
intermediaries with a high penetration rate to improve compliance
behaviour. We believe that this will yield superior results to
the current reliance on Business Link and www.businesslink.gov.uk
regardless of perceptions and performance.
Co-ordination with EuropeImpact
Assessments (IAs) are prescribed by both the UK and EU regulatory
regimes, and yet there is little integration between the two processes
at the domestic and European level.[26]
In the UK, guidance on both Impact Assessment and the transposition
of EU Directives treats the UK and EC impact assessments as entirely
separate documents.[27]
With more than half of all regulatory burdens originating from
Brussels,[28]
better integration of UK and European practice in regulation design
and impact assessment is a promising, but largely unexplored,
option for regulatory reform.
Better communicationPerceptions
can be as important as facts in shaping the business environment,[29]
and so communicating progress in regulatory reform is crucial
if businesses are to reap its benefits. But this must focus not
on "celebrating success", as the government seems intent
on doing,[30]
but on informing businesses, especially at the grassroots level,
of the work undertaken and seeking their views. This could in
turn not only generate useful insights for policymakers but also
help change one of the most frustrating perceptions of all, namely
that the government does not understand business well enough to
regulate.[31]
2.6 Regulatory reform as business support,
and business support as regulatory reform.
Governments around the world, including the
UK, have embraced fiscal policy interventions in an effort to
contain the effects of a global downturn. As a substitute for
fiscal policy, regulation could limit the effects of fiscal stimulusand
regulatory reform can be used to reinforce them. The UK government
came close to taking this route in autumn, when it was widely
reported that new employment regulations were likely to be delayed
in order to support small businesses.[32]
But it missed this opportunity and also appeared to misjudge how
the administrative burden of implementing VAT cuts at a very short
notice would compromise its fiscal stimulus.[33]
Throughout 2008, ACCA urged the government to
consider regulatory reform as part of its support to hard-hit
businesses. We noted in October that if every sole practitioner
discouraged from hiring by employment regulation were to take
on one member of staff, they would reverse all of the job losses
sustained in the preceding year.[34]
We were delighted that the Anderson Review employed a similar
rationale to support its recommendations.[35]
However, research commissioned by BERR suggests
that the burden or otherwise of regulation is determined at least
in part by business' own capabilities and resources. This suggests
a role for business support as a regulatory reform mechanism.
Building small businesses' ability to comply can both reduce the
burden of regulation and, by changing compliance behaviour, improve
regulatory outcomes.[36]
3. DESIGNING
BETTER REGULATION
3.1 Understanding business.
Independent evidence suggests that businesses
don't believe that Government officials understand them well enough
to regulate.[37]
It is fair to say that the practicalities of life in a small business
cannot readily be appreciated by anyone working in a larger organisation,
private or public. It is also a fact that SMEs are numerous and
diverse, and it is difficult to derive a representative picture
of their behaviour without compromising its value through aggregation.
We have welcomed the initiative to make small
firms impact testing compulsory for all Impact Assessments and
are encouraged by the NAO's reporting of a 78% compliance rate
in 2008.[38]
But the selection of "representative" businesses, the
design of a consultation process and the consideration of alternatives
for the purposes of the test all rely on officials' familiarity
with the realities of small business, which brings regulators
back to square one.
We have welcomed the Regulatory Reform Committee's
call for grass-roots information[39]
as a means of improving policy-makers' understanding of business,
and would like to see more of it complementing the more aggregated
process of "stakeholder engagement". Initiatives such
as the Small Firms Consultation Database can contribute to this
body of knowledge and should be strengthened.
Additionally, a requirement that IAs outline
their assumptions on SME compliance behaviour would be welcome.
Making officials conscious of their assumptions concerning in-house
resources and capabilities, supply chain relationships and bargaining
power, the state of workplace relations, as well as recourse to
advice and compliance behaviour, would, we believe, improve the
overall quality of IAs.
3.2 Understanding implementation.
IAs typically assume that regulations can be
applied ideally, eliciting 100% compliance rates and a uniform
response from businesses of all shapes and sizes.[40]
In reality, research carried out for the Anderson Review suggests
that the compliance behaviour of some 42% of SMEs will not fit
a standard model,[41]
and that one in six businesses are unlikely to take proactive
action in order to remain compliant. It is also documented that
the adequacy of SMEs' internal resources determines to a large
extent the costs and benefits of compliance.[42]
In failing to account for the complexities of compliance behaviour,
IAs can misrepresent the costs and benefits of regulation.
There is potential to improve this understanding
through post-implementation reviews, whereby regulators can assess
the responses of businesses and their antecedents. But the evidence
suggests that the proportion of IAs that make reasonable provision
for such fell to one in three between 2006 and 2008 despite
improved IA guidance.[43]
That said, officials can hardly be expected to plan for reviews
when they haven't planned for implementation in the first place.
Incredibly, the NAO found that the proportion of IAs that included
an implementation plan plummeted from 74 to 20% between 2006 and
2008.[44]
February 2009
1 R A Posner, "Taxation by Regulation" Bell
Journal of Economics 2(1): 22-50 Spring 1971. Back
2
Edelman Trust Barometer 2009. Fieldwork took place from 5 November
to 14 December 2008. Back
3
Ibid. Back
4
A recent survey by the National Accident Helpline reported employees'
belief that the recession has reduced attention to health and
safety since the recession hit. The latest data from the Health
and Safety Executive (Q2 2008) suggest the number of incidents
has been falling, against seasonal trends. Back
5
ACCA, "Better regulation: what it really means" February
2009. Back
6
R Thurik, "Allocation and productivity of time in new ventures
of female and male entrepreneurs." Small Business Economics,
December 2008. Back
7
"The Good Guidance Guide: Taking the uncertainty out of regulation."
BERR, January 2008. For the effect of perceived administrative
burdens on action taken to start a new business see Grilo, I &
Thurik, R. "Determinants of entrepreneurial engagement levels
in Europe and the US." Industrial and Corporate Change.
17:6, October 2008. Back
8
C Decker, T Keyworth, and G Yarrow, "Identification of regulatory
impacts on scale economies in compliance costs." In BERR
Occasional Paper no. 3, "Impact of regulation on productivity"
September 2008. Back
9
ACCA, "SME Credit Update Q4 2008" January 2008. Back
10
BERR "Impact assessment of regulatory budgets consultation"
August 2008 Back
11
ACCA, "Climbing out of the Credit Crunch" September
2008. Back
12
Ibid. On the trade-off between regulation and trust, see
R Reeves and E Smith, "Papering Over the Cracks? Rules, Regulation
and Real Trust", The Work Foundation, January 2006. Back
13
BERR "Regulatory Budgets Consultation Event-7 October
2008: Executive Summary" December 2008. Back
14
IFF Research, "The Annual Survey of Small Businesses' Opinions
2006-07 (ASBS 2006/07)" BERR, February 2008. Back
15
See for instance M Hart, J Kitching, R Blackburn, D Smallbone,
N Wilson, R Athayde, "The impact of regulation on small business
performance", BERR, April 2008. Back
16
ACCA "Regulatory Budgets: A Consultation Document-Comments
from ACCA" November 2008 Back
17
Ibid. Back
18
NAO, " Delivering High Quality Impact Assessments" January
2009. Back
19
Better Regulation Commission, "Public Risk-The Next Frontier
for Better Regulation" January 2008. Back
20
Hart et al, op cit. Back
21
Better Regulation Commission, op cit. Back
22
Commons Regulatory Reform Committee, "Getting Results: the
Better Regulation Agenda and the Impact of the Better Regulation
Executive" July 2008. Back
23
Commons Public Accounts Committee, "Managing financial resources
to deliver better public services" September 2008. Back
24
On the adequacy of BRE resources in this area, see NAO, "The
Administrative Burdens Reduction Programme 2008" October
2008 Back
25
See for instance HMRC "HM Revenue and Customers and the taxpayer"
June 2008 and Companies House, "Strategic Direction
for 2010". Commons Business and Enterprise Committee, "Companies
House" November 2008. Back
26
Evaluation Partnership, "Evaluation of the Commission's Impact
Assessment System". EC, April 2007 Back
27
BERR Impact Assessment Guidance v3.0, 2008 and BERR, "Transposition
guide: how to implement European Directives effectively"
September 2007. Back
28
BCC Burdens Barometer, 2008 Back
29
See for instance Arenius, P and M Minniti, 2005, Perceptual variables
and nascent entrepreneurship, Small Business Economics 24(3),
233-247 Back
30
Commons Regulatory Reform Committee, "Getting Results: the
Better Regulation Executive and the Impact of the Regulatory Reform
Agenda: Government Response to the Committee's Fifth Report of
Session 2007-08" November 2008 Back
31
This view was expressed by 63% of respondents to a NAO survey
in February 2008. NAO, "The Administrative Burdens Reduction
Programme 2008" October 2008. Back
32
See for instance J. Eaglesham, "Mandelson faces union backlash"
Financial Times, 21 October 2008. Back
33
20% of respondents to a British Chambers of Commerce survey conducted
in January 2009 found that the VAT cut had imposed a net
burden on their business, while 76% claim not to have benefited.
"Business reports deteriorating relationship with bank managers"
BCC Press Release, 15 February 2009. Back
34
"Don't give up on regulatory reform, says ACCA urges to the
new Minister for Communications, Technology and Broadcasting."
ACCA press release, 10 October 2008. Back
35
"The Good Guidance Guide: Taking the uncertainty out of regulation."
BERR, January 2008 Back
36
Hart et al, op cit. Back
37
NAO, "The Administrative Burdens Reduction Programme 2008"
October 2008 Back
38
NAO, " Delivering High Quality Impact Assessments" January
2009. Back
39
Commons Regulatory Reform Committee, "Getting Results: the
Better Regulation Agenda and the Impact of the Better Regulation
Executive" July 2008. Back
40
NAO, op cit. Back
41
Ipsos MORI, "Business perspectives of government guidance"
BERR, July 2008. This percentage is based on a statistical classification
of SMEs and includes all SMEs except those classified as "capable
but unconcerned" and "prepared and established",
whose compliance behaviour is considered predictable as it is
unconstrained by the adequacy of internal resources. Back
42
Hart et al, op cit. Back
43
NAO, op cit. Back
44
Ibid. Back
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