Examination of Witnesses (Questions 380-399)
MR QUENTIN
DAVIES MP, GENERAL
SIR KEVIN
O'DONOGHUE KCB CBE, LIEUTENANT
GENERAL ANDREW
FIGGURES CBE AND
MR AMYAS
MORSE
16 DECEMBER 2008
Q380 Chairman: But that is precisely
what you did with the aircraft carriers.
Mr Davies: In the case of the
aircraft carriers it was not a competitive contract of the kind
I have just described, it was one of these sort of partnership
contracts.
Q381 Chairman: That makes a difference,
does it?
Mr Davies: It can make a difference,
yes; it can certainly make a difference.
Q382 Chairman: We will move on to
one other set of aircraft issues, the A400M aircraft: are they
going to have full defensive aid suites?
Mr Davies: The answer is yes.
Q383 Chairman: All of them?
Mr Davies: The ones that we are
employing in theatre, certainly, because we make it a principle
that we do not fly troops, personnel, indeed civilian personnel—even
ministers, though that may be controversial—into theatre
without defensive aid suites. The only aircraft we fly into theatre
without defensive aid suites would be aircraft not owned by us
and carrying freight not human beings.
Q384 Chairman: So you might be buying
some A400Ms that do not have full defensive aid suites on the
basis that they would never fly anywhere into danger, is that
right?
Mr Davies: Mr Arbuthnot, we need
to take that decision nearer the time. We are sadly -sadly—some
way from an in service date for the A400M. That itself is a difficult
matter at the moment on which we are focusing, so we are some
way down the road from deciding that. I have just given you the
general principle and it is a very important general principle.
In so far as we were clear that some A400Ms would not need to
fly into theatre maybe we would not need to fit the defensive
aid suites, but we would have to take a view as to whether it
would be sensible to have some aircraft, maybe just for training
purposes, where we did not need that. It is a decision we have
not taken yet.
Q385 Chairman: So the answer to you
might be having some A400Ms without defensive aid suites is a
yes.
Mr Davies: It is possible.
Q386 Chairman: The fuel inertion
system that is currently being fitted to the C130s and others,
is that going to be put into the A400Ms?
Mr Davies: The same principles
apply to the fuel inertion system and also to—because you
are probably about to ask me about that too—to the explosive
suppressant foam.
Q387 Chairman: I was.
Mr Davies: Yes. The same principles
apply in all three cases because obviously the three cases are
very analogous and the same issues arise.
Q388 Chairman: What about the Chinook
helicopters that have just been made available to go to Afghanistan,
will they have the fuel inertion system?
Lieutenant General Figgures: They
have the pannier tanks, the piano hinges and they have got self-sealing
tanks so the business of catastrophic failure through fire would
appear not to be the same as on a large fixed-wing aircraft; there
is a balance of risk there, but we constantly review where to
strike that balance. If we felt as a result of this constant assessment
that it was necessary to do it we would have to do it, although
again we may not do it in quite the same way. Currently we believe
we have reduced the risk sufficiently through the self-sealing
tanks and the fact that they are on panniers outside. When you
have an enforced landing the tanks fall off and so reduce the
danger of a catastrophic fire.
Q389 Chairman: Was it a balance of
risk that decided the Ministry of Defence not to fit explosive
suppressant foam into the Hercules that came down?
Lieutenant General Figgures: I
think that was the judgment of those concerned—and I cannot
speak for them because I was not there when these things were
considered.
Q390 Chairman: What makes you think
you have got this decision right?
Lieutenant General Figgures: Because
I am certainly conscious of the requirement to review this and
carry out the necessary risk assessments and carry out the necessary
trials to see that we have reduced it to as low as reasonably
practicable.
Q391 Mr Havard: Before we move on
can I just ask briefly about the A400M. If it is not known as
to when the A400M is coming we have a problem with heavy lift
in the meantime. Are we going to see substantial refurbishment
of the C-130Ks, are we going to buy more C-17s, are we going to
bring forward the air tanker programme, have you got any clue
what we are going to do?
Mr Davies: Mr Havard, you are
asking a very pertinent question, a question which is very close
to my heart and which I reflect on every day. We do find ourselves
in a difficult situation with the A400M, I cannot tell you exactly
what the latest delivery schedule is—we are expecting it
more or less daily from OCCAR and we do have a big problem, we
do have a big gap in the air bridge. As I said, I cannot even
say how long it is going to last because we do not know what the
delivery schedule for the A400M is. I have had conversations with
Monsieur Gallois and I have expressed myself as forcefully as
I know how on this particular subject, but that does not necessarily
produce any aircraft overnight. The answer to your question is
that all of the options that you mention are real ones that we
will be looking at. There may be one or two others which you have
not mentioned which we are also looking at, and the air bridge
is an absolute critical imperative for us. That is my attitude
to it.
Q392 Mr Jenkin: Looking at the overall
affordability of the equipment programme you will be aware that
we have had numerous representations suggesting that the Government's
stated programme is actually unaffordable, but now that you have
completed this short equipment review can we take it that all
the capabilities set out in the Strategic Defence Review—the
additional new chapter, the 2003 White Paper and so on—this
is now an affordable programme?
Mr Davies: Yes, the equipment
programme is an affordable programme. We have had to make an adjustment
about exactly the pace with which we are bringing certain things
forward and, as I have already explained, some of the priorities
are being increased and others are being set back a bit. We will
always have this, Mr Jenkin, we will never have a situation in
which everything can be afforded today, of which there are no
changes in year—that just would not be a natural situation
to be in—but I believe that the equipment examination exercise
has relieved an awful lot of pressure, let me put it that way.
As I said right at the beginning of our proceedings I am not concealing
from you any decision that we have taken which is a dramatic major
decision in which we are about to announce some further delay
or cut or indeed any cut in a programme, so I would hope that
we would only have to cut programmes if we really decided they
were not really necessary, really essential, in the defence interests
of the nation.
Q393 Mr Jenkin: In the Winter
Supplementary Estimates you did reduce the net provision of
defence capability by RfR1 by £950 million. That is a cut,
is it not?
Mr Davies: No, it is not a cut.
The defence budget and the defence control environment equipment
and support budgets are increasing in real terms the whole time
so we are spending more money in real terms. There is no suggestion
at all—you look surprised but I assure you that is the case,
there are no cuts at all here, no cuts.
Q394 Mr Jenkin: No cuts at all?
Mr Davies: No, we are not cutting
defence expenditure, no.
Q395 Mr Jenkin: That is not what
I asked. I asked in your Winter Supplementary Estimates—this
is presumably what rebalancing means, that we are cutting investment
in future capability to support current operations. That is the
new mantra is it not?
Mr Davies: The word "cut"
is the word that I am resisting.
Q396 Mr Jenkin: It is in brackets,
it is negative, there is the number, £950 million.
Mr Davies: If the word "cut"
appears there it would (a) surprise me very much and (b) it would
be some sort of mistake because it would not be an accurate description
of the position. Rebalancing means changing the priorities; bringing
some things forward; pushing some things back. That is what we
do, that is what we will continue to do the whole time I am sure.
Q397 Mr Jenkin: The Government's
defence policy has not changed.
Mr Davies: The defence policy
has not changed, no.
Q398 Mr Jenkin: Can you explain—I
am looking at the out of service dates and in service dates of
helicopters over the next 10 years—at the moment we have
520 helicopters in the Armed Forces overall, including the US
helicopters; according to your Parliamentary answers, by 2020
we will have nearly 215 helicopters in the British Armed Forces.
How possibly would we be able to support the tempo of operations
that we are currently supporting on less than half the number
of helicopters?
Mr Davies: Mr Jenkin, you are
a considerable defence expert and known for that in the House
and you know the answer, I suspect, that I am about to give you.
It would be absolutely crazy to equate numbers of helicopters
with helicopter capability. A lot of the helicopters we have got
in that list which you have just mentioned will be old helicopters,
Gazelles and so forth, whose moment, with great respect to that
particular airframe, has passed. Some of the new helicopters we
are bringing on stream are vastly more capable than their predecessors.
Compare the Apache, for example, with the previous battlefield
helicopters we had. There has been an enormous increase in our
helicopter capability. I am glad to say that in Afghanistan from
March last year to the latest figures I have seen, which would
have been in October or November, we increased our helicopter
capability in Afghanistan by 37.5% and there will be another 25%
increase in the coming year, so this is what we are talking about.
Q399 Chairman: Do you know how you
did that?
Mr Davies: Capability and firepower,
number of hours available.
| 
