Conclusions and recommendations
1. The
workforces of both ABRO and DARA, now within DSG, are to be commended
for their conscientious and flexible approach to the merger. The
executive team implementing the merger should also be praised
for ensuring that there was no hiatus in DSG's support for the
Armed Forces nor any diminution to the quality of that support.
(Paragraph 10)
2. We expect the MoD
in its response to this Report to make categorically clear that
the ability of DSG to continue to deliver cost savings will not
alone determine its future, and that the rationale of the creation
of DSG is broader and deeper than the cost considerations that
supported the reasoning behind the merger. (Paragraph 11)
3. The first DSG Annual
Report is expected to be issued in the early summer. It will contain
fuller information relating to DSG's performance in its first
full year, together with its set of future targets. We fully expect
the first year's performance to correspond to the forecasts given
to us in January. (Paragraph 14)
4. Continuing pressure
exists for the Government, and its departments of state such as
the MoD, to realise further cost savings, the efficiency savings
captured from ABRO and DARA during amalgamation, and from DSG
during its first year of operation, have already contributed to
departmental savings: seeking further cuts which might compromise
DSG's operational capabilities and skills according to some arbitrary
allocation of savings expected would be wrong-headed. (Paragraph
15)
5. We are impressed
by DSG's commitment to apprenticeships which we feel shows a real
determination to provide over the long-term a continuing high
level of support to the UK's Armed Forces. (Paragraph 18)
6. We would be grateful
for the MoD's assessment of the particular weaknesses in the area
of high level managerial skills which DSG inherited from its predecessor
organisations, ABRO and DARA. (Paragraph 20)
7. We request a note
from the MoD setting out how DSG intends to deal with distributional
problems relating to the recruitment and retention of its workforce,
bearing in mind that its unique geographical footprint is an asset
it presumably does not want to lose. (Paragraph 21)
8. We express our
gratitude to all those DSG employees who have volunteered, sometimes
on more than once occasion, to deploy in theatre in support of
operations. Such commitment is of great value to DSG and to our
Armed Forces and clearly indicates the high level of dedication
amongst the staff within DSG. (Paragraph 25)
9. The Equipment Sustainability
Solution (ESS) provides an excellent opportunity for DSG to maintain
its strong partnership with industry and continue to provide excellent
quality support to the UK's Armed Forces in theatre. We very much
hope that DSG is successful in the competition for sub-contracts
for work on the ESS. This would be a positive development for
DSG, for industry and for the Armed Forces, who will all need
to work in ever closer cooperation as the conflict in Afghanistan
persists. (Paragraph 28)
10. We are concerned
that current uncertainties with regard to the size and timescale
for the MoD's recuperation programme following drawdown in Iraq
might create difficulties even for an organisation as flexible
and committed as DSG. We call on the MoD to ensure that DSG is
as well apprised as possible of what it will need to do and over
what time period within the recuperation programme. DSG will itself
need to monitor the continuing, if not increasing, demands being
placed upon it, directly or indirectly, by current operations.
(Paragraph 33)
11. We recommend that
the MoD, in its response to this Report, make clear the anticipated
levels of future manpower and resource commitment within DSG to
the ESS, to the recuperation programme, and to UORs, set alongside
its capacity to deal with its core non-operational areas of activity.
(Paragraph 33)
12. The sustained
and thorough commitment of DSG staff to supporting our Armed Forces
in operational theatre is there for everyone to see. We commend
DSG staff for this full-hearted commitment and for maintaining
a high level of performance in support of operations. (Paragraph
34)
13. DSG has shown
since the merger its ability to trade efficiently and effectively
both with the MoD and the Armed Forces and also with industry.
Managing these relationships while maximising performance and
keeping as buoyant as possible its remaining unique and historical
capabilities will be key to DSG's future. The MoD should do nothing
to threaten this, unless it takes serious stock of DSG's position
and decides that the Trading Fund model is no longer appropriate
and that DSG's future lies elsewhere. This is a decision that
must not be taken likely. We wish DSG well and hope that our successor
Committee in the next Parliament will revisit DSG at an appropriate
time to consider its continuing performance and progress as a
Trading Fund. (Paragraph 49)
14. We recommend that
the MoD in its response to the Report takes the opportunity to
set out a clear vision for DSG's future, taking into account the
growing reliance of DSG upon industry. (Paragraph 50)
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