House of Commons
Defence Committee

The Defence contribution to UK national security and resilience

Sixth Report of Session 2008–09

Report, together with formal minutes, oral and written evidence

Ordered by the House of Commons
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The Defence Committee

The Defence Committee is appointed by the House of Commons to examine the expenditure, administration, and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies.

Current membership

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Mr David S Borrow MP (Labour, South Ribble)
Mr David Crausby MP (Labour, Bolton North East)
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Mrs Madeleine Moon (Labour, Bridgend)
John Smith MP (Labour, Vale of Glamorgan)
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The following Members were also Members of the Committee during the Parliament.

Mr Colin Breed MP (Liberal Democrat, South East Cornwall)
Derek Conway MP (Conservative, Old Bexley and Sidcup)
Mr Kevan Jones MP (Labour, Durham North)
Mr Mark Lancaster MP (Conservative, North East Milton Keynes)
Willie Rennie MP (Liberal Democrat, Dunfermline and West Fife)
Mr Desmond Swayne MP (Conservative, New Forest West)

Powers

The Committee is one of the departmental select committees, the powers of which are set out in House of Commons Standing Orders, principally in SO No 152. These are available on the Internet via www.parliament.uk.

Publications

The Reports and evidence of the Committee are published by The Stationery Office by Order of the House. All publications of the Committee (including press notices) are on the Internet at: www.parliament.uk/defcom

Committee staff

The current staff of the Committee are Mike Hennessy (Clerk), Richard Ward (Second Clerk), Karen Jackson (Audit Adviser), Sara Turnbull (Inquiry Manager), Richard Dawson (Senior Committee Assistant), Christine McGrane (Committee Assistant) and Miguel Boo Fraga (Committee Support Assistant).

Contacts

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1 Security and resilience

Our inquiry

1. We announced our intention to inquire into the Ministry of Defence’s contribution to the United Kingdom’s national security and resilience on 2 April 2008. We set out to examine “how the MoD and the Armed Forces interact with other departments and agencies to ensure the safety and security of the UK”.1 We invited written evidence on MoD and UK Armed Forces’ contributions and capabilities, as well as its co-ordination and co-operation with other government departments (OGDs). We took oral evidence from industry on 17 June 2008, from the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Home Office and Cabinet Office on 21 October 2008, and finally from the Commander-in-Chief, HQ Land Forces, along with a panel of maritime security stakeholders, on 27 January 2009. Our inquiry was also informed by several classified briefings and papers from the MoD and Armed Forces, for which we are grateful.

2. We visited the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) at Porton Down on 2 October 2008, where the work of the Counter-Terrorism Science and Technology Centre was explained to us. As part of our visit to HM Naval Base Clyde at Faslane in December 2008, the role played by the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines in defending both the strategic nuclear deterrent and vessels in transit along the Clyde was demonstrated.

Public Service Agreements

3. In terms of Government performance and accountability, national security and resilience straddles several current public service agreements. Public Service Agreement 26 (“Reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism”) is perhaps the most obvious. The scope of national security is reflected in two other PSAs: 3 (“Ensure controlled, fair migration that protects the public and contributes to economic growth”), and 27 (“Lead the global effort to avoid dangerous climate change”).

Balanced Scorecard

4. The Ministry of Defence’s ‘Balanced Scorecard’ is the vehicle by which it assesses its own performance against its departmental objectives. The MoD’s contribution to UK national security and resilience is particularly covered by the following objectives:

- under Purpose, “Defence in the Wider Community: Work with other Government Departments to contribute to the Government’s wider agenda, including on sustainable development”;

- under Resource, “Finance & Efficiency: Maximise our outputs within allocated financial resources”; and

1 ‘Defence Committee inquiry into UK national security and resilience’, Defence Committee Press Release, 2 April 2008
• under Enabling processes, “Reputation: Enhance our reputation amongst our own people and externally”.\(^2\)

We address each of these issues below.

**The National Security Strategy**

5. In March 2008, the Government published *The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world* (NSS). Although the publication was coordinated by the Cabinet Office, the Strategy’s stated aim was “to set out how we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers”.\(^3\) Chapter 4 of the NSS deals in part with the contribution of the Armed Forces to the overarching security policy of the UK.

**Threats and responses**

6. The NSS lays out the fundamental security architecture for its approach to threats to UK security and resilience, acknowledging that the traditional boundaries between Government departments, and between concepts of foreign and domestic policy, no longer apply. Equally, the concept of ‘threat’ has changed with the development of non-state actors such as international terrorist organisations.

   “In the past, the state was the traditional focus of foreign, defence and security policies, and national security was understood as dealing with the protection of the state and its vital interests from attacks by other states. Over recent decades, our view of national security has broadened to include threats to individual citizens and to our way of life, as well as to the integrity and interests of the state.”\(^4\)

7. The definition of national security and resilience now, therefore, encompasses a wide range of threats, from traditional state-on-state aggression through terrorist groups to civil emergencies such as flooding or pandemics. It also encompasses a spectrum of capabilities and responses—not merely preventing or dealing with attacks or natural disasters (‘security’), but also ensuring that vital services are maintained and life can continue as close to normal as possible (‘resilience’).

8. A central plank of the Government’s approach to national security is its Counter-Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), an updated version of which was published on 24 March 2009. It aims “to reduce the risk to the UK from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence”.\(^5\) The strategy is built around what are described as the 4 ‘P’s, Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The MoD notes that it “provide[s] a range of support in each of these areas to a greater or lesser extent”.\(^6\)

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\(^4\) *ibid.*, para 1.5

\(^5\) Ev 67

\(^6\) *ibid.*
Parliamentary scrutiny of national security

9. Several committees are active in the scrutiny of national security issues.

Table 1: Scrutiny of national security issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committee</th>
<th>Area of scrutiny</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defence Committee</td>
<td>The Defence Committee scrutinises the expenditure, administration and policy of the Ministry of Defence and its associated public bodies. The MoD’s responsibilities in the field of national security are the subject of this report.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Affairs Committee</td>
<td>The Home Affairs Committee scrutinises the expenditure, administration and policy of the Home Office and its associated public bodies. In November 2008, the Home Affairs Committee appointed a Sub-Committee to inquire into the Government’s counter-terrorist strategy, Project CONTEST. Formed of four members of the Home Affairs Committee, the Sub-Committee has taken oral evidence on three occasions, from a range of witnesses in the national security field.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence and Security Committee</td>
<td>The Intelligence and Security Committee examines the policy, administration and expenditure of the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), Government Communications Headquarters, as well as the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Intelligence and Security Secretariat. The Intelligence and Security Committee is a statutory committee, established under the Intelligence Services Act 1994. Although formed of eight MPs and a Peer, it is not a Committee of the House, reporting as it does to the Prime Minister. It produces an annual report, as well as inquiring into particular subjects as they arise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy</td>
<td>In a written statement of 22 July 2008, the Prime Minister announced his intention to “consult the parliamentary authorities and the Opposition through the usual channels about the establishment and terms of reference of a Joint Committee on the national security strategy comprising the Chairs of the key departmental Select Committees with an interest in national security, and other Members of Parliament and Peers with particular interests or experience”.7 The Committee is yet to be appointed.</td>
</tr>
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10. Parliamentary scrutiny of national security issues is a developing area. Once stabilised, it remains to be seen precisely how responsibilities will be divided. The Joint Committee will need to work out how its intended role in examining the overall strategy in its successive iterations will connect with scrutiny by existing committees. Whatever happens, we as the Defence Committee will retain an interest and therefore reserve the right to inquire into related issues as and when they arise. We are pleased that the membership of the Joint Committee is planned to include our Chairman, which will help co-ordinate our own work with that of the new body. We believe that different elements of national security are likely to be best examined in detail by the relevant

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7 HC Deb, 22 July 2008, Col 111WS
departmental committees, with the Joint Committee bringing their views together in a critique of the strategy overall.

**Co-ordination of national security**

11. The Cabinet Office plays an important co-ordinating role for national security, through the Civil Contingencies Secretariat and the Joint Intelligence Committee, while the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, through the Foreign Secretary’s oversight of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), is also intimately involved. The Home Office houses the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, which manages the Government’s policy on counter-terrorism. The MoD is represented by the Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) on the JIC and in the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre. In times of crisis, meetings are convened in ‘Cabinet Office Briefing Room A’ (COBRA).

12. Ministerial involvement in national security takes place in the Ministerial Committee on National Security, International Relations and Development, which is chaired by the Prime Minister—or, in his absence, either the Home or Foreign Secretaries—attended by around 15 members of the Cabinet, and supported by a Cabinet Office secretariat. Lord West of Spithead is the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Security and Counter-terrorism in the Home Office. However, none of these ministers, save the Prime Minister (at least notionally) is responsible for national security overall. We expect the creation of a Joint Committee to improve Parliament’s scrutiny of the NSS by bringing them together. However, the question of from which minister the new Joint Committee will take evidence is unclear, unless it is the Prime Minister, calls on whose time are many. We are concerned that this generates two problems: first, that co-ordination at the political level might not be as good as it could be, and secondly, that it only reaches the top of the in-tray in times of crisis. There are various views about the value of the appointment of a National Security Adviser reporting to the Cabinet. We request that the Government sets out its thinking on the matter in its response.

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8 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/secretariats/committees/nsid.aspx

9 Q 81; the Home Office leads on counter-terrorism aspects of national security, but this is but part of the wider national security picture.
2 The Defence contribution

The role of the Ministry of Defence

13. The Ministry of Defence and its assets play a vital supporting role in the Government’s current conception of national security. The MoD’s memorandum to the Committee explained that

“Defence [supports] the civil authorities who lead the response to disruptive natural challenges […] in addition to playing its part in co-ordinating cross-Government effort and contributing to others’ evolving plans, the MoD does of course keep its policy in this area under constant review.”

14. The MoD’s involvement in the development and implementation of security and resilience strategy has several different aspects. As well as the Armed Forces providing the ‘last resort’ for emergencies within the UK, the MoD is represented on the JIC by the Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI). Moreover, scientists and analysts from the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) co-operate with a number of other departments and agencies to develop and deploy military technology to counter threats to security and resilience. The United Kingdom faces many disparate threats, now rightly recognised as needing a combined response. The Armed Forces make a vital and unique contribution to national security and resilience. It is for this reason that this contribution must be appropriately understood, directed, and resourced.

Defence capabilities

15. The Minister for the Armed Forces gave an outline of the capabilities that the Armed Forces provide, when he explained that

“There are two broad categories of capabilities which we [the MoD] maintain and one, I would say, is niche capabilities which other people generally cannot provide, and that is a full range from the air component through to maritime counterterrorism. Special Forces capabilities, things that we cannot go into in detail, but they are there and the MoD is the provider, and then there is augmentation capability as well.”

16. The MoD set out the capabilities it provides in its written evidence.
**Table 2: Defence capabilities**

- A quick reaction capability to deter and defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK airspace, including air defence radar.
- A maritime capability to deter and defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK territorial waters.
- Counter-terrorist capabilities in support of the police on land or sea.
- Public order support in extremis to the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
- Fishery protection vessels in support of DEFRA.
- A maritime search and rescue capability in support of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
- An Explosive Ordnance Disposal ‘render-safe’ capability.
- Scientific support to police operations including a Technical Response Force with access to a wide range of relevant scientific expertise.
- Ministry of Defence Police support to the protection of key points in the critical national infrastructure.
- A regional command and control capability to provide an ability to co-ordinate larger scale defence contributions.
- Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, drawn from the reserve forces, which are potentially available if required to support the responsible authorities for dealing with civil contingencies.

*Source: Ministry of Defence* 

17. The MoD notes that “These capabilities are part of the MoD’s planned force structure and, as such, effectively guaranteed to the lead authority”. They are included in Defence Planning Assumptions. The other sorts of support (such as that deployed during or after flooding events) are “held principally for the purposes of standing or contingent operations overseas and are not planned for regular use on behalf of the civil authorities”.

**Reserve Forces**

18. Civil Contingency Reaction Forces were established under the Strategic Defence Review ‘New Chapter’ of 2002. They are

“drawn from the Reserve Forces and are capable of providing general duties support, which may be used to supplement the local civil emergency response. However, their mobilisation means drawing upon personnel, who have civilian careers, and requires ministerial approval under the 1996 Reserve Forces Act.”

CCRFs are

“formed around a TA Infantry Battalion with its command structure, integral communications, logistic support and sub units. CCRFs are commanded by the Regional Brigade and may include volunteers from all arms of the Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Marines Reserve the TA and the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. Likely CCRF tasking (for which specific training may be required) includes reconnaissance, access control, assistance with mass casualties and displaced people, site search and

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12 Ev 45
13 ibid.
14 ibid.
15 *Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience* (known as JDP 02), para 2F5
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clearance, transport and communications, provision of water and feeding points and command and control.”

19. In a Ministerial statement on 28 April, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces (Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth) announced the publication of a Strategic Review of Reserve Forces, led by Major General Nicholas Cottam. The review redefined the ‘purpose’ of the UK’s reserves as providing a cost effective way of retaining niche capabilities and supporting national resilience. Of direct relevance to the UK’s national security and resilience are the proposed rationalisation of the Civil Contingency Reaction Force and the abolition of elements of 2 (National Communications) Signal Brigade. Under the proposals, Headquarters 12 Signals Group, 33, 34 and 35 Signals Regiments will be wound down and obsolete equipment taken out of service. The former arises from the review itself; the decision on the latter was taken separately.

20. We have been informed of the frustration felt by many in the Territorial Army, and by District Commanders, that the Territorials are rarely—if ever—called upon in civil emergencies, even though it would be practical and good for their morale to do so. Following publication of the Strategic Review of Reserve Forces, we request that the Government investigate how District Commanders could more easily make use of willing and available local TA volunteers, rather than always resorting to regular troops.

Understanding the Defence contribution

21. As set out above, the Minister for the Armed Forces divided the relevant capabilities of the Armed Forces into niche capabilities and an augmentation capability. The Armed Forces maintain niche capabilities for the simple reason that they are not provided for elsewhere. The use of niche capabilities is broadly understood, and whilst it may sometimes cause alarm in the media, it is seldom cast as a failure of the civilian authorities. The augmentation capability is, however, somewhat different in that it can give the impression of ‘calling in the cavalry’. We put this to General Sir David Richards (Commander in Chief, HQ Land and Standing Joint Commander (UK)), and he responded that “dealing with the emergency is what we should all focus on and worry about reputations later”, but admitted that “maybe some people are rather over-focused on the former”.

22. The contribution made by the Armed Forces during the foot-and-mouth epidemic of 2001 in terms of manpower and leadership undoubtedly informed the development of procedures in operation today. The Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report commented on the contribution made by the Armed Forces, stating that,

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16 JDP 02, para 2F6
17 HC Deb 28 Apr 2008, Col 701
18 Niche capabilities are those capabilities provided by the Armed Forces not readily available in the civilian sector. They include the use of special forces and bomb disposal.
19 Q 195
“The military’s role in the Joint Co-ordination Committee [sic] [...] proved to be a critical factor in achieving a more co-ordinated, applied and disciplined approach to tackling a wide range of logistical issues on the ground.”

23. A letter from the then Minister of Agriculture (Rt Hon Nick Brown MP) to the Prime Minister (Rt Hon Tony Blair MP) dated 22 February 2001 revealed his Ministry’s first contact with the Ministry of Defence, and MAFF’s proposal for military support.

“If the disease spreads substantially, we may need to think in terms of extreme measures such as support by the military. My department has made initial contact with MoD to explore the kind of skills and resource which might be needed and—subject of course to collective decision—available.”

24. The Appendices to the Lessons Learned report compare the 1967–68 outbreak and the 2001 outbreak. In 1967–68, it was 12 days before the military were deployed, with a peak involvement of 400. In 2001, 25 days passed before the Armed Forces were deployed (peaking at over 2,000 troops), despite having liaised with MAFF from day one. In 2007, following a much smaller outbreak, the military was not deployed. In the more recent case of the Gloucestershire floods, Brigadier Chip Chapman explained the assistance which had been given by the Armed Forces,

“For example, in the Gloucestershire floods last year when we provided 1,026 people to help the civil community in that circumstance, that was force-generated from SJC Land [Standing Joint Commander] from the Regular and Reserve Force structure without any need to caveat defence outputs elsewhere in the world or in the UK.”

25. This improved response was made possible by the guidance now in place for other government departments wishing to understand what Defence can provide. Nevertheless, General Richards conceded that even now, the current framework for providing military aid could be improved, when he identified

“an inevitable gap between what other government departments expect and what Defence is mandated to, and can, deliver, and this carries, I think amongst other things, significant potential reputational risk. Clarity, I think, is critical, as in all things, and I am of the opinion that we should place defence support on a more secure and transparent footing. We should look at establishing clear statements of requirement with lead government departments underpinned by, what we might call, service-level agreements”.

26. This is a key issue. The General’s concerns about managing expectations and reputational risk directly impact upon two of the elements of the MoD’s balanced scorecard, namely ‘Defence in the Wider Community’ and ‘Reputation’. Any room for misunderstanding has serious consequences for the MoD, the Armed Forces, and the

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20 Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report, HC 888, 22 July 2002, para 11.5
21 Letter from Rt Hon Nick Brown MP to the Prime Minister, 22 February 2001
22 Foot and Mouth Disease 2001: Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report, para 18.5
23 Q 105
24 Q 190
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department or agency to which assistance is being provided. It is worth noting that there are opportunities as well as risks: for example, the contribution led by Brigadier Birtwistle in 2001 was greatly appreciated by Cumbrian farmers.25

Co-ordination, liaison and funding

27. The basis on which the Armed Forces provide aid to the civil authorities is described in the Developments, Concepts and Doctrine Centre publication, Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience (known as JDP 02) and are reproduced here.

Table 3: Military Aid

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<th>Paragraph</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>203. Military operations in the UK, under Military Task (MT) 2.1, are placed under the overarching title of MACA. This section examines the principles, procedures and essential features of providing military assistance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>204. MACA is sub-divided into Military Aid to other Government Departments (MAGD), Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) and Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC). These operations are distinct from one another legally and politically, as well as in terms of military implications. More detailed information on MAGD, MACP and MACC is provided in Chapters 3, 4, and 5 respectively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205. The provision of MACA is guided by 3 criteria:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Military aid should always be the last resort. The use of mutual aid, other agencies, and the private sector must be otherwise considered as insufficient or be unsuitable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. The Civil Authority lacks the required level of capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. The Civil Authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


28. Military Aid to other Government Departments is “assistance provided by the Armed Forces on urgent work of national importance or in maintaining supplies and services essential to the life, health and safety of the community”.26 It requires emergency powers in response to a specific request.27 Support provided in cases of industrial disputes and animal disease outbreaks fall under MAGD. Military Aid to the Civil Power covers "the provision of military assistance (armed if appropriate) to the Civil Power in its maintenance of law, order and public safety, using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capability of the Civil Power".28 Requests for such assistance are made by the Home Office via the MoD. Prior ministerial approval is not required in the case of Category A Military Aid to the Civil Community or delegated cases, such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal and Search and Rescue operations. Military Aid to the Civil Community is unarmed assistance given in times of natural disaster or major emergency (Category A), special projects or events of significant value (Category B), or attachment of volunteers to appropriate organizations (Category C).29 High-readiness Civil Contingency Reaction Forces (formed...

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26 JDP 02, para 301
27 Ibid., para 302
28 Ibid., para 402
29 Ibid., para 501
of Reserve units) exist to provide assistance at a day’s notice.\(^\text{30}\) However, the Government is now intending to abandon that structure.\(^\text{31}\)

29. The Armed Forces are actively engaged in the cross-government programme of resilience exercises. In addition to table-top exercises,\(^\text{32}\) seven ‘major regional exercises’ were undertaken by the units below.

**Table 4: Major regional exercises conducted in 2008**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>38 (Irish) Brigade UK</td>
<td>A major flooding exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>51 (Scottish) Brigade</td>
<td>An adverse weather exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>2 (South East) Brigade</td>
<td>A Counter Terrorism exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 2008</td>
<td>160 (Wales) Brigade and Royal Air Force</td>
<td>An aircraft crash consequence management exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008</td>
<td>15 (North East) Brigade</td>
<td>An adverse weather and widespread coastal flooding exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>51 (Scottish) Brigade</td>
<td>An adverse weather exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2008</td>
<td>43 Brigade (Guernsey)</td>
<td>An infectious disease exercise</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Supplementary evidence from MoD (Annex A), Ev 89

**Funding**

30. JDP 02 states that, subject to certain exceptions (detailed below), “MACA activity is […] not funded within the Ministry of Defence budget and is, therefore, conducted on a repayment basis” and further, that “no matter how valid a request or assistance may appear, Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes”.\(^\text{33}\) The four principles governing military assistance are laid down in the next paragraph.

**Table 5: Financial principles for military aid**

267. Financial Principles. There are 4 financial principles governing military assistance:

a. Defence funds are granted for Defence purposes. Where work is done by the Armed Forces for other purposes, the MOD is required by Treasury rules to secure reimbursement for the costs incurred.

b. Defence assistance must be safeguarded against risks through appropriate insurance and indemnity arrangements.

c. Service personnel must not be used as cheap labour or in competition with commercial firms.

d. The basis of any financial charge may vary according to the nature of the assistance to which it

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\(^{30}\) JDP 02, para 503

\(^{31}\) Ministry of Defence, *The Strategic Review of Reserves*, para 60. All Reservists are now considered available for UK operations and resilience tasks on a command and control basis.

\(^{32}\) Ev 89

\(^{33}\) JDP 02, para 266
relates. Adherence to the charging levels at paragraph 269 generally requires the MOD to recover the full costs of assistance provided to any outside body. Charging full costs avoids subsidising non-defence tasks. It also acts as a useful mechanism to limit the amount of assistance requested to the minimum necessary. However, where there is imminent danger to life (MACC C Cat A), charges are waived.

Source: Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience

Waiving costs

31. We asked General Richards about the consequences of the charging regime. He explained that the principle of recovering costs reflected the view that “as far as the Government is concerned, it [homeland security] is not our job primarily anymore”. The priority for Defence had become deployed operations outside the UK, even if removing the expense of any operations where there was “imminent danger to life” from the Defence budget meant that OGDs might be reluctant to call upon otherwise dormant capability and if capacity building within Defence was being inhibited. General Richards described the process by which assistance was agreed as “a little bit murky at the moment”, saying twice that having ‘statements of requirement’ would add clarity.

32. Brigadier Everard, Director Commitments, HQ Land Commitments, elaborated on the issue of cost recovery, saying that

“[We] would expect the MoD to waive costs in the event of a maxi Cat A saving-life venture. Intermediate costs, if there was a training benefit to us, again we probably would not seek recovery of costs, but again we are, I think, constrained by the envelope we work in and that says that, for those tasks you are not formally mandated to do in Defence Strategic Guidance, you seek recovery of the money in the charging regime as set out by the Treasury […].”

33. This struck us as entirely appropriate. On the specific question of national security, a footnote in JDP 02 explains that the MoD “will not waive costs on grounds of national security […] A MACA request might be related to national security, but would by definition fall within the responsibilities, and therefore the budget, of the requesting Department or agency”.

34. We do not question the principle of cost recovery; to do so would be to undermine the principle that national security and resilience is not the preserve of the Armed Forces. The headline budget for national security of £3.5bn in the 2007 Comprehensive Spending Review is administered by the Ministerial NSID Committee. It is essential that all activity relating to national security is appropriately funded from an indicative national

34 Q 212
35 ibid.
36 Q 190, Q 214
37 Q 215
38 JDP 02, para 270
39 HM Treasury, Meeting the aspirations of the British people: 2007 pre-budget report and comprehensive spending review, Cm 7227, October 2007, para 6.43
security budget and that, when a request is made, it is accompanied by a clear statement of requirement.

**A guaranteed role?**

35. Written evidence from the Morgan Aquila consultancy postulated a ‘pull-through’ of technologies and tactics from the military to civilian responses to the current asymmetric terrorist threat.\(^{40}\) Morgan Aquila stated that an “over-committed military has limited resources to bulge backwards”, which necessitates a certain duplication of function.\(^{41}\) This issue arose in another form during our evidence session with a panel of maritime security stakeholders, when Chief Constable Hogan-Howe said that he did not think that the police had “gone too far” in taking on what would previously have been military tasks. He added that “as soon as you get into the counter-terrorism environment we [the Police] are generally falling back on the military”.\(^{42}\) This seems quite sensible; we found no evidence of the military attempting to ‘bulge backwards’, or of the Police attempting the reverse. The niche capabilities described above will in all likelihood remain with the Armed Forces.

**Industry’s contribution**

36. We took evidence in June 2008 from representatives from the Defence industry on the role played by industry in supporting the Defence contribution to national security and resilience. Two key messages emerged; the first that engaging with the national security and resilience ‘market’ was more difficult than other areas, and the National Security Strategy made insufficient reference to industry.\(^{43}\) The second key message was that technological needs within the UK were sometimes different to those overseas. Speed took priority over security, especially in times of immediate crisis.\(^{44}\)

37. We understand that the Government is engaging with the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Community (RISC) in order to improve the channels of communication between industry and government. We welcome this engagement, but note that if there is a piece missing from the jigsaw, it is a clear connection between the National Security Strategy and industry. We recommend that the Government rectifies this when the time comes to update the NSS.

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40 Ev 38
41 Ev 37; This is subject to the important caveat that many counter-terrorist functions are reserved (i.e., they cannot be deployed overseas).
42 Q 262
43 Q 4, Q 25
44 Q 22
3 Current issues

London 2012

38. Security for the Olympic Games in 2012 is being co-ordinated by the Olympic Security Directorate, of which the MoD is one of the partner organisations. We were given to understand by General Richards that a horizon-scanning process had thrown up some “lurid” possibilities, work on which was being accelerated. General Richards also identified the creation and re-training of new specialist units as potential areas for work. Asked whether a statement of requirement of the sort he thought was generally useful had been received yet, Brigadier Everard told us that one was expected in the autumn of this year.

39. Ensuring the security of the Games for the six week period in the summer of 2012 will be an immense challenge. Whilst it may not be possible to anticipate every threat to the Olympics and Paralympics, we urge the MoD to advertise and exploit the Armed Forces’ relevant expertise during the planning phases.

Maritime security

40. When we took evidence from Lord West (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Security and Counter-terrorism) on 21 October, we asked a series of questions about specifically maritime aspects of national security. It became clear that no single organisation had comprehensive responsibility for the maritime environment. Individual agencies have “prime responsibility” for different areas, and Gold Command rests with the relevant agency (e.g. in the case of pollution, the Maritime and Coastguard Agency). The co-ordination of a response to a major maritime accident—such as the sinking of MV Napoli off Dorset in 2007—is co-ordinated by ‘SOSREP’, the Secretary of State for Transport’s Representative. There appears to be no equivalent role designated for security incidents. Lord West admitted that the “tapestry in those offshore waters is highly complex”. It is not immediately obvious to which Secretary of State a security SOSREP would report.

41. We were also concerned at the limited resources that seemed to be available: The Minister of State for the Armed Forces told us that the vessels available for coastal protection amounted to two frigates, three river-class offshore patrol vessels and a minesweeper. We decided to take further oral evidence on maritime security, and invited representatives from the Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate (Transec), the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA), the Association of Chief Police Officers

45 Q 226
46 Q 193
47 Q 232
48 Qq 152-174
49 Q 153
50 Qq 162-165
(ACPO) and the UK Border Agency (UKBA) to explain in greater detail Lord West’s ‘complex tapestry’.

**The need for greater oversight**

42. We asked our maritime security panel whether they thought there was a case for greater oversight or control of the functions that their organisations currently fulfil. Speaking on behalf of Transec, Ms Tompkinson told us that “we have got very good procedures and processes in place which enable us to co-ordinate”.

Mr Clark from UKBA agreed, saying that “connection and co-ordination at a senior level and a strategic and tactical level is good”. Nevertheless, ACPO’s Mr Hogan-Howe conceded that “there are things that sound, I agree, on the face of it to be confusing, we seem to be potentially disorganised, but it works well”. We are pleased that on an operational level, the relevant organisations say that they work together effectively. What concerns us is not the operational aspect, but strategic oversight and ministerial accountability.

43. Despite our witnesses’ assurances that the present arrangements for maritime security in the UK did not need improving upon, we understand that a review may in fact be underway. We request that the Government updates us on developments in its response.

**Ruling the waves?**

44. A supplementary memorandum from the MoD gave a more precise answer to the questions we asked the Minister in October in relation to the number of vessels in the water. It stated that on 21 October 2008, the day we took evidence from the Minister of State for the Armed Forces and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary from the Home Office, the following vessels were tasked specifically with supporting the strategic nuclear deterrent and maintaining the integrity of UK waters:

- Three Type 23-class frigates;
- Three Hunt-class minesweepers;
- Two River-class offshore patrol vessels; and
- One support tanker.

45. The Minister of State’s description of about six ships specifically tasked with national security was thus fairly accurate. However, a further 13 vessels of varying classes were “in the sea and around the UK’s waters” on the day we took evidence, and presumably available if needed.
46. Six dedicated Royal Navy ships did not strike us as very many. However, the evidence given by our maritime security panel on 27 January 2009 revealed a motley collection of sea-going vessels engaged in one aspect or another of preserving the UK’s maritime security. According to Chief Constable Hogan-Howe, ACPO’s lead officer for maritime and air support policing, estimated that there were “around 115” vessels contributing to maritime security, of which a third were MoD vessels.55

47. We have established that the Police have “of the order of 70 vessels”.56 The MoD Police has “a maritime capability consisting of approximately 50 vessels” able to support other Police forces if needed.57 The Coastguard has “five inshore patrol boats currently in commission: one in the Thames Estuary, one in the Solent, one in the South West and two in Scotland, one on each coast”.58 The UK Border Agency has five cutters, as recommended by the National Security Strategy. However, Mr Clark revealed that the cutters were in fact “capacity that was there within the Customs Group [of HMRC] but it is now part of the UKBA set of interventions”.59 They are deployed on the basis of “sensible and reasonable judgments and decisions on the basis of the risk and the threat”.60

48. We have learned of the contributions being made by several organisations to national security in the maritime environment. We do not question their competence or intention, but the extent to which they are properly resourced and co-ordinated. Vessels have been acquired by different agencies at different times for different purposes. At the same time, we are concerned at the level of action being taken to address identified threats to aspects of critical national infrastructure, such as ports, and that what assets are available for the purposes of maritime security tend to be largely reactive forces.

49. Some Members of our Committee recently witnessed the excellent work done by the Fleet Protection Group Royal Marines at Faslane in protecting vessels in transit along the Clyde, an operation developed in response to an identified threat. We feel that there is a strong case for developing a deterrent capability in relation to threats to civilian maritime targets. It need not necessarily be resourced by the military, but we are not satisfied that an intelligence-led approach is sufficient.

**The impact of current operations**

50. There has been much debate in the past five years over the degree to which the UK Armed Forces are ’stretched’ or ‘overstretched’. Certainly, with two ongoing operational deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Armed Forces are more heavily committed overseas, in a front-line combat role, than has been the case for decades. As of September 2008, 8,380 UK Service personnel were deployed in Afghanistan as part of Operation HERRICK, while there were 4,100 personnel in Iraq under the aegis of Operation TELIC. Concerns have been raised that the high operational tempo has led to pressure on the
Armed Forces’ other activities, such as training, other active deployments and support for the civilian authorities. The MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2007–08 revealed that the Armed Forces “continued to operate above the overall level of concurrent operations which they are resourced and structured to sustain over time” for the sixth consecutive year.61

51. Another impact of current operations and rapid communications is the erosion of any division between ‘home’ and ‘away’. We identified this early on in our inquiry, when we took evidence from industry representatives. Speaking on behalf of Fujitsu Defence and Security, Mr Tony Baptiste told us that he thought that

“the one thing that the NSS does make clear is that there is no division now between overseas and domestic threat and response to it; it is all one integrated threat. In some ways you can look on the NSR situation as the UK front line and Afghanistan and Iraq and places are just the overseas front line.”62

52. We pursued this line of inquiry by asking the Minister for the Armed Forces about the MoD’s role in counter-radicalisation. He told us that

“explaining what we do, the way we do it and the way we conduct operations in order to prevent radicalisation is a role that we can play as defence. We do attempt that; it is not easy and we maybe need to do more.”63

Lord West added that, from the perspective of the Government as a whole

“We have an outward-looking communications policy; RICU [the Research, Information and Communications Unit] are doing certain work on this.64 We are looking very carefully at the use of language. We are engaging the Muslim communities in this country in discussion and debate about things.”65

53. Lord West speculated that it might take 30 years to control radicalisation and extremism. Opportunities exist at home and abroad for Defence to play a very important role in national security and resilience. We urge the MoD to consider what further steps could be taken to use its resources and expertise to achieve this.

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61 Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08, HC 850-I
62 Q 11
63 Q 62
64 The Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) is a cross-governmental strategic communications resource on counter-terrorism. It is owned jointly by Communities and Local Government, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office.
65 Q 63
Conclusions and recommendations

The National Security Strategy

1. Parliamentary scrutiny of national security issues is a developing area. Once stabilised, it remains to be seen precisely how responsibilities will be divided. The Joint Committee will need to work out how its intended role in examining the overall strategy in its successive iterations will connect with scrutiny by existing committees. Whatever happens, we as the Defence Committee will retain an interest and therefore reserve the right to inquire into related issues as and when they arise. (Paragraph 10)

2. We expect the creation of a Joint Committee to improve Parliament’s scrutiny of the NSS by bringing them together. However, the question of from which minister the new Joint Committee will take evidence is unclear, unless it is the Prime Minister, calls on whose time are many. We are concerned that this generates two problems: first, that co-ordination at the political level might not be as good as it could be, and secondly, that it only reaches the top of the in-tray in times of crisis. There are various views about the value of the appointment of a National Security Adviser reporting to the Cabinet. We request that the Government sets out its thinking on the matter in its response. (Paragraph 12)

The role of the Ministry of Defence

3. The United Kingdom faces many disparate threats, now rightly recognised as needing a combined response. The Armed Forces make a vital and unique contribution to national security and resilience. It is for this reason that this contribution must be appropriately understood, directed, and resourced. (Paragraph 14)

4. We have been informed of the frustration felt by many in the Territorial Army, and by District Commanders, that the Territorials are rarely—if ever—called upon in civil emergencies, even though it would be practical and good for their morale to do so. Following publication of the Strategic Review of Reserve Forces, we request that the Government investigate how District Commanders could more easily make use of willing and available local TA volunteers, rather than always resorting to regular troops. (Paragraph 20)

5. Concerns about managing expectations and reputational risk directly impact upon two of the elements of the MoD’s balanced scorecard, namely ‘Defence in the Wider Community’ and ‘Reputation’. Any room for misunderstanding has serious consequences for the MoD, the Armed Forces, and the department or agency to which assistance is being provided. (Paragraph 26)
Co-ordination, liaison and funding

6. It is essential that all activity relating to national security is appropriately funded from an indicative national security budget and that, when a request is made, it is accompanied by a clear statement of requirement. (Paragraph 34)

7. We understand that the Government is engaging with the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers’ Community (RISC) in order to improve the channels of communication between industry and government. We welcome this engagement, but note that if there is a piece missing from the jigsaw, it is a clear connection between the National Security Strategy and industry. We recommend that the Government rectifies this when the time comes to update the NSS. (Paragraph 37)

London 2012

8. Ensuring the security of the Games for the six week period in the summer of 2012 will be an immense challenge. Whilst it may not be possible to anticipate every threat to the Olympics and Paralympics, we urge the MoD to advertise and exploit the Armed Forces’ relevant expertise during the planning phases. (Paragraph 39)

Maritime security

9. Despite our witnesses’ assurances that the present arrangements for maritime security in the UK did not need improving upon, we understand that a review may in fact be underway. We request that the Government updates us on developments in its response. (Paragraph 43)

10. We are concerned at the level of action being taken to address identified threats to aspects of critical national infrastructure, such as ports, and that what assets are available for the purposes of maritime security tend to be largely reactive forces. (Paragraph 48)

11. We feel that there is a strong case for developing a deterrent capability in relation to threats to civilian maritime targets. It need not necessarily be resourced by the military, but we are not satisfied that an intelligence-led approach is sufficient. (Paragraph 49)

The impact of current operations

12. Lord West speculated that it might take 30 years to control radicalisation and extremism. Opportunities exist at home and abroad for Defence to play a very important role in national security and resilience. We urge the MoD to consider what further steps could be taken to use its resources and expertise to achieve this. (Paragraph 53)
Formal minutes

Tuesday 5 May 2009

Members present:

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David S. Borrow
Mr David Crausby
Linda Gilroy
Mr David Hamilton
Mr Mike Hancock
Mr Dai Havard

Mr Adam Holloway
Mr Bernard Jenkin
Mr Brian Jenkins
Robert Key
Mrs Madeleine Moon
Richard Younger-Ross

Draft Report (The Defence contribution to UK national security and resilience), proposed by the Chairman, brought up and read.

Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.

Paragraphs 1 to 53 read and agreed to.

Resolved, That the Report be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.

Ordered, That the Chairman make the Report to the House.

Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order No. 134.

Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report, together with written evidence reported and ordered to be published on 20 May, 17 June and 21 October 2008, in the last Session of Parliament.
Witnesses

Tuesday 17 June 2008

Mr Tony Baptiste, Manager (Business Development and Strategy), Fujitsu Defence and Security, Fujitsu, Mr John Higgins CBE, Director-General, Intellect UK, Mr David Livingstone MBE DSC, Managing Partner, Morgan Aquila LLP, Mr Hugo Rosemont, Policy Adviser, Security and Resilience, SBAC and Mr Doug Umbers, Managing Director, VT Communications, VT Group plc

Tuesday 21 October 2008

Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Ministry of Defence Admiral Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Home Office, Mr Jon Day CBE, Policy Director, Ministry of Defence, Brigadier Chip Chapman, Director (Military) Counter-Terrorism and UK Operations, Ministry of Defence, Ms Gillian McGregor, Head of Operational Support and Knowledge Management, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Home Office and Ms Chloe Squires, National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office

Tuesday 27 January 2009

General Sir David Richards KCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, (Late Royal Regiment of Artillery), as Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, also Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)) with responsibility for the provision of military aid to civil power within the United Kingdom, and Brigadier James Everard OBE, Director Commitments, HQ Land Commitments, Ministry of Defence

Ms Niki Tomkinson CB, Director, Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate, Chief Constable Bernard Hogan-Howe, Lead Officer for Maritime and Air Support Policing, Association of Chief Police Officers, Mr Rod Johnson, Chief Coastguard, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and Mr Brodie Clark, Head, Border Force, UK Border Agency
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<sup>A Government response published as Memorandum in the Committee’s Eighth Report (HC 400)</sup>

<sup>B Government response published as Memorandum in the Committee’s Eleventh Report (HC 885)</sup>

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The Defence contribution to UK national security and resilience

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Fourth Report The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Manufacturing and Skills Base HC 59 (HC 304)

Fifth Report The work of the Committee in 2005 and 2006 HC 233 (HC 344)

Sixth Report The Defence Industrial Strategy: update HC 177 (HC 481)

Seventh Report The Army’s requirement for armoured vehicles: the FRES programme HC 159 (HC 511)

Eighth Report The work of the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and the funding of defence research HC 84 (HC 512)


Tenth Report Cost of military operations: Spring Supplementary Estimate 2006–07 HC 379 (HC 558)

Eleventh Report Strategic Lift HC 462 (HC1025)

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Thirteenth Report UK operations in Afghanistan HC 408 (HC 1024)

Fourteenth Report Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review HC 873 (Cm 7260)

Fifteenth Report The work of Defence Estates HC 535 (HC 109)

Session 2005–06

First Report Armed Forces Bill HC 747 (HC 1021)

Second Report Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes HC 554 (HC 926)

Third Report Delivering Front Line Capability to the RAF HC 557 (HC 1000)

Fourth Report Costs of peace-keeping in Iraq and Afghanistan: Spring Supplementary Estimate 2006–06 HC 980 (HC 1136)

Fifth Report The UK deployment to Afghanistan HC 558 (HC 1211)

Sixth Report Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2004–05 HC 822 (HC 1293)

Seventh Report The Defence Industrial Strategy HC 824 (HC 1488)

Eighth Report The Future of the UK’s Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: the Strategic Context HC 986 (HC 1558)

Ninth Report Ministry of Defence Main Estimates 2006–07 HC 1366 (HC 1601)

Tenth Report The work of the Met Office HC 823 (HC 1602)

Eleventh Report Educating Service Children HC 1054 (HC 58)


Thirteenth Report UK Operations in Iraq HC 1241 (HC 1603)

Fourteenth Report Armed Forces Bill: proposal for a Service Complaints Commissioner HC 1711 (HC 180)
Oral evidence

Taken before the Defence Committee

on Tuesday 17 June 2008

Members present:

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair
Mr David S Borrow
Mr David Crausby
Linda Gilroy
Mr David Hamilton
Mr Dai Havard
Mr Bernard Jenkin
Mr Kevan Jones
Robert Key
Richard Younger-Ross

Witnesses: Mr Tony Baptiste, Manager (Business Development and Strategy), Fujitsu Defence and Security, Fujitsu, Mr John Higgins CBE, Director-General, Intellect UK, Mr David Livingstone MBE DSC, Managing Partner, Morgan Aquila LLP, Mr Hugo Rosemont, Policy Adviser, Security and Resilience, SBAC and Mr Doug Umbers, Managing Director, VT Communications, VT Group plc, gave evidence.

Q1 Chairman: Good morning. This is the first of our evidence sessions into UK national security and resilience. I would like to begin by welcoming our witnesses to the Defence Select Committee and also by saying thank you very much indeed for your various memoranda of evidence which have proved to be fascinating and very helpful. The reason we are starting this inquiry with evidence from industry is that you have been the most productive and the most helpful so far in providing us with the necessary things to think about. Let us start by asking you each, please, to introduce yourselves.

Mr Higgins: Good morning. I am John Higgins; I am the Director-General of the trade association Intellect which represents the IT telecoms and electronics industry here in the UK. I am also currently the Vice Chairman of something I will talk about later called RISC which is the Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers Council which is a pan-trade association and think tank organisation comprising ourselves, SBAC, DMA, the British Security Industry Association, RUSI and Chatham House.

Mr Baptiste: I am Tony Baptiste; I am Manager of the Business Development and Strategy for Fujitsu Defence and Security which is part of the Fujitsu Group, the third largest IT group in the world. We particularly focus on national security and resilience and logistics in a comprehensive approach. We focus particularly on national security and resilience in terms of trying to understand the market and think through some of the issues involved.

Mr Rosemont: Good morning. I am Hugo Rosemont; I am the Policy Adviser for security and resilience at the Society for British Aerospace Companies. SBAC is the UK’s trade association for civil air transport, defence, security and space markets. I am also the Secretary for the RISC International Sub-Group working with John on the RISC community.

Mr Livingstone: I am David Livingstone; I am the Managing Partner of Morgan Aquila LLP which is an independent consultancy based on business transformation in the anti-terrorism era. My background is 30 years in the services, including four years in strategic management of counter-terrorism and security operations in the United Kingdom; eight years in industry primarily based in the security sector. I am also an Associate Fellow at Chatham House where I work on the international security programme on national security matters.

Mr Umbers: Good morning. I am Doug Umbers; I am the Managing Director of VT Communications. I am on the Executive Board of the VT Group. VT has a broad range of interests in national security and resilience covering defence, security services as well as blue light and nuclear activities. We estimate today that we have about £200 million worth of revenues loosely in this sphere and therefore have a vested interest in what is going on.

Q2 Chairman: I would like to ask you to begin by outlining what your organisations do in relation to national security and resilience. It has to be an overview and an outline. Shall we start with the SBAC?

Mr Rosemont: If I may I will talk a little bit about SBAC’s own internal security and resilience programme and then move on to our commitment through RISC working with the other trade associations. In terms of the SBAC’s security and resilience programme, we initiated that towards the back end of last year and on that security and resilience network there are approximately 70 individuals from about 30 individual companies with a direct interest in providing security resilience technology systems and products to the UK Government and overseas. Within that programme, which has just been signed off by the SBAC’s council a couple of weeks ago, key areas of support for that are in the areas of border securities, civil contingencies, support and other areas. In terms of RISC, one of the SBAC’s core strategic imperatives within its security programme is leading support and commitment through to the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers Council (RISC) and in
that role we provide secretariat support to RISC to ensure that that single channel of communication to the broader security and resilience industry for OSCT and other bodies is effective and is a credible single voice for government departments and agencies.

**Mr Baptiste:** In Fujitsu Defence, in its IT infrastructure and solutions and services, particularly into the Ministry of Defence, we are co-leader with the Ministry of Defence, which is a strategy because we saw it as a good foundation to support it. We did welcome the publication of the National Security Strategy from the SBAC perspective is that when it was published we did

**Mr Umbers:** In relation to the MoD’s involvement in this, we supply for example three offshore patrol vessels to the MoD that work around protecting our coastal waters around the UK. In relation to secure communications we are responsible for the Defence High Frequency Communication Service which is a highly resilient long haul radio network which is of use for the civil contingencies in disaster. In terms of secure communications also we work with the General Lighthouse Authority with a technology called Enhanced Loran which has a potential back-up use should the GPS get jammed in any particular location. We are involved in the nuclear industry now and have operations under project Cyclamen for detection and monitoring of radioactive materials of one sort or another. We are responsible for keeping the police cars of the Metropolitan Police on the roads here in London. Also we are involved in intelligence services for a whole series of communications and IT related activities. Finally, we also have quite a big training operation both military and civil, with the fire and rescue services for example, which we would also seek to bring to bear in this environment.

**Mr Livingstone:** Morgan Aquila in terms of business transformation in this new anti-terrorism era, what we essentially do is help enterprises whether they are commercial or otherwise navigate through the plethora of stakeholders and issues associated with the new anti-terrorism construct, ie the 25 or so government level stakeholders from the police, the security services to the Home Office or whatever. We look inside enterprises, find out what might actually fit in terms of capability development for a particular stakeholder or in fact stakeholders if you combine some together (potentially border agencies and some others) to try to leverage some efficiencies out of common work processes inside those programmes for homeland security stakeholders. That is essentially what we do. We have an increasing number of people who are in fact coming to our company to help in that navigation process which leads us to the conclusion that there is some confusion amongst some of the supplier community about how to approach the market.

**Q4 Mr Crausby:** There have been criticisms that the National Security Strategy does not take full advantage of industry’s potential. How good or bad has the UK Government been from an industry perspective at identifying potential threats and responding to them?

**Mr Rosemont:** The first thing to say about the National Security Strategy from the SBAC perspective is that when it was published we did support it. We did welcome the publication of the strategy because we saw it as a good foundation to bring all the threats and challenges that the Government has identified across the various departments into one place: it was a useful bedrock. In terms of how we interface with that, there were
limited references to industry within the document, although where they were they were encouraging. To give an example, it talks about the Government wanting to build on the already existing relationships that it has with industry and from the SBAC’s point of view, as I mentioned earlier, we see that single route through RISC as the UK’s Security and Resilience Industry Supplier’s Council. RISC was not specifically mentioned within the document, nor was any other specific industry body within it. That is not a criticism; that is just an observation of where we are at. At the highest level that is how we see it really. I think we see it as a foundation. There are many areas with which through RISC, through the Office of Security Counter-Terrorism, through the industry advisory groups as John just mentioned I think there is a lot of detailed work to be going forward. In the area of counter-terrorism there are the four specific themes that we have heard about and I think that is an evolving process. As and when that broadens and any model for industry to broaden out into some of the other areas is tackled by the National Security Strategy then again I think SBAC would say that RISC is the most appropriate vehicle for doing that as the channels of the broad industrial base in security affairs. We are building internal mechanisms for the SBAC to be able to support that framework the RISC framework delivering national security and resilience. Mr Livingstone: I think there is a case to say that that National Security Strategy was an opportunity to put in some hooks on which to hang a strategic security industrial strategy and it did not quite achieve that. I think industry was actually mentioned only twice in the paper itself and private enterprise was mentioned a couple of times. When industry is looking at a new strategy, it is part of the certainty process certainly for the bigger hitting industries the larger industries such as BAE Systems or the Lockheed Martins or the Thale’s to actually see a change in the overall national strategy in terms of expenditure of monies and devotion of resource to actually start triggering a change in the industry in order to start changing its strategic business process, to start potentially entering a different market. I think for the bigger industries where a lot of intellectual capital resides and where a lot of the financial power also resides, I do not think there is enough there to actually say, “Here is something that could be engaged as a strategic business area for the longer term”. I think we have to look at the long term purely because I think the globalised terrorism threat is with us for a multi-generational term. We have some figures in there which say that in 2001 we spent £1 billion; we are now spending £2.5 billion and £3.5 billion in this area by the end of 2011. Unfortunately there is no real illustration side to the paper about what actually that addresses. Is that a re-brigading of some parts of the governmental machinery in terms of revenue and customs and the information services brigading to become border agencies and therefore coming into the so-called single security budget? There are a lot of things in there which perhaps could be taken on in the next step because it is a time perishable document in itself because it refers to the timeline until now, ie 2008, so in 2009 it should come under some sort of review. Maybe the next review can start to put in those hooks which bigger industry will need to actually trigger a bigger look at how they define their business process and which markets they are going to go for.

Mr Livingstone: I echo some of that. Industry does find it difficult to engage with the NSR market, if you like, or the Government within the NSR space. That is partly because there is so much more in terms of the organisational fracturing. We have to try to talk to 43 police forces, 50-odd fire brigades and several major government departments. It is difficult enough engaging with the MoD and they have spent ten years or so getting themselves into a state where there is a single point of contact, although within that obviously there are several areas of stakeholders that you need to talk to. The NSR market is immature in the sense that it represents across Government and there is no pan-Government mechanism, which is one of the reasons why people like RISC get invented because that is a way of addressing it on an organisation basis. However, at the end of the day, industry has to be able to establish a procurement and a valuation and identification of risk versus capability matrix with the people in Government who actually need solutions to the problems they have. Trying to establish that is quite difficult at the moment. There are undoubtedly capabilities out there that could be used but we are finding it difficult to engage with the appropriate part of Government that would be able to identify and evaluate them.

Q5 Mr Borrow: The National Security Strategy talks about “shifting the overall balance of defence procurement towards support of current operations” whilst at the same time “continuing to invest in a broad range of capabilities for the long term”. Are those two objectives possible?
Mr Higgins: I think they are essential and I am sure they are possible. Where RJSC is focussed at the moment is on future capabilities, innovation, access to the science base, but clearly there will need to be a continuing spend on operational support.

Mr Livingstone: The integrated strategy, the contest strategy, which includes the pursuit strand which is how to address, to how to interdict the terrorist and particularly overseas that is of course our operations in Afghanistan and Iraq has to be totally integrated with what we are trying to achieve all the way back to our own suburbs here in the United Kingdom. We have to be able to address the changes in tactics which are being uncovered in both Afghanistan and Iraq and spending has to be made in order to protect our troops and to give them the correct capability. The implications are that there have to be judgments made on the longer term programmes and also with regard to this £17 billion worth of savings that are supposed to be made over the next ten years which I think is the latest figure. However, we cannot hazard the overall contest strategy because we cannot generate the kit for our troops who are part of the overall anti-terrorism strategy.

Mr Umbers: I think it is important to ensure that when we are procuring that it is coordinated. There are significant examples across Government where quite a lot of capability is being procured that actually has applicability elsewhere. There are examples, for example in our business we have one contract with a national security agency that has just been extended into another national security agency which has been, if you like a force multiplier; it has gone in very, very quickly at negligible incremental cost, if I can put it like that. That kind of joined up approach is something that we would very much welcome in relation to NSR.

Q6 Chairman: Mr Livingstone, you said in your memorandum, “The long term nature of the current militant Islamic threat requires adequate capability now but better capability later later”. Mr Livingstone: Yes.

Q7 Chairman: Is that what we have?

Mr Livingstone: I think probably we are building towards it in terms of what has actually happened since the sudden emergence through 9/11 of the Islamist threat. A lot of pull-through from military into civilian areas such as gas masks for the police and de-contamination, mobile command and control and things like that have actually worked to an extent to increase capability but very quickly and maybe not an awful lot of the kit has worked as it was designed to do because it was designed for a battlefield rather than an urban environment at home, for example. I think that what we are probably seeing is an emergence of a more coherent strategy as the new larger programmes such as e-boarders and the national identification system are actually emerging and there is coherence between them. That is certainly for the UK domain. That increase in terms of the coherence between the programmes actually has to be maintained with each programme being designed and delivered with other programmes in mind. Whether by design or accident, a terrorist organisation will always find gaps in the coherence between IT systems and intelligence management processes. Certainly out of the terrorist world but back in the law enforcement world the Soham murders were probably a statistical predictable outcome of incoherence in the intelligence systems in law enforcement services in the United Kingdom.

Q8 Mr Jones: We are talking about kit and we are talking about technology, do you actually think that law enforcement in this country has really got an understanding of Islamist threat and how it is using, for example, the internet and computer technology? Does it really understand the psychological way it is actually using it?

Mr Livingstone: That is a very interesting point. The answer is that I think we are still grappling with the internet based radicalisation and the way that the radical groups are using the internet certainly to coordinate and communicate and certainly to push out their message. They are using it very well and their marketing techniques have become more and more sophisticated as time goes on. The jihadist websites are very professionally put together and are multiplying over and over again. Whether we have actually got a strategy to cope with this I am not certain. It is very difficult to censor the internet because the internet was designed to be a resilient structure that always got its message through to the intended end user. However, I would like to make a point here that the National Security Strategy does actually pick out straight away the Islamist threat. My view which I think is reflected by others is that the Islamist threat may only be the first of a number, based on their ability to communicate, to join up and to gather critical mass in the virtual world rather than in the old days in the physical world which is actually a little bit more difficult to achieve.

Q9 Mr Jones: I agree about censoring the internet but I understand some of the most successful individuals at closing certain sites down are actually religious fundamentalists in the United States, for example.

Mr Livingstone: Yes.

Q10 Mr Jones: Is there any work being done on actually recognising that you need to close down some of this traffic?

Mr Livingstone: I think there is work being done but I would very much like to understand how classified that work is before I say anything in this Committee. I can send in a separate note.

Mr Jones: Thank you.

Q11 Mr Borrow: You identified that the threats will become greater rather than lesser. If someone were to say that the movement of procurement funds towards current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan was preventing adequate response towards a long term threat in terms of security resilience capability
for these long term threats, would that be a fair assessment to make or would you feel that the UK Government is putting adequate resources into these long term issues as well as providing resources for current operations?

**Mr Baptiste**: I think the one thing that the NSS does make clear is that there is no division now between overseas and domestic threat and response to it; it is all one integrated threat. In some ways you can look on the NSR situation as the UK front line and Afghanistan and Iraq and places are just the overseas front line. I think it is very much a question of balancing between the two but actually one place has the equivalent effect in the long term on the other place. I do not think industry would want to see funding being taken away from current operations overseas or, indeed, we can talk about current operations in the UK as well to try to fix the problem in the long term because they have to be mutually reinforcing. You could not skip on one and try to fix the other. I think that would be our view.

**Mr Livingstone**: I hope my point was not being misrepresented that we would take money away from the anti-terrorism measures. I thought the point you had asked about was at the expense of other defence programmes such as Typhoon or future submarines or anything like that, and what that balancing act was going to be. I think that probably learned that if you are going to conduct a counter-insurgency campaign as we set out to do in 2001 in Afghanistan if you take the pressure off the insurgent organisation even for a shortish time to go and conduct operations elsewhere that can have a very deleterious effect on what you are trying to achieve and let the insurgents re-gain a foothold in the populations which they are trying to master.

**Q12 Mr Jones**: Mr Umbers, in your memorandum you actually say that industry needs to realign to meet the Government’s homeland security requirements. How confident are you that you actually understand what they are and how good has the Government been at actually communicating to industry what its requirements are?

**Mr Umbers**: When I was talking about the National Security Strategy I think that is trying to set out what the Government’s strategy view is of the threat that it sees. From industry’s perspective I think there needs to be more clarity and certainty about how we are going to deliver on addressing those threats.

**Q13 Mr Jones**: Is that industry asking for clarification from Government?

**Mr Umbers**: I guess my answer is ultimately that it is both in the sense that industry has an important role to play. This is the front end of the thinking as to what these threats are, the potential resolution and how do we address some of those threats and, in producing the appropriate delivery mechanisms and value for money mechanisms that can actually make it affordable and deliverable for Government ultimately.

**Mr Rosemont**: In terms of articulating the requirements what the National Security Strategy is trying to do at the broadest level is to talk about cross-departmental coordination and cooperation. I think that is really important. Any question of capabilities and zero sum gains across those, if there is dialogue between the different agencies then that is going to help that particular argument and that is a governmental matter and probably industry would play a supporting role through RISC and other mechanisms. Specifically on articulating requirements, what the RISC industry advisory groups try to do in this area is exactly that, so in the area of CBRNE for instance what has been asked of industry is to form an advisory group specifically on that matter, pulling together the various Government agencies involved in this, including MoD, and I think at that level this is still work in progress, as I tried to explain earlier it is encouraging that we have that direct dialogue with the multiple agencies at that level so that we can then drive through the requirements and build the trust between the various parties on the side. That is quite important and I think we need to build on that.

**Mr Higgins**: That is my point precisely; that is exactly what the industry advisory groups were set up to do. However, it is also important to realise that it is not just a one-way street. This is not just about Government saying, “Here are the requirements” because industry brings to the table the art of the possible, its experience in other geographies and so, through dialogue, you get a better definition of the requirements, a better understanding of the problem and a better resolution of possible outcomes. That is precisely what these industry advisory groups set out to do. They cannot tackle all the problems simultaneously; these are the first four that have been identified and I am sure others will arise as more discussions take place.

**Mr Baptiste**: There will be direct discussion between industry and the Government where there is a known area where we can have a dialogue.

**Q14 Mr Jones**: How would you prioritise that work stream?

**Mr Higgins**: All four will happen simultaneously. Different people from industry will be brought to the table on all four and they will run in parallel. Clearly there is a capacity limit; we could not do 20 but we could probably do six. I am not sure that there will be too much of a priority issue from the industry side and I think it is for Government to make sure that they bring the right people to the table on each of those IAGs. We have not yet detected any capability or capacity issues but it is early days.

**Q15 Mr Jones**: Mr Livingstone, you said in your memorandum that the National Security Strategy needed to develop the equivalent of the Defence Industrial Strategy. Can you tell us how you think that would come together?

**Mr Livingstone**: As I said, what it does not have is the hook which allows the equivalent of a defence industrial strategy to be generated. I think what we
would have to look at in terms of a security industry strategy or whatever we would call it are the core skills that we would actually need to develop and then maintain to provide not only capability now but capability later, things like systems design, if systems are being introduced into the national security and resilience overall construct, their overall design to allow open systems so they are not closed and can only be developed at great cost and time and so on. I think it is also about organisation. This is where RISC is becoming increasingly important and I absolutely endorse what my colleagues have said in terms of the engagement or the lines of communication which do not really exist at the moment or are only just beginning to exist right now in terms of passing down coherent requirement sets into industry, so: this is what we want to enable us to increase our resilience and security, but also that other flow which is industry coming up with some very bright ideas and saying, “How would it work if we did this?” which is still, I think, an interesting area especially when you look at things like intellectual property rights and protection which I think is an issue of raising up somebody’s invention into wider industry to go through a funnel and how to make sure that that intellectual property is not intercepted at some stage along the way which will be a discouragement for people to actually actively engage in the process. I think also the structure of the communication is the key to it, the communication all the way from the very top of the National Security Strategy all the way down to a little software house who is coming up with some good ideas and how that engagement actually works. Again I think RISC is making huge strides in that respect but how it is actually engaged in a National Security Strategy construct is still missing.

Q17 Mr Havard: I understand that but the point I am trying to get to is that if you are going to have the equivalent of a Defence Industrial Strategy who is going to write it? That needs to be a living activity; it is not a one-shot activity, it has to be something that is evolved and monitored. What institution is going to do that and give you the answers to your integrated teams or whatever it is for any particular procurement? There is no structure that does that it seems to me.

Mr Baptiste: It was the Ministry of Defence because there was a single point of contact there. By definition in the NSR space there is not a single point of contact.

Q18 Mr Havard: What do you want? We do a treaty about intellectual property and sovereignty and all the rest of it, for example in the United States of America on JSF. You have raised a lot of interesting questions about how that would need to be protected, but what do you want as an architecture in order to be able to respond to it?

Mr Higgins: I think Intellect would echo Hugo’s view on behalf of the SBAC. Clearly there is frustration about fragmentation but we do not think the answer is necessarily to create another structure: we think it is much more about integration and coordination and people working to a common agenda. Often these can be provided by just the right culture and the right tools to support the sharing of information. Going back to Mr Jones’ point about Islamist use of modern networking technologies, there is no reason why we cannot be using modern social networking technology and shared spaces where we can be sharing ideas around the common goal. I think a much quicker solution would be better coordination and better integration behind a common goal rather than making a wholesale change in the structure of Government. I have some experience of dealing with the Government’s CIO council in central civil government and they have a model there where the chief information officers from each of the departments do come together behind common goals; they have some concepts of champion assets which I think is a really nice idea. If somebody holds up that this is a champion asset, the best way of doing things, then you have to have a really good case for not using that champion asset. I think there are structures that exist that reflect the way society works in a modern world using network mechanisms, using the tools that are available today. Certainly with SBAC we are not calling for wholesale changes in Government because I think everything will disappear for five years to get it worked out. I think it is about using the tools and technologies that we have today.
Mr Rosemont: In terms of the UK Government’s architecture for security, it is complex and diverse, there are frustrations around some of the fragmentations. I think we also recognise in industry that we are engaging with private operators within the critical national infrastructure, so how do government structures accommodate thinking across all of that? I would like to reinforce what John has just said there in that we need to pull all the relevant stakeholders through that. These are ongoing discussions within RISC about how best to do that, how best to pull in some of the CNI operators and so on. It is Government, industry and the private sector working together.

Mr Umbers: From VT’s perspective I would echo some of those views but I think that whatever we do has to be joined up and connected and it has to have teeth ultimately because this NSR cuts across virtually every government department and therefore if we are going to affect how we do things and what we do then it absolutely has to have teeth and that needs to feed through into the procurement process that industry needs to engage with.

Q19 Chairman: We will be coming in a bit more detail to that coordination issue across departments in a few moments. Before we do, we are doing a concurrent inquiry into intelligent surveillance ISTAR and some of the witnesses to that inquiry have suggested to us that there are technologies which the Government could be using but which are not being properly exploited. One example is UAVs, possibly rotary UAVs which could fit on coastal vessels, for example. Mr Baptiste, I am afraid I am not talking about communications because we are just about to come onto communications after this question, but apart from that are there technologies which are not being fully exploited and which would benefit national security?

Mr Higgins: RISC has assembled a list of technology capabilities where we have world-class expertise and we provided that to the Government. It is a work in progress, about three pages long, with 15 or 20 examples of technologies. We would be very happy to provide that to the Committee for examination. There is a paragraph on each.

Chairman: That would be extremely helpful. We will move onto communications now.

Q20 Linda Gilroy: Mr Baptiste, in your memorandum you point out and in your opening remarks you mentioned the importance of communication technology in enabling a more joined-up approach and delivering interoperability. You note that you are very aware, in common with much of industry, of the capabilities of technologies available. Can you explain that, put a bit more flesh on the bone of the importance of communication technology to security and resilience? How does your company contribute to that area?

Mr Baptiste: What we were trying to do there was to put our finger on this interoperability issue which can be just inter-communications or it can be wider than that in terms of allowing these agencies that would all come together in an NSR crisis to work together more effectively. This is not just the emergency services, this is the plethora of agencies that might get involved; category one responders and category two responders can include private industry and can include utilities, etc. and could also include the military. To enable that to function effectively you need technologies and capabilities, you also need process, doctrine, training, etc., so that people can effectively understand what they are trying to achieve and can be directed and controlled in a vertical kind of command and control sense but also in a horizontal sense in the sense of communities who can still continue to be able to connect with each other.

Q21 Linda Gilroy: You also talk in your memorandum about the distinction between large scale resilience crises and single point attack.

Mr Baptiste: Could I come onto that in just a minute? What we are saying is that there are technologies out there now which allow the individual organisations to talk to each other, to communicate with each other both in voice and data, but particularly voice. It is not about putting over a whole new radio network or anything like that; it is about allowing the existing communication systems within those organisations to talk to each other and you do not have to have a new handset but everybody has to have a particular handset you can use your own telephone, mobile phones, ordinary landlines, PC phones, obviously TETRA phones are mostly services based. Those can be connected and you can deliver a service that allows all those to interoperate with each other.

Q22 Linda Gilroy: In a secure way?

Mr Baptiste: It can be either plain or it can be encrypted. In fact, in a domestic situation probably speed of response is more important than encryption; overseas encryption would probably be more important. You can encrypt those parts of it that you would want to have secure and those parts where it was more important to have speed of communication then you would not bother, it would be a user decision. We draw the distinction between single point and multi point and large scale. We would define 7/7 as a single point crisis; I am aware that there were three locations but in fact it was all within London, it was all within one authority, it was the best trained, the best hardened target that they could have chosen in a way. If it had happened in London, Birmingham and Manchester at the same time we know that is the al-Qaeda way of doing things or it was large scale in the sense that it was pandemic or flooding which covered a massive part of the country (which we have got fairly close to) then you get a much greater number of agencies involved in trying not just to respond to the emergency but to deliver the recovery and resilience which is actually the acid test the NSS makes that clear as well of how we do respond to the NSR equation. In that case it makes the interoperability issues much more complex and definitely you would
not be able to give everybody a particular handset; we have to be able to get organisations that are siloed in their own right the ability to communicate across organisational boundaries.

Q23 Mr Jenkin: Can we be specific about where you believe there are still shortcomings in our communication systems for resilience in this country? For example, the 7/7 inquiry said that one of the problems was that there was no way for the emergency services to communicate with the people underground. Has that been resolved?

Mr Baptiste: I cannot tell you whether it has been resolved in its entirety. I know London Underground are putting radio bearers underneath the Underground. You will not always know exactly where these things are going to happen and certainly some of the art of the possible activity and capability that we have been working on allow you to daisy drop wireless repeaters down into any underground situation whether it is tube or some other area. This was originally technology that was designed for battleships or convoys so that you were able to communicate along the convoy or down a battleship, but there is no reason why you cannot just daisy drop these down into the underground. We have demonstrated the ability to have real time video cameras down there pushing pictures from the underground back up to the surface and then if you want to you can push it across to a subject matter expert who may be in a distant location.

Q24 Mr Jenkin: So this is a system that would be deployed during the emergency.

Mr Baptiste: Yes.

Q25 Mr Jenkin: Has the Government shown interest in that system?

Mr Baptiste: Individuals have shown interest but we then run into the same problem that there is no single organisation that can actually say they would really like to do that.

Q26 Mr Jenkin: Do you feel that the Government is approaching this with sufficient urgency?

Mr Baptiste: Individuals are but I think they run up against the organisational fracturing that is the problem we have talked about before.

Q27 Linda Gilroy: Mr Umbers, in the annex to your memorandum you talk about providing high frequency communications to UK and NATO military units and secure links to the Royal Navy’s submarine fleet as well as the UK Loran navigation signal which is a highly resilient terrestrial back-up to GPS. Can you put a bit more flesh on the bones about the relevance and the importance of that to security and resilience?

Mr Umbers: Depending on the degree of event or disturbance of one sort or another, varying degrees of communication infrastructure will go down. There is a reasonably well-known tier hierarchy of communications that exists. The last man standing, as it were, typically will be the high frequency radio communications that we run on behalf of the military, which also has access by the civil contingency body here in the UK. GPS is quite jammable; a biro as big as this can stop ships in a port being able to receive GPS. The General Lighthouse Authority therefore has invested in something called e-Loran which is an update of a very old technology actually that is substantially more un-jam-able, ie you need a huge field of antennas and powerful transmitters to jam that. It is highly resilient and mission critical really for the maritime market. Clearly it could have uses elsewhere within the country.

Q28 Linda Gilroy: You have described how GPS can be interfered with and how you can help with that, but at a more strategic level are you also being called on and looking at providing back-up alternatives if there is a more strategic attack on the GPS systems which presumably, looking further out, is one of the things we need to be prepared for.

Mr Umbers: It is not something that we as VT are currently engaged with.

Q29 Linda Gilroy: Did you want to add anything to your previous answer?

Mr Umbers: Talking about technology and communication is one part of that. I have a slightly different take in the sense that a lot of what we might be aiming at, as it were, within NSR is uncertain and will move considerably over a period of time, therefore the traditional procurement methodologies, for example, may be quite inappropriate. I think a lot of the technologies that we have, as Tony was talking about, exist; it is a question of how they are applied to the situation in hand. I think it requires a much more agile and flexible approach to procurement that allows perhaps lead integrators or contractors to find intelligent suppliers who are then able to corral capabilities to apply to particular situations as they occur. There is no way today that we can write down exactly how the next problem is going to occur.

Q30 Linda Gilroy: We keep asking about whether we need a defence industrial strategy and whether there is an equivalent to respond to some of the questions that you are raising. That is dealing with very big procurements, with sovereign capabilities, whereas the words and the frameworks you are describing are a bit different. You have talked about champion assets and network mechanisms. Is there a case for having something that is a security industry strategy that tries to identify these sorts of things but in a very different way perhaps from the way in which this identifies sovereign capabilities?

Mr Higgins: I would have thought it would be well worth doing the thinking, so thinking about what the procurement challenge is, the unknown problems we might have to meet, the re-use of assets. We need to think through all that and say, ‘Well if this is the problem we are trying to face, this is the fragmentation; how are we going to get the maximum out of our procurement capability?’
think anything that provides more certainty to industry so we can make the appropriate investment choices, so SMEs can choose whether to be in the security market or in the health market, anything that gives that sort of additional confidence to the market would be very welcome. To be clear, however, we are not necessarily saying, “Just take the DIS and replicate it”, but rather to do that thinking, think what is the best procurement strategy to deal with those issues and how does that engage industry to the best effect and enable us to make the right investment decisions would be very welcome.

Q31 Robert Key: Back in 2002 the United States established a Department of Homeland Security. Should the United Kingdom have a Department of Homeland Security?

Mr Higgins: You already have my view on that.

Mr Baptiste: I think the feeling is that it would not necessarily advance us a very long way. The traditions in the UK are different from the States and we can potentially achieve what that is seeking to achieve in the States through the existing government mechanisms but with some changes in the areas we are talking about. I think the fear of the idea of a Department of Homeland Security is that actually everything stops for five years while you actually organise it and then all the funding goes into the organisation. What we are saying is that there is a lot of technology out there that is not expensive and can be used quickly if we can find a way to evaluate and employ it. Re-organising a Department of Homeland Security would not necessarily achieve that.

Q32 Robert Key: Are you saying that there should perhaps be a Minister for Homeland Security somewhere, a focus within Government?

Mr Baptiste: If that helps Government to get its mind around a more agile and focussed engagement point then yes.

Mr Livingstone: I would agree if there was a minister who is an effective rallying point, who will stand up when things are going either well or badly on the day of the next disaster and say, “This is what we are doing as a nation” then surely that would be sufficient. I would also like to back up what Mr Baptiste said. I think there would be some five years of turbulence while we put a Department of Homeland Security together. I am not sure if it would achieve much; I think a lot of money would be lumped into it and there would be cultural arguments about who is in charge. I am not sure if it would prove anything. The better way to do this is probably get more coherent messaging coming out of the plethora of the stakeholders in the national security stakeholders set; that surely suffices as well, but probably led by a minister.

Mr Jenkin: Mr Umbers talked about the whole procurement process having to have more teeth. We all know that a second permanent secretary in the Cabinet Office who does not have a department, does not have a budget can only be a persuader. Rather than have a whole, fully fledged department, how about that person being a cabinet minister who is the secretary of state for security or national security, having control of a budget through the Cabinet Office which reaches into the other government departments in order to give the procurement process those teeth.

Chairman: I should leave that because I think Robert had suggested he wished to ask that but probably in a different structure.

Q33 Robert Key: It would be very good if you could answer Bernard’s question because it was exactly what I was going to say.

Mr Umbers: VT would welcome that kind of approach. If a minister is going to have teeth they have to have the ability to reach into people’s departments to affect the connecting thinking and the strategy that he is trying to impact and therefore ultimately affect the funding lines.

Q34 Robert Key: In practical terms do you actually regard the Cabinet Office as in the lead on this? Who do you talk to about these issues?

Mr Rosemont: The National Security Strategy falls across all the departmental activity and outlines the roles and responsibilities of each individual department. Within that of course the Home Office is principally responsible for UK security and resilience within its shores. Principally through RISC we are engaging the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism as a principal lead on those matters, pulling together the different agencies where it is relevant. I think that is the appropriate channel. There is a security minister in place in Lord West and certainly there has been some high level dialogue between RISC and the security minister. In terms of who owns the National Security Strategy more broadly, that is the Cabinet Office that is true. Where it gets interesting for industry is the mentioning of the National Security Forum within that and how does industry play a role in that. I think there are some unanswered questions around that so that is something that, certainly from SBAC and I hope from the RISC point of view, RISC is the most appropriate mechanism for that. In terms of wholesale reform of the government machinery, as I mentioned before, I think OSMC should be the place where it is leading on domestic matters or that is certainly a political judgment. That is where industry is engaging.

Mr Baptiste: Picking up the point that the object of the exercise is to find a way of Government pooling some of its resources so that it can act in the common good and act cooperatively, if you were to identify a place in Government that could own a budget it might have to negotiate with all the other departments and say, “Can I have some of your funding for the common good that will enable the joining up process that we want to happen?” We feel that part of the problem at the moment is that the Government is not joined up enough to do the things that will enable it to get joined up in this sort of area
of capability and technology. If you could achieve that mechanism of liberating some budget into a central pot that was for the common good then I guess the Government would achieve its objective.

Q35 Robert Key: Mr Rosemont, you said that SBAC had welcomed the establishment of the four industry advisory groups, but is four appropriate? Would it not have been better to have one?

Mr Rosemont: I think it is a judgment for Government on that in terms of where should industry be engaging. Part of RISC is to work in partnership with the Government and the appropriate agencies and it is true that pulling together the cross-departmental agencies informing that process is a good move, and reflected in the strategy, and how do we build on that? I think that is really important.

Mr Higgins: There is an over-arching steering group as well. There is the one steering group and it collectively decides what are the areas for the IAGs. Mr Rosemont: Absolutely. I think industry, through RISC, would see itself as responding to the requirements from that direction. Certainly, through the RISC council and other mechanisms, help inform that as called upon to do so.

Q36 Robert Key: Do you think the arrangements are working as far as industry is concerned?

Mr Higgins: From my point of view it is early days but we have seen from the Office for Security and Counter Terrorism a willingness to try to engage, to understand the capabilities, to share common problems. At the moment we are intending to get behind them and make that system work to the best of our ability.

Mr Livingstone: I think industry would still like to see what the overall programme looks like and where the big chunks of money are. In the end you have to follow the money because industry has to pay people’s mortgages, our employees have mortgages. If they cannot understand how it works then industry is going to go into another market; it is not going to devote its resources into national security and resilience if it cannot sense where the resources are coming from.

Mr Umbers: As highlighted earlier on, VT operates quite a lot in tactical areas with particular departments of which there are a number in relation to NSR and its particular activities. As part of the National Security Strategy there are a number of other bodies that have been set up and/or will continue to exist. It is very, very difficult to work out how to engage at that strategic level and have a sensible conversation. I think there is a risk that there are just too many people to point at and the risk is that at some point industry will lose interest.

Q37 Robert Key: Of course we see all this from the point of view of the defence department, but in your opinion is the Ministry of Defence doing enough to work with other departments and agencies as you look at it from your industrial point of view? Is the MoD fully engaged in this, talking to other departments?

Mr Baptiste: Without trying to alienate our current customer, I think there are two aspects to that problem. There is a lot of contact between the MoD at operational level and obviously the security agencies and Home Office and things like that and the army have the counter-terrorist groups around the country. That is happening but I think the issue is: do the civil responders want the military to be involved? I think there is a bit of a divide there. They certainly do not want the military to come in and take over and they do try to establish a lot of the capabilities that previously the military may have provided but they are in the civilian sector now. On the other hand they do not want to forego the benefits of the military. The military are saying that they want to concentrate on Afghanistan and Iraq and do not actually want to put a lot of effort in the UK. I think there is a dialogue which, certainly from the outside, we see is not really connected and there needs to be some fundamental thinking about that.

Q38 Robert Key: We also have a problem at Parliament because of course the parliamentary select committees reflect the structures of Government and we are also heavily compartmentalised. Do you think Parliament is scrutinising adequately the way in which this is all developing with the security industry in a cross-Government way or should Parliament be doing something different to talk to you?

Mr Rosemont: Within the National Security Strategy there is a commitment to increase Parliamentary oversight across the whole broad spectrum. I think that is a consideration and one of the things SBAC put in our submission I think the MoD did exactly the same is that we assume that this particular inquiry is based on UK based security and resilience. We also take the view that operations overseas affect the national security and resilience agenda and how does that link up to it? That is a key consideration. It is possibly not very helpful but certainly the SBAC and I am sure RISC would also want to contribute to anything that was formed around that particular outlook.

Q39 Mr Havard: You talk about industry’s interface and there are all these committees and things. I think it was in Mr Livingstone’s paper where you say that it has to involve academia as well. You sponsor research; there is a relationship between academia and industry in this regard. Presumably academia is involved in that sense, but how else is it is involved?

I think this is Robert’s point, what we do in terms of fundamental science, what we are doing in university policy has nothing to do with the military as such but everything to do with the military in terms of science. We are not joining it up, are we? Do you represent that as well?

Mr Higgins: I think you have put your finger on a very good point. In RISC we wanted to involve think tanks and academics but it has been quite hard...
to get academic involvement at the right level. We are all aware that the people who are conducting the research and the people who are making the choices about research grants need to be more involved. We see some evidence of it, for instance the Technology and Strategy Board have sent representatives to some of our meetings and they are in that gap really between research council funded research and industrial research. We have seen some evidence I think from the EPSRC attending some of the meetings. You are absolutely right, more could be done to make sure that academic research is following those same signals; I think that is what we need to try to achieve.

Chairman: Mr Higgins, we have had the same problem with this inquiry so if you have any suggestions as to how we can energise academia to take part in this inquiry that would be very helpful.

Q40 Richard Younger-Ross: Following on from the homeland security point Robert made with the free-flow of people across European borders, it is not that we need a European homeland security but is there enough integration between the British and the European?

Mr Higgins: I do not know whether you are aware of it but there is a European sort of equivalent to RISC that we are aware of. I am not sure that it is exactly parallel but we have seen some industrial engagement at European level.

Mr Rosemont: The European Organisation for Security tries to look at that and certainly RISC is tied into that through something called the National Security Platforms. What that is trying to do is pull together the various industry bodies that are trying to be representative of the broad security industry in each country. There is a meeting today in Paris on that; my colleague, Derek Marshall, the Secretary of RISC, is attending. There are links through to RISC on that and certainly through the RISC International group this is an active part of the agenda in terms of how does the UK security industry support some of those initiatives and support some of the border security whilst representing industry as well. We are tied into that debate at the same time as being tied into the new defence and security organisation which is all about promoting industry in that particular space.

Q41 Richard Younger-Ross: I am on the European Scrutiny Committee as well as being on this Committee so I am aware of a number of these issues. I was really asking whether you think the UK Government is doing enough to input and to enable that process.

Mr Rosemont: In the RISC International group there is representation from the Home Office on that group who specifically look into the EU research funding programmes, the FP7 arrangements, as a single point of contact to the UK security industry to help promote industry but also provide the opportunities to engage with them. So there is a point of contact in that, that is for RISC International across all the membership that we have spoken about today, to make sure that that is communicated appropriately.

Q42 Linda Gilroy: Small and medium enterprises are often very much the drivers of innovation and in the early days of the Defence Industrial Strategy we had a lot of concerns expressed, concerns possibly overcome to a degree since then. The sort of architecture that you seem to be evolving through RISC and in other ways seems to be very bottom up and accommodating of small and medium enterprises. Am I right in what I am describing and what do we need to think about in order to preserve that extra agility that I think some of us feared would be lost through the Defence Industrial Strategy?

Mr Higgins: I hope it will be and as ever it will depend on the SMEs having time to participate because these can be very time consuming exercises. It is certainly open to SME engagement and I think the points David was making about private contractors actively engaging with their SME supply chain is another route to market as well that I think SMEs need to engage in. I am hopeful, but we will see whether they really have time.

Mr Baptiste: Most of the technologies we are talking about are SME driven at the end of the day. They are keen to work through the primes to get that visibility which they could not leverage in their own rights, so it is working well in that sense.

Mr Livingston: The big primes will only get engaged if they see the big programme and the larger source of funding. The engine room at the moment for a lot of new initiatives is the SME industrial base which manages to find out what is required, comes up with a part solution or the full solution and lift that into the new business process that is required for our operations.

Q43 Linda Gilroy: The points you were making about clarity of goal and where Government want to go and get to is even more important for them.

Mr Baptiste: The SMEs will tend to have a part solution and it is the primes that actually integrate it in a way that is not just necessarily a product that you might sell to somebody but very often a service is provided by the large industrial organisations.

Q44 Mr Hamilton: Could I follow one of the points that Robert began to allude to? On numerous occasions you have mentioned the cross-department issues. One of you has spoken about the organisational fracturing that takes place throughout departments. At no time did anybody refer to the fact that we are four different countries and in each of these countries there is a different structure. Although security is reserved, the Scottish police force come under the Scottish Parliament. We have also the MoD which covers the coastlines of England and Wales and Northern Ireland but do not cover the coastlines of Scotland, that is a separate company sub-contracted in Scotland and that also covers the oil rigs. Surely there must be a better way
of working than the fracturing that takes place with different departments, many of whom do not have direct responsibility for Scotland anyway. Is there not a better way forward? It should not take five years to set up, we should have one department dealing with the whole thing covering all parts of the United Kingdom. Surely there is an issue of who you talk to, how you deal with that and at the end of the day there is a fracture taking place and there is an issue that you do not know who to talk to and there is an issue about who gives answers.

Mr Livingstone: I do not think I can argue that through the devolved administrations and the mechanics of law enforcement compared to security that there will be more stakeholders for a central response. I do not think al-Qaeda respects the boundary or the border between Scotland and England, for instance. The more fractures, the more boundary or the border between Scotland and England. Surely there is an issue of who you deal with the whole thing covering all parts of the United Kingdom. Surely there is an issue of who you deal with, how you deal with that and at the end of the day there is a fracture taking place and there is an issue that you do not know who to talk to and there is an issue about who gives answers.

Mr Livingstone: Yes. I have been involved in a programme which has been industry led to take a concept which works very well for the police and then to walk that concept around the other stakeholders in the agencies who are involved in the overall intelligence response. However, that is a time consuming process in itself in its stakeholder management to try to describe the benefits to all. It is a complicated process and you have to have pretty good knowledge of how the stakeholders operate individually before you can then get them all pointing the same way and then start to discuss and demonstrate business benefit to all out of a single concept. It can be done though.

Mr Baptiste: It is the problem of cross-over technology or cross-over capability which was touched on by Mr Key. There are a lot of examples from the military into civilian space and the UAV is a very good example. How you actually manage that is an issue and how you actually cover the culture differences as well as another problem and we do not have an answer to it. If we can crack it there is a lot of capability out there that could be moved across.

Chairman: There may be a role for the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre based in the security service.

Q46 Mr Havard: We have been doing an inquiry about ISTAR and we looked at UAVs. UAVs are a good example in one sense. They are going to be used by, presumably, the police forces; electricity companies may want to use them in order to survey their pylons and lines; all sorts of people might want to use these from private industry, private individuals, police forces, the military, whatever. Presumably from your point of view as industry, if you are going to produce a family to do all of these different things, at a time of crisis they could well be integrated in order to give information. Here is an example: how do you as industry go and say, "Is there a central procurement structure for a decision like that? Why are the police force buying all these things if they could borrow them?" That is presumably the sort of example we have at the moment and you have no focus or focal point or several focal points; is that part of the problem?

Mr Livingstone: Yes. I have been involved in a programme which has been industry led to take a concept which works very well for the police and then to walk that concept round the other stakeholders in the agencies who are involved in the overall intelligence response. However, that is a time consuming process in itself in its stakeholder management to try to describe the benefits to all. It is a complicated process and you have to have pretty good knowledge of how the stakeholders operate individually before you can then get them all pointing the same way and then start to discuss and demonstrate business benefit to all out of a single concept. It can be done though.

Chairman: There may be a role for the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre based in the security service.

Q47 Mr Jenkin: Has the regionalisation of the emergency call centres thrown up more problems or has it resolved problems? I guess one or two of your companies have been involved with it.

Mr Umbers: I am not sure that we have a strong view; we are not directly involved in that particular programme. What I can say is that that will create issues locally but nationally it is precisely the kind of joined up procurement that we are looking for. If you go back to Mr Havard’s earlier statement, the police, for example, with their radio system have something called Airwave that operates across the police network. It was put in by the predecessor of the National Police Improvement Agency which is a cross-police organisation. There is an example of central governmental operation that is ensuring the commonality of systems and interoperability of systems are being put in across the country. I am sure
there is some short term pain in that programme and there will be some dissatisfaction locally, but I think the medium to long term picture looks good.

**Q48 Mr Jenkin:** Looking at the experience of other countries, is industry better involved in this aspect of public policy in other countries? Do we have something to learn from them?

**Mr Rosemont:** It seems to me that there are different models and it is quite difficult to make a judgment on the effectiveness of them. I mentioned colleagues in France today. In France there is a High Committee for Civil Defence which pulls together various regional tiers of government, critical national infrastructure, private providers and also industry and that has been in evidence since 1982 and is a maturing body. This is what we are trying to do with the RISC model, building on that, and I think in certain areas we are doing similar activities, for example advising a group on CBRNE across the multiple agencies. That is a similar activity as to how the High Committee in France works. Where it is slightly different is that in the UK, UK industry through the trade associations is financing the RISC and the RISC model and the French model, for example, receives some state funding on that. That is not a value judgment; it is more of an observation as to how it is actually structured.

**Mr Umbers:** I am aware of the Scandinavian models, one is total defence and one is societal security. I think it is an attempt in Sweden to create a joined up approach to the security challenges they face. It will be very different in scale potentially to the types of challenges that we face, but I think it could be worthy of further exploration.

**Q49 Mr Jenkin:** Are you aware of any particular technologies that we are not exploiting in the UK which are being exploited in other countries?

**Mr Baptiste:** There is a lot in the States now; there is a lot of technology coming through in the States. They have got over the hump, if you like, of establishing the Department of Homeland Security and there is a lot of capability out there which is worth noting.

**Q50 Mr Jenkin:** Can you be specific?

**Mr Baptiste:** Particularly around the communications space again. The sort of thing I was talking about earlier they actually deployed in Hurricane Katrina and that made a big difference there on the ground in terms of getting a horizontal communications network going. There are other ISTAR type capabilities which they are using as well.

**Mr Livingstone:** I always caution against this glittering prize of grabbing a technology from another country, bringing it in and then trying to make it fit somewhere into the business process of whatever you are trying to do in order to make things better. Quite often some of the technologies, particularly in command and control, do not fit because of national procedures themselves and this panacea, once introduced into service, actually creates a little bit more confusion. That also goes for more tactical technologies as well. They have to fit into the business process of what you are trying to do before you go out and buy them.

**Chairman:** That is an extremely helpful concluding answer to a very helpful session. Gentlemen, thank you very much indeed for opening our inquiry in such a beneficial way.
Tuesday 21 October 2008

Members present:

Mr James Arbuthnot, in the Chair

Mr David S Borrow  Mr Adam Holloway
Mr David Crausby  Mr Bernard Jenkin
Mr David Hamilton  Mr Brian Jenkins
Mr Mike Hancock  John Smith
Mr Dai Havard

Witnesses: Rt Hon Bob Ainsworth MP, Minister of State for the Armed Forces, Admiral Lord West of Spithead GCB DSC, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Home Office, Mr Jon Day CBE, Policy Director, Ministry of Defence, Brigadier Chip Chapman, Director (Military) Counter-Terrorism and UK Operations, Ministry of Defence, Ms Gillian McGregor, Head of Operational Support and Knowledge Management, Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, Home Office and Ms Chloe Squires, National Security Secretariat, Cabinet Office, gave evidence.

Q51 Chairman: Good morning and welcome to this session on national security. Minister, would you like to introduce your team?

Mr Ainsworth: Do you want me to make an opening statement as well, Chairman, or just make the introductions?

Q52 Chairman: No, thank you. At the moment just introduce your team—unless there is anything you have to say to start us off.

Mr Ainsworth: I have with me, Chairman, Jon Day, who is our Policy Director at the MoD; I also have with me Brigadier Chip Chapman, who is the Military Director of Counter-Terrorism and UK Operations in the department.

Lord West of Spithead: I have got Gillian McGregor who is from the Home Office; and Chloe Squires who is from the Cabinet Office.

Q53 Chairman: I have an opening statement, which is that this is very much a preliminary inquiry into national security, in the sense that we do not wish at this evidence session to go into lots of operational detail about how this country intends to defeat people who are intent on attacking it. There may be questions which we will ask which you will think it more appropriate to say it would be unhelpful to answer that question. In that case just say so. We do not want to go into a lot of secret secure stuff that would give succour to our enemies, as it were. So long as you make it plain when you do not want to go in particular directions that would be helpful to us. Minister, you began by talking about making an opening statement, is there a need for you to make an opening statement?

Mr Ainsworth: I have got one which I can read out to the Committee, if that is what you wish?

Q54 Chairman: No, thank you. National Security Strategy, who owns it?

Mr Ainsworth: The lead department for national security in the United Kingdom is the Home Office.
sit there, so they are involved in it there; but it is not actually owned into the Home Office directly in that way. We have inputs on counter-terrorism and things like that.

**Mr Ainsworth:** I am sorry, Chairman, the counter-terrorism aspect I meant for the Home Office. I did not want to confuse you.

Q57 Mr Jenkin: That would explain why the NSS is a bit of a Christmas tree because there is no single minister responsible for creating coherence in the National Security Strategy?

**Lord West of Spithead:** First of all, I would have to say I am not sure that it is a Christmas tree. As I say, I think this is the first time this has been pulled together. I have to say that in my Seaforth House paper in 1993 I suggested that we ought to do something like this but it has taken rather a long time to happen. This is the first time this has happened. I think it is very, very good and it is something that will go on and grow. It is a very good first attempt to actually put together in one document all of the key areas of concern to this nation from all the various government departments; and to try actually as well to give some sort of assessment there of what actually we have done about the various things, what each department has done about them, and actually to try to maybe identify levels of risk. That has been quite difficult to do. It is a broad document, and of course we have now set up the National Security Secretariat, and William Nye is the senior civil servant who that is under. He is pulling together his team and he is doing the various bits of work that were identified when we produced this National Security Strategy; for example, we need to establish proper parliamentary oversight, and proposals for that will be going out soon. Also, for example, the National Security Forum, how that will be constructed again, that will be going out very soon, this autumn; putting in place these various things. Of course, that secretariat then will lead on the work to move towards a refreshed National Security Strategy next year, which will probably be in the early summer, which will I hope be even more comprehensive, even more fine-tuned, and will have identified and done some work in other areas where we have identified there were gaps before. For example, there are certain areas which I have already talked to him about that he is starting work with his secretariat to actually tackle.

Q58 Chairman: Minister, how has the Ministry of Defence’s approach been affected by the publication of the National Security Strategy? Has it changed in any way and, if so, what?

**Mr Ainsworth:** We have been involved in the development of the National Security Strategy. We have got officials who have been involved in the development of that. Ministers sit on the committee, as Lord West has just said. It is early days to say that it in itself has developed our capabilities because there is a lot of work still to be done. However, we have developed alongside the Adam Ingram report a compendium of defence capabilities in order to make sure that there is better understanding by all who need to know exactly the full range of what defence has to offer, so they can access it, and that has been part of that process.

**Mr Day:** Throughout my career the MoD has been criticised for pursuing a defence policy in isolation from the wider context. I think for the first time, as has been said, the National Security Strategy provides that broader context for our thinking, rather than having to create that context on a case-by-case basis, annually or in the context of defence reviews. For us it gives us a much more coherent basis for our planning.

Q59 Chairman: What has the Ministry of Defence actually done in terms of the National Security Strategy?

**Mr Day:** The National Security Strategy will play into defence strategic guidance, and it will provide the context for that. It is essentially a planning document. It also provides substance to the committee framework on which we sit. For the first time it will underpin our planning in a way we have not had in the past.

Q60 Chairman: When you say “will” underpin your planning; it has already?

**Mr Day:** It is. It is playing into the current iteration of defence strategic guidance which, as you know, is the basis for our planning.

Q61 Mr Holloway: You have got doctrines, plans, committees, initiatives, X, Y and Z and of course it all sounds absolutely marvellous, but the reality is that we are not winning the war on terror. Do you not think we could be doing rather more in terms of dealing with the drivers of radicalisation and be a little more sensitive in our foreign policy because it might actually make your job rather easier?

**Mr Ainsworth:** “We” the Department of Defence, or “we” the government overall?

Q62 Mr Holloway: The government overall, the Department of Defence, from where you are sitting do you ever find it rather frustrating that you are picking up the pieces of something that, self-evidently, is not working?

**Mr Ainsworth:** In what way is it not working? We have a threat; the threat has been developed; it is a global threat and it is developing over years and we have to respond to that in different ways. Of course preventing radicalisation is a part of that. Defence has a role to play in that as well, but not necessarily a lead role. Actually explaining what we do, the way we do it and the way we conduct operations in order to prevent radicalisation is a role that we can play as defence. We do attempt that; it is not easy and we maybe need to do more; but that is a responsibility of the whole of government to explain its foreign policy, the reasons for its foreign policy; and to attempt to make sure everything about that is explained and is as positive as possible and not having a negative effect.
Lord West of Spithead: I cannot remember your exact turn of phrase there, but actually we have done a great deal in terms of what you loosely call (and I do not like the term) “war on terror”; I would say “excising the terrorist cancer from our society” and actually making us all safer. We have done a huge amount. The formation of the OSCT last year I think was a splendid decision; I had nothing to do with it; I have to say I was not in government at that stage. It took the responsibility for coordination of counter-terrorism across all government departments away from the Cabinet Office, where they did not have the resources for it, and it is now based in the Home Office. The OSCT, under Charles Farr, has been a huge success story. Our counter-terrorist strategy CONTEST was first produced in 2006; we are busy refreshing that and there will be a CONTEST 2 coming out later this year. All sorts of things have been addressed in there. We have done some really good work on the Protect strand. We have done some really good work on the Pursue strand; you can see that when you look at the number of cases going through our courts. We have done an immense amount of work on Prevent, which is stopping radicalisation and stopping extremism. This work had not really been done going back historically. We have actually looked at what are the causes of it; we have put a lot of effort into that. We have got a whole agenda that goes across all government. We now have a weekly security meeting chaired by the Home Secretary, Vernon Coaker or me which gets people from every single department. The MoD are there and they go through issues to do with Prevent; we get briefings from the agencies who are there; we have DCLG; other government departments; and this is really closely coordinated and done and actually I think we are delivering a huge amount. It does not mean the threat has gone away, sadly, because the threat is very high; but we have done a huge amount. As this slowly comes out, what has been achieved, I think quite rightly people will be very proud of what is being done. To be honest we should have done it because we put a lot of resource into it, a lot of effort into it, and those things are beginning to pay off.

Q63 Mr Holloway: I completely accept, amongst this raft of initiatives, there has been some great stuff; but the fact remains that out there in the world we are still delivering defeat. We have got a huge problem with British kids of Pakistani origin; we have got some serious problems in the operational theatres; and Muslim public opinion around the world moves against us by the day.

Lord West of Spithead: I would not actually put it on that basis. All I would say is we have a very closely coordinated plan with the Foreign Office and with MoD about the things we should be doing in places like Afghanistan and other places. We have an outward-looking communications policy; RICU are doing certain work on this. We are looking very carefully at the use of language. We are engaging the Muslim communities in this country in discussion and debate about things. We accept that certain aspects of our foreign policy have caused difficulties with them, but now at least we are engaging in debate with them. I have found that when you talk to them the first discussion with a group is actually pretty hardcore stuff for you, but actually when you do it the second and third time they begin to understand once you explain why you are doing things. They will not always see eye-to-eye, and I think it is those things that we are doing which are all having an effect. This is not going to change just like that. To stop this radicalisation of extremism is going to take (and I will get into trouble for saying this) about 30 years, I think, but it will become a virtuous circle; it will start getting better and better. We have to embark on it and the recognition of that I think is one of the big things that has happened over the last 15 months of the OSCT. That huge Prevent package I think is something we should be proud of. It is not perfect and there are lots of things we have got to do but, my goodness me, we cannot arrest and protect ourselves out of this problem. We have got to have the forces to do the arrests if necessary to look after us, and protect ourselves as necessary while we are doing this, but that is not the way to ultimately solve the problem.

Q64 Mr Hancock: I am curious because when you first answered that question you suggested that there had been success in stopping radicalisation of parts of the community. I would be interested to know how you judge that because when I speak to young Muslims, and I have a sizeable contingent in my own constituency and around the area, I do not see that happening. I am interested to know how you judge the success or otherwise of what you are doing?

Lord West of Spithead: You have hit right on one of the very, very difficult areas. Getting measures of some of these—for the first time ever we have actually got PSAs for some of our counter-terrorism, which was not there before, which is good; but how actually do you measure? It is extremely difficult. An awful lot of what people work on is hearsay and nothing actually tangible; it is not empirical evidence. One of the things we have had to do is try and work out what we can use as empirical evidence. We are putting work into prisons, into places of worship, into sports clubs. I would not pretend for a moment that we have made a huge, huge win here and it is galloping down, and that is why I say it will take that length of time; but we are beginning to get there; we are beginning to have discussions with people. We have identified organisations that actually help us and are sympathetic to the way we are going, who agree with the same shared values that all humans have and that we all have, rather than some groups that did not actually go down that route, and we are really beginning to make progress. I do not pretend for a moment we are nearly there. I regularly go out and talk to youngsters, and some of the reactions I find just amazing because you think, “How on earth can you believe that?” We need to have a dialogue; we need to do this; and we are actually doing that now, I think.
Q65 Mr Jenkins: When I heard the term “overarching strategy” I thought that is a great title, a great term. Within that do we have different departments reporting, like stovepipes, up to the top, or have the departments changed their policy, and are they working closer with each other so there are departments working at every level? How has that approach changed the operation of the MoD; and has the MoD felt its role in working through the Home Office is somewhat restrained; or is it quite happy to do that; or would it like more contacts, please?

Mr Day: Shall I give you an example of the sort of cross-Whitehall working that is now becoming the norm?

Q66 Mr Jenkins: Yes, please.

Mr Day: Under the NSID framework there is an Afghan strategy group which brings together all of the key departments involved in Afghan issues: Foreign, Defence, DFID, Home Office, the agencies when necessary. That organisation has created the joined-up strategy for Afghanistan that was agreed last year by NSID, which had not previously existed. More important than that is now the vehicle through which we implement a joined-up strategy through our military and civilian agencies on the ground, and measuring success. So there is now a cross-government structure for formulating and delivering strategy. Another example. We talked about the Prevent agenda. Within the foreign and security policy context there are two information strategy groups that deal with the information side of our Iraq and Afghanistan operations. This work is now integrated with what the domestic departments do, through for example, RICU. There is a much greater joined-up approach to these problems. This all flows down from the National Security Strategy, which is a change of culture as much as anything else.

Q67 John Smith: Without giving away any secrets, can you say hand on heart that this new joined-up approach to the national security threats on our country has actually prevented or deterred actual threat of attack or security threats against us, since you have been taking this new approach?

Mr Ainsworth: There are repeated examples at every level of a joined-up approach to all the different threats that there are. This provides the umbrella under which to do that. The MoD is constantly responding to requests for assistance from other government departments, both within the United Kingdom and outside the United Kingdom as well. It is just developing that relationship and making sure that we are properly plugged into the decision-making framework and we can make that contribution and people know exactly what contribution there is that is there to be made.

Q68 John Smith: Are you able to say that attacks have been prevented by approaching it in this way?

Lord West of Spithead: I think I should answer that, being the counter-terrorism minister. I think there are two strands. First of all, we were talking initially and I think Jon Day was talking about the National Security Strategy and the joined-up-ness there which is through these NSID committees, which stands for National Security and International Development, another one of these acronyms. It is a Cabinet committee and it has various subcommittees of that Cabinet committee that look at various specifics. That is where all government departments are and that is how you get lots of joined-up stuff at National Security Strategy level better than ever before; and looking at the totality of our security in a different sort of way, not just nation on nation or whatever, but looking at it in a different way. I think your question more was relating down at the counter-terrorist level and the cross-government work that the OSCT is doing. Clearly I cannot go into specifics—if you get anywhere near specifics everyone gets terribly excited and jumps around—but actually the reality is that we have had successes which have stopped attacks in this country. I think it is fair to say we have had successes that have stopped certainly hundreds, if not thousands, of people being killed. So there have been successes. I am not talking about just in the last year—this is over a period of time. One can see that from some of the trials coming through the courts where, because we have doubled the size of the security service, because we are watching these people, we are able to move before they do things and then act. The answer to that is, yes, but clearly I cannot go into details.

Q69 Mr Havard: We have got a National Security Strategy within which there is a component that deals with counter-terrorism essentially, and that element is now vested, for policy purposes, in the OSC in the Home Office, and coordination of responses for that is largely with the Cabinet Office, into which all the other government departments essentially feed in various different ways. Is that essentially what you are explaining to me?

Lord West of Spithead: No. The OSCT leads on cross-government coordination for counter-terrorism. Counter-terrorism is one facet of our National Security Strategy. Within there, there are things like the strategic deterrent; defence of the United Kingdom; there are issues in there now for the first time to do with Resilience; to do with natural disasters; to do with pandemics; the whole gamut of threats to our nation and our people.

Q70 Mr Havard: My question then is this: it seems as though there is an elaborate architecture to deal with the counter-terrorism element, which you now describe, but you have described something that goes beyond that. Is this the only thing that is essentially in the National Security Strategy? Who does the other bits? Who coordinates the policy on those? This is a question which other people have asked of me which is: is it not time to have one ministerial position in the government responsible
for bringing the whole of the National Security Strategy together rather than just one element of it, which is counter-terrorism etc?

Lord West of Spithead: I think it is more joined-up than you would suggest. Within the National Security Strategy, which is coordinated and held by this official Robert Hannigan who reports directly through Cabinet committees to the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister effectively is the minister who actually holds this. These things are coordinated, for example if it is Resilience, by the contingency secretariat who do all of the Resilience issues; so they are coordinating all of those things. You saw we produced a thing called the NRA, the National Risk Assessment, and we produced an unclassified version, the National Risk Register. That is all being coordinated by them, and they work to Robert Hannigan on those things. In terms of defence, the issues to do with defence and what they are doing were explained by Jon Day, how that inputs into there and how that is done. When it comes to pandemic, the Department of Health has the lead on that, and again they will talk about that. This is all coordinated by Robert Hannigan and, by now, the National Security Secretariat—which did not exist before and I am very glad we have now established that and that can actually pull this together better than ever before—then it funnels up through the Cabinet committee and ultimately to the Prime Minister. Should there be a minister doing that? This is something which has been thought about, and we have not come to a final decision on that as yet.

Q71 Chairman: Are we not very unusual in terms of Western countries in not having a national security adviser at the level of Condoleezza Rice?

Lord West of Spithead: I have to say without looking I do not know.

Mr Day: The fundamental difference I think between what you are suggesting and the current approach is that to introduce a minister with the sort of responsibilities you are talking about would either require them to be a coordinator, or to have overarching responsibility (and I am sorry to use that word again) across a range of very large government departments: the Foreign Office; Ministry of Defence; large elements of the Home Office; DFID; the Department of Health—a whole range of departments. You would have to take a decision as to whether that individual minister took responsibility for all of these departments, or was simply a coordinator. At the moment we have the coordinating model, which is done through an official working to the Prime Minister. The alternative model would be quite difficult to implement within our current structure, and would require significant changes to the machinery of government. I am not sure that Condoleezza Rice is quite the equivalent in that respect, because I am not sure that she has the responsibilities across such a large range of what we are calling “national security risks”.

Q72 Mr Hamilton: The one that is missing from all of the contributions is the devolved parliaments, because if you talk about health, if you talk about serious crime that comes under the Scottish Parliament. Therefore there is not a minister responsible; that has to be a dialogue that takes place. Surely it is commonsense to talk about—those matters should be taken from a devolved parliament and brought back into a reserve power. I mean it quite seriously. There is an issue about a reserve power which covers the whole of the UK instead of a patchwork quilt which we have got at the present time. Whoever the minister is will have to deal with a devolved parliament, with the appropriate minister in that devolved parliament about fisheries, about serious drugs and about health. Surely it makes sense that that part of terrorism should be brought right back in and it should be all encompassing?

Mr Ainsworth: There is a lead department for every analysed threat. Where it is a devolved matter, in Scotland a devolved parliament would take the lead. MoD and all of the other parts of government would plug in and give support. Where it is not a devolved matter then the Home Office, or whoever else is taking the lead, would lead on that. Some of these threats exist at the local level and at the regional level. Where is there the need therefore to take that back to a national planning assumption? If there is a threat in Scotland specific to Scotland then it is perfectly appropriate for the devolved administration to take the lead in that area.

Lord West of Spithead: Defence and counter-terrorism are reserved issues, so clearly they are dealt with on a national basis. When it comes to Resilience and things like that, the devolved administrations do sit on the Cabinet committee so that they are fully involved in those discussions. I think this is addressed; maybe it is not as elegant and tidy as it should be but then that maybe is partly to do with other structures, but at least we get the input from them all.

Mr Hamilton: The point I am making is that it is still evolving. If it is still evolving then maybe that should be addressed also. If the policy is still evolving, which it is, then maybe that should be looked at again.

Q73 Chairman: You have heard what he has said. It seems to be a sensible point.

Lord West of Spithead: Yes, absolutely.

Q74 Mr Hancock: I am grateful for the comments we have heard, particularly the one that it is still open to debate whether or not we do have a minister with overall responsibility.

Lord West of Spithead: Can I clarify that. The position is that it is something that has been thought about now certainly for the last 15 months. There are huge implications, and what exactly is he doing, and so we got nowhere in terms of getting anywhere.

Q75 Mr Hancock: I understand the implications, because it is about the ministers giving up power and nobody wants to do that. I understand that but I am
hearthyed by the idea that it is still open to discussion. I would hope that the majority of the British people would like to see somebody like that who is actually given that responsibility. If the seriousness of the situation is such as you have described then the one thing for sure is people do not want to see this done through an elevation of committee structures, ending up with the Prime Minister. There needs to be some sort of coordination there at senior ministerial level—a job for the Deputy Prime Minister, if we had one. I am curious about your suggestion, because when you were asked questions about this organisation you did not actually tell us what the Ministry of Defence were bringing to the party. You told us about all these systems that were being set up, but you did not tell us exactly what differences there were going to be in the past. I am curious about how you are now sure you are going to be sustained in the loop; that the intelligence services are sharing with you information; that the Home Office and Cabinet Office are coming to you at the earliest opportunity, not as an afterthought. I think that is the crucial question the MoD has to answer. What are you bringing to the party? Are you satisfied that the processes that are being talked about are sufficiently secure enough for you to be sure you are being told at the first instance and not at the last step?

Mr Day: On the final point, I am absolutely sure that we are joined-up entirely into the intergovernmental loop to as greater degree as we have ever been. I do not see that as a problem. As far as what the MoD is bringing is concerned, in terms of the operations we are conducting we bring the defence perspective, we bring the capabilities, we bring a level of understanding about operations and policy that does not exist anywhere else in government. In terms of counter-terrorism and Resilience we can perhaps go into that in more detail but, as the Minister said, we bring a range of niche capabilities and provide a “back-up”, if you like. It is very difficult to explain when you are not part of it, but there is a closeness of cooperation now in dealing with a whole range of issues that means, for example, we are able to produce a strategy for Afghanistan that integrates and has the buy-in of very, very different actors from defence, through to DFID, through to the agencies, in formulating and implementing policy. That, to my experience, is something we have not always been good at in the past.

Mr Ainsworth: The fear seems to be that policy will develop and Defence will not be involved in that and will not have a say in the direction of travel. We are involved in the planning process exactly in order to prevent that from happening. We are completely embedded within it. We can see the developments are happening and see proposals as they come forward and we can have our say and have our input into that. As far as access then to defence capability is concerned, of course that has to be done through the Ministry of Defence; it has to be cleared through the Ministry of Defence; so I do not really understand the concern that there is about us being left behind or left out. We are embedded in the planning process and then have control over the contributions that we make to any particular scenario which arises.

Q76 Mr Hancock: No-one was suggesting you were being left out; we were making sure that you were actually included in.

Mr Ainsworth: We are.

Q77 Mr Hancock: I would feel sad if you were left out, but none of us have mentioned that.

Mr Ainsworth: I thought that was your concern.

Q78 Mr Jenkins: If we, as you tell me, have got in position a security coordinator who now is capable of pulling together different parts of different departments, and we may possibly have a minister who could do that but that would be politically dangerous if he were in conflict with other ministers in other departments—I think that is the underlying contention—and we might look at this procedure, do you not think, Minister, in a democracy it is better to have a minister who can be brought to the House and questioned rather than a coordinator who cannot be brought to the House and questioned?

Mr Ainsworth: Yes, of course we need accountability for the decisions taken, and ministers must take that responsibility at the end of the day. What needs to be coordinated is the information flow, and that needs to be coordinated on a regular basis. There is the ability to bring ministers together whenever that is necessary in order to take the required decisions.

Q79 Mr Havard: Is the active debate really one about not necessarily having a minister who is responsible for all these things, but essentially back to this argument about a security adviser so that this coordinating position becomes something slightly different, and in a sense almost in between being a minister and having more capacity than just simply having a coordinating function? It raises still the question that Brian raises about democratic deficit in terms of being able to hold them to account. Is that the real debate that is happening?

Mr Ainsworth: If you put a single person in charge of the whole of the national security environment, or the counter-terrorism environment in that regard, then that single minister winds up being responsible for MoD’s ability to counter-terrorism in the—

Q80 Mr Havard: What about a security adviser.

Mr Ainsworth: MoD’s ability to counter-terrorism in the maritime environment; MoD’s responsibility with regards to rapid reaction in the air environment; and right through the whole spectrum to how you deal with a flu pandemic, with all the expertise that is there and available in the Department of Health. How you would capture that in a single person—whereas Alan said, they would either become a coordinator themselves; or you would be setting up some kind of pretty strange and far-reaching department.
Q81 Mr Havard: That is why I asked you the question. Is it an active debate about having an adviser as opposed to a minister?

Lord West of Spithead: I think the active debate more, now we have moved from the National Security Strategy (for example you talked of accountability), is exactly how we will set up the joint committee on National Security Strategy within Parliament, to actually look at the National Security Strategy and actually be looking at that. That will be coming out in the matter of the next few weeks. Because the Prime Minister has the responsibility for this—as I say, Robert Hannigan through the Cabinet committee supports the Prime Minister—the Prime Minister is the man who is responsible for the National Security Strategy, he has been rather tied up with some other bits and pieces and that has slowed down this move. As I say, this autumn that will come out. We will also establish the National Security Forum which will have a focus group and will be able to aid and assist these things, and I think that will allow us to have a very good and refreshed National Security Strategy next spring. These other issues, as I say, have been hot topics; for 15 months people have been talking about exactly what that top hamper should look like; and I do not think we have absolutely decided yet. I am in no doubt whatsoever that the coordination works well within the Cabinet Office. Robert Hannigan has a very firm hand on this. The areas of Resilience are coordinated by the contingency secretariat. Other people feed into the various Cabinet committees, and therefore we have a very good handle on this composite of risks to our nation, and actually which departments are dealing with it, and each department will then deal with them separately. For example, if we come into Resilience, there are a number of departments responsible and it gets pushed right down to a local level, so local government actually has its local Resilience forums and actually produces plans for things. All this, I think, is actually remarkably well coordinated. It does not mean there is not room for improvement. Now we have this overall strategy it makes things a lot easier.

Chairman: It may be that you have a very good handle on it, but it is a year now since the National Security Strategy was produced and Parliament does not have a good handle on it and it is really about time it did.

Q82 Mr Holloway: Admiral, I worry about this because I think some of this talk is possibly illusional. If you talk about having a joined-up approach in Afghanistan, which I know a tiny bit about; I lose faith in everything else you are saying about what else is happening behind the scenes. As a military man you are, I guess, I, in my pathetic military career, were always told if you wanted to win an insurgency you did not need coordination forums, focus groups, secretariat, yet more self-licking lollipop process; we were told that you had to have unity of command and unity of purpose. Do we have either in the UK at the moment on this—unity of command and unity of purpose?

Lord West of Spithead: I think really this is a defence question, is it not?

Q83 Mr Holloway: No, in terms of dealing with this problem.

Lord West of Spithead: In terms of dealing with the National Security Strategy?

Q84 Mr Holloway: In terms of dealing with the threat we face, and forget about the process at the moment.

Lord West of Spithead: I think we absolutely do have a clear assessment of what the threat is. What is being done to tackle it? All the various departments are there. It is a much more all-encompassing view than it ever was before. As I say, it ranges through flu pandemics, through flooding, coastal flooding, a whole raft of things that before were never ever really looked at in a comprehensive way and now for the first time this is happening. For hundreds of years we have never done that (and today is Trafalgar Day, and I wish you all a Merry Trafalgar Day; about this time I think Admiral Collingwood was breaking the line) and for the first time ever we have actually moved down that route. I think people should be congratulated for doing that—that we are actually trying to tackle this now. We did not have an all-encompassing thing before and now we have.

Q85 Mr Jenkin: We have mentioned Robert Hannigan a few times and he is this coordinator. Why is he not here answering for the government on this?

Lord West of Spithead: I do not know. You would have asked him presumably?

Chairman: I will take responsibility for this, as for most things.

Q86 Mr Jenkin: Does that not underline how in fact accountability is confused? Lord West, you are more refreshingly honest than is probably good for you, your political career I mean, because when you say the Prime Minister has been very busy with other things, is that not exactly the point: the Prime Minister needs someone at his own level sitting at his right-hand side, watching his back and dealing with all these issues, rather than it being lost in the bureaucracy of the Cabinet Office and in the coordination between different departments? It cannot have the same coherence than if a minister was at the Prime Minister’s side coordinating these issues.

Lord West of Spithead: I cannot give a direct answer to that. What I would say is that there is nothing involved with the security of this nation that is not dealt with immediately by the right people to do that.
Q87 Mr Jenkin: I am sure that is the case.

Lord West of Spithead: I am not over-fussed by my political career; I am very fussed by the security of this country, which is why I am doing the job I am doing. I can assure you those things are looked at straight away and dealt with.

Q88 Mr Hancock: Can I ask a direct question of the Cabinet Office about Resilience. Do you know exactly at this moment how many members of the Armed Forces there are, where they are located, and what they would be able to do if you needed them? Do you know that now? I am looking to the Cabinet Office to answer this question. Coordination means that they ought to. If Resilience means anything it means they ought to know because the Ministry of Defence would have told them on a pretty regular basis.

Mr Ainsworth: If somebody in the Cabinet Office does not know exactly what forces we have got in a particular part of the country at any one time, I do not think anybody around this table should be surprised by that; but there is a structure for them to find out immediately at any level that they wish to do so. First of all, there is the Commander, Land Forces who is double-hatted in terms of being the national contact for defence capability; and then we have got the regional structure underneath that. If it is regional people who want to know, they have those relationships already and they plug straight into them.

Lord West of Spithead: In the area, for example, of counter-terrorism—and again this is a step forward that the MoD have done—they have now produced a defence, counter-terrorism and Resilience capabilities compendium—this never existed before—which the OSCT can look at; it says what operations they are involved in; what they are doing; what forces are available for certain things. Yes, in the Cabinet Office they would not know the direct answer, as my colleague says, of course they would not, but they could find out straight away. Some very good things have been done—that is just in counter-terrorism—but in other areas as well to make those things available.

Q89 Mr Hancock: Going down a very long chain before they got the answer.

Mr Ainsworth: The person who is going to be asking the question is the person who is going to be faced up to the threat, and that person at whatever level needs to access military capability, quickly, easily and comprehensively. For instance, when we had the floods in Gloucestershire last year, the command was taken by the Chief Constable of the local area straightaway; he had already a relationship with the regional brigadier who became part of that long command, and who gave him sight of and access to military capability. That is how the system worked at that level.

Q90 Mr Hancock: Some of the Committee were lucky enough to go the Counter-Terrorism Science Technology Centre and they have an extraordinary range of capabilities there, but one of the things the Committee picked up on was the difficulty they were having in getting other government departments to make use of them and to learn from their experiences and use their abilities. What are you going to do to make sure that government agencies are actually looking to that capability and to make better use of it than appears to be the case at the present time?

Mr Ainsworth: Capability is in the compendium we have already talked about, and you can see that yourselves. It is a classified document, so we cannot make it public.

Q91 Mr Hancock: Why are they not using it?

Mr Ainsworth: They are using it. There are requests for their assistance that come to me on a regular basis.

Q92 Mr Hancock: You are satisfied that all government departments who need to are making use of the facility that is there?

Mr Ainsworth: The purpose of the compendium is to make sure that people know exactly what is available to them. For Resilience purposes we will try to make a non-classified document available to a wider community so they can access those capabilities.

Q93 Mr Hancock: What are you doing about making sure those other agencies and departments know what is available there? Why do you think they are not using it at the moment?

Mr Ainsworth: I do not accept they are not using it at the moment. Defence capability is being used by lots of different people on lots of different occasions. It is difficult to go into specifics for obvious reasons but they are being used. The purpose of creating the compendium is to give greater visibility to everybody who needs it so that they can use that capability.

Lord West of Spithead: What establishment are we talking about?

Q94 Mr Hancock: This is the Counter-terrorism Science and Technology Centre at DSTL. Are you saying they are not, in their opinion, fighting an uphill battle to get other agencies to make use of them?

Brigadier Chapman: DSTL have a number of immediate response teams. Those immediate response teams have been used a number of times this year. If they are not used we would argue that is probably a sign of success because of increasing civil resilience. The number of occasions they have been used and the circumstances I cannot obviously go into at this forum. Every civil power is aware of what can be brought to bear across a capability framework. The Protect framework and what the scientific support community can bring, all those who need to know seem to be aware because they are used on a regular basis.

Mr Day: We would be very happy to pass you a copy of the compendium on a classified basis and a list of those people who have it and have access to it.
Q95 Chairman: Yes, it would be helpful if you could.
Lord West of Spithead: Mike has picked up on a point and I think in a sense there is some validity in some of it. Last October I became very clear, for example, that the MoD has more money to look at the scientific development of various counter-terrorist devices than, say, the Home Office; and then there are other government departments all doing the same and the agencies. What was quite clear was there was not a cohesiveness amongst them, bearing in mind this is all a pot of government money, of what are the priorities where this should be going on. Therefore I got the government Chief Scientist last autumn, just before Christmas, to agree to have a meeting of all the chief scientific advisers from all the various departments, and that group now are looking at pulling together and coordinating an overall counter-terrorist scientific requirement. People like the HOSDB, the Home Office science labs, the agency labs will pull these altogether so we do not find, for example, that one department is sending a lot of money to develop something and actually another department is doing the same. That is more coordinated than it was, and we are moving down the track to be able to establish a very sensible look. This will resolve even slight issues they might feel at places like that. I think that is firmly on track to tie that all together.

Q96 Chairman: I do not think that we would want to give the impression from our visit to the Counter-terrorism Science and Technology Centre that everything was going wrong, because we thought that they were very impressive. There was just more we felt that could be done to get what they have to offer out into the broader government community.
Mr Ainsworth: Chairman, that is the purpose of producing the compendium.
Mr Day: Exactly. As the Minister says, it was in response to our concern about this that we produced the compendium, which was only issued during the summer. Inevitably there will be a lag, but we are confident the information other government departments and other agencies require is contained in this document.
Brigadier Chapman: The final codicil to that is that CT centre personnel do sit on CONTEST, science and technology boards, so they do have linkages into the Home Office, science and development branch.
Lord West of Spithead: The significance of that is the linkage for making that look across all government, where the investment is going in and how we can pull all those things together.
Chairman: We need to see whether that linkage is working as effectively as it could be. In answer to Bernard Jenkin’s question, I understand we did ask to see Robert Hannigan but, for good reason, he is away and unable to be here today.

Q97 Mr Crausby: The Committee wanted to explore, with more practical questions, into the cooperation between departments and agencies. I suppose I should begin by asking Mr Ainsworth, what structures do you have in place to work with the UK police forces?
Mr Ainsworth: Commander-in-Chief, Land is double-hatted as the standing joint commander. He has overall responsibility for ensuring that defence cooperates with other government departments. We then have the regional structure which plugs into all of those other government departments at that regional level. All of the planning of training work that takes place across government departments, the MoD is a part of that, is consulted on the developments that are being made and able to cooperate and be fully involved.

Q98 Mr Crausby: I want to make sure that we do not get so concerned with all the technical arguments at the top that we do not get down to the real business on the ground. Can I ask effectively both Mr Ainsworth and Lord West: do Armed Force units take part in regular inter-agency training exercises? How do you satisfy yourself that units are ready to deploy in an emergency and can work seamlessly with all the emergency services, the police, fire brigade, ambulance service, and indeed any other necessary organisations?
Mr Ainsworth: At a national level there is usually a counter-terrorism exercise carried out every year. MoD is fully involved in that. There are three Resilience exercises carried out every year. We are involved in those as well. There are all kinds of different exercises, decided at a local level or decided at a regional level, where MoD is fully involved in a way that it wishes to be. With regard to, how do I satisfy myself that the capability is there and available, the niche capabilities that we are tasked to provide are wholly and solely our responsibility, to make sure they are maintained. So we maintain a maritime capability. We have other niche capabilities it is difficult to talk about—air rapid reaction capability; they are all solely the MoD’s responsibility. Although they are encapsulated in the overall national strategy they are our responsibility to maintain them at the level of readiness that we are committed to do.
Mr Day: The Army’s non-deployable brigade structure in the UK is designed specifically to provide a command and control and cooperation and coordination structure with the civil agencies. Our structure is designed specifically with the sort of thing you are talking about in mind.

Q99 Mr Havard: It is a peripheral point in a sense, but the question was not only other formal agencies but other organisations. I declare an interest here: I am Secretary of the All-Party Mountain Rescue Search Team group and this is an organisation that is purely voluntary. It has to be able to communicate with all these other organisations, and communications is the key to all these responses. We saw this in America with 9/11; we have seen now a new system in the tube, for example, in London so people can communicate whenever they need to. Digitalised processes of communication cost a lot of
money. It is special pleading in one sense but I have been arguing with the Prime Minister about getting some extra money to support some of these voluntary organisations, but they are first responders, second responders, and they are a vital part of the whole picture. The military has to be able to talk to everybody essentially. Could I just make a plea that when you do look at this stuff you actually take into account when these exercises are done that all of the agencies can properly communicate with one another, because there is a growing problem with maintaining that capacity from what is a growing area of people who need to help you in terms of the response.

Brigadier Chapman: Can I pick that up on behalf of the Minister. Just taking the very good example of the mountain rescue teams, as you are aware the RAF maintains four different mountain rescue teams across the country and they have communications which can communicate with the first line responders, including Airwave, which is the principal response communications from police, ambulance and fire services.

Mr Havard: We get great support on the Brecon Beacons from Chivenor; there is not a problem with that, that is not the point. It is the point that it is becoming increasingly expensive for voluntary organisations to keep pace with the technological change—whether it is the police, ambulance service, fire service, military whoever—in order to be able to continue to make that contribution.

Q100 Mr Crausby: Our visit to the Defence Academy last week, I think, provoked us into wanting to ensure that we get full value from the Defence Academy. Whilst I know that it must be very difficult for you to be specific about the training that the Armed Forces undertake for military assistance with the civil authorities, I think what we wanted to draw out really today was to ensure that that is going on and to ask broader questions, such as, is there any doctrinal training going on, for example?

Brigadier Chapman: We have a defined doctrine which is out to all government departments, which is called “Operations in the UK: Defence Contribution to Resilience—JDP-02”, which actually was only republished last year, as I think I am right in saying that it is the second edition. That goes through all the gamut of military support to the military and civil authorities, including MACP, MACD and military aid to the civil communities.

Q101 Mr Crausby: Can you tell us in broad terms what role the Defence Academy plays in this regard with both the MoD and the Government, but broadly? I know it is very difficult for you to go into specifics, but we are interested, as I say, to ensure that we take full advantage of the facilities there.

Brigadier Chapman: The actual doctrinal publication is produced by the Defence Academy through the Director General of Developments, Concepts and Doctrine, so they are plugged in with any developments in this area.

Q102 John Smith: We were, Mr Chairman, as you know, very impressed by what we witnessed at the Defence Academy last week, and I know the Minister is very familiar with what is going on there. I wonder, do you see a greater role that could be played by that Academy in the training of not just military personnel to support civil authorities, but in the training of civil authorities and in fact possibly training the Cabinet? I do not think it would be a bad idea, from our experience last week, to have the Cabinet down once or twice a year and, instead of going to Chequers, perhaps they could go to the Defence Academy and co-ordinate some of this strategy.

Mr Ainsworth: You were really impressed, but have you ever been to Chequers, I do not know!

Q103 John Smith: I used to work there.

Mr Ainsworth: The things that go on at Shrinvenham are not exclusively defence: there are a lot of cross-government courses and training that is made available from the Defence Academy to other government departments. There is a course that I spoke of while you were there which was not exclusively defence, but people from other government departments were there at the time participating in the same courses as military personnel and civilians from the Ministry of Defence.

Q104 Chairman: But I would echo what John Smith says, that a half day spent at Shrinvenham by the entire Cabinet would pay absolute dividends for the future of the country, and I would suggest that is something you should be seriously considering.

Lord West of Spithead: I am all for more military training for everybody, but I think it is just worth emphasising that an awful lot of these issues that we are talking about, the prime responders and the people who are primarily responsible for acting on them are other government departments and agencies. Taking the resilience area, for example, since the Civil Contingencies Act, there is no doubt a lot has been done there in terms of getting acts together and being able to react to these things, and there are large numbers of people. We have something in the region of, if you count PCSOs and everything else, 140/150,000 police in this country, then one looks at the numbers in the military and then we have got 52,000 in the fire brigades. The numbers involved and the responsibilities do lie with these other groups and, as I say, since the Civil Contingencies Act and our National Capabilities Programme, I think we are getting better and better at responding. When one needs the military, apart from some very niche things, if something goes dramatically worse, then there are mechanisms for actually achieving that, but, as my colleague says, there are certain things like MCT and certain things like the air capability which of course could not be provided by anyone other than the military itself.

Mr Havard: One component we saw there was—is it called the Advanced Research Group—ARAG. To me, it is the Advanced Research Group.
Mr Holloway: And Assessment Group.
Mr Havard: Somebody is doing research and this research, whether it is stabilisation in Afghanistan, it is about resilience, it is about all of the various components of national security, and it is something that is under pressure, I believe, in terms of funding every year. It is one of those sorts of things where research is always thought to be not very useful until you need it of course and then nobody has been doing it. It just seems to me that it is a very valuable resource and it is maybe something which ought to be supplemented and embellished rather than under threat through its funding because it is the one place that brings together all the component parts.

Chairman: Well, Minister, you have heard our plug for your establishment.

Q105 Mr Borrow: We have had mention earlier in the proceedings of the role of Commander-in-Chief, Land and the support for civilian authorities, and there are a few questions that I had earmarked to ask you and some of them we may have touched on, but I will just run through them and perhaps get a response, Minister, to those issues. Firstly, could you outline briefly how the provision of military aid is made to the civilian authorities and what provision the MoD makes for emergencies in the UK? In what sort of situations would the civilian authorities be likely to request support from the Armed Forces and how is that decision made as to whether or not that support is given? Finally, are there specific capabilities which you have earmarked for supporting the civilian authorities? I think, Minister, you mentioned one situation and I was not quite sure whether that meant that you could not tell us about the rest or whether there was a wider range of specific capabilities which you could bring into the public domain at this point in time.

Mr Ainsworth: There are two broad categories of capabilities which we maintain and one, I would say, is niche capabilities which other people generally cannot provide, and that is a full range from the air component through to maritime counterterrorism, Special Forces’ capabilities, things that we cannot go into in detail, but they are there and the MoD is the provider, and then there is augmentation capability as well. Generally speaking, that is pulled together through the Commander-in-Chief, Land and the regional structure. Now, that can be provided by whatever is available to suit the purpose at the time. Sometimes it is Reserves and sometimes it is Regular Forces to meet the needs of the particular request. All of those are approved at ministerial level. All of them are charged against the Department which is requesting the assistance because they are the people who actually hold the responsibility, not the MoD, in the first place. If there is a training gain to the MoD in conducting a particular operation, then we take that into account in the charges that we make, but that is the broad structure. I do not know whether Jon might want to put any more on that.

Mr Day: I think, Chip, you can go through the details.

Brigadier Chapman: This really comes into three areas. That we provide military aid to the civil authorities is the broad-brush one and of course within the UK you have civil powers, which we support, by the government departments, the agencies, etc. I think your question is specific to the civil communities and, at the high end of that, we have Military Aid to the Civil Authorities, Category A, which is when there is a threat to life. When there is a threat to life, we would not charge and the Commander-in-Chief, Land, as the standing joint commander, would force-generate from any available Forces outside of the guaranteed niche capability to bring the capability to bear. For example, in the Gloucestershire floods last year when we provided 1,026 people to help the civil community in that circumstance, that was force-generated from SJC Land from the Regular and Reserve Force structure without any need to caveat defence outputs elsewhere in the world or in the UK within the basket of niche capabilities which are guaranteed 24/7, 365 for the high-end counterterrorist aspects or certain other guaranteed capabilities that we bring to bear.

Mr Day: If it would be helpful, we can provide you with examples of the kinds of areas of support we have provided in recent years, both on an unclassified basis and on a classified basis as well.

Chairman: Yes, both of those would be helpful, thank you.

Q106 Mr Borrow: Can I just follow up and ask you, Minister, in relation to the sort of support that would be available in terms of helicopters over the next couple of years, are there any changes likely in that sort of support that can be provided in the UK to civilian authorities from helicopters were circumstances to arise when that request could be made?

Mr Ainsworth: Well, we have the search and rescue capability and we have also got a training capability constantly available in the UK which could be recharged.

Brigadier Chapman: It is worth saying that of course one of the few places where we do have a lead government department responsibility is in the provision of search and rescue, and the number of places I do not think is going to rise in the future, and of course they are of extremely high readiness every day of the year to help the civil community. Of course in the Gloucestershire floods last year, that was the biggest search and rescue used in the UK, I think, since the Second World War.

Q107 Mr Borrow: Are there any plans to change that capability in terms of the UK as against the capability that is available in theatre?

Brigadier Chapman: It is different with a different series of aircraft; they are mutually exclusive.

Mr Ainsworth: Search and rescue aircraft do not leave the UK, they are permanently tasked in the UK, but in Gloucestershire we used more than just search and rescue helicopters. We had Chinooks
active in the area and the other helicopters which were just available and within the UK that we put to task in order to assist.

Q108 Mr Borrow: Are there any changes proposed in terms of the provision that would be available were those circumstances to arise again?
Mr Ainsworth: Specifically on helicopters, we have to maintain a helicopter force in the UK overwhelmingly for training purposes, and that is not going to alter. It is not just a case of your helicopter capability out in theatre, it is not judged by how many frames you can get out in theatre, but it is trained crews that you can get out in theatre that is often the pinchpoint, so you have to have that capability back in the UK.

Q109 Mr Borrow: So as to the level of helicopter support that would be available in 18 months’ time, were an emergency similar to the floods that took place in Gloucestershire last year to happen, we would be able to mobilise the same number of helicopters as were available to be mobilised in 2007?
Mr Ainsworth: I know of no reason why we should not be able to.
Chairman: I am sure you will find that we have further questions to ask on that sort of thing in due course.

Q110 Mr Holloway: Admiral, if there were a series of big, white flashes in a provincial town or city or in London and there were thousands of dead and injured, can you give us just a flavour of the sorts of things that would happen in the aftermath in terms of all that you have been putting together?
Lord West of Spithead: Sorry, do you mean CBRN-type?

Q111 Mr Holloway: Or whatever, but something with many thousands of dead and injured, 10,000, say. What sort of things would come in?
Lord West of Spithead: Well, the initial reactions, as I say, will be taken by the prime authorities, so it will be the police, fire brigade and ambulance which will take the initial actions. Very quickly, if it is a huge thing, it will become clear that they might need extra resources for cordons or whatever it might be, or, if it is a CBRN-type thing, actually for assistance in terms of work with contaminated things, things like that. Then, just digressing down that route, we have done some really good work there with defence and we have a police unit down at Winterbourne Gunner who work very closely and they do lots of exercises for gold, silver and bronze commanders and at Ryton they do similar work, so again over the last few months there has been a huge amount of work there on preparedness for those sorts of things. We would then have to ask for help from the MoD in terms of a MACP request or whatever.

Q112 Chairman: Sorry, can you translate that please?

Lord West of Spithead: That is Military Aid to the Civil Power. COBR obviously would be established and at COBR would be MoD, plus all the various people, and it would become very apparent that this was a very major thing. There would be demands from the people who are set up to respond that they needed extra resources and those bits would come in. Now, initially they might well think, “Well, we can do this with extra resources and police from other constabularies”, things like that, but then they might rapidly say, “We need actually MoD assistance, we need extra resources”, as I say, for cordons, a helicopter, or whatever it might be.

Q113 Mr Holloway: Do you, for example, have a system in place whereby you can suddenly generate beds for 5,000 seriously injured people across the country or 10,000?
Lord West of Spithead: I do not know the exact numbers, but the Department of Health have in place plans to take major numbers of casualties, and this is part of what we do across the board, that we push the departments that they have to put in various contingency plans, and it applies similarly to pandemic flu, it applies to dealing with dead bodies from pandemics. All of these things have to be looked at by that appropriate department to set in place plans and have those sitting there to action, and we do then exercise those as paper exercises and also some of them we exercise as actually people—

Q114 Mr Holloway: But do you have a rough idea of how many beds you could generate over a very short period of time for a very, very large number of civilians?
Lord West of Spithead: I have to say, I honestly do not, and it would be the Department of Health who would be able to tell you that very rapidly because they have things. For example, if a major, wide-bodied jet lands and hits London, there are things in place for what we do if that happens, and one would expect that there would be things in place for that, but I cannot give you a precise answer to that, I am afraid.

Q115 Mr Jenkin: Just on this helicopters point. I represent an east of England constituency which is liable to flooding, coastal flooding, and in 1953 there were very serious floods and a great many people drowned, but, in these days of helicopters, one hopes the helicopters would be available and, as a topical subject, one would hope they would have winches because, in lifting people to safety from a flooded area, you require a winch in your helicopters. Is that something which is being addressed?
Mr Ainsworth: There are winches widely available in the helicopter fleet and all of our helicopters in Afghanistan are now fitted with—

Q116 Mr Jenkin: And on the training helicopters that would be deployed in an emergency?
Mr Ainsworth: I cannot say that every training helicopter in the United Kingdom is fitted with a winch, no, I cannot say that. There are not only
military helicopters available, but there are a lot of helicopters available through all kinds of different organisations in the United Kingdom in the way that there was not a generation ago.

Q117 Chairman: Again, we will come back to that in due course.

Mr Ainsworth: All the search and rescue helicopters have got winches of course.

Lord West of Spithead: If I could just say to Bernard and his very valid question about flooding, what is a step forward is that this is now actually identified in the National Security Strategy as an issue. That is why I say this is a step forward and this means that, as it is in there, these will have to be addressed because the National Security Strategy will sit there and it will affect all those departments because, as it gets more comprehensive, it will start putting a weighting on things and people will have to say, “Right, we’ve got to do something about that”, and it will force people to do things, so I think it is a good thing.

John Smith: I do not think we should give the impression that there is general concern about the ability to respond to civil disasters. We had a major civil disaster exercise in my constituency recently in Barry with an airliner crashing into the big number one dock, involving all the services, and, I have to say, it was a huge success and the professionalism displayed by both civilian, voluntary and professional military personnel was exceptional. Why they chose Barry, I am not sure, Mr Chairman. I think it was to protect the next episode of Gavin and Stacey! It was a very successful exercise.

Chairman: Another tribute!

Q118 Mr Holloway: Do you have groups of people who sit around working up potential scenarios of things that terrorists might do, areas that are vulnerable?

Lord West of Spithead: What you are talking about here is “red-teaming”.

Q119 Mr Holloway: Yes.

Lord West of Spithead: JTAC do a small amount of that, but of course do very good analysis of the threat. It is a very good point, we do not have red teams set up specifically. We do task within the OSCT and we say, “Right, what ifs, what ifs, what ifs”, and I will not go into some of the ‘what ifs’ because it might tell, but I can give you one ‘what if’. For example, as we have done a very good job of melting down our own financial systems in the world, if I were an enemy, I would think, “How could I actually help them along the route?” so I said, “I want a ‘what if’ for the things they might do”, and that work is going on, and they have come up with various options. Is that the sort of thing you mean?

Mr Holloway: Well, at a more sort of tactical level. Do you have people who sit around dreaming how you might blow up an airliner by putting different chemicals together?

Chairman: We do not want to go into examples, but do you?

Q120 Mr Holloway: Are there people who play that scenario at a very practical, technical sort of level?

Lord West of Spithead: We have people at very practical levels who are looking at the details of how these things are done. I have got to be quite careful in what I say actually.

Q121 Chairman: Would you like more? The answer to that is always yes.

Lord West of Spithead: Like more?

Q122 Chairman: Would you like more people doing this horizon-scanning?

Lord West of Spithead: I think probably we need just to tweak out how the people there are doing it. Clearly, when I go back and they say, “My God, you were offered more by somebody and you didn’t take them”, but I think actually we can do it within our structures and it is a question of just making sure it is done in exactly the right way, so, for example, JTAC, I think, needs just a little bit more of that and they are doing some really good work, but it just needs some slight tweaking.

Q123 Mr Jenkin: Can I ask about the CCRFs, the Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, which, I think, were mobilised in 2004. Brigadier, you said that in Gloucestershire, for example, some Reserves were deployed in Gloucestershire?

Brigadier Chapman: That is correct.

Q124 Mr Jenkin: But were they the CCRFs?

Brigadier Chapman: No, they were not. The reason the CCRFs were not there, it is a sign of success because we can force-generate quickly from the Regular Force structure. Now, the difference between them in a sense is that the CCRFs are something which you might need to mobilise for Mr Holloway’s high-end 10,000 people consequence management scenario. We have used Reserves under sections 22 and 27 of the Reserve Forces Act 1996. The CCRFs, if there were a high-end disaster, would need to be mobilised, and obviously it is not for me to say, but that is quite a high-end political decision to take, so the CCRFs have not been used as formed units since they were formed under the SDR new chapter, and that is because we have never met the threshold where we needed to use them because of the increasing civil resilience brought about by the Civil Contingencies Act and the other range of initiatives which have gone on since 2002.

Q125 Mr Jenkin: Well, that is an extremely good answer and one which you might have been thinking of before you came here because, speaking to members of the TA at the 100th Anniversary of the Essex TA celebrations earlier this month, they would like to be deployed in civil emergencies, they would like to wear their uniforms on their home patch and know that they were going to be deployed. Are these CCRFs really deployable?
Mr Ainsworth: You cannot mobilise them unnecessarily.

Q126 Mr Jenkin: I appreciate that.
Mr Ainsworth: They are there and we can mobilise them. In every region there is a CCRF, around about 500-strong from the Reserves, that can be mobilised. In the Gloucestershire case that you talk about, we were asked for specific capability, we were asked for it very quickly and we were not asked for large numbers. We were asked for helicopter lift, we were asked for bodies to build protection around some of the flood infrastructure and we were asked for some logistics to get water distributed. Now, we had Regular Forces and Reserve Forces available to us in order to be able to do that.

Q127 Mr Jenkin: But is it actually more expensive to deploy the CCRFs from Regular Forces and is that why you still draw on the Regular Forces, despite all the other commitments and cancelled leave and cancelled training and all the other things they have to put up with under the present circumstances?
Mr Ainsworth: Yes, there was no request. There was a very urgent requirement to make sure that the initial planning and water distribution was done and the Army did that and had the capability available and did that and then handed over to other people fairly quickly, so it was not an ongoing necessity for us to carry on distributing the water. But we had other people that were happy to do it, but who just did not have that ability to react quickly.
Mr Day: I do not think this is an issue of cost. I think that, if the contingency were large enough, then these would be the people that we would mobilise.

Q128 Mr Jenkin: Do the CCRFs ever exercise as formed units or are too many of them deployed on operations to exercise as formed units?
Mr Day: Because they are based on infantry battalions, they exercise within the framework of being a disciplined body of men with a coherent C3 structure that can be used to execute instructions most likely in an unarmed manner. So again, if you go to Mr Holloway’s example, you would probably want them to do a consequence management task as generalists where they do not need any specialist training, for other tasks, we would bring in generalists where they do not need any specialist training. But is it not the problem that the Civil Contingency Reserve Force?
Q130 Chairman: Before we get on to that issue, can I come back to the Civil Contingency Reserve Force. You are drawing a distinction, are you not, between mobilisation and deployment?
Brigadier Chapman: Yes.
Q131 Mr Jenkin: Exactly.
Mr Ainsworth: Well, you know and other Members of Parliament know that that is ongoing and we will be reporting to Parliament in due course. There is no suggestion that a particular unit is going to be axed, nor has there been any suggestion that that review is in any way finance-led. It is about making our Reserves more appropriate to our needs today, and that is being conducted with that in mind.

Q132 Mr Jenkin: But is it not the problem that the National Security Strategy said that the Government was determined to shift the overall balance of defence procurement towards the support of current operations, and of course that means away from longer-term capabilities? We know that is happening on training and we know that is happening on manpower. Is it not the case that really these Reserve Forces for civil contingencies are quite far down the list of priorities because of the pressures on the Armed Forces elsewhere?
Mr Ainsworth: We have to give appropriate priority to our current operations and any government would do that. We have got to make sure that we are giving them that appropriate priority, but that is not to say that we can forget about tomorrow’s threat and all of these other issues, and we have no intentions of doing so.
Mr Jenkin: So overstretch is not affecting—

Q133 Chairman: How long does it take to mobilise the Civil Contingency Reserve Force?
Brigadier Chapman: Within this forum, all I can say is that they are extremely high-readiness forces. I would not like to go into specifics.
Q134 Chairman: Within this forum, all I can say is that they are extremely high-readiness forces. I would not like to go into specifics.
Mr Day: Again we can write to you with the details.
Q135 Chairman: Could you?
Mr Day: Yes.

Q136 Chairman: Is that something that is sensitive?
Mr Day: Yes, it is.

Q137 Mr Jenkin: We know that the Armed Forces are stretched in the infantry departments, but you are able to give me and the Committee an assurance that the degree of stretch in the Armed Forces, which we know is very intense at the moment, is not affecting the readiness of Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, even though many of those personnel are actually deployed themselves on operations?
Mr Ainsworth: The fact that the Army is working hard and, yes, is stretched has had no bearing on any decision not to mobilise the Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces.

Mr Hancock: Well, you cannot put it more starkly than that.

Mr Hancock: In our predecessor Committee in 2002, we were discussing, in our report then, the ability of the Royal Air Force to respond to a rogue aircraft coming into the UK and we were given assurances at that time that the MoD were satisfied on the legal basis for shooting down an aircraft, and we were told that there was a procedure in place where the final decision would be taken by a minister, not necessarily the Prime Minister, but by a minister. Has that policy changed over those five or six years and, if so, in what way?

Q138 Chairman: This is one of those areas where you might feel it difficult to answer some of the questions.

Mr Ainsworth: All I can say, Chairman, is that since the Committee’s report we did look at the issues that were raised by it about the capability of our people and we satisfied ourselves that we had the appropriate systems in place and appropriate protections in place. I cannot go into the detail of who gives approval, but we have satisfied ourselves as well as to the legal basis of that capability.

Q139 Mr Hancock: But the decision presumably would still be taken by a minister as opposed to a civil servant in the Cabinet Office?

Mr Ainsworth: Yes, the decision would be taken by an elected minister, yes.

Q140 Mr Hancock: If you have read that report, you will know, Minister, that one of the issues was about the psychological effects of doing this would have on pilots, in particular, and whether or not we were giving them adequate preparedness, not after the event, but before the event, to make sure that they were psychologically equipped for doing it. The Committee did actually visit the bases and we did speak to pilots who were involved in this process and at that time there was very little pre-training and support for pilots who were engaged in this, and I would be grateful if you could update us on what procedures are now in place to ensure that the aircrews themselves and their support are given the right sort of help.

Mr Ainsworth: We have, since that, looked at the preparedness of the aircrew, the support that is in place ahead of the task that might be applied to them, but also what would need to be provided after such an event, should it ever come about, so we have looked at all of those issues to try to make sure that we have got appropriate support systems in place for our people.

Q141 Mr Hancock: Well, I am more concerned about in advance of the process because that is the very real difficulty. That is the real problem, is it not?

Mr Ainsworth: There is an issue of aftercare as well, but I am talking about preparedness as well.

Q142 Mr Hancock: In advance?

Mr Ainsworth: Yes.

Q143 Mr Hancock: If I can just ask one question relating to what you have said previously, are you all satisfied in civil preparedness that local government is in a position to be able to respond because, whilst they were given powers, they were once again devoid of resources to support the powers they were given? With responsibility for civil preparedness, are you collectively sure that local government is in a real position to be able to respond in the way that you would expect it to?

Lord West of Spithead: Well, I think now because we have, as I say, the Civil Contingencies Act, the National Capabilities Programme, we have the various groups like the local resilience forums, regional resilience forums, I think stemming down from our NRA, the National Risk Assessment, which of course is the restricted version which became the National Risk Register, which is one that local councils and the public can see, people are aware now what things they have to prepare for and I think that, within the amounts of money that local government have, they set aside the right sums and the right training to achieve that.

Q144 Mr Hancock: But no extra resource was given to local government. I am still a member of local government and I know from my own city’s point of view that it is very difficult to manage, the responsibilities that have been given against the resources that are available. I think this was classically, in the civil contingencies legislation, an issue of passing the responsibility, but with none of the supporting resources which would be necessary to bring it to the level that you, as a government, would expect local authorities to provide.

Mr Ainsworth: Resourcing is an ongoing friction between local government and central government. You do know that local government always say that they want resources for particular allocations and responsibilities and the last thing they want is a leveraging in of all of the monies that are passed to them.

Q145 Mr Hancock: I understand that, but, when new powers are devolved, particularly powers which involve them in taking on some very big responsibilities and co-ordination and even research of what is available, etc, they are very expensive and the Government did not pass to local authorities the resources necessary. I am interested to know, are you satisfied that your response from local government to what you have asked of them is sufficient to give you confidence that they can deliver?

Lord West of Spithead: I think, as I say, what now they are very clear on is what is required.
Q146 Mr Hancock: On what they have to do, yes. *Lord West of Spithead:* Some local authorities have been given extra funding and maybe I could get back to you in writing on that to actually identify what it has been. Also, there are certain things that are provided centrally, so, for example, aspects of CBRN equipment for police forces are provided centrally and provided to these groups, so, whilst, I am sure, always one would like to have extra money to do things, I do not think it is quite as bleak maybe as you are saying.

**Chairman:** Before you move on from that, it would be helpful if you could give us an assessment of how well-prepared you think local authorities are.

**Mr Hancock:** Absolutely. We had a whole session dedicated to it and we actually visited local authorities, and one of the issues, I would say to you, is the failure of the communication system which allowed the local authority to be able to talk direct to the police or fire who were actually on site and they would always have to be going through a third party and sometimes the third party was not equipped, so you had four different systems in place in some instances, the Police, the Army, the Ambulance Service and local authorities. They had no way of communicating on a shared system.

Q147 Chairman: So we are back to mountain rescue again. Perhaps you could do us that assessment.

**Lord West of Spithead:** Absolutely, I will do that. Just on the communications, you are absolutely right, that there are these differences, but we are correcting those things. Airwave was no doubt a big step forward and the fire brigades will be moving across that, and we are getting better at getting people on the same frequency, but it is not good. For example, there are 43 police forces and, with those 43 police forces, you have to knock heads together to make them buy equipment that is compatible, and that is something that I am putting some effort into because that is clearly a nonsense. These are things that one has to work at and we are getting better at it. I go back to the National Security Strategy and everything that comes down from that, that we are better at identifying these things and we are able then to equip them and start doing something about it, but I certainly would not give the impression that we are there yet. Certainly you will have people on different radio frequencies, but that is something we are working at trying to resolve, and I think we will get there.

**Mr Havard:** I do not want to make the point about voluntary organisations again, but, when you do this about local authorities, here speaks an English local councillor, but there are Scots and Welsh and the arrangements are subtly and slightly different and, if you can take that into account when you do it, that would be helpful.

**Mr Jenkins:** Can I get back to air defence please. There was a well-recorded incident recently about a civilian aircraft flying into British airspace and our fighters went up to intercept it. They could not contact it because the blinds were all drawn on the flight deck and it took them nearly half an hour to raise the crew who were asleep. It is true, is it not?

**Mr Havard:** It was in *The Sun*, so it must be true!

**Chairman:** I am not sure where we are going with this though.

Q148 Mr Jenkins: Well, I am. Was the Minister totally involved, so they knew when they were going to give the order and how were they going to give the order to shoot that plane down? Why is it that an aircraft can come into British airspace with the crew asleep and not log in to say, “We’re now coming into your airspace”, because, otherwise, one day someone is going to shoot down a civilian plane?

**Mr Ainsworth:** I do not think that we came close to shooting the aircraft down, I am not sure.

Q149 Mr Jenkins: Why?

**Mr Ainsworth:** I am not aware of the incident that Mr Jenkins is talking about. There are infringements of British airspace all of the time that the RAF are responding to and not everything that you read in the press is true. I read in the press of how a Russian aircraft managed to reach our airspace and the RAF totally failed to respond to it, but, when you actually look at the facts, it was nothing like what was actually reported, so I will have a look into what you are raising with me and I will come back to you with an answer, but it certainly was not raised with me.

Q150 Chairman: It may be that, for one reason or another, the aircraft was not judged to be a threat.

**Mr Ainsworth:** Well, if it were judged to be a threat, then certain operations would have gone into place.¹

**Mr Hancock:** It must have been a threat to send two fighters up to intercept it. Someone must have made that judgment.

**Chairman:** We move on to the maritime world.

Q151 Mr Hamilton: Perhaps I might ask a question and the original question was asked by Mike and others about being mentally prepared for a potential disaster coming up. One of the things that happened in New Orleans in the floods was of course there was a desertion by the police of about 25–30% and the police actually went over the wall rather than do the job they were employed to do, so, when you are doing mental preparedness for the various authorities, surely that must be something that you will look right across the board at, especially with the voluntary sector and especially those who are not in the Armed Forces. Could you report just on how that has been dealt with because that is a big issue.

It is one where we have practical experience where a flood took place, and everyone knew it was going to come, and yet there were major desertions in the various organisations that were meant to deal with that flood, so could I ask that question and maybe see how we could deal with that.

¹ Note by Witness: the MoD has established subsequently that this incident took place in French airspace. No RAF were involved.
Q152 Mr Hamilton: In terms of maritime security, could you explain where the responsibility lies between the Home Office and the participation of Armed Forces units? Who has the primary responsibility, and how are other agencies engaged?

Lord West of Spithead: I think it sort of slightly depends on what we are looking at. If it is to do with shipping and ship safety, it is TRANSEC, and I understand, Chairman, that they are coming to talk to you at some stage and, if they are not, they ought to if you are particularly interested in maritime security, and there are certain aspects of maritime security and our ports and harbours. If it is to do with illegal immigrants and smuggling, then it is UKBA, the UK Border Agency, and HMRC, so that would be a Home Office issue. If it is to do with pollution and things like that, then it is MCA. I think what I am slowly going down the route of saying is that this tapestry in those offshore waters is highly complex, highly complex. Now, there are groups that meet to discuss this, including the MoD. There is the NMSC, the National Maritime Security Committee, there is SDAC, which I used to know well when I was in the Navy, which is the Shipping Defence Advisory Committee. In those, all the key players actually meet, but it is a highly complex area. Indeed it is an area in terms of the issue of illegal immigrants, in terms of could terrorists come in that way, in terms of other aspects of terrorism and things like that where I have asked Chief Constable Hogan-Howe, who is the Merseyside man, he is the co-ordinator within ACPO for these maritime issues and we are doing some work looking at that. As I say, the co-ordination at the moment is done through those two groups. The primary one, safety for shipping, is to do with TRANSEC, it is a transport issue. There is a specific where the military would be involved. For example, I do not know if you remember the MV Nisha incident, but clearly then what swung into operation was our maritime counterterrorism group which is highly trained, always available, and my colleague would be able to talk about it in more detail, but that is a classic example of how this is done. I think the other thing is that, in our territorial seas and then beyond that into our economic zone, actually the police force which abuts on to it, the Chief Constable has a responsibility for that area in policing terms, but he has very few assets with which to do something and, therefore, again often one would have to use the Royal Navy to achieve that because, even though it might only be a couple of miles, you only need a force seven or something like that and the chap in a rowing boat cannot do very much, so the Navy has to be involved and that is the niche where it would be involved and they would be called for assistance. I know that sounds a rather complicated answer, but it is very a very complicated thing.

Q153 Mr Hamilton: Who has the prime responsibility?

Lord West of Spithead: I do not know whether that has been taken into account by the groups that are planning that, but, for example, when we are doing the pandemic work, we make assumptions about quite large percentages of people not appearing, up as high as, I think, 40% we are talking about, as high as that on occasions, so work is done there, so I would imagine that it is included, but maybe I could get back to you on that to confirm that it is.

Q154 Mr Hamilton: The second part was that nobody has direct responsibility for the waters around the UK. Is that what you are saying?

Lord West of Spithead: No, I am not saying that.

Q155 Mr Hamilton: Who is responsible for the waters around the UK?

Lord West of Spithead: In what respect?

Q156 Mr Hamilton: Who takes direct responsibility for monitoring the waters around the UK?

Lord West of Spithead: For the monitoring of all movements then? Well, what we are able to do is that anything of about 50 metres in length has to have an AIS—I have forgotten what it is called—but anyway it has to be monitored so that you know where it is. Anything below that size, the answer is that you do not. One of the issues I have asked the question of TRANSEC is that, if you look at the Channel of a summer, there are hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of boats that go backwards and forwards across to the Continent or along the coast and actually we do not have a handle on all of those. Everything has to be effectively intelligence-based. To actually have a handle on all of that would be very, very complex and extremely difficult. When I was First Sea Lord, I was looking at possible options of could one put the sort of chip that you stick in your Coke can which tells the people who are distributing Coke cans that it is actually empty, could we have something like that on these and we were looking at various options. I do not believe that work has got any further, but maybe my colleagues from MoD know that answer, but we are not able to monitor all traffic in our waters, but, as I say, the work that we do, whether it is HMRC, illegals, whatever, it is intelligence-based and that is often very successful.

Q157 Mr Hamilton: So which agency co-ordinates all of that work that you have just referred to? What is the agency that would deal with that? Is it separate agencies?

Lord West of Spithead: Saying that this is the offshore picture of shipping, that is not something in the Home Office that we at the moment feel we have a need for.

Mr Ainsworth: Different people have different responsibilities in the maritime environment. The Department for Transport, Customs and Excise, the local police looking out to sea in their own area, they
all have their own responsibilities for their own threat, but they do not have a comprehensive responsibility for the maritime environment.

Chairman: Is that not a bit of a worry?

Q158 Mr Hamilton: So we have not got one organisation that co-ordinates all of the areas that have just been referred to by the two of you?

Lord West of Spithead: There is not one. As I say, TRANSEC look after all the transport things, shipping safety and things like that. When it comes to the picture, I know the Navy keeps a picture of offshore traffic which is things above 50 metres and all of this sort of stuff and other shipping stuff, and that is for big shipping, and the Maritime Coastguard Agency keep monitoring that sort of thing. When it comes to these small ones, there is not really any monitoring at all other than by maybe people within a port area or something, and certainly in the Home Office we do not feel we have a need for that. Now, do we feel there is a national need for that? Well, I have to say, this is why I have been talking with the Chief Constable and looking at maritime security in the round because I think it would be quite a useful thing to have. Who actually pays for it and who actually then says, “Right, I’m the people who would like to run this” is rather more difficult, so the tapestry which is there at the moment, which is very complex, and, as I say, there are these groups which need to look at it, I believe it works pretty well, but it is not what I would call ultimately satisfactory. I would love to know where all of these things are. When you look into the sky, generally, and you have confirmed my concern about aviators, that they are all with the blinds down, fast asleep, but we pretty well know what is moving, pretty well, though some of the little light ones are a bit more difficult, but we do not know that in our waters around the country.

Q159 Mr Hamilton: If that is the case, and you have referred three times to the Chief Constable and how you keep the dialogue going with him, I assume that is English chief constables that you talk to, or do you have a responsibility which goes across devolution position and do you talk to the chief constables also in Scotland also? Is that another discussion you have?

Lord West of Spithead: Yes. Well, in counterterrorism, clearly I do, so, as Home Office in counterterrorism, we do.

Q160 Mr Hamilton: But that does not calculate the number of ships that are around the British seas.

Lord West of Spithead: No. But I go back to my point, that the Home Office would not say, “We want to know that.” I was giving a general response. I think it would be quite a good thing to have a very good picture of what is moving around our place, but I think that is not a requirement specifically for the Home Office for counterterrorism.

Q161 Mr Jenkin: In the event of a maritime incident, which is basically civilian, but might require military assistance, who has gold command?

Lord West of Spithead: You are going slightly beyond my remit in the Home Office. If it is something like a spillage or something like that, I imagine the MCA, the Maritime Coastguard Agency, would be responsible, but, as I say, I am stepping outside territory that I have deep knowledge of, I am afraid, so I do not really know. What I would say is that, for example, the 2005 Fleet Review for the bicentenary of Trafalgar, the gold command, which I think was run by someone sitting in this room, was for the first time ever set up properly, involving all of these mass of agencies to make sure that we had security of the Solent area, and what amazed me was the number of people who had to be involved in that, and it was exercised and it ran very well and I think it set a template for how we do these things in our territorial seas. As it goes beyond that, it becomes a little bit more complex.

Q162 Mr Jenkin: How many vessels are available to Her Majesty’s Government, Royal Navy, Coastguard and other government agencies, for coastal protection?

Mr Ainsworth: We have two frigates effectively, one fleet-ready escort available at short notice, and we then have another frigate that can supplement that, which is a patrol ship which is available at any one time. Then we have got three river-class offshore patrol vessels and there is always one minesweeper.

Chairman: That is about six ships!

Q163 Mr Jenkin: That is just the Royal Navy, is it not? There must be other government agencies, the Coastguard and so forth?

Mr Ainsworth: Yes, absolutely.

Q164 Mr Jenkin: Could you write to us with a more sort of comprehensive answer about all the government agencies?

Mr Ainsworth: There will be other vessels available at any one time, but those we are required to maintain.

Mr Jenkin: That is what the Ministry of Defence is required to maintain, but I am asking what is generally available to a gold commander in an area, and I would echo the Chairman’s point that six ships does not seem very much.

Q165 Chairman: I must say, I am listening to these answers with increasing horror!

Mr Day: On any one day, there will be other ships available. This is not guaranteed availability, but on any one day, there will be ships available in the UK waters that will be able to contribute.

Mr Ainsworth: That is a requirement to maintain on patrol six, but there is more than that at any one time.

Mr Jenkin: Could you write to us with details of what is available from the other government agencies because, I appreciate, that might not be in your knowledge at the moment.
Q166 Mr Havard: So, if we have a super-tanker coming into Milford Haven and it has been taken over in some fashion or another, it is going to be used as a weapon and it is within three hours of getting to the place, a ship is not necessarily going to get there in time, so you would call on other assets to help you deal with it or do whatever?

Mr Ainsworth: We have a maritime counterterrorism capability.

Q167 Mr Havard: Part of which would come. Anyway, that is a different matter. The question of ports, I think, is clearly important. The USA are having a debate amongst themselves and a great struggle about their declaration that they want to check everything that is going in and out of their ports and coming on to their land and going off it. I am not quite sure if they know how they are going to do that, in fact they do not know how they are going to do that, but we have the same problem, do we not? Is that co-ordination work being thought about? Yes, it is going to be somewhere, but is the lead on that transport?

Lord West of Spithead: TRANSEC, yes. TRANSEC lead on the security and safety of ports.

Q168 Mr Havard: So the dirty bomb in a container coming through Dover is their responsibility?

Lord West of Spithead: They will lead on the security aspect of what security measures should be in place to try and either stop something coming in or whatever that might be. Now, they will clearly talk to the experts we have to see if there are easy ways of identifying, and clearly agencies and others will feed in intelligence, but it is a TRANSEC responsibility, as it is for the security of the ships, the British-flagged ships, and it is the flag states for those ships coming to the United Kingdom, that is their responsibility, but I think TRANSEC are the best people, in all honesty, to go into the detail of these answers.

Q169 Mr Havard: So presumably the merchant fleet in some fashion are involved in that discussion and then the operators or the commissioning of them and then presumably the Reserves from the Navy presumably? We have people in the Merchant Navy and elsewhere who are reservists who are called upon and presumably they are represented by the Navy in that discussion.

Lord West of Spithead: Again I think TRANSEC are the people to really answer the detail of this. They set the standards of security and safety on board the British-flagged ships, so, say, on a British-flagged ferry leaving from Harwich going across the North Sea, and I had a case of this, someone wrote to me and said, “Look, I notice that people are allowed to walk on so-and-so decks”. I was able to say to TRANSEC, “Well, how the hell did this happen?” and actually the ship had been told not to allow it. These ships had very clear instructions, but they were not being met and therefore, they got a rap over the knuckles and told, “You must make sure this happens”. If it ships coming from other countries, it is that flag state, but, as I say, the real detail you would be best to ask TRANSEC about.

Q170 Mr Hancock: But the overwhelming number of ships coming into the UK are from other states, many of them states which would share no responsibility, Liberia, Panama. The popular flag states are not ones that you would readily associate with being careful about what is going on on their flagged ships. My real question is about the danger, and we went through this before on the maritime side, not so much of a ship at sea, but a ship when it is alongside in port. The example you gave previously on this Committee was of the super-tanker at Fawley alongside with a quarter of a million of tonnes of oil on board with this huge number of pleasure-boats going up and down Southampton water and any of them could be there, yet nobody seemed to have responsibility to prevent them going alongside the super-tanker. We were told they had CCTV cameras which were ineffective and nobody was stopping people going close to these huge ships. Why is that allowed to continue?

Lord West of Spithead: I have not been down there sailing for a while, but all I would say is that TRANSEC are responsible for the security of the UK port and the ships in that port and the ships leaving that port, so, if there was a feeling that there was a security risk, they should make sure that they establish the right security checks to ensure that does not happen.

Q171 Mr Holloway: If there were a major incident, presumably one would need additional hospital beds, ships or helicopters, whatever it is, from the private sector or wherever which was needed in that period. Is there any sort of legal framework for taking over assets that do not belong to the State and using them in an emergency?

Lord West of Spithead: There certainly is in terms of a military-type emergency because one can take up ships in trade. I am not aware of any ability to take up—

Q172 Mr Holloway: In the aftermath of this hopefully unthinkable sort of 10,000-plus casualties, have you got any sort of legal basis where you could take over a private hospital and have every private helicopter in the country working towards the effort or whatever it is?

Lord West of Spithead: As I say, I have not thought through what exactly might be required, but we can use the Civil Contingencies Act and, in using that, we can actually take over things.

Q173 Mr Hamilton: Chairman, the last question will maybe put some light on that and you have to respond about the coverage we have in British seas and the Royal Navy’s role in that and the other agencies which would be involved, but I can say that one of the things that concerns me is that there is not an accountability as far as I can see from all the evidence we have taken today and it worries me that,
if a disaster did happen, I could imagine one phrase being used all the way through this, “Not me, guv! I’m not responsible”. Now, somehow or other it is about public communication and people having public accountability. I have been in this Parliament for seven years and I did not realise that we were not aware of what was going on around the waters of the UK and that a certain department had one identification and another department had another identification, so could I plead with you that, when you have these discussions which are taking place, the communication position to the public, and there are 60-odd million people out there, that that be looked at very seriously and that you should really consider someone taking the responsibility, and not necessarily your Department, but someone taking responsibility for co-ordination. It seems to me like a patchwork quilt we are looking at here.

Mr Ainsworth: You need to think about whether or not you actually divvy up those responsibilities in terms of the land environment, the maritime environment and the air environment or whether or not you divvy them up in terms of particular areas of responsibility because, if you talk about particular areas of responsibility, then people do have responsibilities, do they not, but it is just that we have not divided them up in that geographical way. Her Majesty’s Customs and Excise have their responsibilities, the Department for Transport have their responsibilities, we have responsibility to deliver particular capabilities and, if we do not deliver those capabilities and if there is not that force ready as promised, then we are responsible, so there is responsibility, it is just not divided up in that way. It is not divided up in that way in the land environment either. The Department of Health have certain responsibilities, the Department for Transport have certain responsibilities and we have our own responsibilities with regard to the protection of nuclear establishments, so we do not divide it up by land or maritime or anything else.

Q175 Chairman: Further on David Hamilton’s question just now, getting back to the first question I asked of who owns the National Security Strategy, the impression seems to be, “Well, it’s the Prime Minister”, but, if it is the Prime Minister who owns it, then in reality nobody does. Is that not the problem because, in order to get up to that level, you have got to have an extraordinary catastrophe to bring in the Prime Minister?

Mr Ainsworth: Each contributor, each department, each organisation owns its own area of responsibilities and they are laid out.

Q176 Mr Holloway: But it does feel like no one is in charge.

Lord West of Spithead: But I do not think that is right, Adam.

Q177 Chairman: If that is not right, in what respect is it not right?

Lord West of Spithead: Well, when you say that no one is in charge, is there no one who can take executive action when something occurs? The answer is that there is, and it will be based around that department that is doing that. The overall National Security Strategy, as it stands at the moment, is co-ordinated through a National Security secretariat which is based in the Cabinet Office. There is a senior official who is in charge of all aspects of that, including civil contingency. It goes up through Cabinet committees and, ultimately, to the Prime Minister. Part of the reason for that, I think, is because of these difficulties about saying, “How can we get someone in that position who can have responsibility and everything else?”, but executive decisions can be made straightaway, they can be made straightaway. COBR will form and all the departments will be there and that particular incident will then be handled with reactions being made, and quite often maybe the Prime Minister might attend COBR, not always, but certainly you will put someone there to co-ordinate and make sure actions happen.

Q178 Mr Holloway: But you are the Security Minister, and this is no reflection on you, this is the position you are in, but I am staggered that the person that I thought, in my ignorance before today’s meeting, was in charge actually does not know roughly how many beds we can generate in the event of a mass casualty attack. It really surprises me.

Mr Ainsworth: But the Department of Health will.

Q179 Mr Holloway: Yes, I know, but that is my point.

Mr Ainsworth: COBR will form in a particular format based on the circumstances.

Q180 Mr Holloway: Well, that is reactive, but who is actually joining it up? If we go back to unity of command and unity of purpose, the comprehensive approach, joined-up stuff, it all sounds very good, all this process and paper-pushing, but who is actually in charge?
Lord West of Spithead: It is not process and paper-pushing.

Q181 Mr Holloway: It is an easy answer, it is not complicated.

Lord West of Spithead: As I say, in the Department of Health there will be in place plans to generate numbers of beds going up to certain levels for certain incidents.

Q182 Mr Holloway: But who is in charge?

Lord West of Spithead: Well, when the incident happens, as I say, COBR will meet and locally they will start saying, “This is bigger than we thought. Therefore, we need this other assistance”, and COBR will say, “Right, clearly we’re actually talking here of a 10,000 death thing, so we will need to have extra places for bodies to be stored, we will need extra hospital beds because of the numbers involved”, and all those statistics and figures are all there. They will say, “Implement plan so-and-so” and, bang, up they come with certain numbers.

Q183 Mr Jenkin: My question follows on from this which is that we all know from the polling evidence that the public does not really like being stirred up about this subject. It makes politicians get accused of trying to frighten the public for some sort of political reasons and it is regarded with great suspicion. Is there a danger that, because we all want to avoid doing that, we are actually not giving this the profile in government that it really deserves and that we do not want to have a national security minister in the Cabinet because that would add to the anxiety of people and raise people’s suspicions more, but have we actually not got to face it and have we also not got to recognise that the public need to be made aware of these dangers because, the more aware the public is of these dangers and risks, the more alive they are to those risks and in fact the safer the public is of trying to do. Is there a danger that, because we all want to do it because they will not be there, those people, and there is a whole mass of things which need to be acted on, that some people might well say, “I’m not going to come in because my family are ill”, so we are making an assessment. We also make an assessment of how many are actually ill as well, but this is on top of that.

Q184 Chairman: I also think that we have perhaps been pursuing a question of whether there should be a Cabinet minister involved in national security which is beyond your and our pay grades.

Lord West of Spithead: It is certainly beyond my pay grade, that is for sure!

Chairman: Not beyond ours, but probably beyond yours!

Q185 Mr Jenkins: Based on Lord West’s answer, in a pandemic we plan for maybe 40% illness.

Lord West of Spithead: Not illness, no. We are talking about non-shows in our strategic and vital industries of health, water and power. Do we have power or will we need to create power for the direction of labour so we can put people in, and maybe this is civil contingency?

Q186 Mr Jenkins: So we have got a situation with 40% non-shows in our strategic and vital industries of health, water and power. Do we have power or will we need to create power for the direction of labour so we can put people in, and maybe this is civil contingency?

Lord West of Spithead: Well, I think if things got that bad, we would use the Civil Contingencies Act to ensure that we could do what was necessary to ensure that things happened. I said 40% and I do not want to be quoted exactly on that because I am not sure exactly.

Q187 Mr Jenkins: But do we have the authority within the Civil Contingencies Act to redirect labour in this country?

Lord West of Spithead: Yes, we do.

Q188 Mr Hancock: You need to say that your plan takes account of the possibility of 40% not turning up so the 60% can operate the plan. Otherwise, the wrong message goes out again to the public when you have built in the contingency of 40%.

Lord West of Spithead: Absolutely. We built it, or when I say “we”, this is down at quite local level and within departments, that they should have in place, and it is things like running prisons, there is a whole raft of things, all of which have to happen on the basis that there will be a reduced number of people doing it because they will not be there, those people, and there is a whole mass of things which need to be taken into account. Going to Bernard’s point, some of these, when you develop them, do frighten the horses and you then get accused of saying, “You’re doing this, you’re frightening everyone”, so we have to be very careful and do it in a very sensible, measured way because actually it is incumbent on any government to make sure that they are in place, the right measures, to look after the safety and security of our people, and I believe that is what we are trying to do.

Chairman: Well, thank you very much indeed all of you for giving us evidence and helping, even those of you who did not speak; it is much appreciated. This has been a very interesting, in some ways reassuring, in some ways alarming, morning’s evidence, but I think that is the end of it.
Tuesday 27 January 2009

Members present:

Mr David S Borrow
Linda Gilroy
Mr Adam Holloway
Mr Bernard Jenkin
Mr Brian Jenkins
Robert Key
Mrs Madeleine Moon
John Smith

Witnesses: General Sir David Richards KCB CBE DSO ADC Gen, (Late Royal Regiment of Artillery), as Commander-in-Chief, Land Forces, also Standing Joint Commander (UK) (SJC(UK)) with responsibility for the provision of military aid to civil power within the United Kingdom, and Brigadier James Everard OBE, Director Commitments, HQ Land Commitments, Ministry of Defence, gave evidence.

Q189 Chairman: Good morning and welcome to the Committee, General Sir David Richards and Brigadier Everard. This is a further evidence session in relation to national security. General Richards, as CINCLAND, you are in charge of the military aid to civil authorities and I wonder if you could begin by telling us what that involves and what you do in relation to that, what provision you make and what it is all about, please.

General Sir David Richards: Chairman, it is very good to be back in front of you again. I have some brief opening remarks which capture the essence of the answer to your question, if you are happy for me to go that way, and I will keep it very short. When it comes to the commitment of military capability in support of the civil authorities, and even though our doctrine and, I think, our procedures too are very well-developed, the devil is in the detail in interpretation, in resource, in expectation and, I think, very importantly where we go next, which I suspect you will be wanting to explore. In what is a complex inter-agency arena, we perhaps should not be surprised at that, but getting to grips with it and getting all those different elements to work coherently and in a high tempo, I think, is an area that, as I say, we might explore. I have been 12 months as the Standing Joint Commander (United Kingdom). I have certainly come in that time, having had no experience really of it before, to better understand our approach, the risks we take and the need for transparency. From this foundation, and to inform your opening question, I thought I would just make the following points. In my judgment, we have collectively made really significant progress in the country’s ability to respond to disruptive challenges. The Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat deserves, I think, great credit at delivering real cross-government and inter-agency co-ordination. As Category 1 and Category 2 responders have raised their game in response to that pressure, so the demands on defence and, therefore, on my role have decreased. The Armed Forces are relatively small when compared to the numbers of personnel in the emergency services, the Health Service, local authorities and the utility providers, so this reduction in pressure on us is obviously welcome. As the SJC (UK), I am responsible for the planning, force-generation, deployment, conduct, sustainment and recovery of defence assets conducting military operations in the UK, and I think it is important, though I suspect you know this, but perhaps I may just reinforce this, to understand that I am not at the centre of the web, if you like, but work to the MoD in support of the civil authorities. Indeed, the Chief of Defence Staff provides me with an operational directive and my role is actually quite limited and very clear, and that is a small, standing, joint, and I emphasise it is joint, command headquarters down with the rest of my Land Forces headquarters at Wilton. That directs this activity on a daily basis, supported by the Land Forces’ regional chain of command and joint regional liaison officers, or JRLOs, generating defence capability in support of those responsible for managing and commanding the response to disruptive challenges. Now, this headquarters is pretty lean, but I think it is sufficient and we scrubbed it last autumn to make sure that it was fit for task. I am assured that the Committee does understand the range of capabilities effectively guaranteed by defence, and I could go through it if you want, but it is things like search and rescue. In some cases, this level of support is very clearly articulated, such as the SAR capability, but elsewhere there is a question over exactly what is guaranteed.

Q190 Chairman: ‘SAR’ being search and rescue.

General Sir David Richards: Yes, so what is guaranteed and in what depth. Our ECBRN, explosive (ordnance disposal), chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear, and technical response force capabilities are cases in point. As C-in-C Land Forces, I concede to a concern that there may be an inevitable gap between what other government departments expect and what Defence is mandated to, and can, deliver, and this carries, I think amongst other things, significant potential reputational risk. Clarity, I think, is critical, as in all things, and I am of the opinion that we should place defence support on a more secure and transparent footing. We should look at establishing clear statements of requirement with lead government departments underpinned by, what we might call, service-level agreements, and, as you know, others have reached a similar conclusion when examining this area.
Similarly, we have got a brigade called the ‘2nd (National Communications) Brigade’ and it does do what the SDR New Chapter said it would do, providing the deployable element of a national communications infrastructure and some specialist communications in support of defence assets deployed on UK operations. I visited them late last summer and I was very impressed by what I saw; they do undoubtedly a first-class job. However, any assumption that the Brigade provides an independent and dedicated communications and information spine in support of civil effect across the UK would be incorrect. I am clear in what I have tasked the Brigade to do, but I again believe that a formal SOR of some kind would be sensible.

Q191 Chairman: ‘SOR’ being a statement of requirements.

General Sir David Richards: Yes.

Q192 Mr Jenkin: We all knew that of course!

General Sir David Richards: I think the Chairman did know that, but certainly my wife, who is in the audience, did not know what it was! In terms of wider capability, the Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces, CCRF, concept is perhaps the one measure falling out of the SDR New Chapter that has not been exploited. I think that, when we looked at that, the bottom line is that we have not faced an emergency of such scale and complexity or duration that requires them and, as a result, we have used regular manpower. The Cottam Review, which I know you are aware of, has looked at the CCRF concept and the MoD is, again as I think you know, considering the recommendations in that report. My final point is that of additional augmentation of UK operations from regular forces in the event of a national emergency, and I am very clear on this. We basically do what we are told and, yes, we must be clear that the skills, equipment and the capabilities of the Armed Forces are designed primarily, quite evidently, for military use. Now, given the pressure in Afghanistan and, for now anyway, in Iraq, success on current operations in those places is absolutely my top priority, as you would expect. However, we all fully accept that in an emergency the Government will do, rightly, what is necessary to protect what is necessary, and the single greatest advantage of aligning the appointments of Commander-in-Chief Land Forces and the Standing Joint Commander (UK) is my ability to rapidly reprioritise in response to fresh orders, and I think that is why I, for one, having genuinely looked at the command and control arrangements objectively, and why we came down to it remaining as it is, which I think a recent DOC audit also supported. Finally, you mentioned him, but Brigadier James Everard runs this on a day-to-day basis for me and, where I expose my limitations, I am sure James will come to the rescue. He was my Chief of Staff in 4 Armoured Brigade many years ago, so I think we can trust him!

Q193 Chairman: Is there anything in this area that keeps you awake at night?

General Sir David Richards: I suppose at the back of my mind is 2012. The government ministries are all alert to the necessary work and are getting on with it. I would like to get clarity on what might be required of the Armed Forces as soon as possible really because, with all the other pressure on us, that would be helpful because, if we do have to retrain, create new units, IED specialists and all that sort of thing, the sooner we get clarity, the better, but, otherwise, no. I have no axe to grind on this and I have been really impressed going around at how much, over the last four years, other government departments and the civil services have actually raised their game immensely, particularly obviously the police, the fire service and so on, so we really are providing routinely just a few niche capabilities with that reserve against Armageddon that you would all expect us to provide.

Q194 Mr Jenkin: Going back to the foot and mouth crisis, do you recall the chance meeting of Brigadier Birtwistle and the then Prime Minister in a hotel in Carlisle, I think it was, which resulted in the deployment of military forces to help with that crisis, and referring to your point about the differences of expectation between what the military can provide and what government departments expect, do you think other government departments fully appreciate the capacity of senior military decision-makers to plan and operate in unexpected circumstances? It is not really a cost point because the back of the envelope that Brigadier Birtwistle did for the Prime Minister which transformed the management of that crisis cost nothing, but there had been months of stand-off between Defra and the Ministry of Defence, and I do not know whether it was pride or ignorance, but it really was a period in which the crisis got considerably worse because of that lack of appreciation.

General Sir David Richards: I think there was some of that, to be frank, but I do not detect it today. We are routinely exercising with other government departments and the people under them and my territorial regional brigade commanders report the atmospherics as very good. I would say that, when push comes to shove, as you are implying, our core task, the thing we do better than probably anything else, is to analyse, plan and implement under pressure, and we are there to help them. Our JLROs are deployed with them on every exercise they do and I have had some very nice letters, saying, “Thank you very much for the role of Lieutenant Colonel whoever”, so I recognise what you are saying, but I think familiarity is breeding greater mutual confidence and our methods, our staff skills, have been imported to some of their processes.

Q195 Chairman: Does it matter that, if the military are called in aid of the civil authorities, it might be seen as a criticism of the effectiveness of those civil authorities, that they have failed?

General Sir David Richards: It should not matter if it is required because clearly dealing with the emergency is what we should all focus on and worry about reputations later. I would like to think that the
imperative of the moment would be the thing that dominates who does what, but I can imagine, as you are inferring, that maybe some people are rather over-focused on the former, so yes, it is something to be aware of.

Q196 Mr Jenkin: Should there be permanent liaison officers in police headquarters so that that cultural divide is broken down between gold commanders and the Armed Forces?

General Sir David Richards: I do not think it is necessary because the JLRO system, which is quite cheap and efficient, those officers go round all the police stations or the chief constables, the people they will work with in a civil emergency, and I think they have got very good relations. To find permanent liaison officers for every part of the UK, where probably these things are containable under the current system, would be quite expensive. Give me the resources to do it, yes, it is a jolly good idea. The one area I would see, going back to my point about 2012, is that at some point the command and control arrangements for 2012 will firm up and I think at that point there may be a case for that sort of detailed and enduring liaison within the agencies that we know are going to deal with any emergency wrapped round that, but, otherwise, I think we are okay.

Q197 Chairman: In view of the internalisation of the threats that we face, in view of the fact that the communications between Pakistan and Afghanistan and many places in the United Kingdom are instant, the fact that what happens in South East Asia or South Asia and the United Kingdom is so closely linked, do you think that the distinction between what the military does in the United Kingdom, namely aid to the civil authorities, and what the military does abroad is now an anachronism? This is a Chris Donnelly point.

General Sir David Richards: Yes, I have heard him talk about this. There is something in it. Certainly, generally we do not yet know properly how to dominate the information spectrum and just monitor it in the way we need and contain the threats that can emanate through the ability to talk to each other in the way you are suggesting. It is not a task that we have been given to examine it. We do obviously work very hard on it abroad, but, in that key linkage between places like Pakistan and the UK, I am not qualified to go into any detail and it is certainly not in my list of responsibilities, though I think it is an area that other people are monitoring and working on, but I think that may be something we would have to talk about not in a public session.

Q198 Chairman: But it merits further consideration—

General Sir David Richards: Absolutely.

Q199 Chairman:—particularly in the light of what you said in your opening answer about the need to revisit the whole picture?

General Sir David Richards: Yes, absolutely. I think it is a key area for all of us generically.

Q200 Linda Gilroy: You gave us a fairly clear idea of the resources and commitment to planning for provision in civil emergencies, but I wonder if you can just give the Committee a further idea of the sort of scale of that commitment. I assume that it involves the resilience exercises and what does that, in a typical month or year, look like?

General Sir David Richards: To make sure he earns his keep this morning, James organises all these things.

Brigadier Everard: We do run a comprehensive training programme, exercise programme, throughout the year and, in anticipation that that would be one of the questions that was asked, I have brought a list of those resilience exercises which have taken place in the UK to which we have contributed or have run, I think, throughout the last year and it runs to a full page, covering every aspect. Indeed, if I were not here today, I would be on exercise FORWARD STAR down in Warminster which has a gold commander there and all the agencies looking at one particular aspect of our ability to respond to a crisis, so I think it is pretty comprehensive and grows annually as more people, particularly the Cat 1 responders, come on board and start running their own exercises, as they are mandated to do under the Civil Contingencies Act.

Q201 Linda Gilroy: I take it that that could be available to the Committee rather than running through the detail of it. I think the other aspect I wanted to ask about, and again you have given us something of the flavour of it, is in relation to horizon-scanning, the response you gave to the Chairman’s question about what keeps you awake at night, but also, when you said to us that you take your context from what the MoD do, can you just give the Committee an idea of how that horizon-scanning happens and how it affects what you plan?

General Sir David Richards: I have prepared some stuff on this. Of course, it is the sort of thing we do all the time when looking at deployed operations. Here, the MoD are primarily responsible for horizon-scanning because it does involve all government agencies and government departments, but at a national level the Civil Contingencies Secretariat is actually responsible for doing it and we play a role, particularly when it gets down to the regional and local level, in validating the sort of work that they are doing. I do not know, but do you, James, get involved in the detail at the higher level because that is really my bit of it?

Brigadier Everard: Not at the moment. There is an MoD branch, and I think Brigadier Chip Chapman was here at one of your earlier sessions, and that CT&UK Ops Branch are our link into the Civil Contingencies Secretariat for that high-level horizon-scanning. Beneath that, there is a raft of work drawing on our own Concepts and Doctrine Centre and the Defence Academy to refine our ability to respond. Again, because it is difficult to articulate how much work there is unless you see it, I would bring up here, because I think it might be of
General Sir David Richards KCB CBE DSO ADC Gen and Brigadier James Everard OBE

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interest, our own Standing Operation Instructions\(^1\) which represent all the contingency plans that exist, so, if you want to know how to get a helicopter, this will tell you exactly how many helicopters are available at any one time and where you go to get them. If you want to know, you name it, how to get hold of a communications specialist or someone from the Atomic Weapons Establishment, it is all in here with phone numbers, and all of that has really fallen out of the horizon-scanning work we have done or drilling into those national resilience assessments or assumptions that have fallen out of the Cabinet Office. Again, I’ll pass that round if people are interested to have a look at it.

Q202 Chairman: Is that classified?

Brigadier Everard: That is not classified,\(^2\) so we circulate that widely so that everybody involved in resilience understands what we can do, and it is a sort of supporting adjunct to the capabilities catalogue as a non-classified version and again a classified version which underpins our ability to respond.

Q203 Linda Gilroy: So are there any other things? I am trying to get this sort of balance between lessons learned from previous civil emergencies, but also the picture you have given us that that is changing, the civil response is much better to that and that of course the threats that are there are also changing. What are the other things that maybe do not keep you awake at night, but which give you considerable pause for thought?

General Sir David Richards: Well, I would emphasise again that my focus is deployed operations, so I have routinely a conscience in James Everard and his small joint team that really are very dedicated, and they are also joint because they are within HQ Land Forces, which is sometimes forgotten. They are the ones that on a day-to-day basis are horizon-scanning, doing the work with other government departments, particularly the MoD. I think it is really terrorism and the sort of work the Chairman mentioned of Chris Donnelly, who is a very good friend of mine and in fact we are together later today, looking at the full scale of where defence might have to be deployed over the next ten to 20 years in an away-day, it is that sort of work that I focus on to make sure that I come back and say to someone like James, “Have we factored this into the work done by that joint staff downstairs in our cells?” It is not random, but the work done focused on the UK is part of a much wider piece of work, and I think that is probably right, going back to the Chairman’s point, that it is all so interlinked in a globalised world that that is the way it has got to be, and then I cherry-pick bits that I want then to focus on in respect of UK resilience.

Q204 Robert Key: General, the architecture of all this is really rather complicated, is it not? We have got the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office, the Prime Minister chairs a ministerial Committee on Security and Terrorism and we have the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre at MI5 in Thames House which reports to the Cabinet Office. How do you ensure that the Ministry of Defence is kept in the loop? On a day-to-day basis, is the Ministry of Defence actually keeping up with the work of all those other agencies?

General Sir David Richards: Well, there is a one-star director, Brigadier Chapman, who, I think, has appeared in front of you, whose almost exclusive job is to maintain those links, but I personally do not do it. I do not want to flog a dead horse, but I am quite down the food chain here. Whilst my staff keep tabs on it and I go on the odd exercise, for me this is just one of many tasks that I can have laid on me. I am content, from the times I am exposed to it, that the relations seem to me to work, but I would say that they could probably be a lot clearer and crisper and maybe that is one of the things that will come out of the horizon-scanning work in relation to 2012. My own view, having done a few overseas operations, is that it was Omar Bradley that said that professionals talk logistics and amateurs talk tactics. I have said for many years now that actually professionals talk command and control first, then logistics and then tactics, and I suppose that is a mantra that has not yet permeated all the way through this particular area and there are bureaucratic rivalries that we have got to ease out. It works, but I suspect it could be better.

Q205 Robert Key: Do the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force act completely independently of you or, as Standing Joint Commander, do you co-ordinate their military aid to the civil authorities as well?

General Sir David Richards: Yes, very much so. It is a joint headquarters and we again examined it last summer. The Vice Chief of Defence has a meeting of the three single Service Commanders-in-Chief every three months. We went through this, they communed with their conscience, whether they are unhappy with a soldier doing their bit, and they gave me the thumbs-up. There is an option that the Chief of Defence Staff could, in a particular circumstance, say, “I’m not giving it to Richards, I’m giving it to Stanhope” or whoever it might be, but most of the effects will be on the land and, therefore, even though aircraft, for example, are involved, it often usually would make sense for us to take the lead, and we do this all the time anyway. We have this, as you will know, supporting and supported relationship and I am the supported commander because I am the one that will have to look after most of the impact of any incident, but it works well. I can imagine that where it might not, for example, be me could be if an oilrig were attacked and there is no major obvious land role there, so I suspect that would go to the Navy, for example.

Q206 Robert Key: The Committee visited the Counter-Terrorism Science and Technology Centre at Porton Down in my constituency in October and I think we were very impressed by the vast range of activities they do and their immense capability there.

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\(^1\) Note by witness: Edition 3, as at 9 July 2008.

\(^2\) Note by witness: It has been deliberately kept at RESTRICTED.
I think we got a sense that they were rather frustrated, that they were fighting an uphill battle in persuading other government agencies of what they can offer. Do you have a view on that and how should they, or could they, be better promoted?

**General Sir David Richards:** Well, I have been there and it is very impressive and I did pick up the same worries. I think this is the point we are getting about command and control. We need more clarity and the idea of SORs that brings that clarity is something that we are hoping to see during this year. To reassure you, when preparing for this session, I dug into these things and they are on the case, as I said to the Chairman at the beginning, though maybe I am getting a bit impatient to see the results, but they are aware of that sort of issue.

**Q207 Chairman:** That is particularly in relation to, for example, 2012?

**General Sir David Richards:** I think that, to be frank, sort of galvanised action, yes. Everyone is aware that there are risks over that period that we want to be fully prepared for in good time, and the organisation you have referred to could play a key role in some of the possible scenarios that are being examined, so we are aware of that sort of issue.

**Brigadier Everard:** Just to add, if I may, that particular organisation, which we have a lot of contact with, works at the DSTL in Porton Down, but it is not a DSTL agency, and actually works with the MoD and the Chief Scientific Adviser, so they are the voice of science or the scientific authority, both for the Army, the Navy and the Air Force units have in CBRN or actually an EOD requirement and they support of the civil authorities in the event of a CBRN or EOD event. Of course, in terms of our UK ops response capabilities, so on?

**General Sir David Richards:** Again, I might ask James because James is responsible for it.

**Brigadier Everard:** For those niche capabilities that we are mandated to provide, specific training goes on to ensure that they are trained to the standard that they need to train to. For augmented manpower, of course we are drawing on the general capabilities of the Army, hence the fact we have SJIC headquarters located next to Land Commitments so that we can identify the best courses to do the job that is required. I have been doing this job for a year and nine times out of ten what people are after is just trained manpower, a body of people who can react to circumstances, and that is what we produce on a daily basis anyway.

**Q209 Robert Key:** What specific training do the Army, the Navy and the Air Force units have in preparation for military assistance to civil authorities?

**Brigadier Everard:** Over and above those troops that are pitched against those niche capabilities, none. We do not specifically train our forces to contribute to MACA; it is a task that falls out of their military training anyway.

**General Sir David Richards:** The role that we tend to fill, picking up on James’s point about what the other agencies want, is quality-trained manpower. That is what we are. The issues are not nearly as demanding normally, we could do some horizon-scanning and obviously there are big implications with some of the worst-case things, but normally all that this requires is a commander with a team that can analyse, plan and implement quickly under pressure, and that is our core business, so we do not think, for the vast majority of instances, things like flood relief operations, for example, that it is that difficult, given that is what we practise in all the time, albeit the subject matter is different. That does not mean that we do not need sappers with boats because of course also they do that on normal military operations, so, give or take the whole raft of things, the 90% of the things we might be called in to help over, they are there anyway, but, instead of applying it to the operations in Iraq or Afghanistan, we apply it to probably usually much-easier-to-cope-with, if I am frank, operations in the UK.

**Q210 Robert Key:** Could I ask for a little update on what is happening at the Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear Centre at Winterbourne Gunner, where, I know, the Army, Navy and Air Force attend for training in those areas, and of course next to it is the Police National College for Training as well. Is there co-ordination, therefore, between the police and military forces at Winterbourne Gunner or are they completely separate establishments?

**Brigadier Everard:** I do not know the answer to that question and I have not been to Winterbourne Gunner. Of course, in terms of our UK ops response to EOD, we have the Joint Services EOD Centre at Didcot. They have a standing authority to deploy in support of the civil authorities in the event of a CBRN or actually an EOD requirement and they have very good links with the other agencies, including maritime and indeed police who provide those capabilities, so, on the exercises I have been to, I have seen that joint training in action. Whether at Winterbourne Gunner it takes place, I do not know.

**General Sir David Richards:** If we may, can we come back to you on that?

**Robert Key:** Yes, please. I would be grateful. Thank you very much.

**Chairman:** Moving on to funding and Bernard Jenkin.

**Q211 Mr Jenkin:** How happy are you with the funding arrangements for MACA?

**General Sir David Richards:** Well, for what we are mandated to do at the moment, it seems to work. If we provide an EOD team to another government department, Defence gets paid for it and, therefore, it does not have to come out of the Army’s hide, for...
example. Whether it would work in a large-scale disaster of some kind where a nuclear bomb was let off in the docks or something like that, I can only imagine that it should because, at the scale we are doing it, it seems to work very well, but I suppose scale would then become a different issue, but we have not had any problems with it to date.

**Brigadier Everard:** No. I think the funding and repayment regime, the rules are set by the Treasury and we apply them as best we can, so I think that works well. For those niche capabilities, of course they are mandated in Defence Planning Guidance and we are funded to provide those.

**Q212 Mr Jenkin:** But the DCDC publication *Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience* sets out the principles of funding, and the key principle seems to be, “If the cost is not applicable to defence, then it represents an improper use of resources and must be recovered”, but does that not inhibit capacity-building in the Ministry of Defence and does that not discourage government departments from using perhaps dormant capability because the cost of deploying it is in fact prohibitive, particularly if you are going for full recovery of costs?

**General Sir David Richards:** I can identify with what you have just suggested, but, in a way from a defence perspective, where our priority quite clearly now is mandated to be on deployed operations outside the United Kingdom, anything which, however accidentally, forces others to do what they are supposed to do for fear that it will be more expensive if they come to us maybe is not a bad thing. I suspect that has been a catalyst for some of the investment, very good investment, that we have seen in the last four years, so there is another side to it. Should we do it for others? Well, there is an argument for saying we should, but actually, as far as the Government is concerned, it is not our job primarily anymore, but we are there in support of others who should make the necessary investment.

**Q213 Mr Jenkin:** But, if it were easier for you to support capacity to do some of these tasks, which of course then would be available capacity for other tasks when not required by MACA, that would be in the national interest, would it not?

**General Sir David Richards:** Well, I can absolutely understand that case, but we are not paid at the moment to do it, so I would not want to do it unless it is in the way that you have just described. We need to be properly resourced to do any more and that is why we are so keen, and perhaps it would be helpful if you emphasise this if you agree, that we do tidy up what we are required to do through some sort of SOR process that tells us this and then we will do it, but the rather sort of ‘come as you are’, which we have got to avoid, can be muddling. We need to know what it is, pay us to do it and we will provide the capability, but it is a little bit murky at the moment.

**Q214 Mr Jenkin:** But of course the charging levels are rather malleable in that there can be full costs’ recovery, there can be marginal costs’ recovery or the costs might be waived.

**General Sir David Richards:** Yes.

**Q215 Mr Jenkin:** Are you happy that this is stability in terms of what the Ministry of Defence is going to get paid for? Are expectations fulfilled?

**General Sir David Richards:** So far, normally our expectations have been fulfilled because it is a collaborative effort. Have you got any more detail to help answer that question because you get involved with it?

**Brigadier Everard:** Well, I am lucky in the fact that the charging regime is an MoD responsibility and, for example, I would expect the MoD to waive costs in the event of a maxi Cat A saving-life venture. Intermediate costs, if there was a training benefit to us, again we probably would not seek recovery of costs, but again we are, I think, constrained by the envelope we work in and that says that, for those tasks you are not formally mandated to do in Defence Strategic Guidance, you seek recovery of the money in the charging regime as set out by the Treasury, so, unless those rules are changed, that is what we will continue to do.

**General Sir David Richards:** Of course we do not get involved in it. We provide the troops and whatever might be required and then it is for the MoD to decide the regime.

**Q216 Mr Jenkin:** I appreciate I am asking slightly outside your remit, but it has been very helpful, the answers you have been giving. There is a footnote about national interest, that, “MoD will not waive costs on grounds of national security”. I think people would be rather surprised by that statement. Can you think of any example when the national interest criterion for waiving MACA charging has been fulfilled?

**General Sir David Richards:** I do not know, but, I agree with you, I think it does sound rather surprising.

**Q217 Mr Jenkin:** Would that be the large-scale things?

**General Sir David Richards:** Yes, that would come in that category. No, you are educating me; I find that interesting.

**Q218 Chairman:** But putting context, that statement is followed by, “Those aspects of national security for which the MoD has responsibility are funded within the defence budget”, in other words, pretty much what you have been saying—

**General Sir David Richards:** Yes.

**Q219 Chairman:**—that even national security does, in certain circumstances, come under the budgets of departments other than the Ministry of Defence.

**General Sir David Richards:** Yes.
Q220 Mr Jenkins: Could I take you back, General. You have said that in the last four years some of the agencies that you would normally have supplied resources to stepped up to the mark maybe because of the pricing regime. Is that correct?

General Sir David Richards: I think it might have been a factor in their decision. I think there were other factors, but that might be one.

Q221 Mr Jenkins: That would raise a little bit of concern in my mind that we might be duplicating resources now in that event, so are you saying, and maybe you are, that at the present time it may be better for other agencies to step up to the mark and take over those areas that the military are now responsible for to allow the military to use their resources, hard-pressed as they are, on its commitments elsewhere? Is it possible that the domestic agencies could carry out those tasks at the same level?

General Sir David Richards: I suppose it is possible, but it would then raise the absolutely right issue you have just mentioned of duplication. I think there are certain key areas, like search and rescue and EOD specialists, where to reinvent that wheel and get others to invest in a huge amount of training and the resourcing of it probably would not make any sense. I would just emphasise that the areas in which we are mandated to respond are very small now and there are a few niche capabilities that avoid the issues that you have just raised very interestingly, and I do not see any of them now slipping further towards the civilian agencies. I think the ones we have got are about right, given that it takes a lot of time and effort to become an EOD specialist, for example. It suits us, funnily enough, to have a capability in the UK if for no other reason than we can rotate people through operational deployments and times at home so that they do not get too tired and fed up going abroad.

Chairman: We may come back to this in just a moment.

Q222 Mr Jenkins: I am now getting to the point where I am thinking that, if that is the case, if we have got now some residual component that is not met in any other fashion, why is it not fully financed and resourced rather than this charging between different departments?

General Sir David Richards: Which one are you thinking of?

Q223 Mr Jenkins: Air sea rescue, for instance.

Brigadier Everard: Explosive ordnance disposal. I think the point the Commander-in-Chief made earlier in terms of what we can provide, at the moment we provide a car, but we do not specify what car or for what duration and that is what we need to drill into. We provide a very good capability, but it is from our latent capacity, so do people need more than that? That is what we are trying to drill into in these areas.

Q224 Chairman: I do apologise, but ‘EOD’ is explosive—

Brigadier Everard: Explosive ordnance disposal. I think the point the Commander-in-Chief made earlier in terms of what we can provide, at the moment we provide a car, but we do not specify what car or for what duration and that is what we need to drill into. We provide a very good capability, but it is from our latent capacity, so do people need more than that? That is what we are trying to drill into in these areas.

Q225 Mr Holloway: What impact have our commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan had on the readiness of the Armed Forces to respond to a sort of domestic emergency?

General Sir David Richards: Well, the niche capabilities which we are mandated to provide are not affected by EOD, SOR and so on, which I think you are aware of. Obviously, if there were a sort of catastrophic multi-city emergency, the fact that we have got lots of people deployed would make our response to that more difficult self-evidently, but, that said, this is sort of what we train to do to respond to the unexpected, that, at short notice, we have the command and control arrangements in place. At the moment, there are roughly 12,000 deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan together, therefore, there is still a lot of Army left back here on which we could call if we need to and of course that is why we have not actually called out the CC RF before now, so I think it has an effect at the margins, but not fundamentally.

Q226 Mr Holloway: Obviously, we have heard what you had to say about A war and The war, but do you think that now we are fighting a different sort of war where attacks can take place on our soil where again we could have mass casualties amongst the civilian population, and do you think we need to think about restructuring or rebalancing our Armed Forces to deal with that kind of challenge?

General Sir David Richards: I do, and obviously you are aware broadly that I do. That is work that has been accepted as to what is the nature of future conflict and are we geared up for the right one, and this is a subset of that. That work is going on and the Secretary of State has called a meeting over the next two days specifically to examine it, so, although, I think as ever, it has taken us time to grapple with the implications of contemporary operations, I think we now are firmly on the case and, as I said, the 2012 Olympics with some of the more lurid things that the horizon-scanning process has suggested could happen has been a catalyst to accelerating that work, so yes is the answer. I do not know how it will come out, but lots of people have strong views on it and it is a fascinating thing to be involved in.

Q227 John Smith: Does that include geographical restructuring and reconfiguration within the United Kingdom so that our Forces are physically better-placed to be able to respond to large-scale crises in the regions, Wales and Scotland?

General Sir David Richards: It has not got to that; it is quite embryonic. I suppose, if you are one end of that type of thinking, that is the sort of thing we
Just going off piste a little bit, how helpful actually is it for the military, in terms of military learning and understanding, to actually engage with civil authorities and how much is it also a quid pro quo in terms of your staff actually appreciating some of the pressures, strains and difficulties of responding within the civil emergency organisations? How much has that also helped you?

General Sir David Richards: Well, it is a very useful by-product. We are, as Mr Holloway was hinting, in a different era now where the military does not do its stuff abroad, and certainly never here, in some sort of discrete area in which no one else lives; it is a war amongst the people, as Rupert Smith said, so the more that our people can mix and become used to other factors, whether it is prejudices towards the military on the one part, which we increasingly do not come across because the relationships are better, through to understanding other people’s points of view which are perfectly legitimate, this cannot be a bad thing. I was with a regional brigade commander the other day who had done two of these exercises last year and he said to me that it was just like being in Iraq and working with the civil agencies over there, so there is a spin-off which is another reason we ought to remain engaged at the level we are.

Q230 Mrs Moon: I was wondering about your comment that something that keeps you awake at night is 2012 and, in terms of the new technology and equipment that you are using in Iraq and Afghanistan, do you think that new equipment has any potential for homeland security, for resilience and indeed for use in 2012? Obviously, I do not expect you to go into details, but is there new equipment that you are using now that actually you can see being useful in assisting the security and defence issues of 2012?

General Sir David Richards: I do not think I could go into details, as you have kindly suggested, but undoubtedly there are things that, in certain of the scenarios, are being looked at rightly, and you would expect it, that that sort of equipment particularly that gives an intelligence and understanding of what is going on would be very usefully used over here.

Brigadier Everard: In relation to that question, again I have brought something else which I think speaks for itself. This is a secret document which is signed out to me for the day, but this is the database of those sorts of capabilities that exist within the military which could be used by civil authorities in the UK, and again I will pass it round because it gives you a flavour of those things that we flag up to the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism, for example, to say, “You can think about using these because we have them”.

Q231 Chairman: Well, if it is secret, make sure you get it back!

Brigadier Everard: I will, sir.

Q232 Mr Holloway: What sort of support do you think you might provide to the Olympics and when do you think you will know what is going to be required of you?

General Sir David Richards: Well, I think it is a very open-ended question depending on what one’s assessment of the risk is. We do not expect to do a great deal routinely because the MoD again are primarily involved, but I did ask this question in preparation for your session today and they have it pretty well buttoned up. I would like, as I said earlier, to accelerate the decision-making so that we
know more precisely not necessarily what areas we
might be required to help in, but the scale, how many
EOD teams and all those sorts of things, but that
work is—

Brigadier Everard: In the autumn this year, we are
told, we will be given a statement of requirement.

General Sir David Richards: We can live with that,
and I know people are aware that we and others need
to get on with it because we need to then exercise in
it certainly by no later than 2010 and James has then
got to factor that sort of thing into the overall
programming of military activities, so at the end of
this year will be okay, but not much later.

Q233 Chairman: The final question and a
hypothetical one: if you are faced with a fire brigade
strike, do you think it is appropriate for you to
join in?

General Sir David Richards: Well, you are all
politicians, so you will know this is rather political!
I think my honest and best answer is that we will do
as we are told and, if it is lawful, which I assume it
would be, then we would have to help.

Q234 Chairman: You see, we have had two different
experiences of that over the last decade or so. In one
circumstance, the military were called in and, in
another circumstance, the military either were not
called in or said, “We have so many people in Iraq
and Afghanistan that we simply can’t manage it”.
What would be your response now?

General Sir David Richards: It would depend on the
scale. If it were a nationwide fire strike and clearly
lives were routinely being put at risk as a result, my
own personal view is that we would have to do
something to help, although one would be reluctant,
but no one, nor would my troops and officers, stand
by watching people being burned in their houses for
fear that we get caught up in some sort of political
tagion.

Q235 Chairman: Does that not make it easier for the
authorities to fail to reach agreement with the fire
brigade, and this is all completely hypothetical, to
avoid that contingency arising in the first place?

General Sir David Richards: I can see that it might,
although our ability to help will be pretty limited, so
there would still be the imperative from a
humanitarian perspective alone, I would hope, to
not put us in that position, but I do recognise that
may be a factor. Would you not think that we would
have to respond because, one, we could not do as we
are told and, two, we could not stand by and watch
people die while Rome burned?

Q236 Chairman: I have never heard this before; I am
meant to be asking the questions but my answer is,
yes, I would.

General Sir David Richards: Good.

Chairman: Thank you very much indeed; that is very
helpful from both of you and I am delighted that the
delayed session was eventually able to take place.
We are most grateful.

Witnesses: Ms Niki Tompkinson CB, Director, Transport Security and Contingencies Directorate, Chief
Constable Bernard Hogan-Howe, Lead Officer for Maritime and Air Support Policing, Association of Chief
Police Officers, Mr Rod Johnson, Chief Coastguard, Maritime and Coastguard Agency, and Mr Brodie
Clark, Head, Border Force, UK Border Agency, gave evidence.

Q237 Chairman: Welcome to the Committee; I
wonder if I could possibly ask you, please, to tell us
exactly who you are and tell us what you do in a brief
sentence. Would you like to start?

Ms Tompkinson: Thank you very much, good
morning, ladies and gentlemen. I am Niki
Tompkinson, I am the Director of the Transport
Security and Contingencies Directorate, which is a
unit which sits within the Department for Transport,
so I am responsible to the Secretary of State for
Transport. The responsibilities within my unit,
which is known as TRANSEC, are focused on
protective security for all of the transport industry,
so we have programmes that go across land,
maritime and aviation. Our job is to protect the
transport industries, primarily from acts of
terrorism, so we are essentially a counter-terrorist
unit as opposed to security for counter-crime or
other reasons. Our job is not to deliver the security
because that is done by the transport industries, but
to set the standards, write the programmes for
security that the industries are required to carry out
and we have powers under various bits of legislation
which enable us to direct the industries to carry out
protective security measures. Then we have teams of
inspectors that can also go and inspect the level of
compliance. Within Government, as well as being
within the Department for Transport, we are very
much part of the cross-government counter-terrorist
community, programmes of work that come under
CONTEST, the counter-terrorist strategy and our
work fits into that as well.

Q238 Chairman: I will stop you there, Brodie Clark.
Mr Clark: Good morning, I am Brodie Clark, I am
the Head of the UK Border Force; that is within the
current UK Border Agency in the Home Office. The
Border Force has a responsibility primarily around
illegal and illicit goods coming into the country and
illegal people coming into the country. We have
9,000 staff currently deployed on that, we operate at
the border and we have a very large scale intelligence
capability but we also have some more immediate
direct intervention capability and some very close
links and liaison across other policing and criminal
justice agencies and of course the Office of Security
and Counter-Terrorism within the Home Office.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I am Bernard Hogan-
Howe, Chief Constable of Merseyside, but invited to
appear before you today as a Chief Constable for
ACPO who represents ACPO on maritime issues.
Just to say briefly for those members who may not

27 January 2009 General Sir David Richards KCB CBE DSO ADC Gen and Brigadier James Everard OBE
be aware, there are 43 Police Services in England and Wales and a further eight in Scotland and Northern Ireland and there are some services which go right across the UK, for example the Serious and Organised Crime Agency and the British Transport Police. ACPO, the Association of Chief Police Officers, tries to draw together some issues that link us all; we have committees and we have people who lead on various issues. I lead on maritime. Maritime is split into four areas: one is around maritime planning, which essentially is around crime, so trying to stop criminals who are at sea or trying to get into this country, maybe linked to drugs, maybe linked to guns, but that type of event, or where crime is committed at sea—for example, on a cruise ship, somebody is assaulted—so trying to make sure we get into this country, maybe linked to drugs, maybe linked to guns, and also at both a local, tactical and strategic level can bring all the pieces together. The way it works on maritime, in fact, it actually mirrors the Government’s counter-terrorism approach; whether it is on land, in the air or at sea we have very similar processes and procedures in place so that all of us know exactly what we need to do and who we need to talk to. I would say that it works well the way the cake is cut at the moment; it could be cut in a different way but you would just have joins in a different place.

Mr Clark: Could I comment? The key is co-ordination and relationships and the co-ordination is very, very powerful and increasingly so. If I take the work that we do in terms of the UK watch list—that is a watch list of people whom a whole range of agencies will have concerns about—if the individuals on that watch list were to enter the UK, we do that on behalf of other agencies, including the security services, and that is a very effective piece of work across government, delivered by one agency on behalf of others. The connection and co-ordination at a senior level and a strategic and tactical level is good. It shows itself in things like the intelligence-sharing and data-sharing activity that goes on and I think also at local level there are very, very good examples where UK Border Agency Staff and Special Branch staff work hand-in-glove in terms of security issues. We have recently signed an MOU with ACPO in terms of security issues at the border. My final comment is, as Niki said, you could cut it in a different way but the risk is you disconnect border security from national security inland and there would be, I think, even greater dangers in doing that.

Q241 Chairman: Would anybody like to add anything? By the way, you do not have to, just because there are four of you, answer every question in quadruplicate. Mr Hogan-Howe.
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I would really just echo what people have said. I am sure that in some ways we could improve but I do not think at the moment there is a need for a standing person or body to actually try and co-ordinate because I think what each of us brings is a strength in our own area. We have some very good links in terms of trying to prevent crime or in terms of links with the military around counter-terrorism; in the event that something moved from a threat to something actually happening we have got some very well-tried systems that work well. We exercise well together, and that is not just the police and the military but also right across these groups we have similar training. There are things that sound, I agree, on the face of it to be confusing, we seem to be potentially disorganised, but it works well so that those who have most expertise in the area in which they are organised bring that to the party, and then when we need to work together we do.

Q242 Chairman: As a matter of interest do your IT systems talk to each other?  
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: They do, certainly, in terms of the sharing of information about people embarking and disembarking at ports—not every IT system will talk; our HR system probably would not talk to another HR system.

Q243 Chairman: Even within the police the IT systems do not always talk to each other.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I plead guilty on that one. Certainly, so far as there is a need to then the IS-IS IT system is very good. The main thing is that we share, as Brodie has said, the intelligence, certainly through the Navy, through the National Ports Analysis Centre which happens to sit in Merseyside on behalf of the Police Service, we have an opportunity to share intelligence in a way that helps us all to do our job.

Q244 Mr Jenkins: There was a phrase that Mr Clark used; he said “doing work on behalf of others”, is that correct?  
Mr Clark: I think that is correct, yes.

Q245 Mr Jenkins: Who pays for it?  
Mr Clark: There is a variety of arrangements in terms of how the funding comes to the department who is doing the delivery on behalf of others. If I consider the e-borders option, the Joint Border Operation Centre—which is staffed, interestingly enough, by Border Agency staff but also staffed by police, by representatives from the Serious Organised Crime Agency—a range of organisations share in the operation of that centre and they have contributed to the cost of delivering the e-border programme.

Q246 Mr Jenkins: As long as it is a shared operation it is a shared cost, but when you go outside your remit and do something on behalf of others, normally you re-allocate the costings; do you negotiate that between the different groups?  
Mr Clark: It depends on the scale and the nature of the issue or operation. If it is a large-scale programme or project around, say, IT delivery then one would seek to negotiate a cost-sharing as well, the benefit and the share of the cost ought to be shared. If it is a short term operational piece of activity that invariably does not get shared; that is simply contributing to the activity and business of another part of government in the interest of a higher common purpose.

Q247 Mr Jenkins: “In the interest of a higher common purpose.” If you have a lot of negotiation and discussion between these agencies surely the higher common purpose should be to have unity and increase the efficiency and effectiveness. Whilst you all may have separate entities a co-ordinated body might be a bit more efficient, do you not think?  
Mr Clark: In terms of our experience as we currently are that sharing operates very effectively and I know I have no concerns or issues I would want to raise with the Committee of any dysfunctional nature around that sharing. It works to the higher common purpose, we respond and we have responses from other agencies.

Q248 Mr Jenkins: No one has any disregard for the fact that you make it work; it is commendable that you make it work, but is it the best system, that is what I am asking?  
Mr Clark: If you take it in the round you are almost back, if I may say, to one of the earlier questions of the Chairman.

Q249 Mr Jenkins: Oh yes, and I might come back again until we get the right answer.  
Mr Clark: I would give the same answer as I gave before, that there are other risks in terms of creating one single entity which would try and capture the whole security agenda. I do not want to repeat things unnecessarily.

Q250 Chairman: In answer to the question who pays for it, presumably what follows from what you have said is that there is no regime, it is worked out on an ad hoc basis.

Mr Clark: It is worked out on a case by case basis.

Q251 John Smith: It does seem a very complex arrangement to us. If I put the question round another way, do you identify any gaps in the co-ordination between the different agencies that could be filled? That is the first question. On the subject of how well do you co-ordinate between yourselves, how well did you co-ordinate during the coastguard dispute which resulted in industrial action which greatly reduced the monitoring capability of sea-going craft around our waters for quite some considerable time. Was that discussed? Was that covered? Were there any potential security implications?  
Ms Tompkinson: I wonder if I could just start by saying a little bit about the overall governance of co-ordination and then perhaps pass to Rod to talk
about the specific question, because we should not leave you with the impression that we are all doing our own jobs and from time to time ring each other up and there is a casual sort of co-ordination. There is that, of course, because we know each other and work together but there is also quite a clear structure within Government. There is the CONTEST programme, the counter-terrorist programme, which is run by the Home Office so you have a clear driving point and ownership in the Home Office and going up to the Home Secretary, of the whole programme, all of the work that fits together, and then it breaks down into its individual strands until you get down to the tactical level and the programmes that we are all delivering. Everything that we are doing, therefore, is overseen both by ministerial and official level committees, any gaps can be identified or if any of us are having any difficulty in co-ordination—I cannot think of one recently—there are structures there for us to go to to bring it closely together. At the more tactical level there are committees both within departments and more broadly that will make sure that the co-ordination is in place, so it is not just done on an ad hoc casual basis but we are all accountable to a structure. On the Coastguard question I might turn to Rod to say something about that.

Mr Johnson: Thank you. Mr Smith, during the industrial disputes last year contingency plans were put into operation and all of our delivery functions were delivered upon—vessel tracking information that we normally pass to the security services was passed as normal, the act of monitoring of the Dover Strait carried on as normal, all of our functions were delivered upon through our contingency plan. I do not think there was any breakdown during the industrial dispute and during the contingency plans for that we were in daily contact with partners in other government departments to just assure them that the service would be provided and to make them aware of our plans.

Q252 John Smith: But no gaps anywhere.

Mr Johnson: We are a provider of information to the other agencies but my view is that the strength of a multi-agency co-ordinated approach is that in peacetime individual agencies can focus on their core business and then when required to ramp up for an operation the whole is greater than the sum of its parts—a wider variety of expertise can be brought into play than perhaps could be done by a single monolithic operation, and that is in fact from the concept of operations to the Government’s maritime emergency response in the UK.

Q253 Chairman: Do you mean the coastguards can go on strike and no detriment to the service is felt?

Mr Johnson: The contingency plans that we put in place ensured that our delivery for search and rescue co-ordination and traffic monitoring was fulfilled. Had we been unable to deliver upon that through our contingency plans then as a Category One responder under the Civil Contingencies Act we would have advised other government departments that that was not going to be the case, but in the case of last year’s industrial disputes we did continue to deliver upon our functions.

Q254 Chairman: Is that yes?

Mr Johnson: That is a yes.

Mr Clark: Can I respond to the no gaps question because there is a piece of work which is now underway looking to just address that issue and see across government whether and what the gaps are. That is a piece of work that was commissioned arising from the Cabinet Office review on the Security in a Global Hub paper. That work is well in train and that is looking to see whether there are areas that the collaboration might look to address or not, and that is coming to the stage of a consultation process across government and across other interested and involved departments.

Q255 Chairman: What is the timescale of that?

Mr Clark: The first draft of that went out for consultation last Friday so we have two or three months to run before we feel comfortable that we have got the final model.

Q256 Chairman: Could we have a copy of that?

Mr Clark: Yes, of course.

Q257 Mr Jenkin: We have no evidence to suggest that the co-ordination between your various activities is not commendable, and in fact it is welcome to hear that any potential gaps have been addressed. I remain anxious about what the command chain is like in a real crisis. Take the MV Nisha accident, for example, who was in charge?

Ms Tomkinson: Shall I start off by describing the processes? I was not there at the time of the MV Nisha but when an incident happens, or during a time of extreme threat, then there is both a strategic and a tactical response. At the strategic level that means convening COBR [Cabinet Office Briefing Room] and if it is an incident or an extreme threat at home then the Home Office and the Home Secretary would be in the lead and if it is overseas the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary would be in the lead, and all of the key departments would be in the COBR room at either ministerial or official level addressing, at a strategic level, what the incident was and what the appropriate Government response would be. At a tactical level the relevant police force would take command and would address the incident and call upon such resources as the police need, whether it be in a maritime context from the Coastguard or from the Navy or from anybody else, and the relationship between the two bodies is such that if there is an issue around resources or needing more help then the police in command can come to COBR and request assistance but also request strategic guidance to the handling of the incident. That is broadly the way it works. I do not know whether you want to add to that.
Q258 Mr Jenkin: But there is Gold command. Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: The only thing I would add to what Niki has said is that during this last year we have changed slightly the command structure. What is said is that in the event that the vessel is not under control then the Police Service has limited opportunities to intervene in that sort of scenario and therefore what is said is that if the local force where the vessel is does not have the opportunity to intervene it is hardly a good idea to give it responsibility. The change that has therefore happened this year is that the National Coordinator Terrorist Investigations, the Deputy Assistant Commissioner in the Met, John McDowell, will take the lead not only in investigation of counter-terrorism incidents but in managing that incident if it is an incident that is on-going, so that person would be the Gold if the vessel is not under control. As Niki has said it works to a Gold, Silver and Bronze mechanism. We have limited facilities to operate at sea or even on the water so generally that means that there will be a request for assistance through the MACP process and that is managed through COBR, but COBR has to be convened and obviously those requests will go in. Generally the line command is pretty good; we have enhanced it this year and what does happen is that if a vessel which has not been under control moves under control or moves alongside the local Chief Constable would then take control of the immediate incident because they have all the resource in place, but the National Coordinator Terrorist Investigations leads the investigation into any terrorism crime that may have been committed on that vessel. We think we have a simple process which has stood us in good stead and we exercise regularly. There are three grades of exercise for that type of counter-terrorism response per year and certainly last year we have changed slightly the command structure. What is said is that in SO15, which is the counter-terrorism unit within the Metropolitan Police, there is a level of expertise. The final element I would lay on that is that in SO15, which is the counter-terrorism unit within the Metropolitan Police, there is an urgent need for the Police Service to sit here and say that it is the highest priority we have ever had, but I think you can be reassured that there is a level of expertise and on top of that, apart from the expertise that our colleagues who generally work in maritime have, you have also the ports themselves and some of them have their own port police. There is a level of experience, therefore, and through the ACPO committees we keep some good, broad policies and we exercise. Just as an example of where we can show that we are rigorous in making sure that we are match fit, in February all the port commanders will be going around and peer-assessing their colleagues around the coast, so they will all move up one and test whether they say is happening is happening. It has never been the highest priority for any land-based force—you will all know that there are many priorities for the Police Services—so I am not going to sit here and say that it is the highest priority we have ever had, but I think you can be reassured that there is a level of expertise. The final element I would lay on that is that in SO15, which is the counter-terrorism unit within the Metropolitan Police, there are certain officers who are trained particularly around a maritime environment. The idea there is that if ever there is a situation on a ship and the police have to go on after the situation has been restored to normality, they are trained to try and help in both restoring normality, gathering evidence and making sure that suspects and victims are handled in a professional way.

Q259 Mr Jenkin: That Gold commander would make the tactical assessment of the nature of the threat and might have to decide whether to call in military assistance; he would be making that decision. Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: That person has to make that decision, yes. As I say, to a large extent in a maritime environment we have limited capacity so quite often we are immediately seeking some military response.

Q260 Mr Holloway: Given that this could happen in any one of the very large number of police forces is there not a danger of a lack of experience in dealing with these things at a tactical level and, given that, if it is offshore one is going to get the Royal Navy or the Royal Marines to deal with it, is there not an argument for them to have responsibility from the outset? Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: Of what?

Q261 Mr Holloway: From the outset of any incident. They should have responsibility now. Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: In terms of is there a chance that there will be limited experience then that is likely. There are 33 forces that are coastal within England, Scotland and Wales so not all forces have that experience. They do exercise, but they have not all exercised regularly and they certainly have not all experienced a counter-terrorism incident, so there is some danger of lack of expertise in that sense. What you probably have to realise is that we have a pretty good system of portal control around the country anyway in terms of Police Services. We have divided the coast into nine areas, three in Scotland and six in England and Wales; there is a regional ACC (Assistant Chief Constable) in each of those regions, they pull together the portal commanders every one to three months—they have a system of meeting—and they then work together with all the agencies around security plans around the ports. There is, therefore, a level of expertise and on top of that, apart from the expertise that our colleagues who generally work in maritime have, you have also the ports themselves and some of them have their own port police. There is a level of experience, therefore, and through the ACPO committees we keep some good, broad policies and we exercise. Just as an example of where we can show that we are rigorous in making sure that we are match fit, in February all the port commanders will be going around and peer-assessing their colleagues around the coast, so they will all move up one and test whether they say is happening is happening. It has never been the highest priority for any land-based force—you will all know that there are many priorities for the Police Services—so I am not going to sit here and say that it is the highest priority we have ever had, but I think you can be reassured that there is a level of expertise. The final element I would lay on that is that in SO15, which is the counter-terrorism unit within the Metropolitan Police, there are certain officers who are trained particularly around a maritime environment. The idea there is that if ever there is a situation on a ship and the police have to go on after the situation has been restored to normality, they are trained to try and help in both restoring normality, gathering evidence and making sure that suspects and victims are handled in a professional way.

Q262 Mr Holloway: Do you think it has gone too far the way that the police with their tactical teams are attempting to do jobs that previously had been done by military people who spend their entire careers rehearsing for these sorts of things? Are the police trying to do too much in explosive entry, boarding ships and so on? Do you think a line has been crossed, have the police gone too far?
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I do not think so really. There are two things; there is the general situation where we use that type of tactic, which is really against criminals, and then if you move into the maritime environment we do not have an awful lot of capacity to do the types of things you have just described so we do really rely on the military. There are some areas of the country where we can, with consent, board ships and test whether or not the people are on them, but there are other agencies who get involved in that more than we do. Generally I do not think we have crossed that line and the reality of life is that if some of the other specialist skills are not available someone has to take action, so I think if some of the other specialist skills are not available we generally to do with criminals. As soon as you get into the counter-terrorism environment we are generally falling back on the military and then compound that by a huge factor when you move into the maritime environment.

Q263 Chairman: There is a National Maritime Security Committee; what does it do?
Ms Tompkinson: That is a committee that I chair within the Department. It is one of our key fora for bringing Government and industry together so its main focus is on the protective security programme that the industry delivers, so we will talk to the industry about the measures that they have to deliver, about their preparedness for going to a higher level, but also at that committee we bring in other colleagues from other departments—the police are represented there, John Donlon who is the National Coordinator Ports Policing is there and the Ministry of Defence is represented there and the Maritime and Coastguard Agency is there. We have around the table, therefore, all of the stakeholders in maritime security, albeit in this particular forum most of the focus is on protective security and preparedness.

Q264 Chairman: There has just been a new Ports Security Directive; what does it do?
Ms Tompkinson: We are working on that with the police. It has come out of a European directive so it is as a consequence of the gradual stepping up of protective security that has been worked on and implemented really since 9/11 and then in about 2004 the implementation of the International Code. It was then transposed into European law and the Ports Security Directive is a final piece of that which was then transposed into European law and the Ports Security Directive was not a huge leap; a lot of it was in place already on the ground and the Ports Security Directive has formalised it if you like.

Q265 Chairman: What impact is that going to have?
Ms Tompkinson: It is bringing together different elements within a port because the whole issue of the definition of a port is actually different from one country to another, so in terms of port security and the individual programmes if you take one of the larger ports there will be lots of elements of facilities within that port, some of which need security and some of which do not. The European Directive requires us to take the port as a whole and we were keen to make sure that that did not result in protective security where none was needed. But nevertheless within an area—some ports are very easily defined and others might be strung along a large area—we take an area that we define a port and ensure that within that area there are people who are accountable for delivery of security as a whole as well as the individual pieces.

Q266 Mr Jenkin: What does it implement that we would not otherwise implement?
Ms Tompkinson: They were doing that and we would say that implementing the Ports Security Directive was not a huge leap; a lot of it was in place already on the ground and the Ports Security Directive has formalised it if you like.

Q267 Mr Jenkin: Were we not doing that already?
Ms Tompkinson: They were doing that and we would say that implementing the Ports Security Directive was not a huge leap; a lot of it was in place already on the ground and the Ports Security Directive has formalised it if you like.

Q268 Chairman: There are new Police Portal regions; how is that going to help?
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: The main thing is, certainly as I took over this particular portfolio, it seemed to me that there was a need, as Mr Jenkin said to, firstly, start to corral expertise and develop it; secondly, to have recognised leads within certain areas and also to recognise, as I say, that we tend to look inwards to the land and we do not always look outwards to obviously the sea and how that particular community organises itself. If you look at the way that, for example, ships approach this country, you obviously have western approaches, you have the ships that come in through the south, you have got the North Sea entrances, and we needed to some extent to try and mimic the way that the sea ports were operating. Secondly, there was some organisation already between the ports themselves because obviously they have sometimes conflicting transport arrangements and they have things that they need to talk about, so the idea was to try to get the ACCs to talk to the Commanders in each of the ports from the police perspective and make sure that we got consistency. By putting a senior officer in there it helps to make sure that you do get the consistency. We get regular exercising and in the event that we have questions on policy we are well-informed when we ask for those leads. It seems to help at that level.

Q269 John Smith: Are there any different arrangements for the devolved parts of the country? I noticed when you were talking about your areas you did not mention Northern Ireland, for example. There is another layer of government, there is another layer of agency and I wonder whether that creates problems?
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: It does not particularly refer to that. Just one thing that I ought to remark is that the Association of Chief Police Officers covers England, Wales and Northern Ireland and there is a separate arrangement for Scotland, but we work together, so on most of our committees we have Scottish representation, for example, and on my committee there is a Scottish representative who represents the Scottish position. There are some jurisdictional issues but everyone is aware that there is a separate legal jurisdiction in Scotland and from time to time those issues have to be resolved. If you think back to the bombing of Glasgow Airport and the bomb attack that happened just prior to that in London, there were jurisdictional issues that had to be resolved because some of the offenders who had committed offences, it is alleged, in London were arrested in Scotland, so from time to time there are things that we all have to work on. One reality is that we share a military response so far as the areas that I have a responsibility for are concerned we work together to make sure that we have a joint response to any counter-terrorist threat and security in that respect is not a devolved power, that is one that I believe is a reserved power retained by the United Kingdom Government. That does not cause us any particular problems and we work very well with our Scottish colleagues to make sure that we have a common response. The way we do that most often is that a Scottish representative sits on my committee. It is also true in terms of Northern Ireland; possibly I forgot to mention Northern Ireland but you will remember that I said that there were three areas that we divided Scotland into and that matches across the Irish Sea over to the Northern Ireland side, and they are included.

Q270 John Smith: What about other departments?
Ms Tompkinson: As Bernard said security is not a devolved issue so our directions apply equally across the UK and we will deal with industry across the UK.
Mr Clark: I can confirm that that is exactly the same with the UK Border Agency; it is not devolved, we work with ACPOS, the Scottish ACPO, we work with officials in Scotland in terms of our engagement and activities in Scotland and in Ireland.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I have to say that of all of the things we were asked at the beginning about gaps, what you could do better, the Gold, Silver, Bronze system and our links with the military work very well. It really is not something that worries me. The unity of command in a maritime environment is, in fact, the best that we have throughout the country in terms of counter-terrorism because we now have the certainty that the National Co-ordinator for Terrorist Investigations is the person who is in charge of the police response and is also the link with the military, so I honestly think that that is a very well-established process. Each of the 43 forces, plus the eight plus the one, exercises regularly in terms of counter-terrorism.

Q272 Mr Holloway: How did it go with the MV Nisha then?
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: Equally I was not around at the time.

Q273 Mr Holloway: Neither was Ms Tompkinson but you must have learnt something from it.
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I understand there were concerns about that but it did get resolved. Frankly, at the time, it was one of the first after the first type of incidents in that environment that they had all had to cope with. Obviously, as you may know, it came from a very quick piece of intelligence where they had to react quickly, so I think people learnt an awful lot of lessons from that and in fact the committee that I now have, that was one of the direct results and the multi-agency group as I explained earlier around counter-terrorism was a direct result of that event because there was a feeling at the time that more co-ordination and planning could have taken place, and exercising, to make sure that we were all co-ordinated better. I am not going to sit here and say it is perfect but I honestly think it is far better than that particular example which is now a reasonable number of years ago.

Mr Clark: It is back to this co-ordination issue in terms of the operational activity. In the UK Border Force we have five cutters, five ships that we use; a lot of the time of those ships is used in terms of the business of the UK Border Agency but we are there also to respond to other agencies and other issues as our help is sought. We work very closely with the Royal Navy, we are part of the exercises that the Royal Navy deliver, we are part of the scenario planning that the Royal Navy takes forward, we are part of some of the more detailed pieces of training that go on in the Royal Navy and we have been deployed successfully over the last six months on a number of very major operations involving the Royal Navy and the police and ourselves. In terms of the command structure, that has worked effectively.

Q274 Mr Holloway: You seem happy in terms of the command arrangements but do you think you need more capacity?
Ms Tompkinson: On my side, which is very focused on what the industry is delivering, we have a capacity for being out at the ports, the airports and elsewhere and checking on what the industry is doing; you could always have more, you could always increase that amount of oversight, but in practice we do a pretty good job with what we have got and the industry responds very responsibly to the requirements that are placed upon them.
Chairman: I suspect we remain as a Committee with the impression that you spend a great deal of your time in committee meetings co-ordinating things. Would that be an unfair impression for us to be left with?

My colleagues have expressed it very eloquently and I share their view; it would be unjustified to suggest that we spend all of our time in meetings, we are spending most of our time actually delivering.
are a lot of exchanges about what the US are doing, what we are doing and to see where we can learn from each other. That has been very profitable.

Q283 Chairman: If there were a terrorist incident just outside territorial waters, or perhaps moving in and out of territorial waters, are there different procedures and are these different procedures generally understood?

Ms Tompkinson: At the strategic level, at CBRA, we would have all the players there anyway; if it was moving in and out of territorial waters then I would expect the Home Office in practice to take the lead given that you are going to be focused on the territorial aspect of it. Tactically again I would look to the police to answer that.

Chief Constable Hogan- Howe: There is a series of questions any government would have to ask as to whether it intervened outside territorial waters such as which port is the ship coming from, which one is it going to, which affects the jurisdictional issues. Then, who are the passengers? Who owns the ship? Who operates the ship? What nationality is the crew? The answer to all that gives you the legal answer and of course then there is a political answer as to whether or not the Government wants to intervene and it may depend, I suppose, how far outside territorial waters it was and where the ship was going. If it is parked there I am sure if we were the ones with the nearest opportunity to actually intervene and people wanted us to intervene I am sure there would be huge pressure for the UK to take action. If, however, the ship is sailing past and going to France or another country, presumably it may be that we cannot react quickly enough, so I think an awful lot of questions have to be asked before a government would make a decision about that particular outcome because obviously the deployment of the military is a big decision for any government to make and it needs to be sure it is on solid legal ground. If it is going in and out of the 12-mile limit it seems to me it complicates it a little but if it is at any time within the territorial waters it probably becomes a little easier. Those are the sorts of questions any COBR would be asking before they committed. I have no doubt that while those legal questions were being resolved we would all be preparing to intervene in the best way that we thought we could.

Q284 Chairman: All of this relies extremely heavily, it seems to me, on a COBR meeting.

Chief Constable Hogan- Howe: Yes. Those COBR meetings are very well practised, they have actually operated in real time quite often in recent years, unfortunately, and they can be brought up to speed very, very quickly once the threat is identified and that is something that probably, in the circumstances you describe, will primarily be the responsibility of the Government to decide how to respond. The police would take primacy if it was decided that it was a crime in action which the UK was going to take responsibility for and I suspect the military would be called on very quickly in the event that we decided to take both jurisdiction and responsibility.

Q285 Linda Gilroy: How do you interact with other countries which overlap in the waters outside the 12-mile limit? Presumably there is some mechanism for doing that, and for identifying threats.

Chief Constable Hogan- Howe: There are two mechanisms really, I suppose. The Department for Transport is one clear mechanism because they have a security responsibility around transport generally and obviously we have security services who share intelligence between security services.

Q286 Linda Gilroy: How does the MoD fit into that?

If in the middle of all of this you suddenly have what is basically a threat from a vessel that has fallen through the nets of all the surveillance that you have, which becomes something that would demand a military response, how does that happen?

Chief Constable Hogan- Howe: The practical bit is that if COBR is sitting, which is led either by the Prime Minister or by the minister in the relevant department, which in these circumstances probably would be the Home Office, so it could be the Home Secretary or the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Defence are sat around the table and the military assets cannot be deployed—there is a well-established convention for this—without ministerial approval. The Police Service cannot deploy them so the Government have to be satisfied they have a legal jurisdiction, there is intelligence or there is a case for deployment. That is the way it is generally operated.

Ms Tompkinson: In terms of dealing with other countries the Foreign Office will of course take the lead because they will also be there, so if there was an issue around ensuring that we had the right links with another country then the Foreign Office would arrange that.

Q287 Mr Jenkin: I represent a coastal constituency in North Essex with nuclear power stations nearby, we have got Felixstowe and Harwich fairly nearby, we are all sitting at our desks not in meetings, how do we identify maritime threats?

Chief Constable Hogan- Howe: There are a number of ways. In Essex you are very well-positioned in terms of Essex Police because they have eight craft which help to provide some surveillance around the coast, possibly because of the nature of the risk that you mention. Of course, what we have not talked about yet is the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Police who clearly have got the responsibility around the national infrastructure so far as the nuclear facilities are concerned, but first of all there is intelligence gathering which we have all referred to. One, that can be through the intelligence services—what is out there, who is intending to attack us—number two is that you have the intelligence that we share between each of the agencies, so the Coastguard will hold certain intelligence, the Border Agency, the Department for Transport and our own officers, so that is shared.
you recall, we said that that is fed back through something called the National Ports Analysis Centre which checks not only the ship movements where they are seen to be unusual, but also if there is some intelligence about people who are arriving or leaving the country. That is the way that we generally do it and, obviously, if something presents itself in front of us then we have to deal with it.

Q288 Mr Jenkin: Who is actually physically tracking potential threats? We have a chart in our brief which shows the AIS display; who has ownership of that?

Ms Tompkinson: There are systems in place for tracking ships for certain reasons and the coastguard can perhaps talk a bit more about that. From the security point of view as Bernard has said we are informed by threat information that we get from the agencies which enables us to put the right level of security in place in the first place, and then there are other things in place like tracking systems which may well be there for safety and traffic management reasons but which can then be brought into play should they be needed in response to something happening.

Q289 Mr Jenkin: Who is accountable for identifying threats? All this information is churning around, who is actually accountable?

Ms Tompkinson: In terms of going out and getting the information or responding to information coming in?

Q290 Mr Jenkin: Who is responsible for making sure that ships in our coastal waters are not a threat and positively identifying ships as non-threatening?

Mr Clark: We all have a responsibility for that in terms of the groups represented here and we increasingly are improving our processes for sharing that intelligence and that information that we have got. We all have a responsibility for recognising threats and vulnerabilities to the UK as far away from the UK actually as we can get them, then pooling that, and that is back to the co-ordination of intelligence and data leading to some kind of intervention by the right lead government department.

Q291 John Smith: Can you understand why I am not entirely happy with your answers?

Mr Johnson: Now might be a good time for me to pipe up. If it is a question of monitoring commercial shipping traffic—that is everything over 500 tonnes would be fitted with a transponder—that might present a threat to safety or to the environment, then that responsibility is the Coastguard’s, and if a ship represents a threat to safety or the environment we will respond to it. Our information is shared with the Navy at Northwood who build up a recognised maritime picture. We provide them with information, we can provide them with additional information on request about cargo, ownership, last port, movements and when that information is fused with other intelligence a threat may be identified. If it is a security threat that is not a Coastguard matter but if it is a safety or an environmental threat then it is.

Q292 Mr Jenkin: Different people are responsible for different types of threat.

Ms Tompkinson: I think that is true. If a ship itself is in distress then it can send a signal and we can respond to that but what we are trying not to say because it would be misleading is that somebody is watching every vessel out at sea all the time to assess it as a potential security threat, any more than any of us are watching every vehicle on the road all the time to assess it as a potential car bomb or lorry bomb.

Q293 Mr Jenkin: You talked about large ships but in fact the smaller ships do not have AIS or any form of tracking at all.

Ms Tompkinson: At present they do not.

Q294 John Smith: I also have a coastal constituency and, as I am sure you are aware, in the last decade or two there has been an absolute explosion in the number of unregistered pleasure craft going to sea and relatively small boats can carry some pretty horrendous weapons and threats to this country. You are telling me, I understand from what you said, nothing under 300 tonnes is obliged to identify itself; most people using these boats do not have to be qualified or even registered; it is a constant worry to me as to how on earth we can protect ourselves from a maritime threat coming from small, unregistered, unregulated, unidentified craft. I know we depend on intelligence and I know our intelligence is good but is it not time that we looked at the relatively simple technologies that could be used to identify every craft that puts to sea, where it puts to sea and where it is going?

Mr Clark: Part of the review that I mentioned earlier on in terms of looking at the gaps is looking at exactly the issue of small leisure craft and shipping coming into marinas, small ports, coves . . .

Q295 John Smith: There are millions of them.

Mr Clark: Right across the country, and we have to understand that you cannot staff up every small cove in the country to wait for something coming in. It does depend on intelligence and I think you will find a very heavy focus in the review that is under way on looking at local engagement of those who run marinas, those who operate in those areas and a much different scale and type of engagement with those groups to help inform and advise and keep those interested agencies alive to change in threat and risk around those areas. That has to be an area where it is going then it can send a signal and we can respond to that but what we are trying not to say because it would be misleading is that somebody is watching every vessel out at sea all the time to assess it as a potential security threat, any more than any of us are watching every vehicle on the road all the time to assess it as a potential car bomb or lorry bomb.

Q296 John Smith: What about the technology side? If Tesco can track a can of beans around the world, this is relatively simple, inexpensive technology which would require all craft just to have something
on there that could be picked up on—not transponders, but there is technology that is cheap and readily available.

Mr Johnson: First of all with regard to unregulated, if a ship even below 300 tonnes is in commercial use it is regulated, and if it is more than 24 metres in length even in private use you do need qualifications to drive it, so the population you may be looking at, sir, is the under 24 metre pleasure craft which drop out of the bottom of everything.

Q297 John Smith: Of which there are large numbers. Mr Johnson: There are a large number of them. With regard to tracking them the political will to increasingly regulate that sector, even for matters such as drink-driving offences, is not there at the moment so we would be requiring the leisure industry to purchase equipment and stick it on board. If we could monitor them, either visually or by some electronic device, we would also have to assume that somebody who was using them for nefarious purpose would be prepared to keep the transponder active so that we could track it and I would suspect that the only technology that would give you the level of assurance you require would be some form of visual lookout and we do not have the capability to actually watch small craft movements around the coast of the UK. Anything else could be defeated quite simply.

Q298 Chairman: It is a constant worry to John Smith: is that not a constant worry to you? Mr Johnson: My responsibilities are for the protection of life and the environment and I work on the assumption that anybody who needs our help will call for it. With regard to the provision of that information to the security services I have to say that I cannot provide it.

Q299 John Smith: I have port-side chemical plants. I have power stations. I have potential targets built in areas and it just seems to be, on the subject of security gaps, potentially a matter of constant concern.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I share your concerns from a slightly different angle in terms of organised crime, for example, because the vessels we are talking about in terms of weapons or carrying weapons could equally be carrying contraband or drugs, so there is a concern there. One of the policies that we have taken forward with ACPO is that we have something called “Kraken”—“Project Kraken” is a process that assumes that people who work and live in marinas and work in a marine environment notice the unusual. I accept that this is not the technological solution that you are talking about but actually people notice the unusual and will report it if only we ask. They will notice the unusual place that something berths, where it does not come in at night when it should do and that type of thing. That is something that goes right around the coast and it is something like a neighbourhood watch. I suppose, for marinas and ports. I know that the Border Agency also are developing in that particular field and it seems to me that that is important. The other thing of course is that although there may not be regulators within some of the marinas, everybody who runs a marina wants to make money, they still want to maximise their revenue, so they certainly know what is coming in, when it leaves, who it is, whether they are going to get paid, and there is a huge surveillance there, which I accept is not technological, but I think there is something there to hopefully offer some reassurance, particularly around crime but also around counter-terrorism. There is something there that offers some level of reassurance and the other thing is in terms of the CONTEST strategy in terms of counter-terrorism: those things that are positioned by the coast, and you went through a list of some, there are physical measures that can be taken to try and provide some measure of deterrence or prevention if anybody should think about that type of incident that you and we are all concerned about. There are, therefore, some things in place to try and prevent that type of thing which probably did not always get discussed as much as perhaps it could, although of course things are being thought about. Whether it is perfect is always a debate.

Ms Tompkinson: I was just going to make the point that Bernard has just made, that power stations or energy plants that are part of the critical national infrastructure do get protective security advice, not from us directly but from the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, who will advise them on appropriate security for that installation, and if it is within a port area then we will liaise with them so that our programmes are joined up. They do get that advice.

Q300 John Smith: Am I right in concluding that we have the least regulated leisure maritime craft in Europe and North America—our Coastguard friend.

Mr Johnson: I do not know if it is the least regulated but I would say it is quite benign as far as the legislature is concerned, but I do not know where it ranks with other States.

Q301 Mr Holloway: I appreciate what Mr Clark says about being in the real world, but equally I have the Port of London Authority in my constituency and they have an incredibly good picture of exactly what is in the rather large area that they seem to patrol. It sounds like an enormous gap to me; when we are in an environment where there are multiple threats, the sort of thing that happened in Bombay recently, can someone tell me where does Jacqueline Smith or Chris Grayling or whoever is the Home Secretary go when there is a dynamic multiple incident taking place? Where do they go to be told what is where and what is coming from which direction and what ship may have met another ship or whatever it is? Where do they go?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: There are two primary sources and the Coastguard are one of them; they feed their material through to the military and they have a picture, so far as it is possible to
determine it, of those vessels that are around the coast. It is slightly different, is it not, to the air traffic control that we see because of the speed at which aircraft travel, they have to be monitored and managed in a different way to the speed of vessels travelling, but that broadly is the best picture we have, which is available either through the Coastguard or through the military.

Q302 Mr Holloway: But is that good enough?  
Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: Certainly it may not pick up the under 24 metres but there are some environments where that can be picked up. The question is, is it totally comprehensive? Okay, there may be more that can be done but there are some very significant areas that have alternative methods of surveillance that are fed in through the military. I am not sure it fully answers your question to give you total reassurance, but there is a level there that probably could be offered privately.

Mr Holloway: But it is quite a big gap.

Q303 Chairman: The distinction between those vessels that are under 50 metres and those that are under 24 is only that those between 24 and 50 have to have qualified people in charge, but neither of them fall under the AIS regime—if they are under 50 metres they do not fall under the AIS regime, do they?

Mr Johnson: No, they do not.

Q304 Linda Gilroy: I still do not have a clear picture. Chairman, of who owns what. If John’s worst nightmare happens who owns the immediate circumstances so that the response is agile? Jacquie Smith is not going to be the first to know, nor is John Hutton; how do you ensure that it does not fall through the net of all your responsibilities if things are escalated in a speedy and agile sort of way?

Ms Tompkinson: As soon as something is known at the grassroots level. If, for example a ship puts in an alert—the Coastguard will be informed and my staff will be informed. One of the first things they do at a very junior level is to get that information out to all the players and then at a strategic level where Jacquie Smith would come immediately is COBR, which would convene extremely quickly and she would then get the best possible picture that we all have of what is happening, where it is happening and who has got assets to deal with it. By convening CBRA that is immediately where you have all of the expertise, leading out to the home department and agencies to bring it together.

Q305 Linda Gilroy: I am just envisaging that from that very junior level, which is the first to pick up what is an imminent threat, how does it get through to the level of doing something quickly and effectively about it?

Ms Tompkinson: Because it will feed quickly to the Gold commander.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I can see why there is a concern but honestly it does not worry me; that phone call happens very quickly and it gets through very quickly to the highest levels. There is not a bureaucracy to go through; if you get a ship alert that comes through TRANSEC it will fire its way through all the systems very quickly.

Q306 Linda Gilroy: Does that happen? When did you last have such a signal?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: We have had two at least in the last year.

Ms Tompkinson: The ship alerts do happen on a regular basis and so far there has been an innocent explanation for that in the same way that we occasionally get hijack alerts from aircraft. So the system is tried and tested.

Q307 Linda Gilroy: You are confident that junior personnel would be taken seriously.

Ms Tompkinson: Absolutely.

Q308 Linda Gilroy: And it would not be “Are you sure? Go away and check.”

Ms Tompkinson: No, absolutely. Again, these things get exercised so as Bernard said it should move very quickly.

Q309 Mr Jenkin: Mr Clark, the National Security Strategy recommended that UKBA take delivery of some fast patrol boats; have you got them?

Mr Clark: We have got the five cutters which are the fast patrol boats that are reflected there and we got those in the merger between ourselves and HMRC.

Q310 Mr Jenkin: Is that new capacity for you?

Mr Clark: That is new capacity. It is capacity that was there within the Customs Group but it is now part of the UKBA set of interventions that we have got in place.

Q311 Mr Jenkin: Do you think that is exactly what the NSS was recommending?

Mr Clark: I think so.

Q312 Mr Jenkin: Can you describe what they are?

Mr Clark: They are 42 feet long, they travel at 20 knots, they take a staff of 12 people, they are deployed around the country, normally on a tactical/threat assessment basis but they can be deployed to support other agencies in following their critical operational activities. Each of them has within it a rigid inflatable boat which can take five people; they can travel at 35 knots—I can carry on with the description if you want.

Q313 Mr Jenkin: Is five enough? We have a large coastline.

Mr Clark: Yes, we have a large coastline but my earlier point was that you have to make sensible and reasonable judgments and decisions on the basis of the risk and the threat around the UK. We will deploy those five effectively and they will add to the value of security for the UK border.

Q314 Mr Jenkin: Has Northern Ireland got one, has Scotland got one?
Mr Clark: They are not allocated in that way. They are allocated around the UK in terms of what the assessment at any time is in terms of threat or risk, so they are not linked to a particular part of the coast. Invariably the greater part of the deployment is around the southern parts of the coast and the eastern parts of the coast but that does not exclude other areas where we will go and test risk from time to time.

Q315 Mr Jenkin: Generally would further surveillance capacity and interdiction capacity be helpful—and this is a question for all the witnesses really—or do you feel you are adequately covered?

Mr Clark: Can I make a couple of comments? This is a risk assessment business, it is not one model fits every part of the country, so in a sense your conversations, lots of people talking together, are bringing together threats and risks around the UK in order to know where best to deploy those resources that between us we have actually got, separately and in support of each other. In a sense of course all of us could use more resource, but actually there is a reasonableness around what we have and that is deployed on the basis of risk and threat.

Q316 Mr Jenkin: You have got enough and nobody is going to highlight any shortages?

Mr Clark: Not highlighting concerning threats and risks to the UK but always if there are more resources you could further develop technologies and of course we would all welcome that, but what we have we are delivering individually as agencies and also together.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: One thing I would support Brodie in is that if you remember I said there were 43 forces of which 12 have a marine capacity, boats of various sizes and various types, which means around 115 vessels of which a third, broadly, are with the Ministry of Defence. If you take the Ministry of Defence as an example, they will be grouped around their particular assets to make sure that they protect and assist in surveillance around their assets, but if you follow Brodie's line in the event that you need to move some of those resources around the coastline, then that is what we would need to do. Forces have invested in that type of asset, as has the Government. The boats are the things that are quite expensive to buy and it is putting the staff in them that makes them expensive to run. Of course, you could make an argument that every coastal force ought to have some capacity but not all parts of the coast are navigable by the types of boats that we would have, so there is a reasonableness test. We have got a capacity, however, for the Police Service to deploy in terms of surveillance, which takes me back to one of my first points: if you want to confront something like an oil tanker it would not be a wise option. There are some things they can do but they cannot do everything. Do we need to invest hugely in that at the moment, I would think not.

Mr Clark: Where we see higher risk we look to share and invest and we have got some shared investment with Kent Police in terms of a launch that they have; we operate that in effect together for our joint interests.

Q317 Mr Holloway: Who has patrol boats for example in our ports? Is it the police and Coastguard?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: It is quite a mixture if you go around the coast and you could have a map of where all these boats are positioned. Then of course you have got the Private Port Police in some places who have their own craft as well so there is certainly a significant surveillance capacity.

Q318 Chairman: You have just told us that there are 115 vessels available, of which about a third are owned by the Ministry of Defence, When Minister Ainsworth was in front of us Mr Jenkin asked: “How many vessels are available to Her Majesty's Government, Royal Navy, Coastguard and other government agencies, for coastal protection?” The answer was: “We have two frigates effectively, one fleet-ready escort available at short notice, and we then have another frigate that can supplement that [. . . ] Then we have got three river-class offshore patrol vessels and there is always one minesweeper.” That does not sound to me like a third of 115.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: Chairman, I saw that transcript and I think the gentleman who was answering may have been answering a different question. I think what they were being asked was “What is your military capacity to respond to something at sea if there is a need for military intervention?” The Ministry of Defence Police retain some small craft for surveillance and when I answered Mr Jenkin those are the numbers I was talking about. Generally we would operate within rivers, to some extent at sea and, to be honest, I do not know exactly how we operate all the time. The numbers I am talking about include the smaller craft, not what might be seen as the sea-going fleet, so that may be a reason for the discrepancy but obviously I do not know exactly why that gentleman answered in the way he did. That was how I read it.

Q319 Chairman: How many Ministry of Defence vessels, of whatever size, would you say were available to do some of this surveillance or responding work?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I think the figure is 45.

Q320 Chairman: What about other agencies?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: The main agencies you have sat here; they are the two main ones, and then the balance of the 115 is obviously the Police Service, then also you have the vessels that the Coastguard and the Border Agency have.

Q321 Chairman: The police have roughly what?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: It is of the order of 70.
Q322 Chairman: And the Coastguards have how many?
Mr Johnson: We have five inshore patrol boats currently in commission: one in the Thames Estuary, one in the Solent, one in the South West and two in Scotland, one on each coast.

Q323 Chairman: And the UK Border Agency?
Mr Clark: Five.

Q324 Chairman: You have got the five you have just been talking about. TRANSEC?
Ms Tompkinson: We do not own any maritime assets but the ports that we regulate do—we do not require a written handover back so the police assume control of that operation and then, at the end of the operation, they hand over control of the military’s assets because they clearly have the documentary handover; the police are not responsible for them. They have got elsewhere.

Q325 Mr Jenkin: How does MACA work—Military Aid to the Civil Authorities? How does that liaise with the Ministry of Defence work? How does the process work in the way of responsibility?
Ms Tompkinson: If it was a request for military aid, as we said earlier the request would come from the police to COBR and would be discussed at COBR with either the Prime Minister or the Home Secretary, or whichever minister was in the lead, to agree whether or not that should be granted, and that would come with a plan as to why the request was being made and what military aid was going to be put in place.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: In the event that the military do deploy to take action there is a documentary handover of responsibility because one of the things that I hope has come out up to now is that in the event of a crime, even if it is counter-terrorism—terrorism is a crime so the police retain primacy in terms of the investigation of the crime even if it cannot intervene immediately, and then there is a handover of power to the military to take that action, with a written handover between the Gold of the police and the senior officer for the military, but that has to be signed off by the Government.

Q326 Mr Jenkin: Because of the Gold command chain that you have described, in a crisis those military assets required to handle the crisis would be under the ultimate command of that civilian Gold commander.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: Not at the point at which they were taking action. That is the purpose of the documentary handover; the police are handing over control—they are not handing over control of the military’s assets because they clearly have control of that but they hand over control of that operation and then, at the end of the operation, there is a written handover back so the police assume primacy if they take over an investigation.

Q327 Mr Jenkin: In the event of a crisis there may well be a senior military figure who then is running the crisis at a tactical level.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: Usually there are two; there is one who sits in COBR, as there would be a senior police officer sitting there, and then there would be a commander on the ground obviously.

Q328 Mr Jenkin: Are you confident there is sufficient permanent liaison between that potential Gold commander you describe in the anti-terrorist branch and the Ministry of Defence? What level of continuing co-operation is there in order to ensure that MoD and the Armed Forces and the police understand each other’s mode of operation and capabilities?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: If you were to characterise it I would say excellent. From time to time different people will be sat in the chair because sometimes the military will bring different resources to the party depending on what the problem is, and occasionally it may be that the Gold commander from the Police Service is in a different part of the country, but we exercise together very often. What you have also had over the last three to five years of the counter-terrorist operation that has happened in this country is that there has been a growing experience of the police working with the military because that is what events have driven us towards, so the National Coordinator Terrorist Investigations who has been in the past, as you know, Peter Clarke, now John McDowell, Andy Hayman and now Bob Quick, they are in very regular contact with the military during their working lives anyway so then from time to time they will come together for this committee to deal with a particular high profile or very dangerous situation. That operates in two ways. You have the COBR situation which is when something sometimes literally but definitely has the potential for blowing up and becoming a very serious matter, and then it is not irregular to have the Emergency Liaison Groups, which are happening right around the country, reasonably regularly. Where there is a terrorist threat the local force has to deal with it, the Metropolitan Police are involved and other agencies, and the way to manage that operation is by something called an ELG which takes place in the police force area where it happens and there will also be a parallel event happening in London. For those two reasons both the COBR experience and the Emergency Liaison Group experience are well-tested and at the relationship level they know each pretty well and trust each other. Again, that is not something I would be particularly concerned about at this stage.

Q329 John Smith: A good test of the effectiveness of all this is the frequency of joint exercises, and you said you often have exercises. How often, who initiates them and who pays for them? Do the military regularly participate given the pressures they have got elsewhere?

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: Certainly in terms of counter-terrorism operations generally there are three exercises that will happen every year: one is called Remount—and that is not the name of the...
particular operation, one type of exercise is called Remount—one is called New Salesman and one is called Aglow. The New Salesman exercise is a tabletop exercise, so people sit around the table and do what you might imagine on paper feeds. You have the Remount exercise which is a live exercise where you have people outside the room doing things, whether it be on water or actually exercising the process that you want to test, and that is without CBRA sitting. Then you have the final one, which is Aglow, where COBR will sit. It may not be that all the players are there, the senior ministers may be tied up and sometimes a senior civil servant will play the role of the minister, but the video link and all the other things that go with that type of operation are tested. That is three times a year in different force areas and then at the moment, over the last three years, we have had a maritime exercise. Coincidentally—and it is not arranged for this Committee’s benefit—we are having a tabletop tomorrow around maritime because there is something in particular we want to check out. Then there is an Operation Wessex Torch, which takes place in March, and will be actually exercising on the water with all the agencies involved. This is not just because of this Committee’s interest; that type of exercise takes a lot of planning. To go to the final point, the military do take part. It is obviously a bit easier, as it is for us, on the tabletop but when it gets to the live exercises they take part in large numbers. The costs tend to some extent to fall where they are but to be fair, also, the Home Office and all the ministries will do their best to support us in funding, particularly on the biggest. Probably the final point to make is that I took part last year, not in a maritime exercise but in a counter-terrorism exercise in the North West which was the largest we had had in this country. It crossed four police forces, we had two Golds operating for three days and I know that was a very significant cost and it was a very significant deployment of the military, particularly of some of the more specialist assets they have. They are quite prepared even, as you have indicated, in difficult times to turn up in large numbers because they know that it is best to exercise and if it is going to go wrong it is best that we discover that quickly in that environment and not when we have to. There is a great commitment on everybody’s part, therefore, to make sure it works.

Q330 Chairman: The final question. Let us go back to John Smith’s constituency and let us assume that some of these targets that he has identified are part of the critical national infrastructure. Would it be helpful to have a deterrent? I know you give advice to these organisations but would it be helpful to have a deterrent presence around elements of the critical national infrastructure in the maritime environment?

Ms Tompkinson: That will depend on what it is and where it is and it will be part of the protective security advice that is given. As I say, it does not come directly from my department but from those who advise the industries on their protective security. Some of the security will be very much about locks and bolts and fences and some of it may well be about policing and patrolling and things that will provide a visual deterrent, so that will be part of the advice that is given on a site by site basis.

Q331 Chairman: It would be you giving advice to them rather than the agencies in front of us today providing such a deterrent presence.

Ms Tompkinson: The advice comes from the agency responsible for protective security in that area, the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure and they will give advice to the critical national infrastructure as to how best to protect themselves. In some instances part of that may well be a permanent police presence; that is certainly true on the land side but not necessarily on the maritime side.

Chief Constable Hogan-Howe: I would not mislead you but certainly it is true that the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Police do have a seaborne capacity. What I would not try and give you detail about is exactly what that is formed by, but I do know that we have just signed a Memorandum of Understanding with them because there are transport issues at sea that they need to prepare and have prepared very carefully for. Again, it is probably not something to be talked about in this open forum but they do have a capacity that allows them to provide that protective environment around certain sites and around certain transport arrangements.

Chairman: Thank you very much indeed. It has been helpful and interesting evidence that you have given us this morning and you will be relieved to know that that is the end of it.
Written evidence

Memorandum from Morgan Aquila

THE ROLE OF INDUSTRY IN THE NEW ANTI-TERRORISM ERA

As the fight against terrorism takes central stage as a new globalised conflict paradigm emerges, there needs to be a careful re-assessment of how an effective division of effort between universities, national laboratories, industry and the military can be developed to deal with critical new challenges. What, for instance, are the real incentives for government, the science and technology community and private industry to co-operate, more than these different stakeholders have done in the past? How can these incentives be harmonised with dramatically differing strategic objectives for each of them, and how can any disincentives, for there must be some in any change in strategy, be overcome?

From the industrial perspective, one of the key principles of a healthy business outlook, and the business plans that are triggered by it, is that there needs to be a vision of where future revenue streams will come from and the business stream’s long-term viability. The aiming point needs to be a clear definition of what the “market space” is, and how it will develop. So far, in this shift in the threat paradigm since the mid 1990s, this has been a conundrum. The tactic of terrorism has been with modern Western societies for some considerable time, but not on the scale represented by the attack on the United States, or the more recent Madrid or London attacks and many others worldwide. Former terrorist attacks were also not brought to the public instantly, and in such dramatic style, by the ubiquitous 24-hour visual media.

An important consideration is whether we have seen a strategic swing away from accepted modern forms of conflict and security on a scale which will force an overall change in the relations between society and security, and in which industry will be a key stakeholder. In the Counter Terrorism/Homeland Security environment, is there now a requirement to conduct a critical review of industry’s strategic vision of the future, and of the capabilities it will be required to bring into being? The National Security Strategy is disappointingly “light” on the future trajectory of the industrial aspects of the anti-terrorism era and certainly does not provide a sufficient motive to catalyse an equivalent of the Defence Industrial Strategy. Such a review, if properly conducted with the right level of effort and the right safeguards, can perhaps initiate a debate on whether the new security threats present significant market opportunities to explore. If there is a market, then industry will surely address it.

Even if there is no such review, it is important that there is an underpinning and generally held view on how the world has changed to act as the catalyst that will trigger a united response across the defence and security stakeholder spectrum. Although a trigger such as this may indeed be only a high-level vision, it can provide a framework which will give the stakeholder set a common idea of the required changes in responses to the threat, and a picture of the overall effect. As a corollary, it is interesting to note that there is currently no accepted international definition of what a terrorist is, although everyone knows what a terrorist does.

The nature of the new terrorist threat, and its new brand of terror, including its desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction, means that society is facing once again an example of asymmetrical warfare whereby the adversary ignores his enemy’s strengths and instead targets his weaknesses. Interestingly, the 11 September terrorists seem to have chanced upon (or was this by design?) a way to combine, two “Western strengths”: (procedure-free air travel, and a propensity to build very tall buildings to convey success), to bring disaster of unanticipated style and proportion, using the catalyst of suicide tactics.

Care has to be exercised when investigating the answer to the new anti-terrorist rebalancing conundrum, as a concept of Homeland Security, which tends to imply a “whole society” response (because the scene of action has moved away from battlefields, into the anonymity of a mass population), cannot be treated in isolation from other security related policies which accompany it. These may be military policies designed for traditional war, or the policies of law enforcement and other public safety communities, along with the legal frameworks that allow all of the responding communities to perform their duties. The NSS goes some way to reaching across the conflict spectrum (and probably further than any policy has gone before), and provides an important consideration is whether we have seen a strategic swing away from accepted modern forms of conflict and security on a scale which will force an overall change in the relations between society and security, and in which industry will be a key stakeholder. In the Counter Terrorism/Homeland Security environment, is there now a requirement to conduct a critical review of industry’s strategic vision of the future, and of the capabilities it will be required to bring into being? The National Security Strategy is disappointingly “light” on the future trajectory of the industrial aspects of the anti-terrorism era and certainly does not provide a sufficient motive to catalyse an equivalent of the Defence Industrial Strategy. Such a review, if properly conducted with the right level of effort and the right safeguards, can perhaps initiate a debate on whether the new security threats present significant market opportunities to explore. If there is a market, then industry will surely address it. The nature of the new terrorist threat, and its new brand of terror, including its desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction, means that society is facing once again an example of asymmetrical warfare whereby the adversary ignores his enemy’s strengths and instead targets his weaknesses. Interestingly, the 11 September terrorists seem to have chanced upon (or was this by design?) a way to combine, two “Western strengths”: (procedure-free air travel, and a propensity to build very tall buildings to convey success), to bring disaster of unanticipated style and proportion, using the catalyst of suicide tactics. Care has to be exercised when investigating the answer to the new anti-terrorist rebalancing conundrum, as a concept of Homeland Security, which tends to imply a “whole society” response (because the scene of action has moved away from battlefields, into the anonymity of a mass population), cannot be treated in isolation from other security related policies which accompany it. These may be military policies designed for traditional war, or the policies of law enforcement and other public safety communities, along with the legal frameworks that allow all of the responding communities to perform their duties. The NSS goes some way to reaching across the conflict spectrum (and probably further than any policy has gone before), and has sought to engender a big umbrella approach to national security using some sensible expedients, such as the sharing of the National Risk Register (in some variety) with the public. A conflict analysis to accompany the new strategy therefore needs to span the entire threat spectrum, of not only armed conflict but also address that part termed as public safety. Although not all of such threats to the citizen imply mortal danger, they are still threats, and are part of a wider environment of security that allows citizens to carry on with their lawful purposes. Once we have established society’s current readiness to respond to these threats, we can look to how to increase readiness in a more coherent fashion against all threats, without the adoption of inappropriate processes, without undue risk of technological failure, or the use of human resource in an improper way.

The requirement therefore is a capability model that (from one end of the scale) starts with pickpocketing, proceeds through serious crime, terrorism and insurgency, through traditional deployed military operations, to (at the other extreme of the scale) the recovery from a nuclear exchange, and a curve that shows how ready the nation is to respond to those threats.
Figure 1 is a view of what a Utopian secure society may look like, with an x-axis that shows Threat—from pickpocketing through to a nuclear exchange between nation states—and a y-axis that shows society’s readiness to combat those threats. With “perfect security” if a citizen was pickpocketed then the full weight of the law, and its criminal justice apparatus, would be levied against detecting and prosecuting the perpetrator. At the other end of the scale, we would have a society that was fully prepared for nuclear exchange.

![Figure 1](Morgan Aquila LLP - 2008)

However, Figure 2 is a model that shows what a typical national threat/readiness posture might look like taking into account the resources required to combat the threats—figuratively in the post Cold War, pre al-Qaeda period.

![Figure 2](Morgan Aquila LLP - 2008)

Public safety readiness, particularly law enforcement, can be seen to be peaking at serious offences against the person such as murder and kidnap (after all, is a full police response normally deployed after a pickpocketing incident?). Readiness declines at a point where combating the threat would be outside the capability of the civil agencies, or where generation of this capability would be too costly to contemplate taking into account its unlikely nature. There is an overlap here, where, under police/military arrangements, a military response might be deployed to assist the civilian agencies, classically in counter terrorism operations such as bomb disposal or specialist operations against terrorist current operations (as in Iranian
Embassy at Princes Gate in London in 1980), or in the event of a crisis (floods, fuel tankers, fire strikes et al). Military readiness then has a corresponding curve where maximum capability is generated for counter insurgency, peace keeping or peace enforcement operations with reduction of capability as the threat heads towards high intensity conflict (where this diminution would be addressed by urgent operational requirements as a particular conflict approaches), tailing to a limited capability to survive a nuclear exchange where there would be a long warning period to re-generate capability—of course, at some financial cost.

In Figure 3 we can observe the effects of the emergence of an asymmetric al-Qaeda type threat, based within a society, that is essentially “at peace”. The readiness required curve from the public safety capability has to rise to cater for the new threat conditions, purely because the over-committed military has limited resource to bulge backwards—and anyway, in simple terms, the new order of terrorism is still viewed (certainly in UK eyes) as only a crime.

This leads to two phenomena shown at Figure 4; the first being a pull-through of military technology and processes into the capability area now required from the public safety agencies. Examples of this could include gas masks, Chemical/Biological suits and specialist chemical agent detectors for the police and fire brigades. The second phenomena is seen in the area under the curve that has no previous “owner” which now represents the new capabilities required to increase capability against the new order of threat. Examples of the latter might include the amalgamation of responding agencies, introduction of better border controls, ID cards, integration of stove-piped intelligence data bases, an exponential growth of biometric-related identity projects, computer network defence initiatives, and recruitment of more security agency personnel (all combinations of people, processes and technologies). And, in the UK, to finance some Government initiatives there has been some extra funding for counter terrorism capability for the public safety agencies, supported by the formation of new organisations to make strategic response to the threat more coherent—such as the new Health Protection Agency and the Borders Agency to name but two—and the enactment of enabling legislative instruments (variously Terrorist and Civil Contingencies Acts).
What is certain is that any resource will always be finite, so the question is how do we extend that national resilience/homeland security curve, either in real or virtual terms, to minimise the area where there is no current capability?

There has to be a strategy for those in the preparation and response fields to make assessments on how to absorb the first blow, then recover from, those disasters (whether man-made or natural) that are either beyond normal comprehension, or are beyond the limits of resource to prepare against. What, for example, would be the key issues in the mass evacuation of an urban centre, such as London or Paris? What would the effects be of a terrorist smallpox “mule” targeting a travel hub, such as a city railway station at commuter time? In the latter, how does one assess the spread of the disease? How soon will supermarkets and chemists run out of analgesics? When will the first presentations be made to doctors’ surgeries? How soon will patients self-present at Accident and Emergency rooms? When will these be overwhelmed? How soon will non-urgent patients in hospitals be returned home, and how, and who will care for them? When will the hospitals be overwhelmed, and which institutions could be used to offload the non-critical cases? How many casualties will die, and how will the bodies be disposed of? When will normality return, and how much will it all cost?

Clearly the modelling required to make some of these calculations will need to be sophisticated, but the current growing sophistication in synthetic environments may soon provide the route, firstly to provide the preparatory analysis, but then to act as a decision support tool when a real emergency arises.
Synthesis and modelling thus manages to help close the gap between the “peaks of capability” at the centre of the readiness vs threat graph, and directs us to a coordinated strategy to develop the response, as shown at Figure 5, in that:

1. In the capability that exists already, capability needs to be reviewed, gaps need to be identified and then repaired (for example within the dislocations in the UK police intelligence infrastructure highlighted by the Bichard Inquiry and the still evident symptom of retention of intelligence within stovepipes at Department level).

2. Within the resource limitations of the response, there needs to be a process of capability growth, and integration.

3. Where resource constraints impose themselves limitations on physical preparation of a response, then modelling and exploration provide the optimum, cost effective route to enhanced capability—through better readiness.
With a coherent capability now defined, total resource available will now define the outer limits of the new response curve, as shown in Figure 6.

Figure 6
The New Centre of Gravity (resource limited)

This Figure also demonstrates the principle of addressing deficits in capability for immediate and specific theatres through urgent operational procurement. However, it also shows, critically, those capabilities which could now be considered to be superfluous to the Response in the light of the shift in conflict paradigm, and within a resource limited society.

The requirement to get the greatest return on investment will determine how Government makes its cost/benefit judgements, but from the outset a few principles can be clearly identified:

Firstly, there is no prospect of solving new capability requirements through brute force provided by manpower alone, as this would be prohibitively expensive. The penalties on resource budgets that would be required for the physical guarding of critical national infrastructure, or to “hire in” sufficient intelligence analysts to sift the volumes of data extracted from global intelligence sources would be simply too enormous. So physical security has to evolve from the Cold War structures of the defence of static sites, and take the established models of threat, vulnerability and risk forward to a wider environment of the security of the societal base that the likes of al-Qaeda seem to be targeting and within which it operates, and from where its people are recruited, that is, to raise resilience across society.

So can process and technology be the cost effective force multipliers in the public safety arena to compensate for the lack of people? They can be, but only if accurately focused on helping provide what the public safety agencies need in terms of time. Characteristically, arrest or disruption of terrorist cells happens only shortly before their operations are planned to “go” or indeed have happened already. To give society a greater margin of safety, public safety agencies are forced to put in place the technologies and processes to help the right people lengthen this critical time, by providing the instruments to gain more certain intelligence—that is, evidence—that allows an arrest or interdiction operation to occur many days or weeks before the planned terrorist event. Deterrence needs to increase, in order to deflect the threat, by making life so uncomfortable for the terrorist that either he goes elsewhere, or is forced into procedural errors that will make him show his hand earlier that would have formerly been the case.

Secondly, the new solutions in security need a systems-of-systems approach. There is no single programme that will solve all a nation’s new security needs, but the scope of the challenge—the depth and breadth of the new terror threat—dictates that it is not a matter of buying the right bit of kit. Point solutions—single programmes or pieces of equipment, no matter how capable in isolation—will not annul those deficiencies in capability, or fill the gaps between various capabilities, that the terrorist will seek to exploit. A system-of-systems approach will also demand interoperability between responding agencies, in designing from the outset capability for people, processes and technologies that co-operate with each other, that allow the sharing of information, that deliver synergies in information acquisition and analysis, and coordinate decisive action based on what arises. And to do that any new capabilities need to be based on common standards in infrastructure, applications, process and people, so that they can be easily integrated to raise security across the piece without excessive time or financial penalties. This is where stronger central governance has a real role to play in demanding absolute standards to enable the long-term acquisition of coherent capability.
And yet it is also the case that the pace of technology presents challenges as well as opportunities. If technology is to be harnessed as a tool against disruptive challenges it needs to be developed incrementally, so that today’s solution is open to tomorrow’s improvements. In other words, spiral development is a key in that coherence is needed to ensure that the terrorist organisation cannot find the weaknesses he needs to exploit to retain his own winning strategy, which is through asymmetry.

And so the long-term nature of the current militant Islamic threat requires adequate capability now, but better capability later. Near term solutions obviously need to be effective, but still should be designed with the long-term solution in mind. Solutions will need to be compatible with two things; first, the trajectory of technological advances as we currently know them, and second, with the need to adapt or evolve if the threat makes an unexpected deviation from established assumptions. Security architectures need to be truly upgradeable, and based on open architectures that can rapidly cater for the unexpected. To complement this, we need ever more effective ways of scanning the threat horizon to be able to guide our decisions, on where to focus our research effort and develop our technological countermeasures to emerging disruptive challenges. In our Homeland Security capability graphs, as above, this is represented by the “model and explore” field, where in addition to using experts, academia and history (people and process), technology can provide a vehicle in this voyage of exploration. For example, “virtual” toolsets can help focus our thoughts and plans on how to address a variety of disasters, whether man-made or natural—and to investigate the possible outcomes, and even, during consequence management following a real incident, to act as a decision aid in developing appropriate responses.

An example of such a tool could be a large-scale synthetic environment, that replicates the core functions of a nation, and that characterises the function of the Critical National Infrastructure, both in physical and virtual domains, that would help scope the boundaries of what must be protected to preserve life, the machinery of government and national infrastructure, which at the moment remain less than fully charted across society as a whole. By extension, it could also have an enabling role in better early warning, through systematic horizon scanning and the early identification of issues, key pillars of a capability-building programme and which the NSS seems sensibly to demand. The various technologies to achieve this are already in existence, but in piecemeal, although for specific natures of risk permit a role in the response (three infectivity models were used in the UK Foot and Mouth epidemic of 2001). On a national or even an international scale all that remains to be done is to carry out a programme of development and system integration to bind a number of models together (such as those that already exist in many individual components of the CNI).

The real benefit of a synthetic approach to the unknown/unaffordable/incomprehensible is that no matter how far the response security agencies are funded to fill the strategic gap, the unaffordable void can still be filled with tools to allow decision makers to plan for, and react to, a wide variety of threats that simply cannot be exercised in a representative way, simply because of the scale of the event. The effects of a pandemic disease, of an improvised nuclear device, of a chemical attack on a mass transit system—how, apart from simulation, can these disasters be exercised on sufficient scale to replicate the challenges that a true life incident of this nature will present—particularly at strategic (eg COBR) decision making level?

The need to get the counter terrorism capability balance right has now, in many nations’ instance, been tackled by the highest echelons of Government, and the evidence needed by industry to confirm the emergence of a new commercial market (in Homeland Security capability) is now beginning to emerge. Primarily this evidence manifests itself by re-organisation of the security response, but also through the introduction of primary legislation that enables more fundamental changes to national security. This evidence is now the key for strategic industry to engage the machinery of business planning.

Having identified the strategic capability gap, and associated with it a customer set, industry now has the vital headmark that allows it to make sense of the potential market, and to trigger off the drafting of the corresponding business case that will shape its long term approach to the security market. The capability gap is now scoped, and so whether through identification programmes, border control, computer network defence systems or whatever, it can anticipate the release of (particular financial) resource by the top level customer set to bring new capabilities into existence. In some cases industry achieves increased confidence when it sees new primary legislation, or through organisational response by the formation of new instruments of State, such as, in the UK, the Serious and Organised Crime Agency, or perhaps by the brigading of a number of smaller agencies such as the Health Protection Agency, to bring greater operational efficiencies. The rebalancing of people (and their organisations) and process (and the business change required to address security issues) will inevitably be followed by the procurement of the third component in the triumvirate—technology. And the delivery of technology is where the interest of private sector industry primarily resides.

So can industry lay down any rules, or preferences, on how it would like to see the development of the global and systemic response to the new threat paradigm—given that Governments are willing and able to accept that a new paradigm exists?

Firstly, there should be a system-of-systems approach, conceived at the highest level. A scattergun approach, a project here and a bit of kit there, is an unattractive business environment for the larger scale commercial enterprises that inevitably command some of the richest intellectual capital (partly because of the wages it can afford to pay). This is because the cost of capturing business revenues (per dollar/euro/pound sterling) becomes higher, and therefore the return on sales-and-marketing investment decreases. This is a
key factor in deciding whether to commit to the process of capturing business, which is an overhead, and industry tends to dislike disproportionate overhead. Identifiable large-scale end-to-end programmes, which have sensible milestones, which are led by governments with clear strategic and coherent intent makes good sense to industry. The certainty provided in this environment makes it easier to commit critical investments, such as research and development resources, that underpin the evolution of appropriate technologies in advance of the competition. The issue of fixed financial milestones is a much underrated key, as a commercial venture’s chief financial concern is to generate the cash (“Cash is King!”) which allows employees to be paid, allows re-investment to improve product and performance, and allows the servicing of debt. Unless cash rich already, a commercial organisation may find that the risks associated with an environment of poor cash flow is a prohibitive bar to market entry when it makes its assessment of a strategic business case.

Secondly, intended capability needs to be compatible with the trajectory of technology as we know it, but with acknowledgement that the systems of tomorrow may well have to adapt to combat as yet unknown threats. In this early stage of this complex and multi-generational effort against pan-national terrorism, it is difficult to predict the course of events and how terrorist tactics will evolve. It is significant that, in the few years since 2001, al-Qaeda has transformed from a relatively tightly knit, closely controlled organisation into what is now an international brand name in terrorism, and whose tactics have become less centrally controlled, in which the movement’s outrages are limited only by the imagination of the followers. So when an unexpected event or tactic is encountered at some time in the future (including the emergence of new globalised groups such as “eco-terrorists” and others), the need to develop a new response from a completely different technological departure point would involve time (society’s enemy) and the waste of considerable invested resources. Therefore, there is a decision to be made to commit some investment, payable at the front end of a programme, to future-proof the systems and processes—by designing in truly open architectures that make them adaptable to future deviations from the anticipated.

From an “old school” industrial perspective, this is not an optimum path. It is not in industry’s basic financial interest to encourage this open systems approach because ultimately “there is less money in it”, compared to a closed systems approach which involves severe penalties on the overall response, in time and materials, when new capability is needed from, or added to, existing systems and software. The nature of the development of the asymmetric threat is markedly different from the classical, and more ponderous, Cold War industrial/military philosophy, in which strategic military intelligence provides an assessment of enemy military capability, which industry is then tasked to provide the means to defeat. The old forms of procurement, of concept studies, scoping studies, feasibility studies, prototyping, and then production will be simply too slow to react to an adversary relatively unencumbered by bureaucracy. The former systems are simply “too slow to market”. Within the asymmetric environment capability development has to move with speed, driven by a “can-do” attitude and where commercial risk is effectively underwritten by Government. The requirement to observe an opponent’s, to then orientate, decide and then act (a Boyd Cycle of conflict) will now be measured in terms of weeks or months rather than in the years which was formerly the case.

But there is a financial downside in this. Centres of excellence in technological developments, which will be needed to rapidly bring capability into the hands of the operational response, may have to be retained as discreet units, even in the absence of identified projects, as the mutations in terrorist modus operandi may be unpredictable in terms of an overall “programme timeline”. The retention of these expert cadres of people, waiting “on the books” for new terrorist tactics to suddenly and unpredictably emerge, will constitute higher overhead (bad news for the “bottom line”) and either must be absorbed by industry or underwritten by the customer-in-waiting. If the financial resource is not found from somewhere, then there will be compelling financial reasons for companies to disperse these centres of excellence, which will probably have delivered brilliantly during a crisis. This dispersion will then lead to a diminution of cohesive technical expertise, to the detriment of the overall counter terrorist effort, as when a new threat emerges and teams are formed again into properly organised development entities, they will do this at the expense of all-important time.

The possibility of higher overhead, and how to manage this, may only be one of a number of changes to previously strict financial regimes, and it is increasingly important that those in Government with limited experience in industrial imperatives have some view of the traditional motivators in commerce, which in their fundamental nature must remain, no matter the exterior catalysts.

Industry has Three Important Stakeholders to Balance

Firstly, there is the shareholder, who has invested in the company and wishes to see a return on that investment through growth in earnings per share. Industry will do this by identifying the market, by winning the business (probably against competition) and then will aim for increasing its reputation by superior programme execution. If it can achieve this, it will be reflected in good financial results in terms of profit, cash flow and backlog, and a growth in the future business pipeline. This is symptomatic of a well run, competitive and ambitious organisation which will be looked upon favourably by appropriate analysts on the financial markets, who will make good reports which in turn drive up the share price.
Along with this there is that difficult area of profit, which has classically provided a bone of contention in any supplier/customer relationship. But a balance needs to be struck between realisation of short term profit, and the ability to generate profit over a number of years. Compare the following and make the business decision:

1. “We are in programme ‘x’ for 20 years although the margins are a bit thin” against,
2. “We’ve got the business and the profit is good, but we have to re-compete after five years”.

Secondly, a commercial organisation needs to execute its responsibility to wider society in terms of legal, cultural, environmental and ethical norms, and make sound judgements on where it can provide sociological stimulus to create wider employment, attract investment to a geographical area leading to the creation of well-being within a community.

And finally, a good industrial organisation bears a heavy responsibility to the employees in its care—its workforce—through development of its people, providing stable employment by fostering employees’ welfare, and by apportioning due reward for performance. The uncertainties of asymmetric warfare demand that the brightest and most innovative responses are given the greatest opportunity to prosper, and be given the tools and environment to maximise their potential.

So, as long as these relatively simple needs are taken into account, strategic industry will be able to fully commit, along with its partners in government and the Science and Technology (S&T) community, to any business stream, not least that of anti-terrorist capability development.

However, in the new conflict model, there may be no need for a set-in-stone 15-year programme on the model of the aircraft carrier, new type of armoured fighting vehicle or new fighter-bomber. This is not good news for the traditional defence industrial construct favoured by the big Prime Systems Integrators that rely on the stability of long term revenues underpinned by commensurately long term defence programmes.

Therefore, it can be argued, to de-risk the more uncertain nature of the long term market, that within a counter-terrorist capability development programme it will make better sense for government, with its industrial, scientific and technological communities to establish concomitantly longer term partnerships. These need to be managed on trust, rather than have the more formal (or even adversarial) customer/supplier arrangements in former models (in which a succession of projects are re-competed time after time). The growing together of the stakeholder community in an environment of common endeavour reduces the penalties, on all, of having to survive the difficult and disruptive process of forming new relationships and programme consortia at regular intervals. A repetitive bidding regime is expensive, and makes for less certain financial projections, although as a moderating influence, industry needs always to aver to competition and benchmarking where this really does make sense, or where it is demanded from customers or regulatory authorities driving for value for money.

But this is not about the micro-management of that development. There will always be a plethora of Small to Medium Enterprises simply delighted to market their “kit” to resolve point deficiencies in capability, and this should not be discouraged. Many of these smaller enterprises will also be the very source of invention and innovation required to feed the systems integrators that lie above them in the industrial pecking order, assuming, of course, that the Big Hitters are still engaged with the market and have not diversified elsewhere, or demerged, because they cannot sense the long term revenue stream. Currently, this is a significant risk, and there is a case that the industrial response may be led, certainly in the early phases, by second tier industry, simply because the Prime Systems Integrators are finding it difficult to engage.

The optimum path on the long and complicated road ahead needs engagement by the whole of the industrial stack, just as during previous disruptive challenges, such as the Second World War. Resolution of the conflict imbalance certainly needs to attract the interest of the big systems integration houses that can provide the critical top level programme management skills to make sure that there are no residual vulnerabilities when the capability is rolled out. If there are vulnerabilities, then the terrorist will find them, and exploit them.

Overall, some critical enablers that will encourage the engagement of industrial capability can thus be identified:

1. The willingness of government to develop, commit to and foster long term relationships. Although there has been a movement towards this, such as through the Security and Resilience Industries Council, the path has not been easy. A chief failing has been the lack of an instinctive understanding of industry by government, and also of how to harness the development of capability with the need of an organisation that has commercial, social and human resource responsibilities.
2. Clarity in strategic vision, and the willingness of government to trust industry to help form part of that vision as part of an integrated team (that must also involve academia and the S&T community). It is interesting to note that industry is not specifically mentioned as a potential stakeholder in the proposed National Security Forum. With defence and security structures still in place that have actually changed little over the years, there has yet to be a true change to a blended spectrum of response which incorporates all elements of society addressing threats, from pickpockets through to a nuclear exchange of Cold War proportions. In this there is no doubt that government must take the lead and show an understanding of how the principle of security needs to be transformed, and the NSS is a good first step in broadening the security envelope.
3. The generation of relatively stable, coherent and adequately funded capability development programmes that allow industry to conduct strategic business planning, which will include self-funded research and development, with confidence. Although there will be cyclical periods of activity when a new terrorist tactic comes to light, and lulls as the threat reduces, ways need to be found to provide long term stability. This will inevitably require an element of central procurement, strategically managed by a singular agency that has its hands on the counter terrorism tiller.

4. The requirement for programmes to have fixed and identifiable milestones which can enable good cash flow. There is no avoiding this fundamental commercial enabler to successfully managed finance. “Cash is King” is the phrase heard often at business schools and every other school of finance that knows its subject.

5. A collective environment of gainshare, in which industry and other stakeholders can exploit technologies and processes into wider markets. This will reduce the financial burdens placed on the government customer and will make industry more willing to engage with the counter terrorism market. The promise of success in adjacent markets is yet another factor which can help underwrite a business plan.

6. Open and honest data sharing within the government/industrial/academic and scientific team, with a reduction in the privacy and secrecy barriers that have traditionally hindered the exchange of information between national security stakeholders.

7. The appropriate sharing of risk, where innovation is encouraged, and where superior performance is duly recognised.

8. The acknowledgement that, in terms of liability, industry cannot be expected to expose itself to punitive damages should, despite everyone’s best efforts, “the bomber get through”. It does not make sense for a commercial enterprise to risk suffering crippling damages, awarded through the courts, for the sake of financial rewards that could be relatively small.

The solution to the emerging asymmetrical threat lies in the thrust of the security rapier, and not in the blow of the traditional defence axe, although counter insurgency campaigns designed to throttle the terrorist infrastructure overseas will be a continuing military and civic action requirement. The change in conflict paradigm from its last manifestation, that of the industrialisation of armaments, to that of global irregularity, demands a new behaviour from industry and the stakeholders allied to it, based on rapidity, flexibility and innovation. The challenge is new, complex, and multi generational, and demands change from the former days of relative industrial stability. Those industries that have the vision to respond by changing their mindsets are more likely to succeed than those that hark to the salad days of Cold War stability, and those changes in mindsets need to be fostered by the wider national security stakeholder set.

24 April 2008

Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence

THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION TO COUNTER-TERRORISM AND NATIONAL RESILIENCE

As the Committee will be aware the counter-terrorism and resilience challenges facing the UK and the Government’s response have evolved significantly since the committee’s 2002 inquiry Defence and Security in the UK and the 2003 inquiry into the then draft Civil Contingencies Bill.

The Home Secretary remains responsible for the security of the citizens of the UK. The Government’s Counter Terrorism Strategy (CONTEST), which was presented to Parliament in July 2006, is led by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in the Home Office. It aims to reduce the risk to the UK from international terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and with confidence. The strategy is structured around four “P”s: Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The aim of the Prepare strand of CONTEST is “where we cannot stop an attack, to mitigate its impact” and this work is led by the Cabinet Office’s Civil Contingencies Secretariat. The role of the Ministry of Defence in the delivery of CONTEST is a supporting one. Nonetheless the MOD does provide a range of support in each of these areas to a greater or lesser extent. This note deals with MOD activity in the UK, on the understanding that this is where the Committee wishes to focus its inquiry, rather than covering the entire range of our counter terrorist activity worldwide—a somewhat larger and more complex area than appears to be envisaged by the Committee.

Similarly the committee will recognise that, in the UK, defence plays a supporting role to the civil authorities who lead the response to disruptive natural challenges. Support in this area is provided through the well-understood principle of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). This is set out in detail in Joint Doctrine Publication 02, Operations in the UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience. In short, defence support can be provided where the responsible civil authority lacks either the capability or the immediate capacity to deal with a situation. Defence support is normally the last resort, with mutual aid or commercial options having first been exhausted.

The Committee’s note asked for the MOD’s assessment of the threat to the UK. The MOD contributes to cross-government mechanisms in order to assess the threat to the UK from terrorist activity and natural hazards. For CONTEST purposes, the lead authority is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). The
MOD has seconded several members of staff to JTAC in order to contribute to its work. JTAC’s assessment is that the threat from international terrorism to the UK and UK interests overseas is extremely serious, more ambitious in scope than we have seen before and will probably be with us for the foreseeable future. The Government is committed to tackling this threat and the MOD will play a full part in this.

The Cabinet Office Domestic Horizon Scanning Committee (DHSC) performs a similar role in assessing non-malicious risks which could impact on the UK in the near future (approximately 12 months). The MOD provides a representative on that committee and contributes more widely to the cross-Government planning support co-ordinated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS).

The CCS also manages the cross-departmental Resilience Capability Framework (RCF) which underpins medium term planning and capability building for Resilience. The RCF consists of a risk assessment process which draws on the work of the DHSC and JTAC to identify the highest risks, both malicious threats and non-malicious hazards, which could impact on the UK over a five-year period and the development of planning assumptions outlining the potential consequences of these risks. These planning assumptions set the bar for civil Resilience capability-building at national, regional and local levels. The MOD contributes to all elements of this work, including providing representatives for all related committees. Many of the major risks identified through this process are increasing due to the inter-connected nature of modern societies and some, such as widespread flooding and an influenza pandemic, would have a major impact on our way of life in the UK. The lead responders for such events do not include defence, but we contribute to the lead responders’ plans, not least in order to identify any potential role for defence. We carefully consider any requests for assistance from the civil authorities, whether in the planning for or response to a crisis.

The assessments of these bodies provide the basis for the MOD’s CT and Resilience planning. Based on this methodology, and as a result of extensive and detailed consultation with the lead civil authorities, the MOD currently makes available a range of capabilities. We do not categorise our support along single service lines as the Committee’s note asked for, but the capabilities we currently make available are as follows:

- A quick reaction capability to deter and defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK airspace, including air defence radar.
- A maritime capability to deter and defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK territorial waters.
- Counter-terrorist capabilities in support of the police on land or sea.
- Public order support in extremis to the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
- Fishery protection vessels in support of DEFRA.
- A maritime search and rescue capability in support of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
- An Explosive Ordnance Disposal “render-safe” capability.
- Scientific support to police operations including a Technical Response Force with access to a wide range of relevant scientific expertise.
- Ministry of Defence Police support to the protection of key points in the critical national infrastructure.
- A regional command and control capability to provide an ability to co-ordinate larger scale defence contributions.
- Civil Contingency Reaction Forces, drawn from the reserve forces, which are potentially available if required to support the responsible authorities for dealing with civil contingencies.

These capabilities are part of the MOD’s planned force structure and, as such, effectively guaranteed to the lead authority. The MOD conducts regular liaison with each of these organisations to ensure that the capabilities earmarked remain appropriate and exercises them to validate extant planning and identify any improvements needed. They are then reflected in Defence Planning Assumptions which are reviewed regularly.

In addition to these commitments, the MOD can also make available, on a case by case basis, defence assets to support operations led by other organisations. In 2007, defence provided such support on 90 occasions. These included:

- Logistics support to police operations through the use of the defence estate.
- Aerial imagery and analysis support to police search operations.
- Flood defence assistance in the Yorkshire/Humber and Gloucestershire regions.
- Logistics support to Severn Trent Water during the Gloucestershire floods.

The above capabilities are held principally for the purposes of standing or contingent operations overseas and are not planned for regular use on behalf of the civil authorities. Where they are not being used to support overseas operations however, they can be made available to the civil authorities where it is appropriate to do so.
It would also be appropriate to highlight the progress which has been made in the development of civil capabilities. Over the last few years, with the passage of the Civil Contingencies Act and the development of the National Capabilities Programme, the emergency services and other responders have made significant improvements in their own capabilities. One consequence of this is that the threshold for the requirement for defence support has risen significantly. Examples include: the response to the Buncefield fire in 2005, which would previously have relied upon support from the Defence Fire Service; the Fire and Rescue Services’ New Dimension programme which has been used in recent flooding events; and the acquisition of enhanced aerial capabilities by the Metropolitan Police. So although the risk of disruptive challenges is arguably increasing, the support required from defence is not necessarily rising. Nonetheless, we remain committed to providing the support needed where this is identified.

Defence also contributes significant assets to activities overseas aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and pursuing terrorists. Most of this work has to remain confidential, for obvious security and diplomatic reasons, but it includes: counter-terrorist capacity building with partner nations; the collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorist networks; and the maintenance of a range of capabilities to conduct disruption operations against potential terrorist attacks. These activities support the Government’s wider counter terrorism agenda and contribute to the security of the UK, but are not addressed in detail here as they may be considered to fall outside the scope of the Committee’s inquiry. Please let me know if the Committee does wish to broaden the terms of its inquiry in this respect.

In addition to playing its part in co-ordinating cross-Government effort and contributing to others’ evolving plans, the MOD does of course keep its policy in this area under constant review. As well as participating in the further development of CONTEST, the review of the Civil Contingencies Act currently being planned, and Home Office reviews of aspects of protective security, the MOD exercises its plans regularly and reviews all standing operations in the UK on an annual basis. We look forward to discussing these policies and plans with the Committee. The Committee will be aware that the Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP has been asked by the Prime Minister to review the Defence contribution to the Government’s Counter Terrorism and Resilience strategies. His work is progressing well and he expects to report his findings by the summer.

22 February 2008

Memorandum from Demos

Executive Summary

— The UKs National Security Strategy represents an important initial step in developing a strategic approach to the contemporary security challenges of the 21st century. The real “strategic” challenge, however, centres on translating this understanding of the risk spectrum into cross-departmental cooperation, which fosters a practical ability to react in the event of unexpected crises, while also adopting a longer-term perspective that foresees and prepares for future threats.

— The traditional approach to national security and defence needs to undergo a systematic reassessment. National Security is now the new concept for organising government.

— The MoD has traditionally adopted a sub-strategic approach to managing defence. The new security paradigm hasn’t, to date, had the fundamental and meaningful impact on Defence Planning Assumptions that is necessary to address contemporary national security challenges.

— The MoD’s concentration on the expeditionary warfare mission risks undermining the Armed Forces’ ability to maintain a general capacity for emergency action.

— A decade after the last defence review, and in light of the new security environment the Government should fundamentally reassess the role of defence for the twenty first century. We believe this review should take place in 2010.

Written Evidence Submission

The following evidence addresses four of the five issues raised by the terms of the inquiry, leaving aside the “specific capabilities maritime, land and air forces provide”, which falls outside the author’s specific area of expertise. Engagement with the four remaining issues is prefaced by a section on the nature of ‘national security’ in the contemporary context—assessing the themes animating the current debate and shedding light on some of its central cleavages. In particular, this introductory section seeks to understand the discussion and rationale leading up to the Government’s publication of The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent World (hereafter the UK NSS), as well as highlighting some of its limitations. Indeed, it is believed that this offers a useful platform from which to assess the specific matters raised by the inquiry—providing the necessary contextual backdrop against which the Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) role and future conduct should be examined.
INTRODUCTION

1. Globalisation continues to drive change across the world at unprecedented speed. The dynamism and vibrancy of this interconnected world has the potential to create wealth, freedom and security. Such a connected world, however, is increasingly vulnerable to shocks, disruption and uncertainty anywhere in the system. The UK government has found it hard to intervene effectively in political and economic problems with changes in the global system often reverberating unpredictably throughout British society: cartoons shown in Danish newspapers create civil unrest on the streets of London; drugs from the poppy fields of Afghanistan lead to violence on Glasgow estates; while hurricanes off the west coast of America raise the price of petrol in the UK.1

1.1 The recognition of this rapidly changing global environment, with its associated risks and opportunities, provided the rationale behind the British Government’s recent publication of a National Security Strategy. As the UK NSS states in its introduction, “[t]he scope and approach of the strategy reflects the way our understanding of national security has changed”.2 Specifically, the aim of the Strategy is “to set out how we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its citizens, our prosperity and our way of life”.3 Such an understanding at the heart of Government concerning the scale of the challenge is encouraging—with the ability to place the different risks (both threats and hazards) in context with one another represents an important initial step in the contemporary “strategic” approach that is required to meet the challenges of 21st century national security.

1.2 The real “strategic” challenge, however, centres on translating this understanding of the threat spectrum into practical cross-departmental cooperation, in such a way that fosters a practical ability to react in the event of unexpected crises, while also adopting a longer-term perspective that foresees and prepares for future threats.

1.3 Stated bluntly, the national security architecture has yet to adapt to the 21st century. Existing habits of thought and institutions remain powerfully conditioned by the concept of the nation state that has dominated Western thinking since the seventeenth century. Today power is dispersing around and through the nation state. This is most apparent in the blurring of three traditionally important distinctions—between domestic and international spheres; between policy areas; and between public, private and non-profit sectors.4

1.4 The new security paradigm demands a new approach by the UK government. Collaboration, for example will be central to this approach. The test of whether this more integrated security concept is translated into practical effect will depend, in the UK at least, on whether government is reformed to meet the new challenges, in terms of adjusting departmental boundaries between the MoD, FCO, DFID and Home Office, questioning relevant budgetary arrangements, and creating a stronger central coordinating capacity in the Cabinet Office area.5

1.5 In place of the current siloed approach to national security, the contemporary context necessitates a holistic perspective—fostering and embedding a culture of interdependence between government departments and agencies, imparting flexibility in the short-term and promoting an integrated horizon scanning capacity over the longer-term, thereby ensuring greater preparedness in the face of uncertainty about the future. Such an approach is particularly necessary given the increasing prevalence of so-called “wicked” problems—that is, those “problems which are unbounded in scope, time and resources, and enjoy no clear agreement about what a solution would even look like, let alone how it could be achieved”.6 Indeed, it is only by implementing a network based system approach across government, in place of traditional hierarchies, that we may begin to evolve to meet the challenges posed by the new security paradigm.

1.6 In summary, the new understanding of “national security” in the 21st century represents an important concept for organising government—providing a unifying theme, sufficiently important to galvanise both politicians and the civil service in equal measure, while also necessitating that short-term measures are closely tied to a longer-term perspective.

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3 UK NSS, p 3.
5 K Tebbit, Countering international terrorism: joining up the dots in Hennessy, New Protective State.
The MoD and the New Security Paradigm

2. The new security paradigm hasn’t, to date, had the fundamental and meaningful impact on Defence Planning Assumptions that is necessary to address contemporary national security challenges. The MoD has traditionally adopted a sub-strategic approach to managing defence which often fails to sufficiently place the variety of current risks (both threats and hazards) in context with one another and consequently, its ability to adopt a long-term/horizon scanning perspective is impaired. There are four notable areas where the rigidity of DPAs is particularly apparent:

(a) **Procurement**—since the end of the Cold War the UK’s defence procurement priorities have been dominated by a number of major procurement programmes. These include Typhoon for the RAF, the Royal Navy’s CVF carriers and Type-45 destroyers and the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA); not to mention the planned development of a successor to the Trident nuclear weapons system. These programmes represent the cutting edge of military technology. Yet their very complexity and expense puts a strain on the defence budget, while the decades long time-scale over which they are developed introduces a debilitating rigidity into the procurement process.

(b) **Expeditionary warfare and procurement**—The organisational requirements of the conflicts in which the Armed Forces are currently engaged have been consistently downplayed relative to wider defence planning goals. Regrettably these have tried to maintain the three services and their prestige procurement projects, within the context of high intensity expeditionary warfare. Tellingly, the equipment demands of recent missions have not been for more cutting-edge technology, but on the rapid introduction of less advanced equipment. Simply stated there is a need to streamline the procurement process—with a greater emphasis on pre-existing “off the shelf” equipment which offers cheaper, more swiftly deliverable alternatives than bespoke programmes.

(c) **Focus on international terrorism as the overriding threat to security**: The focus on international terrorism reflects the legacy of the Cold War and the need for a single overarching threat on which to base planning options. Undue focus has been put on the post-9/11 threat of international terrorism however and has in the process detracted from other, arguably equally pressing risks.

(d) **The nature of post-Cold War and post-9/11 reform within the MoD**—more generally, defence planners have sought to paper over the contradictions of the UK defence sector through reorganising existing force structures and attempting to introduce “efficiency gains” into the Armed Forces themselves. Such an approach to reform fails to address the underlying organisational dilemmas facing the Armed Forces and shies away from taking decisions that are likely to be both suitable and sustainable over the long-term. In short, deeper and more sustainable root and branch reform is necessary.

2.1 The primary organisational dilemma for UK Defence concerns the utility of the expeditionary role—broadly defined—in meeting the primary threats to UK security. In particular, there is a risk that too narrow a concentration on the expeditionary warfare mission risks undermining the Armed Forces’ ability to maintain what the military academics Christopher Dandeker and Lawrence Freedman have called “a general capacity for emergency action”. Emergency planners are clear that in the event of a disaster what they require from the Armed Forces is a predictable and available resource on which to draw at short notice. However, the current prioritisation of expeditionary warfare—in terms of both restructuring and deployments—diverts significant resources away from “national” defence.

2.2 While the New Chapter did establish 14 new regionally located Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces (CCRF)—each comprising 500 military volunteers—to provide assistance to civil authorities in the event of a domestic emergency, doubts have been raised over their suitability for their role, in terms of appropriate training, speed of response and manning levels.

2.3 The domestic security mission for the UK Armed Forces is one that needs to be taken more seriously than it has been to date. This is particularly the case given the clear domestic contribution that the Armed Forces have made in recent years—including during the foot and mouth crisis of 2001 and the summer flooding of 2007. It is also important to underline to British citizens themselves that the services are not just interested in or equipped for military adventures abroad. They also have an important contribution to make at home as well.

2.4 Current operational commitments and manpower problems mean that the Armed Forces’ capacities in this area are more limited than they might otherwise be, amongst both regular forces and the Territorial Army. Indeed, in a leaked memo published by a national newspaper in July 2007, General Sir Richard Dannatt, head of the Army confessed that the commitment of troops to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that it had “almost no capability to react to the unexpected”, either at home or abroad. Arguably, this represents an important oversight in UK defence planning; one that exposes once again the fragility of the UK Armed Forces’ current organisational predicament.

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8 C Dandeker and L Freedman, The British armed services, Political Quarterly 73, no 4 (October 2002).
2.5 The central theme drawing together the issues raised in this section and underlying many of the
dilemmas highlighted concerns the question of priorities for British defence and how these shape the role of
the Armed Forces in the 21st century context. Responding to the changed international environment in
the immediate post-Cold War period, the 1998 Strategic Defence Review articulated a vision of “foreign
policy led defence”\(^{12}\)—something that necessitated the continuation of an expeditionary role. The general
principles of this approach were largely reinforced post-9/11 by the SDR New Chapter, the Defence White
Paper (2003) and the accompanying Future Capabilities (2004) document—though these did envisage a more
proactive approach to potential security threats, in contrast to the largely reactive stance of the SDR (1998).

2.6 The impact of this expeditionary model on the UK Armed Forces has, however, been consistently
under-estimated and defence planners have found it difficult to acknowledge the scale of the organisational
and operational challenges that it entails in practice. As the above analysis on the contribution to UK
resilience illustrates, attempting to fulfill the expeditionary role has—given available resources—perpetuated
tension with homeland security responsibilities, particularly when viewed from the perspective of
contemporary national security challenges

COOPERATION WITH WHITEHALL

3.1 The current state of inter-departmental cooperation was outlined in the 2007 Capability Reviews,
which were aimed at driving improvement and a more joined-up approach in government. The MoD
capability review focuses primarily on its “insularity and reluctance to consult and work with others in the
formulation of strategy and policy”. This can be changed, the review goes on to state, by taking “steps to
make its work more accessible—even down to changing the language for different audiences or revising
security classifications where possible”.\(^{13}\) There are a number of specific measures that would mark useful
initial steps in implementing such an approach, each of which the Ministry of Defence would be central to
achieving given its dominant presence in the national security architecture.

(a) The creation of a National Security Secretariat would facilitate the collaborative approach that is
necessary in the contemporary environment. This new secretariat would have four areas of
responsibility: strategic planning, capabilities and resources, horizon scanning and performance
evaluation.

(b) The government should consider developing an “indicative” national security budget, bringing
together the existing spending plans of the MoD, FCO, Home Office, Intelligence agencies and
other relevant budgets of the national security budget (such as the budget of Transec in the
Department of Transport). A key issue behind the existing mismatch between resources and the
role of government is the fact that currently departments prepare their own budgets according to
their own analysis and assessment of threats and hazards to the UK. As this memorandum argues,
the MoD’s analysis of contemporary national security has, to date, been sub-strategic in
character—with its allocation of resources arguably not facilitating the best outcome in “national
security” terms. In the future all analysis and assessment should be brought together by the new
national security secretariat in collaboration with government departments so that an indicative
national security budget can be prepared.

3.2 Taking the relevant departments and agencies (including the Metropolitan Police) the national
security budget of the UK equals approximately £48 billion. According to the departmental budgets for
2006–07, the MoD receives well over half of this and incidentally more than double what the next largest
recipient, the Home Office, is allocated. It is therefore imperative, given the dominant proportion of the
national security resources that the MoD take a proactive approach to encouraging such a transition—
eschewing the competitive tensions along institutional lines that have become a hallmark of budgetary
wrangling.

CONCLUSION

4. The UK NSS makes some encouraging initial steps—most clearly in fostering a consensus across
Whitehall about the diverse and multifarious character of the challenge to national security in the 21st
century. Unsurprisingly, given the relatively quick time in which it was drawn up, however, it fails to propose
the kind of widespread/root and branch institutional reform that is required. Indeed, citing the changes
already made to the national security architecture since 9/11, the UK NSS “does not propose further radical
structural change”\(^{14}\) (though it commits to keep “structures and processes […] under review”).\(^{15}\) This is
particularly worrying since it suggests a misjudgement of the true scale and scope of current and future
threats.

4.1 Undoubtedly, “wicked” problems are here to stay and the sooner this is recognised at the heart of
Government, the sooner the process of fundamental institutional reform can begin. As one of the major
stakeholders in the national security equation, the MoD undoubtedly has a prominent role to play in

\(^{14}\) UK NSS, p 58.
\(^{15}\) UK NSS, p 58.
shaping the pace and direction of this process. Indeed, how the Ministry of Defence approaches the challenge posed by contemporary national security is likely to determine not only its continuing prominence as a core institution of state, but also attitudes across the wider canvas of government.

If the Defence Committee wishes to pursue any of the themes and arguments raised in this submission, the author would be happy to elucidate further.

16 May 2008

Memorandum from VT Group

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This memo:
(a) provides an introduction to VT Group, its vision and values;
(b) provides some examples of VT “Homeland Security” services;
(c) identifies VT Group’s approach to remaining a key partner in an increasingly challenging security and economic environment; and
(d) makes a number of suggestions for action.

2. INTRODUCTION TO VT GROUP PLC

(a) VT Group is a leading defence and support services contractor that provides engineering focused, mission critical support to the defence, nuclear and secure communications sectors, supported by a comprehensive specialist training business. The Group employs over 14,000 people and has a turnover of over £1.2 billion. Its vision is “to be recognised as the number one international government services group”, which VT aims to achieve by living its core values:

People—the quality of VT’s people contributes directly to business success; VT is committed to enabling people to release their full potential and realise their goals;

Performance—as the business grows, VT is committed to delivering excellence to both internal and external customers, and to ensuring employees are focused on performance; and

Partnering—VT has played a ground-breaking role in developing and applying approaches to partnering with the customer; its trusted and reliable processes deliver on time and to budget. VT is committed to remaining an innovative and best practice partner.

(b) In recognition of VT’s approach to partnering, the July 2007 MoD Directorate of Supplier Relations (DSR) performance review rated VT as “the MoD’s highest performing company”. In particular, the review noted: “the company has a culture of developing professional, open and honest relationships, and actively encourages an atmosphere of mutual trust and support. This was particularly demonstrated in those relationships based on a ‘partnering’ approach. Comments received also indicated that in most cases these relationships stand up to strong debate and issues are jointly resolved as one team.”

3. VT “HOMELAND SECURITY”

(a) VT “Homeland Security” brings together expertise from across the Group to make a wide and diverse contribution to UK national security and resilience. This contribution is underpinned by a long-standing appreciation of military and “blue-light” ethos, and a genuinely impartial take on equipment that enables VT to broker differences between the customer and the original equipment manufacturer.

(b) VT’s contribution includes the provision of communications infrastructure, nuclear engineering and technical services, fire fighting training facilities, military training, aircraft and ships.

(c) Communications infrastructure, for example, spans the design, build and operation of mission critical communications for long-standing customers such as national intelligence agencies, the UK Armed Forces, including the RN’s submarine fleet (as well as the national strategic deterrent), and other NATO militaries. Advanced technological solutions are complemented by full through-life maintenance and support services.

(d) Nuclear engineering and technical services, by way of further example, include the monitoring of radioactive materials in and out of Sellafield and the provision of emergency response capabilities. Working for the UK Government under programme Cyclamen, our emergency response teams ensure specialist expertise is on hand 24/7/365 to deal safely with a radiological incident, both by identifying and disposing with any suspect materials.
(e) A number of examples of VT “Homeland Security” solutions are set out in the table below. VT’s complete contribution, from design and build through to maintenance and support, is set out at Annex A.

4. EXAMPLES OF VT “HOMELAND SECURITY” SOLUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Contract Type/Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secure and resilient communications</td>
<td>VT provides the UK and NATO militaries with High Frequency communication. The secure and resilient service can be used to contact ships and aircraft.</td>
<td>Min(DES) Acquisition Award for Excellence, May 08. Special Min(DES) Acquisition Award for Partnering, May 08. 270 military personnel returned to high priority duties. 2,000 acres of land returned to MoD.</td>
<td>15-year PPP let in June 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast services</td>
<td>VT delivers secure communications to the RN’s submarine fleet (including the national strategic deterrent). The service is based on the message “always getting through”.</td>
<td>The global service is often the only communications medium available instantly in the event of major incidents, where television and telecommunications networks are the first casualty.</td>
<td>PFI let in January 2004.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclamen emergency response service</td>
<td>VT delivers the BBC World Service globally, as well as programming for a number of other broadcasters.</td>
<td>Cyclamen capability is available at ports, airports and temporary/mobile locations throughout the UK.</td>
<td>£11 million. 2006–17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing critical infrastructure</td>
<td>VT has supplied, installed and commissioned a radiological and nuclear monitoring system to detect illicit radioactive movements onto or from the Sellafield nuclear licensed site.</td>
<td>The system is one of several that help deter nuclear material proliferation. The system also detects movements onto site which might be associated with a “dirty bomb” or “improved nuclear device”.</td>
<td>£6 million. Supply contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and environmental radiation monitoring</td>
<td>On behalf of various nuclear licensed sites, VT provides radiation monitoring for over 15,000 people. This covers “film badges” through to complex internal dosimetry. VT provides the Met Police with through-life capability support (including surge capacity) for some 3,600 vehicles.</td>
<td>The recent Polonium 210 poisoning incident was confirmed by using internal dosimetry, which is also capable of detecting many other radioactive substances.</td>
<td>£4.7 million pa. Three year plus two extension.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through-life capability support</td>
<td>VT leases three off-shore patrol vessels (OPVs) to MoD and maintains these in aid of, among other things, drug interdiction, anti-terrorism and submarine support duties. VT also leases an OPV with helicopter carrying capability to the MoD for the purposes of patrolling the Falkland Islands’ waters.</td>
<td>Commander HMS Clyde and former commander HMS Mersey, Lieutenant Commander Jonathan Lett RN: “These are modern, fast, agile and versatile platforms. [...] In my two commands, I have built up a close relationship with VT and genuinely feel I am in partnership with the company.”</td>
<td>OPVs: output-based contract. 2002–13. Falkland Islands vessel: output-based contract. 2007–13.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5. THE FUTURE OF UK NATIONAL SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

(a) As the National Security Strategy notes, the UK’s security landscape is increasingly complex and unpredictable. Interconnected threats and risks have the potential to undermine stability both here and abroad. Just as VT responded quickly and pragmatically to developments in Government defence industry policy, eg by constructing BVT Surface Fleet, the maritime joint venture between VT Group and BAE Systems, the Group is poised to respond to developments in Government homeland security policy. Indeed, in many respects (as evidenced in this memo), VT is already at the forefront of efforts to address and manage the interconnected threats and risks identified by the National Security Strategy.

(b) Going forward, as the Government shapes its approach to homeland security, VT will continue to provide:

(i) **Best value for money partnering arrangements**, where behaviours include taking the long view, establishing shared goals, operating open book accounting, contracting for availability, gainsharing, driving thought leadership and continuously reviewing progress and processes;

(ii) **Unique delivery capability**, where practice includes equipment impartiality, proactive through-life servicing, a whole-life cost outlook and making use of bespoke technology to capture management information and drive thought leadership;

(iii) **Cutting-edge innovation**, whether it applies to the application of new technologies or the development of commercial models.

6. SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTION

As the National Security Strategy also notes, “To deliver […] in a challenging environment, we are reforming the approach to defence procurement and our relationship with the defence industry, with more hard-headed prioritisation and a greater emphasis on value for money.” (p 46). VT Group welcomes this commitment and suggests a strategic alignment with first procurement principles in order that industry makes the necessary investment to meet the Government’s homeland security requirements. To promote efficiency and to give industry direction, aspects of an aligned approach to homeland security could include:

(a) a homeland security procurement strategy;

(b) a procurement model that takes the best of the defence procurement and through-life support model and applies it to homeland security;

(c) a central homeland security procurement agency;

(d) a Government/industry contact programme; and

(e) a capable UK supply chain, in order to ensure we, as a nation, are as self-sufficient as possible.

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**Annex A**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Detail</th>
<th>Comment</th>
<th>Contract Type/Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Secure and resilient communications</td>
<td>VT provides the UK and NATO militaries with High Frequency communication. The secure and resilient service can be used to contact ships and aircraft.</td>
<td>Min(DES) Acquisition Award for Excellence, May 08. Special Min(DES) Acquisition Award for Partnering, May 08. 270 military personnel returned to high priority duties. 2,000 acres of land returned to MoD.</td>
<td>15-year PPP let in June 2003.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure and resilient communications</td>
<td>VT delivers secure communications to the RN’s submarine fleet (including the national strategic deterrent). The service is based on the message “always getting</td>
<td>Winner “Most Innovative PFI Contract” 2001. £1 million returned to MoD through innovative re-financing in 2007.</td>
<td>PFI let in January 2004.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Broadcast services</td>
<td>VT delivers the BBC World Service globally, as well as programming for a number of other broadcasters.</td>
<td>The global service is often the only communications medium available instantly in the event of major incidents, where television and telecommunications networks are the first casualty.</td>
<td>10-year contract let in 1997. Extended to 2012.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure positioning</td>
<td>VT provides the UK eLoran navigation signal, which is a highly resilient terrestrial back-up to GPS. The service also has the capacity to broadcast to users in the event of a major incident when telephone/mobile networks are otherwise down.</td>
<td>GPS can be easily jammed and is not always effective in built-up areas. eLoran, on the other hand, has no problem penetrating built-up areas.</td>
<td>15-year PFI contract let in 2007.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secure and resilient networks</td>
<td>VT provides the MoD and a national intelligence customer with regulation compliant network infrastructures, which it also designs and installs.</td>
<td>The services are delivered by security-cleared technicians and are designed hand-in-hand with the customer.</td>
<td>Contract let in 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK time signal</td>
<td>On behalf of the National Physical Laboratory, VT provides the UK national time radio signal. The service also has the capacity to broadcast to users in the event of a major incident.</td>
<td>The service currently controls a number of systems, including railways, telecommunications networks and logistic distribution systems.</td>
<td>10-year contract let in 2006.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialist vehicles</td>
<td>VT designs and builds specialist communications vehicles for the MoD and security services. The vehicles are designed to operate in the most demanding environments and have minimal radio frequency leakage.</td>
<td>These vehicles are easily deployed to the scene of a major incident in order to set up a communications infrastructure as rapidly as possible.</td>
<td>Contract let in 1995.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyclamen emergency response service</td>
<td>VT provides an emergency response capability on a 24/7/365 basis across the UK in the event that suspect radioactive material is found.</td>
<td>Cyclamen capability is available at ports, airports and temporary/mobile locations throughout the UK.</td>
<td>£11 million. 2006–17.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securing critical infrastructure</td>
<td>VT has supplied, installed and commissioned a radiological and nuclear monitoring system to detect illicit radioactive movements onto or from the Sellafield nuclear licensed site.</td>
<td>The system is one of several that help deter nuclear material proliferation. The system also detects movements onto or from the Sellafield nuclear licensed site.</td>
<td>£6 million. Supply contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and environmental radiation monitoring</td>
<td>On behalf of various nuclear licensed sites, VT provides radiation monitoring for over 15,000 people. This covers “film badges” through to complex internal dosimetry.</td>
<td>The recent Polonium 210 poisoning incident was confirmed by using internal dosimetry, which is also capable of detecting many other radioactive substances.</td>
<td>£4.7 million pa. Three year plus two extension.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tactical radiation monitoring equipment</td>
<td>VT supplies and supports MoD with critical radiation monitoring equipment. This includes supply, calibration, maintenance and repair, simulators and training.</td>
<td>Used by front-line troops in their active operations worldwide.</td>
<td>£14 million.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Managing counter-proliferation</td>
<td>VT is the managing agent for DBERR’s counter-proliferation activities in Russia. This includes letting contracts for physical protection equipment and nuclear materials accountancy, as well as the provision of specialist training for Russian guards at sensitive sites.</td>
<td>Nuclear materials accountancy is the process where receipts and exports of nuclear material are verified to ensure that all material is accounted for and any attempts at illicit or willful diversion are detected and stopped in a timely manner.</td>
<td>£4 million. 2005–10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through-life capability support</td>
<td>VT leases three off-shore patrol vessels (OPVs) to MoD and maintains these in aid of, among other things, drug interdiction, anti-terrorism and submarine support duties. VT also leases an OPV with helicopter carrying capability to the MoD for the purposes of patrolling the Falkland Islands’ waters.</td>
<td>Commander HMS Clyde and former commander HMS Mersey, Lieutenant Commander Jonathan Lett RN: “These are modern, fast, agile and versatile platforms. [...] In my two commands, I have built up a close relationship with VT and genuinely feel I am in partnership with the company.”</td>
<td>OPVs: output-based contract. 2002–13.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“White Fleet” vehicles</td>
<td>VT provides the MoD with up to 15,000 non-military vehicles, which are continually upgraded to meet changing emissions targets.</td>
<td>Voted “best deal to reach financial closure” in 2006 and “best operational defence scheme” in 2007. Both awards made by Public Private Finance. PFI contract.</td>
<td>2001–11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction equipment</td>
<td>In partnership with Amey, VT provides the MoD with construction and engineering equipment (most of which is military) world-wide.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2005–21.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Engineering training</td>
<td>On behalf of MoD, VT operates the engineering school, REME at Arborfield and Bordon, and the Armour Training School at Bovington. VT provides training in support of UORs at all locations.</td>
<td></td>
<td>2000–10.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>VT provides the RAF with up to 50,000 flying hours per year on light aircraft (for training purposes). VT also provides the necessary support services.</td>
<td>The Authority has stated complete satisfaction with the contract at every annual contract review.</td>
<td>PFI contract. 1999–2009.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support services</td>
<td>VT operates the Tucano Total Support Programme, which delivers 13,500 flying hours per year to the RAF on RAF-owned aircraft.</td>
<td>This was the July 2007 DSR’s highest scoring contract.</td>
<td>Output-based contract. 2002–10.</td>
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Defence Committee: Evidence

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
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<th>Contract Type/Period</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training facilities</td>
<td>VT provides the following Fire and Rescue services with state-of-the-art training facilities: Somerset, Avon, Gloucester, Devon and South Wales.</td>
<td>Contract with Gloucs FRS covers Devon, Somerset, Gloucs and Avon services.</td>
<td>£42 million PFI contract with South Wales Fire and Rescue Services (2005–30).</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>£72.5 million PFI contract with Gloucs Fire and Rescue Service (2003–28).</td>
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16 May 2008

Memorandum from the Society of British Aerospace Companies (SBAC)

1.1 SBAC is the UK’s national trade association representing companies supplying civil air transport, defence, security and space markets. SBAC encompasses the British Airports Group and UKspace. Together with its regional partners, SBAC represents over 2,600 companies across the UK supply chain.

1.2 Alongside civil air transport equipment and services SBAC members provide equipment and support to the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for use in battlefield operations. The sector is also heavily engaged in the fast developing security markets for which there are many interfaces with government departments, emergency services and other agencies. There are opportunities for the government (MoD, Home Office and other appropriate agencies) to work closely with industry to meet UK national security and resilience needs and SBAC therefore welcomes the opportunity to contribute to this inquiry.

2. Summary

2.1 The national security and resilience policy agenda is affected by well-documented challenges; MoD, other government departments and industry have a critical role in addressing these, and they must do so in the context of rapid change. MoD has a great deal of experience and capability and should be considered part of UK’s total capability in meeting the challenges identified in the Government’s National Security Strategy (NSS).

2.2 Traditional boundaries between “defence” and “security”, and the distinction between how “domestic” and “foreign” policies affect national security, are increasingly blurred. Government and industry structures must continue to adapt to reflect these trends.

2.3 UK industry possesses a broad range of capabilities to support MoD, Home Office and other appropriate agencies in delivering UK national security and resilience; industry should be considered as a willing strategic partner to agencies responsible for delivering national security.

2.4 Industry looks forward to ongoing MoD and cross-government engagement through existing mechanisms such as the National Defence Industries Council (NDIC) and the UK Security and Resilience Industry Suppliers Council (RISC). These bodies offer industry and government the opportunity to review defence industrial matters and, where appropriate, to work together to improve the UK’s ability to meet challenging operational requirements, particularly in the security arena.

3. MoD Role in National Security and Resilience—SBAC View on UK Context

3.1 The UK faces complex national security and resilience challenges, in large part owing to the sustained and well-documented terrorism threat. As recognised in the NSS, multi-agency cooperation and public/private sector collaboration is necessary to meet the broad range of challenges.

3.2 Traditional boundaries between “defence” and “security” are increasingly blurred. For example, overseas stabilisation and peace-keeping operations help to tackle the conditions which might promote terrorism and lead to terrible consequences for domestic security. Similarly, “defence” equipment, systems and technologies are increasingly deployed in a civil context to help counter the threat posed by a broad range of threats and challenges (e.g. terrorism, natural disasters). Government structures and industry’s outlook are adapting to reflect this increasing trend. For example, on 1 April 2008, the UK Trade & Investment Defence & Security Organisation was launched with responsibility for supporting both defence and security exports. Similarly the SBAC, under the overall direction of its Aerospace Defence and Homeland Security (AD&HS) Board, seeks to develop common industry views across the defence and security arena and liaises with various government departments and agencies.

3.3 Many other European countries, including the USA and European countries, already routinely bring together “defence” and “security” policy considerations into national security governance structures and facilitate more direct cooperation between civil and military authorities. Similarly European industrial
interface mechanisms have been designed to accommodate this trend. In France, for example, a “High Committee for Civil Defence” has been in operation since 1982 to act as the single industrial interface covering all areas of hazard to society (ie not only terrorism).

3.4 Boundaries between domestic and foreign policies affecting national security are similarly increasingly blurred; the government’s NSS explains that a distinction between the two is often “unhelpful”. For example the UK’s armed forces, both in operations abroad and in a number of domestic roles identified in the new chapter of the Strategic Defence Review, contribute significantly to the UK’s ability to mitigate and respond to threats to the country.

3.5 The provision of UK security and resilience, as illustrated in the NSS, is no longer purely a UK-based, domestic challenge. UK national security governance architecture must address the new and complex interconnected challenges by integrating the outlook and activities of all the relevant agencies, including MoD. The NSS explains that “the major security challenges require an integrated response that cuts across departmental lines and traditional policy boundaries.” The processes for developing the equipment, systems and technologies that may required to mitigate (and respond to) emerging terrorist threats, for example, will benefit from MoD’s full engagement and participation. Industry is fully supportive of a more integrated government approach to meet these challenges.

4. INQUIRY COMMENTS

4.1 Against this background SBAC would offer the following comments.

4.1.1 MoD makes an invaluable contribution to UK security and resilience. Both in operations abroad and in their domestic roles, the UK armed forces complement the work of the Home Office and other agencies in delivering UK national security and resilience. With regards to developing UK-based security operational requirements, the Home Office has a leading role to play in setting priorities and working with other agencies and industry to support them. Since 2007 the Home Office’s Office of Security and Counter Terrorism (OSCT) has engaged industry through RISC; this should continue. RISC has emerged as the single strategic point of contact between Government and Industry to address shared counter-terrorism issues. Collaborative formation of necessary requirements, drawing on expertise from MoD where appropriate, is the next natural step for the security agenda.

4.1.2 MoD is cooperating with other Government departments and agencies both to determine and, where necessary, deliver the military component of national security. Historically, there has been a somewhat fragmented approach to determining the domestic security and resilience operational requirement and system/equipment procurement drives. Recently, industry in the UK has welcomed the government’s establishment of four “Industry Advisory Groups” (IAGs) on four themes pertinent to the current threat posed. Industry is encouraged that MoD is represented on these IAGs; in this way OSCT and other appropriate domestic security agencies will be able to harness the relevant MoD capabilities and experience whilst engaging industry in a collaborative manner.

4.1.3 In meeting the security challenges that the UK faces, the provision of state-of-the-art equipment will be critical. MoD has unparalleled experience of managing major equipment programmes and industry in the UK is widely acknowledged as a world leader in the provision of defence and security equipment (defence exports contributing £5 billion to the British economy each year). Industry in the UK is also a leading supplier to the global market of CBRN defensive equipment, supporting technologies, doctrine and protective measures. It also provides cutting edge command and control systems that facilitate multi-agency responses to emergency scenarios by integrating complex information quickly and effectively to support the public authorities’ and armed forces’ critical decision-making. Additionally, UK border and maritime security has benefited from the adaptation and deployment of “defence” capabilities for civilian purposes (eg surveillance systems and detection technologies).

5. PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE FINAL REPORT

5.1 Industry should be recognised, embraced and promoted as a key strategic partner to MoD, Home Office and other appropriate agencies in delivering UK national security and resilience.

5.2 MoD, Home Office and other appropriate agencies should continue to engage industry at the highest levels through existing mechanisms (such as RISC and the NDIC) to formulate and develop future security and resilience technology/equipment operational requirements and responses.

6. CONCLUDING REMARKS

6.1 SBAC and other RISC members already support MoD, Home Office and other agencies’ critical role in national security and resilience with a wide range of equipment and systems. Industry should be considered and embraced as a willing strategic partner to MoD and other government departments in meeting complex UK security and resilience challenges.
6.2 SBAC would welcome the Committee’s recognition of MoD and industry’s critical roles in UK national security and resilience. Through its support of the UK’s armed forces and government agencies through RISC and other existing channels, industry will continue to support UK national security and resilience.

3 June 2008

Memorandum from Fujitsu Defence and Security

BACKGROUND

The current national security and resilience (NSR) situation is complex in that it covers resilience both in response to terrorist action and civil disaster or contingency. The recent publication of the National Security Strategy (NSS) provides a useful opportunity for taking stock.

The UK has had a counter-terrorist strategy (known as CONTEST) for some years. It is based on a framework of four P’s:

— preventing things happening by dealing with the underlying causes;
— pursuing those intending violence to reduce the threat;
— protecting the UK by reducing physical and electronic vulnerability; and
— preparing for attacks should they nevertheless happen.

The CONTEST strategy was made public in 2006—in itself a sign of changing times and a recognition of how much information is now in the public domain about the activities and capabilities of the police as well as, intelligence and security agencies.

The latest advance was the publication by the government in March 2008 of the National Security Strategy for the UK. It is important because it acknowledges and captures the nature of the changes that are occurring, and sets out the government’s aspirations for the way things should develop further.

The NSS, for the first time, puts terrorism formally in the wider context of other threats to the nation and its people. It carries forward the logic of the Resilience agenda in recognising that responses to threats and catastrophes may have common features independent of their origins. It broadens the scope of national security to look at the risks to the UK from terrorist, criminal, man-made and natural disasters.

The Strategy also notes that the pervasiveness of the internet and mobile communications, and their familiarity and accessibility to those active in crime and terrorism, means that a great deal of the recruiting, planning, preparing and organisation of criminal and terrorist activity now takes place in the electronic space. Increasingly, this is the battle space within which government needs to be effective if it is to detect and prevent malicious activity. At the same time, our electronic dependency also provides opportunities for criminals and, potentially, for terrorists.

The NSS recognises explicitly that measures to reduce vulnerability, and to increase preparedness to deal with disaster, build resilience against a range of threats, and are consistent with a more all-hazards and all-embracing “comprehensive approach”.

“Because of the scale and speed of the risk they [pandemic, epidemic, flooding, extreme weather] pose, those phenomena have similar potential to other security challenges to threaten our normal way of life... Moreover our approach to them... is similar to our approach to other national security challenges, including terrorism... as economies and societies grow increasingly dependent on national and global electronic information systems, it becomes even more important to manage the risk of disruption to their integrity and availability through cyber-attack whether terrorist, criminal or state-led.”

National Security Strategy for the UK March 2008

In summary, the government’s intention is to encourage a broader and more connected view of National Security that links more closely the integrity of the state and the safety of the individual. It seeks a more effective coalition of central and local government, security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement, business and commerce, as well as non-profit organisations and individuals. In effect, both a globalisation process and a multi agency approach is required if a coherent and effective response to NSR is to be achieved, and if critical national infrastructure (CNI) is to be protected.

The government has a leadership role to play and has made some major changes to address the multi agency approach with:

— The creation of the National Security, International Relations and Development Committee (NSID) formed from the Cabinet, chaired nominally by the Prime Minister.
The reorganisation of the Home Office. This includes the creation of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism (OSCT), a unified Borders Agency and extensions to e-Borders, continued (for the moment) commitment to the National Identity Scheme (NIS) and new Police Counter-Terrorism structures.

The last spending round that favoured security, intelligence and counter-terrorism (and constraints on defence spending).

Reviews of intercept as evidence and data security, new asset freezing proposals, new court rooms and judicial arrangements for terrorist trials, and proposals for detention beyond 28 days.

In the future, consideration is being given to:

- Consultation on ideas for a joint Parliamentary National Security Committee.
- Strengthening of horizon-scanning and forward planning capability.
- Creation of an (advisory) National Security Forum with representation from government, the wider political scene, voluntary sector, academia and others to discuss strategy and exchange ideas.

The NSS also seeks to balance terrorism against other threats to civil society, with for instance “flooding and flu” seen as a greater immediate threat to our way of life than terrorist incidents. The response level will be the same however with the focus on operating within a complex multi agency environment.

PROBLEMS AND ISSUES

There is a distinction between responding to a large scale crisis, which so far the UK has not suffered, and a point attack, such as 7/7. In a large scale crisis, there will almost certainly be features that distinguish it from a more straightforward situation. Specifically, a complex multi agency environment, significant military engagement and a requirement for interoperability between all agencies, particularly the first responders (police, fire service, paramedics, NHS etc), local and central government, the security services and military. Key to establishing the required levels of interoperability, is the ability for each of those agencies to be working from a common operational picture and able to communicate by voice and data with all other agencies.

The main issue is the need to effect a more ‘joined up’ approach to any response in the face of this multi agency environment. This involves not only technology but also doctrine and process. This approach needs to be implemented in harmony across all organisations involved so that they may be exercised to a high standard of delivery ahead of any crisis. If not the danger exists that in a crisis, organisations and individuals will revert to what they know best and ignore newer technologies. The widespread use of commercial mobile phones by the emergency services in 7/7 is a case in point.

There is, therefore, a growing “cross-over” area in which many of the approaches, disciplines, capabilities and skills developed to meet the needs of traditional defence and security clients are equally needed in the UK civil government sector. This cross-over area does not have the degree of coherence, predictability or procurement doctrine familiar in individual departments such as the MOD. The government aspires to something more coherent and joined up. There are some good examples of effective partnership but there appears to be no clear plan to achieve it. For instance, substantial obstacles exist in the range and nature of accountabilities of different parts of the sector, their enabling legislation, and the way budgets are allocated.

There may be plans for a “single budget” for counter-terrorism and security, but this is likely to be at best, the sum of the parts rather than an accountability mechanism. In effect there is a real risk that the nation will remain so compartmentalised that it will find it impossible to identify and procure the systems up front that would enable it to “join up” across organisational boundaries when faced with a multi agency crisis, and thereby allowing the first responders and the security services to react to crises efficiently and comprehensively.

The consequences of different agencies not being all informed results in confusion and delay when time is likely to cost lives. If the situational awareness of different agencies during a complex emergency is not the same, responses are likely to be both slow and uncoordinated. Relatively simple solutions, either adapting legacy systems or using Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) solutions, can plug these holes quickly and efficiently.

THE FUJITSU APPROACH

Information and Communications Technology (ICT) has a major role to play in enabling this more joined up approach and delivering interoperability. Fujitsu is one of the largest suppliers of IT systems to both government and the private sector; with installations in the Home Office, Cabinet Office, MOD, HMRC and Security Agencies. It is in a pre-eminent position to assist government departments to work more effectively both singly and also with other organisations. Fujitsu Defence and Security, as one of the UK’s leading IT Systems Integrators, is well placed to manage this process. As well as helping to enlarge a market
for ICT and our services in particular, we are also very aware (in common with much of industry) of the capabilities and technologies available which are not being utilised and could make a real difference to all our lives and security.

There are two distinct areas where Fujitsu can bring its defence and government expertise in ICT systems to bear:

— At one level, it is a matter of integrating information across a secure government infrastructure, which is already available in silo systems, to provide the authorities with the right secure information to enable them to manage the crisis at a strategic level.

— At another it is bringing new advanced capabilities together to generate interoperability at the operational level—as a key systems integrator. This would include capabilities such as the Crisis Communications Service—integrating incompatible comms networks, and the OpenJop system providing situational awareness for operational commanders at Gold or Silver level.

WHAT WE ARE DOING AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

To date Fujitsu has been promoting awareness of the issues around large scale resilience crises, as opposed to the single point attack, which we believe have not been fully evaluated in respect of their impact on any multi agency response. We believe more could be done in the areas of interoperability and the ability of technology (with the associated changes in doctrine and process) to deliver increased capability “on the ground”. In many respects there is technology available which is not costly or complex, which could be implemented relatively quickly and which would make a real difference. Part of the problem appears to be the lack of a pan government process of evaluation and procurement that can determine which technologies would deliver effect quickly and cost effectively across the agencies—in some ways analogous to the UOR principle in the MoD. However the multiplicity of agencies including 43 police services etc, makes the implementation of a single UOR process in the civil sector much more difficult to realise—although the appearance of OSCT and similar cross government agencies may make a difference in the future.

To assist recognition of these issues, we have for the past two years been raising awareness in a number of public events. We sponsored a Chatham House seminar in May 2007, for invited leaders of a range of agencies that could be involved in a large scale crisis. This included the police, fire service, government departments, regional resilience forum, utilities, environment agency etc. It was chaired by Sir David Omand, and as far as we are aware, was the first attempt outside government, to collect representatives of all the agencies that might be involved within a large scale crisis (whether prompted by natural disaster or terrorist attack) in a single place—to debate the issues around interoperability and response. There was a follow up event on HMS Belfast in July 2007, which Lord West and Dame (at the time) Pauline Neville Jones attended. We have also spoken at other conferences such as RUSI and CityForum alongside other NSR speakers, as well as promoting more directly our capabilities at Fujitsu open days and major exhibitions such as DSEI last September.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE COMMITTEE

The questions that might be useful to explore would include:

— What are the capabilities that are available now and which could provide increased performance across the agencies especially in delivering operational interoperability.

— Assuming we have the technologies to improve interoperability, how do we establish the processes, legislation and budget alignment to make effective multi agency working happen.

— What is the relative risk, impact and likelihood of a large scale crisis happening as a result of terrorist action, rather than another point attack.

While less likely it is we believe very possible (and becoming more of a threat), and the impact if it occurs could be devastating. The ability of the country to work as a whole, at local as well as national level, would depend to large extent on the ability to improve levels of interoperability on the ground. We need to have this in place, trained, exercised and embedded within the culture of the various organisations, but particularly the emergency services, before the next crisis hits us. Attempting to implement increased levels of interoperability at the same time as managing the crisis, would be extremely hard if not impossible.

11 June 2008
Memorandum from Intellect

OVERVIEW

Intellect believes that our industry’s contribution to UK security and resilience is in better enabling the different parts of this disparate community to work together. Our members are of the firm view that constantly improving co-operation and communication between the departments, agencies, individuals and companies charged with the country’s security will help them be more effective and more efficient.

Co-ordination of actors and assets is vital during crises or events, and also in preparation—training, scenario and response planning, and intelligence work. The fragmented nature of the security and resilience community is a strength in some ways, as it brings a huge range of capabilities, expertise and resource to the table, but they must be corralled effectively if the UK is to have the optimal mix at any one time.

Intellect’s view is that much of this co-ordination requires a level of integration, in terms of both technologies and processes. For example, at various points in the preparation, response and recovery stages, the need exists to integrate command and control functions, communications and intelligence analysis, and therefore technological capabilities within related bodies must take this into consideration during development and deployment.

INDUSTRY’S PERSPECTIVE

In this submission Intellect addresses the security and resilience space from the perspective of capability and technology providers—whether global integrators of complex systems, national communications infrastructure providers or niche specialists in specific technologies.

Policy decisions about the use of the military in national security and resilience—and the operational, legal and constitutional aspects of these policies—are beyond the purview of industry. This submission should in no way be interpreted as comment on policy decisions.

This industrial perspective is, rather, focused on how stated Government policy can be realised most effectively and efficiently. Industry is a strategic partner on projects and programmes across the breadth of security and resilience, and is therefore able to understand the challenges of coordinating and supporting the different contributors in this vital area.

SECURITY AND RESILIENCE

The Government’s National Security Strategy articulated a broad definition of “national security”, incorporating issues like energy security and trans-national crime alongside core security challenges around counter-terrorism and national resilience. The modern threats and hazards that the UK faces reach across traditional boundaries between the military, civil, national, regional, economic and social phases of our society, and the flexible and innovative response which is required to meet them will depend on the successful coordination of a range of different stakeholders.

In the domestic sphere, for example, countering terrorism and the protection of critical national infrastructure are two principal concerns, and require collaboration between, for example, intelligence agencies, criminal justice authorities, local and regional government, and industry—both as suppliers of capability and owners of infrastructure.

This kind of multi-stakeholder collaboration relies on communications and information sharing. In crisis response situations—such as 7/7—post-incident reports have determined that the status of, for example, mobile communications links between different actors are a major contributor to the effectiveness of emergency personnel. In prevention of terrorism, similarly, inquiries into 9/11 have concluded that agencies’ ability to share intelligence in large part determines how effectively and efficiently they can work.

THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE’S ROLE

MoD is a provider of a number of specific and unique capabilities for domestic security and resilience (eg special forces operations, bomb disposal and forensics), which work alongside civil partner agencies in areas like transport security. MoD is also used as a provider of last resort in a number of resilience scenarios—for example during the firefighters strike and foot and mouth crisis—and in support of the civil power during landmark events like the 2012 Olympics.

In the latter, particularly, the challenges of coordination and integration are evident in microcosm. MoD planning, training and funding does not always reflect the potential role of the Armed Forces in domestic security and resilience, and civil planning often excludes the military’s role, whilst assuming that MoD will inevitably act as the “last insurance policy”. Collectively this can lead to sudden unexpected appropriation of military resource which must be diverted from other priorities.
There is much that MoD could bring to UK security and resilience if coordinated and integrated properly—it is perhaps the Government’s most effective acquirer of complex and advanced technology, has first rate command and control methodology, highly competent personnel and a huge portfolio of unique capabilities. The opaque relationship between civil security and resilience demands and MoD’s “core” business does not, however, encourage consideration of wider potential uses beyond the expeditionary defence and geographical integrity which are its bread and butter.

If MoD (and other relevant stakeholders) are to play an optimal and co-ordinated role in the overall security and resilience “force mix”, integration of their information, communications and technology assets is critical. Joined-up capabilities must be the response to cross-cutting challenges.

BACKGROUND

Intellect is the UK trade association for the IT, telecoms and electronics industries. Its members account for over 80% of these markets and include blue-chip multinationals as well as early stage technology companies. These industries together generate around 10% of UK GDP and 15% of UK trade. Intellect is a vital source of knowledge and expertise on all aspects of the hi-tech industry.

The following paper provides the initial views of Intellect member companies on how the Ministry of Defence and UK Armed Forces interact with other departments and agencies to ensure the safety and security of the UK. This paper addresses aspects specified in the Committee’s call for evidence, and also raises issues that Intellect believes are relevant to the scope of this inquiry.

Intellect welcomes the opportunity to provide input to the committee and is keen to engage with the committee, the Ministry of Defence, and UK Armed Forces to ensure progress on the issues raised in this submission.

11 June 2008

Memorandum from Clive Murgatroyd

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Defence policy does not look sufficiently far ahead to take full account of the potential impacts of climate change. As defence acquisition responds to policy, capital expenditure decisions are being made without full consideration of the climate-induced risks that might reduce the effectiveness and affordability of defence capabilities.

INTRODUCTION TO SUBMITTER

Clive Murgatroyd is an independent defence consultant and a lecturer at the Defence College of Management and Technology, Cranfield University. Recently retired as a Commander in the Royal Navy, he has wide experience of maritime and joint operations, defence acquisition, and policy, concepts and doctrine development. He spent his last appointment in the Ministry of Defence leading the Surface Effects and Self Defence Capability Planning Group within the Directorate of Equipment Capability (Above Water Effects) and was Chairman of NATO’s Maritime Capability Group 1 on Above Water Engagement. He is currently studying for a Master’s degree and is researching the impacts of climate change on defence policy and acquisition.

BACKGROUND

1. In the Government’s sustainable development strategy for the UK, *Securing the Future*, published in March 2005, climate change was identified as “the greatest threat”. Commenting on the Ministry of Defence (MOD) Sustainable Development Action Plan in July 2007, Defence Secretary Des Browne said: “The Armed Forces currently operate in places around the world where access to scarce resources can contribute to conflict, and communities are directly affected by environmental devastation. We are now certain that climate change contributes to instability, and will have implications for future operations. The extent of climate change that we can expect over the coming decades will potentially present MOD with considerable security challenges. Defence must adapt to meet these challenges by working to understand the impact on our personnel, equipment and estate.” Taking actions to limit climate change (mitigation) and prepare for its effects (adaptation) will be fundamental activities for the MOD as it seeks to acquire and sustain capabilities that will be in service in 2050 and beyond, by which time significant climate change impacts are expected.


**Defence Planning Assumptions and Military Tasks**

2. The projected impacts are likely to undermine current Defence Planning Assumptions (DPAs), requiring a reassessment of the balance of capabilities that may be necessary to meet the military tasks. The current taxonomy of military tasks, as published in the December 2003 Defence White Paper, 18 is probably sufficiently generic to require little amendment in the short-to-medium term. How defence can meet the tasks will, however, need to be evaluated against the climate-induced changes to the strategic environment. UK’s armed forces are already operating above the long-term concurrency level that they are structured and resourced to sustain. 19 This is only possible by accepting risk against lower priority goals, but some of these are likely to become much more important in the future.

3. Examination of a selection of the military tasks shows how climate change impacts could affect DPAs, indicating where action to rebalance capabilities may be necessary. Accurate and continuous Strategic Intelligence (Military Task (MT) 1.1) on the effects of climate change, particularly on vulnerable populations, will be needed to provide indicators and warnings of potential conflict and humanitarian suffering so that early action can be taken to prevent, stabilise or contain a crisis. 20 An expanded understanding of the environment from Hydrographic, Geographic and Meteorological Services (MT 1.3) will also be required, both for forecasting extreme events and for rapidly assessing any changes to hydrography and topography that could impede operations.

4. Many of UK’s overseas territories (MT 3.1) are islands in regions already susceptible to hurricanes. The frequency and intensity of such extreme events are likely to increase, threatening the lives of populations and the agriculture and infrastructure on which they depend. By mid-century climate change is expected to reduce water resources in many small islands to the point where they become insufficient to meet demand during low rainfall periods. 21 Indeed, increased temperatures and droughts may compromise the habitability and sustainability of the Cyprus Sovereign Base Areas (MT 3.2), at a time when their strategic location is likely to be increasingly important.

5. Forces provided for Defence Diplomacy, Alliances and Support to Wider British Interests (MT 3.3) can assist the work of other government departments in building confidence and security as climate impacts develop but, with extreme weather causing floods, damage to crops and possibly disease, and with conflicts breaking out over the availability of water and food, the demand for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (MT 4.1) Operations and Evacuation of British Citizens Overseas (MT 4.2) is likely to grow.

6. Peacekeeping (MT 4.3) and Peace Enforcement (MT 4.4), probably under NATO, EU or UN auspices, will become particularly important to deter, contain and stabilise situations that could otherwise compound the effects of climate change by limiting or even preventing mitigation and adaptation activities. Planning for such operations may also need to consider the direct use of armed forces to enforce mitigation activities such as countering illegal deforestation, although the national dynamics within the UN Security Council may hinder such positive action.

7. Conventional threats and acts of terrorism are unlikely to diminish in the face of climate change, so war-fighting capabilities will continue to be needed to conduct Power Projection (MT 4.5), Focused Intervention (MT 4.6) and Deliberate Intervention (MT 4.7) operations, but they will need to be effective under even harsher climatic conditions than those currently being experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan, and with limited access to fresh water, food and fossil fuels.

8. Whilst overseas tasks will be placing significant demands on already stretched forces, it is also likely that as the incidence of storms, floods and fires in the UK increases, there will be additional calls on regular forces and reserves to assist the civilian authorities and emergency services (MT 2.1), both with manpower and with niche capabilities such as helicopters and boats. The damaging floods of 2007 suggest the level of activity to be expected in future, 22 such that establishment of an organisation similar to Australia’s State Emergency Services (SES),23 perhaps using retired military personnel and other suitable volunteers, might be a useful enhancement to national resilience. Requests for Military Aid to the Civil Power may also increase should there be internal unrest following an influx of climate refugees, many of whom may try to arrive by sea, threatening the integrity of UK waters (MT 2.3). The demand for fishery protection is also likely to rise as increasing sea temperatures lead to migration or collapse of fish populations and fiercer competition for dwindling resources.

9. The incidence of MTs will depend on how successfully the world moves to a low carbon future. For example, the strategic significance of fossil fuel supplies should eventually diminish, although in the immediate future it is likely to increase, requiring in the short-to-medium term continued (and probably enhanced) engagement in politically unstable, oil-rich regions, and the maintenance of secure sea lines of communications (SLOCs). In the longer term, food is likely to prove the most important commodity to

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18 MOD, *op cit* at note 14.
20 Assessments of the impacts of climate change on human societies at the regional and local scale will be supported by the Met Office Hadley Centre within the Integrated Climate Programme announced in September 2007.
21 IPCC, *op cit* at note 3.
protect along the SLOCs, particularly if crops fail and food becomes scarcer as a result of regional climate impacts. A consequent shift in focus of national interests may require changed assumptions about the reach and sustainability of defence capabilities.

10. From this short analysis it is clear that the tempo of operations in a climate-stressed future is likely to be continually high, with an emphasis on delivering lower order strategic effects,26 preventing crises, setting the secure and stable conditions to bring situations under control and actively restraining the spread, duration and influence of climate-induced crises. There will be frequent humanitarian and disaster relief operations and sustained and widespread constabulary operations in support of national and international mandates. There will also be an enduring need to secure SLOCs and there will be more short notice home commitments.

DEFENCE CAPABILITIES

11. If the UK’s ability to conduct successful military operations is not to be constrained, the defence acquisition process must deliver adaptable capabilities that take the wide range of climate change effects fully into consideration. Planning for the acquisition of defence capabilities responds to Defence Strategic Guidance (DSG). Although DSG is classified, much of its strategic context can be inferred from one of its source documents, the Development, Concept and Doctrine Centre’s Strategic Trends,25 last issued in March 2007 and baselined in December 2006. Strategic Trends looks 30 years ahead and identifies climate change as one of its “Ring Road issues” that is projected to touch the lives of everyone on the planet.

12. Unfortunately, although many of the associated risks have been postulated out to 2036, Strategic Trends does not provide a sufficiently long view of the possible impacts of climate change and, as it pre-dates the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment Report,26 the impacts considered are probably understated. As the MOD is currently committing to capability solutions that will be in service for up to 40 years (such as the new aircraft carriers), an understanding of the climate risks out to at least 2050 is needed to shape policy and the acquisition process, and thereby adequately inform future force structures and major capital investment decisions.

13. However, although the new National Security Strategy (March 2008) accepts the threat of climate change,27 it states the government’s determination to “shift the overall balance of defence procurement towards support of current operations, while at the same time continuing to invest in a broad range of capabilities for the long term”.28 There is therefore a risk that there will be even less consideration of possible climate impacts on defence acquisition. Whilst I agree that it is vital to support current operations, capability planners must also be encouraged to assess the possible impacts of climate change as far into the future as possible to ensure the delivery of appropriate capabilities.

14. Therefore, to properly underpin the acquisition process, DSG will need to look further than the scope of Strategic Trends and incorporate DPAs that reflect the likely scale and concurrency of future operations by analysing the IPCC scenarios29 from a defence perspective, and testing current and future capabilities against SAG (Studies and Assessment Group) scenarios and vignettes that take climate change into consideration. These scenarios should then be used to inform the Baseline Review and Audit stage of the Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) process,30 to determine critical thresholds in the response of individual capabilities to climate change.

15. I would like to highlight two complications that compound the problem of adapting to a climate-changed future. The first is the dependence on fossil fuels. MOD’s sustainable development strategy and climate change strategy, which are scheduled for publication in late 2008, are likely to direct UK’s armed forces to contribute to the achievement of Kyoto Protocol emission targets, and any revision of the targets that might be agreed in Copenhagen in 2009, by reducing their use of fossil fuels substantially. Peacetime activities, especially training, could be acutely affected, even without the soaring costs of fuel that are already forcing a move away from live training towards the use of synthetic environments. With every expectation that fuel costs will continue to rise in the future, especially as resources decline, even the residual requirement for fossil fuels is likely to result in a significant impact on running costs for many defence capabilities. Alternatives to fossil fuels should therefore be investigated as a matter of urgency.

16. The second complication that must be considered is that climate change exhibits manoeuvrist characteristics.31 A high tempo of unexpected and potentially extreme events could expose political and military weaknesses, with a real danger that they could so overwhelm decision making that increasingly
inappropriate actions—or no actions at all—are taken, paralysing UK’s ability to adapt and undermining the will to combat the threat. Paralysis is likely to be hastened if there are other stresses such as regional conflicts.

17. Defence must therefore establish a framework of capabilities across all of the Defence Lines of Development that can optimise its adaptive capacity, and reduce the risks and uncertainties from climate change. This means a sustainable infrastructure resilient to climate extremes; manpower equipped and trained appropriately for future military tasks; logistics support that is less reliant on fossil fuels; organisations agile enough to pre-empt climate impacts and take timely decisions; equipment designed for operation in extreme climates, with sufficient platforms to maintain presence and deliver lower order strategic effects; and rapid conceptual and doctrinal development that reflects the most up-to-date climate risk assessments.

18. Since resources are finite, the uncertainties inherent in predicting the impact of climate change will need to be addressed through the application of risk models across the policy and capability acquisition domains. The UK Climate Impacts Programme has developed detailed guidance on risk, uncertainty and decision-making, which could provide a useful model for MoD to adapt for its own purposes. As MoD will probably wish to transfer as much climate risk as possible to industry, it is essential that defence industry is fully integrated within the capability planning process, to ensure that it can develop and deliver products suitable for, and adaptable to, defence in a changed climate.

RECOMMENDATIONS

19. Establish the mechanisms that will ensure the armed forces are structured, resourced and sufficiently adaptable to face the uncertain challenges that climate change will pose.

20. Develop Defence Planning Assumptions and appropriate scenarios that will support policy that looks sufficiently far ahead to allow the planning of capabilities that will meet the scale and incidence of the likely military tasks.

21. Use the revised scenarios to inform the Baseline Review and Audit stage of the Through Life Capability Management (TLCM) process.

22. Embed climate risk assessment at all levels across the Defence Lines of Development to inform acquisition decisions that deliver the most appropriate, adaptable solutions within limited resources.

23. Optimise adaptive capacity, so that defence planning and responses are sufficiently agile to overcome the manoeuvrist nature of climate change impacts.

24. Identify alternative energy sources for defence capabilities.

25. Consider the use of retired servicemen and women (and suitable volunteers) to supplement civilian emergency services in an organisation similar to Australia’s State Emergency Services, to assist with response to floods and forest fires in UK.

Clive Murgatroyd
Commander Royal Navy (retired)
26 September 2008

Supplementary memorandum from the Ministry of Defence

A memorandum from the Ministry of Defence responding to the Committee’s requests for further information on maritime security; Defence and police CBRN activities; and exercises, following the evidence session on 27 January 2009.

MARITIME SECURITY

Within UK territorial waters, safety and security issues are the responsibility of the Home Secretary, as they are on the land. The Committee has heard evidence of the responsibilities of other organisations in the maritime sector. The Ministry of Defence provides ships and other force elements to support these agencies. There are three major and ongoing tasks which naval forces conduct:

— Nuclear Deterrent—In support of the deterrent itself there are always vessels at sea which provide an early warning to prevent attack on the nuclear deterrent or to prevent its location being discovered. This is crucial support to ensure the continued effective operation of the nuclear deterrent. There are permanently a small number of units tasked to provide the necessary support.

32 “The ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential damages, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned, and can be carried out in response to or in anticipation of changes in climatic conditions.” UKCIP definition of “Adaptive Capacity”, in Robert Willows and Richenda Connell, Climate adaptation: Risk, uncertainty and decision-making (Oxford, UKCIP, 2003), p 111.

— **Fishery Protection**—Over the last two years the Royal Navy have been contracted to cover 700 “fish” days. The Royal Navy usually provide two Off-shore Patrol Vessels (OPV) each day that are responsible for patrolling the British Fishery Limits. The areas patrolled each day are prioritised based on an intelligence based risk assessment.

— **Integrity of UK Waters**—This task involves the maintenance of the integrity of the UK through the location, identification, interception and engagement of hostile and renegade air and sea craft, including maritime CT, in order to, where necessary, protect national rights and interests. This is achieved through contributing to the provision of recognised, and cross agency referenced, air and maritime picture that enables an integrated policing capability and assists the Civil Power in its objectives. It includes the conduct of port and route survey and also provides the capability to respond to requests for escort and intelligence led operations against potential rogue vessels. In the absence of any specific indication of a threat there will be a small number of units conducting these tasks or ready to respond quickly to an emerging situation. These can of course be augmented if the situation requires it.

In addition to these ongoing tasks there may be, at any given time, a range of other naval vessels stationed at ports throughout the country, including vessels which form part of the Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF). These can of course be called upon to respond to a maritime incident if required.

The exact number of ships on specific tasks is potentially sensitive, but on 21 October 2008, the day on which the Committee heard evidence from the Armed Forces Minister and the Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Home Office, the following ships were in UK waters undertaking the duties outlined above:

| HMS SOMERSET | HMS WESTMINSTER |
| HMS SEVERN | HMS TYNE |
| HMS CATTISTOCK | HMS BROCKLESBY |
| HMS BANGOR | RFA ORANGELEAF |
| HMS ST ALBANS | |

In addition to these vessels, the ships listed below were at sea in and around the UK’s waters undertaking other activities:

| HMS ILLUSTRIOUS | HMS BULWARK |
| HMS GLOUCESTER | HMS CORNWALL |
| HMS ARGYLL | HMS EXPLOIT |
| HMS TRAFALGAR | HMS MIDDLETOWN |
| HMS GLEANER | HMS ENTERPRISE |
| RFA ARGUS | RFA LARGS BAY |
| RFA MOUNTS BAY | |

In addition the MOD Police have a maritime capability consisting of approximately 50 vessels. These are designed principally to enable them to carry out their policing function across the Defence estate, but can be made available to support other police forces in certain circumstances.

The Defence CBRN School at Winterbourne Gunner provides specialist CBRN training. In October 2001, the Home Office began to form a Police CBRN Training Unit, co-located with the Defence CBRN Centre at Winterbourne Gunner. Initially the police based at Winterbourne Gunner were trained by the military and many police officers went on the Defence CBRN instructors’ course.

Following this initial training from the military, the Police National Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centre (PN-CBRN-C) has now developed its own courses for Instructors and train-the-trainer style cascade training, expanding in scope to include the Fire and Rescue Services and the Ambulance Services. By 2006, this centre had trained more than 7,000 police officers in CBRN response. The centre also conducts regular Gold and Silver level multi-agency command training courses for senior officers from all Police, Fire and Rescue and Ambulance services. Attendance on these courses regularly includes military personnel from the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) specialism.

The PN-CBRN-C at Ryton was established in September 2006. This is where the Police CBRN Resilience programme’s senior management oversees Police capacity and capability to deal with CBRN incidents. It is also home to the Police CBRN Operations Centre, which is the national focus for coordinating CBRN responses within the UK. The military Technical Response Force (TRF) links in to the Police through the CBRN Ops Centre, in the event of any military assistance being provided to the Police during a CBRN incident.

Following the establishment of the PN-CBRN-C at Ryton, many business areas have moved away from Winterbourne. As the MOD is required to keep an overseas Counter Terrorism capability, Winterborne Gunner will still be used for MOD CBRN training.
EXERCISING

The Committee wanted to see a list of exercises which Defence had participated in with civil authorities in the UK. The list at Annex A includes a range of national and regional exercises. In addition to the exercises identified, there were a large range of local exercises that the MOD were involved with.

3 March 2009

Annex A

SUMMARY OF DEFENCE UK OPERATIONS EXERCISES (2008)

National Exercise Programme

The MoD took part in all nine Cross Government exercises in 2008, these included:

— July 2008—Fuel shortage exercise chaired by BERR;
— October 2008—Exercise simulating a specialised terrorist attack;
— November 2008—CBRN Exercise chaired by DEFRA;
— November 2008—Olympic planning exercise; and
— November 2008—Counter Terrorism Exercise.

Standing Joint Commander (SJC) (UK) Study days:

— January 2008—CBRN;
— March 2008—Leadership in Resilience (Pandemic Flu, Adverse weather, NARO update, CONTEST strategy);
— July 2008—Force Generation; and
— September 2008—CBRN.

Major Regional Exercises

Examples:
— April 2008—38 (Irish) Bde UK—A major flooding exercise;
— June 2008—51 (SCOT) Bde—An adverse weather exercise;
— October 2008—2 (SE) Bde—A Counter Terrorism exercise;
— September 2008—160 (W) Bde/RAF—An aircraft crash consequence management exercise;
— October 2008—15 (NE) Bde—An adverse weather and widespread coastal flooding exercise;
— November 2008—51 (SCOT) Bde—An adverse weather exercise;
— November 2008—43 Bde (Guernsey)—An Infectious disease exercise.

Local Authority Exercises

There were over 50 local authority exercises.

In addition to the exercises above the MOD participated in the following training activities:
— Cross Government Emergency Resilience Training.
— Courses sponsored at the Emergency Planning College at Easingwold.
— Gold Commanders Acquaint Days.
— CBRN courses at Winterbourne Gunner.
— six UK Operations study days were held at Response Force formation level.
— TRF conducted three major exercises in conjunction with Civil Authorities.