UNDERSTANDING THE DEFENCE CONTRIBUTION
21. As set out above, the Minister for the Armed
Forces divided the relevant capabilities of the Armed Forces into
niche capabilities and an augmentation capability. The Armed Forces
maintain niche capabilities for the simple reason that they are
not provided for elsewhere. The use of niche capabilities is broadly
understood,[18] and whilst
it may sometimes cause alarm in the media, it is seldom cast as
a failure of the civilian authorities. The augmentation capability
is, however, somewhat different in that it can give the impression
of 'calling in the cavalry'. We put this to General Sir David
Richards (Commander in Chief, HQ Land and Standing Joint Commander
(UK)), and he responded that "dealing with the emergency
is what we should all focus on and worry about reputations later",
but admitted that "maybe some people are rather over-focused
on the former".[19]
22. The contribution made by the Armed Forces
during the foot-and-mouth epidemic of 2001 in terms of manpower
and leadership undoubtedly informed the development of procedures
in operation today. The Lessons to be Learned Inquiry Report
commented on the contribution made by the Armed Forces, stating
that,
"The military's role in the Joint Co-ordination
Committee [sic] […] proved to be a critical factor in achieving
a more co-ordinated, applied and disciplined approach to tackling
a wide range of logistical issues on the ground."[20]
23. A letter from the then Minister of Agriculture
(Rt Hon Nick Brown MP) to the Prime Minister (Rt Hon Tony Blair
MP) dated 22 February 2001 revealed his Ministry's first contact
with the Ministry of Defence, and MAFF's proposal for military
support.
"If the disease spreads substantially, we may
need to think in terms of extreme measures such as support by
the military. My department has made initial contact with MoD
to explore the kind of skills and resource which might be needed
and—subject of course to collective decision—available."[21]
24. The Appendices to the Lessons Learned report
compare the 1967-68 outbreak and the 2001 outbreak. In 1967-68,
it was 12 days before the military were deployed, with a peak
involvement of 400. In 2001, 25 days passed before the Armed Forces
were deployed (peaking at over 2,000 troops), despite having liaised
with MAFF from day one.[22]
In 2007, following a much smaller outbreak, the military was not
deployed. In the more recent case of the Gloucestershire floods,
Brigadier Chip Chapman explained the assistance which had been
given by the Armed Forces,
"For example, in the Gloucestershire floods
last year when we provided 1,026 people to help the civil community
in that circumstance, that was force-generated from SJC Land [Standing
Joint Commander] from the Regular and Reserve Force structure
without any need to caveat defence outputs elsewhere in the world
or in the UK."[23]
25. This improved response was made possible
by the guidance now in place for other government departments
wishing to understand what Defence can provide. Nevertheless,
General Richards conceded that even now, the current framework
for providing military aid could be improved, when he identified
"an inevitable gap between what other government
departments expect and what Defence is mandated to, and can, deliver,
and this carries, I think amongst other things, significant potential
reputational risk. Clarity, I think, is critical, as in all things,
and I am of the opinion that we should place defence support on
a more secure and transparent footing. We should look at establishing
clear statements of requirement with lead government departments
underpinned by, what we might call, service-level agreements".[24]
26. This is a key issue. The General's
concerns about managing expectations and reputational risk directly
impact upon two of the elements of the MoD's balanced scorecard,
namely 'Defence in the Wider Community' and 'Reputation'. Any
room for misunderstanding has serious consequences for the MoD,
the Armed Forces, and the department or agency to which assistance
is being provided. It
is worth noting that there are opportunities as well as risks:
for example, the contribution led by Brigadier Birtwistle in 2001
was greatly appreciated by Cumbrian farmers.[25]
Co-ordination, liaison and funding
27. The basis on which the Armed Forces provide
aid to the civil authorities is described in the Developments,
Concepts and Doctrine Centre publication, Operations in the
UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience (known as JDP 02)
and are reproduced here.Table
3: Military Aid
