Conclusions and recommendations
The National Security Strategy
1. Parliamentary
scrutiny of national security issues is a developing area. Once
stabilised, it remains to be seen precisely how responsibilities
will be divided. The Joint Committee will need to work out how
its intended role in examining the overall strategy in its successive
iterations will connect with scrutiny by existing committees.
Whatever happens, we as the Defence Committee will retain an interest
and therefore reserve the right to inquire into related issues
as and when they arise. (Paragraph 10)
2. We
expect the creation of a Joint Committee to improve Parliament's
scrutiny of the NSS by bringing them together. However, the question
of from which minister the new Joint Committee will take evidence
is unclear, unless it is the Prime Minister, calls on whose time
are many. We are concerned that this generates two problems: first,
that co-ordination at the political level might not be as good
as it could be, and secondly, that it only reaches the top of
the in-tray in times of crisis. There are various views about
the value of the appointment of a National Security Adviser reporting
to the Cabinet. We request that the Government sets out its thinking
on the matter in its response. (Paragraph 12)
The role of the Ministry of Defence
3. The
United Kingdom faces many disparate threats, now rightly recognised
as needing a combined response. The Armed Forces make a vital
and unique contribution to national security and resilience. It
is for this reason that this contribution must be appropriately
understood, directed, and resourced. (Paragraph 14)
4. We
have been informed of the frustration felt by many in the Territorial
Army, and by District Commanders, that the Territorials are rarely—if
ever—called upon in civil emergencies, even though it would
be practical and good for their morale to do so. Following publication
of the Strategic Review of Reserve Forces, we request that the
Government investigate how District Commanders could more easily
make use of willing and available local TA volunteers, rather
than always resorting to regular troops. (Paragraph 20)
5. Concerns
about managing expectations and reputational risk directly impact
upon two of the elements of the MoD's balanced scorecard, namely
'Defence in the Wider Community' and 'Reputation'. Any room for
misunderstanding has serious consequences for the MoD, the Armed
Forces, and the department or agency to which assistance is being
provided. (Paragraph 26)
Co-ordination, liaison and funding
6. It
is essential that all activity relating to national security is
appropriately funded from an indicative national security budget
and that, when a request is made, it is accompanied by a clear
statement of requirement. (Paragraph 34)
7. We
understand that the Government is engaging with the UK Security
and Resilience Industry Suppliers' Community (RISC) in order to
improve the channels of communication between industry and government.
We welcome this engagement, but note that if there is a piece
missing from the jigsaw, it is a clear connection between the
National Security Strategy and industry. We recommend that the
Government rectifies this when the time comes to update the NSS.
(Paragraph 37)
London 2012
8. Ensuring
the security of the Games for the six week period in the summer
of 2012 will be an immense challenge. Whilst it may not be possible
to anticipate every threat to the Olympics and Paralympics, we
urge the MoD to advertise and exploit the Armed Forces' relevant
expertise during the planning phases. (Paragraph 39)
Maritime security
9. Despite
our witnesses' assurances that the present arrangements for maritime
security in the UK did not need improving upon, we understand
that a review may in fact be underway. We request that the Government
updates us on developments in its response. (Paragraph 43)
10. We
are concerned at the level of action being taken to address identified
threats to aspects of critical national infrastructure, such as
ports, and that what assets are available for the purposes of
maritime security tend to be largely reactive forces. (Paragraph
48)
11. We
feel that there is a strong case for developing a deterrent capability
in relation to threats to civilian maritime targets. It need not
necessarily be resourced by the military, but we are not satisfied
that an intelligence-led approach is sufficient. (Paragraph 49)
The impact of current operations
12. Lord
West speculated that it might take 30 years to control radicalisation
and extremism. Opportunities exist at home and abroad for Defence
to play a very important role in national security and resilience.
We urge the MoD to consider what further steps could be taken
to use its resources and expertise to achieve this. (Paragraph
53)
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