Memorandum from the Ministry of Defence
THE DEFENCE
CONTRIBUTION TO
COUNTER-TERRORISM
AND NATIONAL
RESILIENCE
As the Committee will be aware the counter-terrorism
and resilience challenges facing the UK and the Government's response
have evolved significantly since the committee's 2002 inquiry
Defence and Security in the UK and the 2003 inquiry into
the then draft Civil Contingencies Bill.
The Home Secretary remains responsible for the
security of the citizens of the UK. The Government's Counter Terrorism
Strategy (CONTEST), which was presented to Parliament in July
2006, is led by the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism in
the Home Office. It aims to reduce the risk to the UK from international
terrorism so that people can go about their business freely and
with confidence. The strategy is structured around four "P"s:
Prevent, Pursue, Protect and Prepare. The aim of the Prepare strand
of CONTEST is "where we cannot stop an attack, to mitigate
its impact" and this work is led by the Cabinet Office's
Civil Contingencies Secretariat. The role of the Ministry of Defence
in the delivery of CONTEST is a supporting one. Nonetheless the
MOD does provide a range of support in each of these areas to
a greater or lesser extent. This note deals with MOD activity
in the UK, on the understanding that this is where the Committee
wishes to focus its inquiry, rather than covering the entire range
of our counter terrorist activity worldwide—a somewhat larger
and more complex area than appears to be envisaged by the Committee.
Similarly the committee will recognise that,
in the UK, defence plays a supporting role to the civil authorities
who lead the response to disruptive natural challenges. Support
in this area is provided through the well-understood principle
of Military Aid to the Civil Authorities (MACA). This is set out
in detail in Joint Doctrine Publication 02, Operations in the
UK: The Defence Contribution to Resilience. In short, defence
support can be provided where the responsible civil authority
lacks either the capability or the immediate capacity to deal
with a situation. Defence support is normally the last resort,
with mutual aid or commercial options having first been exhausted.
The Committee's note asked for the MOD's assessment
of the threat to the UK. The MOD contributes to cross-government
mechanisms in order to assess the threat to the UK from terrorist
activity and natural hazards. For CONTEST purposes, the lead authority
is the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). The MOD has seconded
several members of staff to JTAC in order to contribute to its
work. JTAC's assessment is that the threat from international
terrorism to the UK and UK interests overseas is extremely serious,
more ambitious in scope than we have seen before and will probably
be with us for the foreseeable future. The Government is committed
to tackling this threat and the MOD will play a full part in this.
The Cabinet Office Domestic Horizon Scanning
Committee (DHSC) performs a similar role in assessing non-malicious
risks which could impact on the UK in the near future (approximately
12 months). The MOD provides a representative on that committee
and contributes more widely to the cross-Government planning support
co-ordinated by the Civil Contingencies Secretariat (CCS).
The CCS also manages the cross-departmental
Resilience Capability Framework (RCF) which underpins medium term
planning and capability building for Resilience. The RCF consists
of a risk assessment process which draws on the work of the DHSC
and JTAC to identify the highest risks, both malicious threats
and non-malicious hazards, which could impact on the UK over a
five-year period and the development of planning assumptions outlining
the potential consequences of these risks. These planning assumptions
set the bar for civil Resilience capability-building at national,
regional and local levels. The MOD contributes to all elements
of this work, including providing representatives for all related
committees. Many of the major risks identified through this process
are increasing due to the inter-connected nature of modern societies
and some, such as widespread flooding and an influenza pandemic,
would have a major impact on our way of life in the UK. The lead
responders for such events do not include defence, but we contribute
to the lead responders' plans, not least in order to identify
any potential role for defence. We carefully consider any requests
for assistance from the civil authorities, whether in the planning
for or response to a crisis.
The assessments of these bodies provide the
basis for the MOD's CT and Resilience planning. Based on this
methodology, and as a result of extensive and detailed consultation
with the lead civil authorities, the MOD currently makes available
a range of capabilities. We do not categorise our support along
single service lines as the Committee's note asked for, but the
capabilities we currently make available are as follows:
— A quick reaction capability to deter
and defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK airspace,
including air defence radar.
— A maritime capability to deter and
defend against serious threats to the integrity of UK territorial
waters.
— Counter-terrorist capabilities in
support of the police on land or sea.
— Public order support in extremis
to the Police Service of Northern Ireland.
— Fishery protection vessels in support
of DEFRA.
— A maritime search and rescue capability
in support of the Maritime and Coastguard Agency.
— An Explosive Ordnance Disposal "render-safe"
capability.
— Scientific support to police operations
including a Technical Response Force with access to a wide range
of relevant scientific expertise.
— Ministry of Defence Police support
to the protection of key points in the critical national infrastructure.
— A regional command and control capability
to provide an ability to co-ordinate larger scale defence contributions.
— Civil Contingency Reaction Forces,
drawn from the reserve forces, which are potentially available
if required to support the responsible authorities for dealing
with civil contingencies.
These capabilities are part of the MOD's planned
force structure and, as such, effectively guaranteed to the lead
authority. The MOD conducts regular liaison with each of these
organisations to ensure that the capabilities earmarked remain
appropriate and exercises them to validate extant planning and
identify any improvements needed. They are then reflected in Defence
Planning Assumptions which are reviewed regularly.
In addition to these commitments, the MOD can
also make available, on a case by case basis, defence assets to
support operations led by other organisations. In 2007, defence
provided such support on 90 occasions. These included:
— Logistics support to police operations
through the use of the defence estate.
— Aerial imagery and analysis support
to police search operations.
— Flood defence assistance in the Yorkshire/Humber
and Gloucestershire regions.
— Logistics support to Severn Trent
Water during the Gloucestershire floods.
The above capabilities are held principally
for the purposes of standing or contingent operations overseas
and are not planned for regular use on behalf of the civil authorities.
Where they are not being used to support overseas operations however,
they can be made available to the civil authorities where it is
appropriate to do so.
It would also be appropriate to highlight the
progress which has been made in the development of civil capabilities.
Over the last few years, with the passage of the Civil Contingencies
Act and the development of the National Capabilities Programme,
the emergency services and other responders have made significant
improvements in their own capabilities. One consequence of this
is that the threshold for the requirement for defence support
has risen significantly. Examples include: the response to the
Buncefield fire in 2005, which would previously have relied upon
support from the Defence Fire Service; the Fire and Rescue Services'
New Dimension programme which has been used in recent flooding
events; and the acquisition of enhanced aerial capabilities by
the Metropolitan Police. So although the risk of disruptive challenges
is arguably increasing, the support required from defence is not
necessarily rising. Nonetheless, we remain committed to providing
the support needed where this is identified.
Defence also contributes significant assets
to activities overseas aimed at preventing terrorist attacks and
pursuing terrorists. Most of this work has to remain confidential,
for obvious security and diplomatic reasons, but it includes:
counter-terrorist capacity building with partner nations; the
collection and analysis of intelligence on terrorist networks;
and the maintenance of a range of capabilities to conduct disruption
operations against potential terrorist attacks. These activities
support the Government's wider counter terrorism agenda and contribute
to the security of the UK, but are not addressed in detail here
as they may be considered to fall outside the scope of the Committee's
inquiry. Please let me know if the Committee does wish to broaden
the terms of its inquiry in this respect.
In addition to playing its part in co-ordinating
cross-Government effort and contributing to others' evolving plans,
the MOD does of course keep its policy in this area under constant
review. As well as participating in the further development of
CONTEST, the review of the Civil Contingencies Act currently being
planned, and Home Office reviews of aspects of protective security,
the MOD exercises its plans regularly and reviews all standing
operations in the UK on an annual basis. We look forward to discussing
these policies and plans with the Committee. The Committee will
be aware that the Rt Hon Adam Ingram MP has been asked by the
Prime Minister to review the Defence contribution to the Government's
Counter Terrorism and Resilience strategies. His work is progressing
well and he expects to report his findings by the summer.
22 February 2008
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