Memorandum from Demos
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
— The UKs National Security Strategy
represents an important initial step in developing a strategic
approach to the contemporary security challenges of the 21st century.
The real "strategic" challenge, however, centres on
translating this understanding of the risk spectrum into cross-departmental
cooperation, which fosters a practical ability to react in the
event of unexpected crises, while also adopting a longer-term
perspective that foresees and prepares for future threats.
— The traditional approach to national
security and defence needs to undergo a systematic reassessment.
National Security is now the new concept for organising government.
— The MoD has traditionally adopted
a sub-strategic approach to managing defence. The new security
paradigm hasn't, to date, had the fundamental and meaningful impact
on Defence Planning Assumptions that is necessary to address contemporary
national security challenges.
— The MoD's concentration on the expeditionary
warfare mission risks undermining the Armed Forces' ability to
maintain a general capacity for emergency action.
— A decade after the last defence review,
and in light of the new security environment the Government should
fundamentally reassess the role of defence for the twenty first
century. We believe this review should take place in 2010.
WRITTEN EVIDENCE
SUBMISSION
The following evidence addresses four of the
five issues raised by the terms of the inquiry, leaving aside
the "specific capabilities maritime, land and air forces
provide", which falls outside the author's specific area
of expertise. Engagement with the four remaining issues is prefaced
by a section on the nature of `national security' in the contemporary
context—assessing the themes animating the current debate
and shedding light on some of its central cleavages. In particular,
this introductory section seeks to understand the discussion and
rationale leading up to the Government's publication of The
National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in
an interdependent World (hereafter the UK NSS), as well as
highlighting some of its limitations. Indeed, it is believed that
this offers a useful platform from which to assess the specific
matters raised by the inquiry—providing the necessary contextual
backdrop against which the Ministry of Defence's (MoD) role and
future conduct should be examined.
INTRODUCTION
1. Globalisation continues to drive change
across the world at unprecedented speed. The dynamism and vibrancy
of this interconnected world has the potential to create wealth,
freedom and security. Such a connected world, however, is increasingly
vulnerable to shocks, disruption and uncertainty anywhere in the
system. The UK government has found it hard to intervene effectively
in political and economic problems with changes in the global
system often reverberating unpredictably throughout British society:
cartoons shown in Danish newspapers create civil unrest on the
streets of London; drugs from the poppy fields of Afghanistan
lead to violence on Glasgow estates; while hurricanes off the
west coast of America raise the price of petrol in the UK.[1]
1.1 The recognition of this rapidly changing
global environment, with its associated risks and opportunities,
provided the rationale behind the British Government's recent
publication of a National Security Strategy. As the UK NSS states
in its introduction, "[t]he scope and approach of the strategy
reflects the way our understanding of national security has changed".[2]
Specifically, the aim of the Strategy is "to set out how
we will address and manage this diverse though interconnected
set of security challenges and underlying drivers, both immediately
and in the longer term, to safeguard the nation, its citizens,
our prosperity and our way of life".[3]
Such an understanding at the heart of Government concerning the
scale of the challenge is encouraging—with the ability to
place the different risks (both threats and hazards) in context
with one another represents an important initial step in the contemporary
"strategic" approach that is required to meet the challenges
of 21st century national security.
1.2 The real "strategic" challenge,
however, centres on translating this understanding of the threat
spectrum into practical cross-departmental cooperation, in such
a way that fosters a practical ability to react in the event of
unexpected crises, while also adopting a longer-term perspective
that foresees and prepares for future threats.
1.3 Stated bluntly, the national security architecture
has yet to adapt to the 21st century. Existing habits of thought
and institutions remain powerfully conditioned by the concept
of the nation state that has dominated Western thinking since
the seventeenth century. Today power is dispersing around and
through the nation state. This is most apparent in the blurring
of three traditionally important distinctions—between domestic
and international spheres; between policy areas; and between public,
private and non-profit sectors.[4]
1.4 The new security paradigm demands a
new approach by the UK government. Collaboration, for example
will be central to this approach. The test of whether this more
integrated security concept is translated into practical effect
will depend, in the UK at least, on whether government is reformed
to meet the new challenges, in terms of adjusting departmental
boundaries between the MoD, FCO, DFID and Home Office, questioning
relevant budgetary arrangements, and creating a stronger central
coordinating capacity in the Cabinet Office area.[5]
1.5 In place of the current siloed approach
to national security, the contemporary context necessitates a
holistic perspective—fostering and embedding a culture of
interdependence between government departments and agencies, imparting
flexibility in the short-term and promoting an integrated horizon
scanning capacity over the longer-term, thereby ensuring greater
preparedness in the face of uncertainty about the future. Such
an approach is particularly necessary given the increasing prevalence
of so-called "wicked" problems—that is, those
"problems which are unbounded in scope, time and resources,
and enjoy no clear agreement about what a solution would even
look like, let alone how it could be achieved".[6]
Indeed, it is only by implementing a network based system approach
across government, in place of traditional hierarchies, that we
may begin to evolve to meet the challenges posed by the new security
paradigm.
1.6 In summary, the new understanding of
"national security" in the 21st century represents an
important concept for organising government—providing a
unifying theme, sufficiently important to galvanise both politicians
and the civil service in equal measure, while also necessitating
that short-term measures are closely tied to a longer-term perspective.
THE MOD
AND THE
NEW SECURITY
PARADIGM
2. The new security paradigm hasn't, to
date, had the fundamental and meaningful impact on Defence Planning
Assumptions that is necessary to address contemporary national
security challenges. The MoD has traditionally adopted a sub-strategic
approach to managing defence which often fails to sufficiently
place the variety of current risks (both threats and hazards)
in context with one another and consequently, its ability to adopt
a long-term/horizon scanning perspective is impaired. There are
four notable areas where the rigidity of DPAs is particularly
apparent:
(a) Procurement—since the end of
the Cold War the UK's defence procurement priorities have been
dominated by a number of major procurement programmes. These include
Typhoon for the RAF, the Royal Navy's CVF carriers and Type-45
destroyers and the Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA); not to mention
the planned development of a successor to the Trident nuclear
weapons system. These programmes represent the cutting edge of
military technology. Yet their very complexity and expense puts
a strain on the defence budget, while the decades long time-scale
over which they are developed introduces a debilitating rigidity
into the procurement process.
(b) Expeditionary warfare and procurement—The
organisational requirements of the conflicts in which the Armed
forces are currently engaged have been consistently downplayed
relative to wider defence planning goals. Regrettably these have
tried to maintain the three services and their prestige procurement
projects, within the context of high intensity expeditionary warfare.
Tellingly, the equipment demands of recent missions have not been
for more cutting-edge technology, but on the rapid introduction
of less advanced equipment.[7]
Simply stated there is a need to streamline the procurement process—with
a greater emphasis on pre-existing "off the shelf" equipment
which offers cheaper, more swiftly deliverable alternatives than
bespoke programmes.
(c) Focus on international terrorism as the
overriding threat to security. The focus on international
terrorism reflects the legacy of the Cold War and the need for
a single overarching threat on which to base planning assumptions.
Undue focus has been put on the post-9/11 threat of international
terrorism however and has in the process detracted from other,
arguably equally pressing risks.
(d) The nature of post-Cold War and post-9/11
reform within the MoD—more generally, defence planners
have sought to paper over the contradictions of the UK defence
sector through reorganising existing force structures and attempting
to introduce "efficiency gains" into the Armed Forces
themselves. Such an approach to reform fails to address the underlying
organisational dilemmas facing the Armed Forces and shies away
from taking decisions that are likely to be both suitable and
sustainable over the long-term. In short, deeper and more sustainable
root and branch reform is necessary.
2.1 The primary organisational dilemma for
UK Defence concerns the utility of the expeditionary role—broadly
defined—in meeting the primary threats to UK security. In
particular, there is a risk that too narrow a concentration on
the expeditionary warfare mission risks undermining the Armed
Forces' ability to maintain what the military academics Christopher
Dandeker and Lawrence Freedman have called "a general capacity
for emergency action".[8]
Emergency planners are clear that in the event of a disaster what
they require from the Armed Forces is a predictable and available
resource on which to draw at short notice.[9]
However, the current prioritisation of expeditionary warfare—in
terms of both restructuring and deployments—diverts significant
resources away from "national" defence.
2.2 While the New Chapter did establish
14 new regionally located Civil Contingencies Reaction Forces
(CCRF)—each comprising 500 military volunteers—to
provide assistance to civil authorities in the event of a domestic
emergency, doubts have been raised over their suitability for
their role, in terms of appropriate training, speed of response
and manning levels.[10]
2.3 The domestic security mission for the
UK Armed Forces is one that needs to be taken more seriously than
it has been to date. This is particularly the case given the clear
domestic contribution that the Armed Forces have made in recent
years—including during the foot and mouth crisis of 2001
and the summer flooding of 2007. It is also important to underline
to British citizens themselves that the services are not just
interested in or equipped for military adventures abroad. They
also have an important contribution to make at home as well.
2.4 Current operational commitments and
manpower problems mean that the Armed Forces' capacities in this
area are more limited than they might otherwise be, amongst both
regular forces and the Territorial Army. Indeed, in a leaked memo
published by a national newspaper in July 2007, General Sir Richard
Dannatt, head of the Army confessed that the commitment of troops
to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan meant that it had "almost
no capability to react to the unexpected", either at home
or abroad.[11]
Arguably, this represents an important oversight in UK defence
planning; one that exposes once again the fragility of the UK
Armed Forces' current organisational predicament.
2.5 The central theme drawing together the
issues raised in this section and underlying many of the dilemmas
highlighted concerns the question of priorities for British defence
and how these shape the role of the Armed Forces in the a 21st
century context. Responding to the changed international environment
in the immediate post-Cold War period, the 1998 Strategic Defence
Review articulated a vision of "foreign policy led defence"[12]—something
that necessitated the continuation of an expeditionary role. The
general principles of this approach were largely reinforced post-9/11
by the SDR New Chapter, the Defence White Paper (2003)
and the accompanying Future Capabilities (2004) document—though
these did envisage a more proactive approach to potential security
threats, in contrast to the largely reactive stance of the SDR
(1998).
2.6 The impact of this expeditionary model
on the UK Armed Forces has, however, been consistently under-estimated
and defence planners have found it difficult to acknowledge the
scale of the organisational and operational challenges that it
entails in practice. As the above analysis on the contribution
to UK resilience illustrates, attempting to fulfil the expeditionary
role has—given available resources—perpetuated tension
with homeland security responsibilities, particularly when viewed
from the perspective of contemporary national security challenges
COOPERATION WITH
WHITEHALL
3.1 The current state of inter-departmental
cooperation was outlined in the 2007 Capability Reviews, which
were aimed at driving improvement and a more joined-up approach
in government. The MoD capability review focuses primarily on
its "insularity and reluctance to consult and work with others
in the formulation of strategy and policy". This can be changed,
the review goes on to state, by taking "steps to make its
work more accessible—even down to changing the language
for different audiences or revising security classifications where
possible".[13]
There are a number of specific measures that would mark useful
initial steps in implementing such an approach, each of which
the Ministry of Defence would be central to achieving given its
dominant presence in the national security architecture.
(a) The creation of a National Security Secretariat
would facilitate the collaborative approach that is necessary
in the contemporary environment. This new secretariat would have
four areas of responsibility: strategic planning, capabilities
and resources, horizon scanning and performance evaluation.
(b) The government should consider developing
an "indicative" national security budget, bringing together
the existing spending plans of the MoD, FCO, Home Office, Intelligence
agencies and other relevant budgets of the national security budget
(such as the budget of Transec in the Department of Transport).
A key issue behind the existing mismatch between resources and
the role of government is the fact that currently departments
prepare their own budgets according to their own analysis and
assessment of threats and hazards to the UK. As this memorandum
argues, the MoD's analysis of contemporary national security has,
to date, been sub-strategic in character—with its allocation
of resources arguably not facilitating the best outcome in "national
security" terms. In the future all analysis and assessment
should be brought together by the new national security secretariat
in collaboration with government departments so that an indicative
national security budget can be prepared.
3.2 Taking the relevant departments and
agencies (including the Metropolitan Police) the national security
budget of the UK equals approximately £48 billion. According
to the departmental budgets for 2006-07, the MoD receives well
over half of this and incidentally more than double what the next
largest recipient, the Home Office, is allocated. It is therefore
imperative, given the dominant proportion of the national security
resources that the MoD take a proactive approach to encouraging
such a transition—eschewing the competitive tensions along
institutional lines that have become a hallmark of budgetary wrangling.
CONCLUSION
4. The UK NSS makes some encouraging initial
steps—most clearly in fostering a consensus across Whitehall
about the diverse and multifarious character of the challenge
to national security in the 21st century. Unsurprisingly, given
the relatively quick time in which it was drawn up, however, it
fails to propose the kind of widespread/root and branch institutional
reform that is required. Indeed, citing the changes already made
to the national security architecture since 9/11, the UK NSS "does
not propose further radical structural change"[14]
(though it commits to keep "structures and processes [...]
under review").[15]
This is particularly worrying since it suggests a misjudgement
of the true scale and scope of current and future threats.
4.1 Undoubtedly, "wicked" problems
are here to stay and the sooner this is recognised at the heart
of Government, the sooner the process of fundamental institutional
reform can begin. As one of the major stakeholders in the national
security equation, the MoD undoubtedly has a prominent role to
play in shaping the pace and direction of this process. Indeed,
how the Ministry of Defence approaches the challenge posed by
contemporary national security is likely to determine not only
its continuing prominence as a core institution of state, but
also attitudes across the wider canvas of government.
If the Defence Committee wishes to pursue any
of the themes and arguments raised in this submission, the author
would be happy to elucidate further.
16 May 2008
1 C Edwards, The case for a national security strategy
(London: Demos, 2007), available at www.demos.co.uk/publications/nationalsecuritystrategy Back
2
The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security
in an interdependent world (London: The Stationery Office,
March 2008), p 3. Back
3
UK NSS, p 3. Back
4
J M Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organisations,
3rd edn (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 2004). Back
5
K Tebbit, Countering international terrorism: joining up the
dots in Hennessy, New Protective State. Back
6
J Chapman, System Failure: Why government must learn to think
differently, 2nd edn (London: Demos, 2004). Examples of "wicked
problems" include international terrorism, organised crime
and climate change. Back
7
See for example, HoCDC, UK Operations in Iraq (London:
The Stationery Office, 10 August 2006), pp 16-21; HoCDC, UK
Operations in Afghanistan, pp 32-5. Similarly, in 2004, the
National Audit Office identified a 38% shortfall in overall battlefield
support helicopter lift. NAO, Ministry of Defence: Battlefield
Helicopters (London: The Stationery Office, 7 April 2004),
p 4. Back
8
C Dandeker and L Freedman, The British armed services,
Political Quarterly 73, no 4 (October 2002). Back
9
House of Commons Defence Committee, A New Chapter to the Strategic
Defence Review (London: The Stationery Office, 2003), p 28. Back
10
Ibid pp 28-9. See also Paul Wilkinson, International
Dimensions of Homeland Security, in Paul Wilkinson (ed), Homeland
Security in the UK: Future Preparedness for Terrorist Attack Since
9/11 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007), p 374-6. Back
11
T Harding, Britain almost out of troops, memo reveals,
Daily Telegraph, 20 July 2007. Back
12
Ministry of Defence (MoD), The Strategic Defence Review
(Norwich: The Stationery Office, 1998). Back
13
Cabinet Office, Capability Review of the Ministry of Defence
(London: Cabinet Office, March 2007). Back
14
UK NSS, p 58. Back
15
UK NSS, p 58. Back
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