Memorandum from Intellect
OVERVIEW
Intellect believes that our industry's contribution
to UK security and resilience is in better enabling the different
parts of this disparate community to work together. Our members
are of the firm view that constantly improving co-operation and
communication between the departments, agencies, individuals and
companies charged with the country's security will help them be
more effective and more efficient.
Co-ordination of actors and assets is vital
during crises or events, and also in preparation—training,
scenario and response planning, and intelligence work. The fragmented
nature of the security and resilience community is a strength
in some ways, as it brings a huge range of capabilities, expertise
and resource to the table, but they must be corralled effectively
if the UK is to have the optimal mix at any one time.
Intellect's view is that much of this co-ordination
requires a level of integration, in terms of both technologies
and processes. For example, at various points in the preparation,
response and recovery stages, the need exists to integrate command
and control functions, communications and intelligence analysis,
and therefore technological capabilities within related bodies
must take this into consideration during development and deployment.
INDUSTRY'S
PERSPECTIVE
In this submission Intellect addresses the security
and resilience space from the perspective of capability and technology
providers—whether global integrators of complex systems,
national communications infrastructure providers or niche specialists
in specific technologies.
Policy decisions about the use of the military
in national security and resilience—and the operational,
legal and constitutional aspects of these policies—are beyond
the purview of industry. This submission should in no way be interpreted
as comment on policy decisions.
This industrial perspective is, rather, focused
on how stated Government policy can be realised most effectively
and efficiently. Industry is a strategic partner on projects and
programmes across the breadth of security and resilience, and
is therefore able to understand the challenges of coordinating
and supporting the different contributors in this vital area.
SECURITY AND
RESILIENCE
The Government's National Security Strategy
articulated a broad definition of "national security",
incorporating issues like energy security and trans-national crime
alongside core security challenges around counter-terrorism and
national resilience. The modern threats and hazards that the UK
faces reach across traditional boundaries between the military,
civil, national, regional, economic and social phases of our society,
and the flexible and innovative response which is required to
meet them will depend on the successful coordination of a range
of different stakeholders.
In the domestic sphere, for example, countering
terrorism and the protection of critical national infrastructure
are two principal concerns, and require collaboration between,
for example, intelligence agencies, criminal justice authorities,
local and regional government, and industry—both as suppliers
of capability and owners of infrastructure.
This kind of multi-stakeholder collaboration
relies on communications and information sharing. In crisis response
situations—such as 7/7—post-incident reports have
determined that the status of, for example, mobile communications
links between different actors are a major contributor to the
effectiveness of emergency personnel. In prevention of terrorism,
similarly, inquiries into 9/11 have concluded that agencies' ability
to share intelligence in large part determines how effectively
and efficiently they can work.
THE MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE'S
ROLE
MoD is a provider of a number of specific and
unique capabilities for domestic security and resilience (eg special
forces operations, bomb disposal and forensics), which work alongside
civil partner agencies in areas like transport security. MoD is
also used as a provider of last resort in a number of resilience
scenarios—for example during the firefighters strike and
foot and mouth crisis—and in support of the civil power
during landmark events like the 2012 Olympics.
In the latter, particularly, the challenges
of coordination and integration are evident in microcosm. MoD
planning, training and funding does not always reflect the potential
role of the Armed Forces in domestic security and resilience,
and civil planning often excludes the military's role, whilst
assuming that MoD will inevitably act as the "last insurance
policy". Collectively this can lead to sudden unexpected
appropriation of military resource which must be diverted from
other priorities.
There is much that MoD could bring to UK security
and resilience if coordinated and integrated properly—it
is perhaps the Government's most effective acquirer of complex
and advanced technology, has first rate command and control methodology,
highly competent personnel and a huge portfolio of unique capabilities.
The opaque relationship between civil security and resilience
demands and MoD's "core" business does not, however,
encourage consideration of wider potential uses beyond the expeditionary
defence and geographical integrity which are its bread and butter.
If MoD (and other relevant stakeholders) are
to play an optimal and co-ordinated role in the overall security
and resilience "force mix", integration of their information,
communications and technology assets is critical. Joined-up capabilities
must be the response to cross-cutting challenges.
BACKGROUND
Intellect is the UK trade association for the
IT, telecoms and electronics industries. Its members account for
over 80% of these markets and include blue-chip multinationals
as well as early stage technology companies. These industries
together generate around 10% of UK GDP and 15% of UK trade. Intellect
is a vital source of knowledge and expertise on all aspects of
the hi-tech industry.
The following paper provides the initial views
of Intellect member companies on how the Ministry of Defence and
UK Armed Forces interact with other departments and agencies to
ensure the safety and security of the UK. This paper addresses
aspects specified in the Committee's call for evidence, and also
raises issues that Intellect believes are relevant to the scope
of this inquiry.
Intellect welcomes the opportunity to provide
input to the committee and is keen to engage with the committee,
the Ministry of Defence, and UK Armed Forces to ensure progress
on the issues raised in this submission.
11 June 2008
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