Examination of Witnesses (Question Numbers
60-79)
RT HON
BOB AINSWORTH
MP, ADMIRAL LORD
WEST OF
SPITHEAD GCB DSC, MR
JON DAY
CBE, BRIGADIER CHIP
CHAPMAN, MS
GILLIAN MCGREGOR
AND MS
CHLOE SQUIRES
21 OCTOBER 2008
Q60 Chairman: When you say "will"
underpin your planning; it has already?
Mr Day: It is. It is playing into
the current iteration of defence strategic guidance which, as
you know, is the basis for our planning.
Q61 Mr Holloway: You have got doctrines,
plans, committees, initiatives, X, Y and Z and of course it all
sounds absolutely marvellous, but the reality is that we are not
winning the war on terror. Do you not think we could be doing
rather more in terms of dealing with the drivers of radicalisation
and be a little more sensitive in our foreign policy because it
might actually make your job rather easier?
Mr Ainsworth: "We" the
Department of Defence, or "we" the government overall?
Q62 Mr Holloway: The government overall,
the Department of Defence, from where you are sitting do you ever
find it rather frustrating that you are picking up the pieces
of something that, self-evidently, is not working?
Mr Ainsworth: In what way is it
not working? We have a threat; the threat has been developed;
it is a global threat and it is developing over years and we have
to respond to that in kinds of different ways. Of course preventing
radicalisation is a part of that. Defence has a role to play in
that as well, but not necessarily a lead role. Actually explaining
what we do, the way we do it and the way we conduct operations
in order to prevent radicalisation is a role that we can play
as defence. We do attempt that; it is not easy and we maybe need
to do more; but that is a responsibility of the whole of government
to explain its foreign policy, the reasons for its foreign policy;
and to attempt to make sure everything about that is explained
and is as positive as possible and not having a negative effect.
Lord West of Spithead: I cannot
remember your exact turn of phrase there, but actually we have
done a great deal in terms of what you loosely call (and I do
not like the term) "war on terror"; I would say "excising
the terrorist cancer from our society" and actually making
us all safer. We have done a huge amount. The formation of the
OSCT last year I think was a splendid decision; I had nothing
to do with it; I have to say I was not in government at that stage.
It took the responsibility for coordination of counter-terrorism
across all government departments away from the Cabinet Office,
where they did not have the resources for it, and it is now based
in the Home Office. The OSCT, under Charles Farr, has been a huge
success story. Our counter-terrorist strategy CONTEST was first
produced in 2006; we are busy refreshing that and there will be
a CONTEST 2 coming out later this year. All sorts of things have
been addressed in there. We have done some really good work on
the Protect strand. We have done some really good work on the
Pursue strand; you can see that when you look at the number of
cases going through our courts. We have done an immense amount
of work on Prevent, which is stopping radicalisation and stopping
extremism. This work had not really been done going back historically.
We have actually looked at what are the causes of it; we have
put a lot of effort into that. We have got a whole agenda that
goes across all government. We now have a weekly security meeting
chaired by the Home Secretary, Vernon Coaker or me which gets
people from every single department. The MoD are there and they
go through issues to do with Prevent; we get briefings from the
agencies who are there; we have DCLG; other government departments;
and this is really closely coordinated and done and actually I
think we are delivering a huge amount. It does not mean the threat
has gone away, sadly, because the threat is very high; but we
have done a huge amount. As this slowly comes out, what has been
achieved, I think quite rightly people will be very proud of what
is being done. To be honest we should have done it because we
put a lot of resource into it, a lot of effort into it, and those
things are beginning to pay off.
Q63 Mr Holloway: I completely accept,
amongst this raft of initiatives, there has been some great stuff;
but the fact remains that out there in the world we are still
delivering defeat. We have got a huge problem with British kids
of Pakistani origin; we have got some serious problems in the
operational theatres; and Muslim public opinion around the world
moves against us by the day.
Lord West of Spithead: I would
not actually put it on that basis. All I would say is we have
a very closely coordinated plan with the Foreign Office and with
MoD about the things we should be doing in places like Afghanistan
and other places. We have an outward-looking communications policy;
RICU are doing certain work on this. We are looking very carefully
at the use of language. We are engaging the Muslim communities
in this country in discussion and debate about things. We accept
that certain aspects of our foreign policy have caused difficulties
with them, but now at least we are engaging in debate with them.
I have found that when you talk to them the first discussion with
a group is actually pretty hardcore stuff for you, but actually
when you do it the second and third time they begin to understand
once you explain why you are doing things. They will not always
see eye-to-eye, and I think it is those things that we are doing
which are all having an effect. This is not going to change just
like that. To stop this radicalisation of extremism is going to
take (and I will get into trouble for saying this) about 30 years,
I think, but it will become a virtuous circle; it will start getting
better and better. We have to embark on it and the recognition
of that I think is one of the big things that has happened over
the last 15 months of the OSCT. That huge Prevent package I think
is something we should be proud of. It is not perfect and there
are lots of things we have got to do but, my goodness me, we cannot
arrest and protect ourselves out of this problem. We have got
to have the forces to do the arrests if necessary to look after
us, and protect ourselves as necessary while we are doing this,
but that is not the way to ultimately solve the problem.
Q64 Mr Hancock: I am curious because
when you first answered that question you suggested that there
had been success in stopping radicalisation of parts of the community.
I would be interested to know how you judge that because when
I speak to young Muslims, and I have a sizeable contingent in
my own constituency and around the area, I do not see that happening.
I am interested to know how you judge the success or otherwise
of what you are doing?
Lord West of Spithead: You have
hit right on one of the very, very difficult areas. Getting measures
of some of these—for the first time ever we have actually
got PSAs for some of our counter-terrorism, which was not there
before, which is good; but how actually do you measure? It is
extremely difficult. An awful lot of what people work on is hearsay
and nothing actually tangible; it is not empirical evidence. One
of the things we have had to do is try and work out what we can
use as empirical evidence. We are putting work into prisons, into
places of worship, into sports clubs. I would not pretend for
a moment that we have made a huge, huge win here and it is galloping
down, and that is why I say it will take that length of time;
but we are beginning to get there; we are beginning to have discussions
with people. We have identified organisations that actually help
us and are sympathetic to the way we are going, who agree with
the same shared values that all humans have and that we all have,
rather than some groups that did not actually go down that route,
and we are really beginning to make progress. I do not pretend
for a moment we are nearly there. I regularly go out and talk
to youngsters, and some of the reactions I find just amazing because
you think, "How on earth can you believe that?" We need
to have a dialogue; we need to do this; and we are actually doing
that now, I think.
Q65 Mr Jenkins: When I heard the
term "overarching strategy" I thought that is a great
title, a great term. Within that do we have different departments
reporting, like stovepipes, up to the top, or have the departments
changed their policy, and are they working closer with each other
so there are departments working at every level? How has that
approach changed the operation of the MoD; and has the MoD felt
its role in working through the Home Office is somewhat restrained;
or is it quite happy to do that; or would it like more contacts,
please?
Mr Day: Shall I give you an example
of the sort of cross-Whitehall working that is now becoming the
norm?
Q66 Mr Jenkins: Yes, please.
Mr Day: Under the NSID framework
there is an Afghan strategy group which brings together all of
the key departments involved in Afghan issues: Foreign, Defence,
DFID, Home Office, the agencies when necessary. That organisation
has created the joined-up strategy for Afghanistan that was agreed
last year by NSID, which had not previously existed. More important
than that it now is the vehicle through which we implement a joined-up
strategy through our military and civilian agencies on the ground,
and measuring success. So there is now a cross-government structure
for formulating and delivering strategy. Another example. We talked
about the Prevent agenda. Within the foreign and security policy
context there are two information strategy groups that deal with
the information side of our Iraq and Afghanistan operations. This
work is now integrated with what the domestic departments do,
through for example, RICU. There is a much greater joined-up approach
to these problems. This all flows down from the National Security
Strategy, which is a change of culture as much as anything else.
Q67 John Smith: Without giving away
any secrets, can you say hand on heart that this new joined-up
approach to the national security threats on our country has actually
prevented or deterred actual threat of attack or security threats
against us, since you have been taking this new approach?
Mr Ainsworth: There are repeated
examples at every level of a joined-up approach to all the different
threats that there are. This provides the umbrella under which
to do that. The MoD is constantly responding to requests for assistance
from other government departments, both within the United Kingdom
and outside the United Kingdom as well. It is just developing
that relationship and making sure that we are properly plugged
into the decision-making framework and we can make that contribution
and people know exactly what contribution there is that is there
to be made.
Q68 John Smith: Are you able to say
that attacks have been prevented by approaching it in this way?
Lord West of Spithead: I think
I should answer that, being the counter-terrorism minister. I
think there are two strands. First of all, we were talking initially
and I think Jon Day was talking about the National Security Strategy
and the joined-up-ness there which is through these NSID committees,
which stands for National Security and International Development,
another one of these acronyms. It is a Cabinet committee and it
has various subcommittees of that Cabinet committee that look
at various specifics. That is where all government departments
are and that is how you get lots of joined-up stuff at National
Security Strategy level better than ever before; and looking at
the totality of our security in a different sort of way, not just
nation on nation or whatever, but looking at it in a different
way. I think your question more was relating down at the counter-terrorist
level and the cross-government work that the OSCT is doing. Clearly
I cannot go into specifics—if you get anywhere near specifics
everyone gets terribly excited and jumps around—but actually
the reality is that we have had successes which have stopped attacks
in this country. I think it is fair to say we have had successes
that have stopped certainly hundreds, if not thousands, of people
being killed. So there have been successes. I am not talking about
just in the last year—this is over a period of time. One
can see that from some of the trials coming through the courts
where, because we have doubled the size of the security service,
because we are watching these people, we are able to move before
they do things and then act. The answer to that is, yes, but clearly
I cannot go into details.
Q69 Mr Havard: We have got a National
Security Strategy within which there is a component that deals
with counter-terrorism essentially, and that element is now vested,
for policy purposes, in the OSCT in the Home Office, and coordination
of responses for that is largely with the Cabinet Office, into
which all the other government departments essentially feed in
various different ways. Is that essentially what you are explaining
to me?
Lord West of Spithead: No. The
OSCT leads on cross-government coordination for counter-terrorism.
Counter-terrorism is one facet of our National Security Strategy.
Within there, there are things like the strategic deterrent; defence
of the United Kingdom; there are issues in there now for the first
time to do with Resilience; to do with natural disasters; to do
with pandemics; the whole gamut of threats to our nation and our
people.
Q70 Mr Havard: My question then is
this: it seems as though there is an elaborate architecture to
deal with the counter-terrorism element, which you now describe,
but you have described something that goes beyond that. Is this
the only thing that is essentially in the National Security Strategy?
Who does the other bits? Who coordinates the policy on those?
This is a question which other people have asked of me which is:
is it not time to have one ministerial position in the government
responsible for bringing the whole of the National Security Strategy
together rather than just one element of it, which is counter-terrorism
etc?
Lord West of Spithead: I think
it is more joined-up than you would suggest. Within the National
Security Strategy, which is coordinated and held by this official
Robert Hannigan who reports directly through Cabinet committees
to the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister effectively is the minister
who actually holds this. These things are coordinated, for example
if it is Resilience, by the contingency secretariat who do all
of the Resilience issues; so they are coordinating all of those
things. You saw we produced a thing called the NRA, the National
Risk Assessment, and we produced an unclassified version, the
National Risk Register. That is all being coordinated by them,
and they work to Robert Hannigan on those things. In terms of
defence, the issues to do with defence and what they are doing
were explained by Jon Day, how that inputs into there and how
that is done. When it comes to pandemic, the Department of Health
has the lead on that, and again they will talk about that. This
is all coordinated by Robert Hannigan and, by now, the National
Security Secretariat—which did not exist before and I am
very glad we have now established that and that can actually pull
this together better than ever before—then it funnels up
through the Cabinet committee and ultimately to the Prime Minister.
Should there be a minister doing that? This is something which
has been thought about, and we have not come to a final decision
on that as yet.
Q71 Chairman: Are we not very unusual
in terms of Western countries in not having a national security
adviser at the level of Condoleezza Rice?
Lord West of Spithead: I have
to say without looking I do not know.
Mr Day: The fundamental difference
I think between what you are suggesting and the current approach
is that to introduce a minister with the sort of responsibilities
you are talking about would either require them to be a coordinator,
or to have overarching responsibility (and I am sorry to use that
word again) across a range of very large government departments:
the Foreign Office; Ministry of Defence; large elements of the
Home Office; DFID; the Department of Health—a whole range
of departments. You would have to take a decision as to whether
that individual minister took responsibility for all of these
departments, or was simply a coordinator. At the moment we have
the coordinating model, which is done through an official working
to the Prime Minister. The alternative model would be quite difficult
to implement within our current structure, and would require significant
changes to the machinery of government. I am not sure that Condoleezza
Rice is quite the equivalent in that respect, because I am not
sure that she has the responsibilities across such a large range
of what we are calling "national security risks".
Q72 Mr Hamilton: The one that is
missing from all of the contributions is the devolved parliaments,
because if you talk about health, if you talk about serious crime
that comes under the Scottish Parliament. Therefore there is not
a minister responsible; that has to be a dialogue that takes place.
Surely it is commonsense to talk about—those matters should
be taken from a devolved parliament and brought back into a reserve
power. I mean it quite seriously. There is an issue about a reserve
power which covers the whole of the UK instead of a patchwork
quilt which we have got at the present time. Whoever the minister
is will have to deal with a devolved parliament, with the appropriate
minister in that devolved parliament about fisheries, about serious
drugs and about health. Surely it makes sense that that part of
terrorism should be brought right back in and it should be all
encompassing?
Mr Ainsworth: There is a lead
department for every analysed threat. Where it is a devolved matter,
in Scotland a devolved parliament would take the lead. MoD and
all of the other parts of government would plug in and give support.
Where it is not a devolved matter then the Home Office, or whoever
else is taking the lead, would lead on that. Some of these threats
exist at the local level and at the regional level. Where is there
the need therefore to take that back to a national planning assumption?
If there is a threat in Scotland specific to Scotland then it
is perfectly appropriate for the devolved administration to take
the lead in that area.
Lord West of Spithead: Defence
and counter-terrorism are reserved issues, so clearly they are
dealt with on a national basis. When it comes to Resilience and
things like that, the devolved administrations do sit on the Cabinet
committee so that they are fully involved in those discussions.
I think this is addressed; maybe it is not as elegant and tidy
as it should be but then that maybe is partly to do with other
structures, but at least we get the input from them all.
Mr Hamilton: The point I am making is
that it is still evolving. If it is still evolving then maybe
that should be addressed also. If the policy is still evolving,
which it is, then maybe that should be looked at again.
Q73 Chairman: You have heard what
he has said. It seems to be a sensible point.
Lord West of Spithead: Yes, absolutely.
Q74 Mr Hancock: I am grateful for
the comments we have heard, particularly the one that it is still
open to debate whether or not we do have a minister with overall
responsibility.
Lord West of Spithead: Can I clarify
that. The position is that it is something that has been thought
about now certainly for the last 15 months. There are huge implications,
and what exactly is he doing, and so we got nowhere in terms of
getting anywhere.
Q75 Mr Hancock: I understand the
implications, because it is about the ministers giving up power
and nobody wants to do that. I understand that but I am heartened
by the idea that it is still open to discussion. I would hope
that the majority of the British people would like to see somebody
like that who is actually given that responsibility. If the seriousness
of the situation is such as you have described then the one thing
for sure is people do not want to see this done through an elevation
of committee structures, ending up with the Prime Minister. There
needs to be some sort of coordination there at senior ministerial
level—a job for the Deputy Prime Minister, if we had one.
I am curious about your suggestion, because when you were asked
questions about this organisation you did not actually tell us
what the Ministry of Defence were bringing to the party. You told
us about all these systems that were being set up, but you did
not tell us exactly what differences there were going to be in
the past. I am curious about how you are now sure you are going
to be sustained in the loop; that the intelligence services are
sharing with you information; that the Home Office and Cabinet
Office are coming to you at the earliest opportunity, not as an
afterthought. I think that is the crucial question the MoD has
to answer. What are you bringing to the party? Are you satisfied
that the processes that are being talked about are sufficiently
secure enough for you to be sure you are being told at the first
instance and not at the last step?
Mr Day: On the final point, I
am absolutely sure that we are joined-up entirely into the intergovernmental
loop to as greater degree as we have ever been. I do not see that
as a problem. As far as what the MoD is bringing is concerned,
in terms of the operations we are conducting we bring the defence
perspective, we bring the capabilities, we bring a level of understanding
about operations and policy that does not exist anywhere else
in government. In terms of counter-terrorism and Resilience we
can perhaps go into that in more detail but, as the Minister said,
we bring a range of niche capabilities and provide a "back-up",
if you like. It is very difficult to explain when you are not
part of it, but there is a closeness of cooperation now in dealing
with a whole range of issues that means, for example, we are able
to produce a strategy for Afghanistan that integrates and has
the buy-in of very, very different actors from defence, through
to DFID, through to the agencies, in formulating and implementing
policy. That, to my experience, is something we have not always
been good at in the past.
Mr Ainsworth: The fear seems to
be that policy will develop and Defence will not be involved in
that and will not have a say in the direction of travel. We are
involved in the planning process exactly in order to prevent that
from happening. We are completely embedded within it. We can see
the developments are happening and see proposals as they come
forward and we can have our say and have our input into that.
As far as access then to defence capability is concerned, of course
that has to be done through the Ministry of Defence; it has to
be cleared through the Ministry of Defence; so I do not really
understand the concern that there is about us being left behind
or left out. We are embedded in the planning process and then
have control over the contributions that we make to any particular
scenario which arises.
Q76 Mr Hancock: No-one was suggesting
you were being left out; we were making sure that you were actually
included in.
Mr Ainsworth: We are.
Q77 Mr Hancock: I would feel sad
if you were left out, but none of us have mentioned that.
Mr Ainsworth: I thought that was
your concern.
Q78 Mr Jenkins: If we, as you tell
me, have got in position a security coordinator who now is capable
of pulling together different parts of different departments,
and we may possibly have a minister who could do that but that
would be politically dangerous if he were in conflict with other
ministers in other departments—I think that is the underlying
contention—and we might look at this procedure, do you not
think, Minister, in a democracy it is better to have a minister
who can be brought to the House and questioned rather than a coordinator
who cannot be brought to the House and questioned?
Mr Ainsworth: Yes, of course we
need accountability for the decisions taken, and ministers must
take that responsibility at the end of the day. What needs to
be coordinated is the information flow, and that needs to be coordinated
on a regular basis. There is the ability to bring ministers together
whenever that is necessary in order to take the required decisions.
Q79 Mr Havard: Is the active debate
really one about not necessarily having a minister who is responsible
for all these things, but essentially back to this argument about
a security adviser so that this coordinating position becomes
something slightly different, and in a sense almost in between
being a minister and having more capacity than just simply having
a coordinating function? It raises still the question that Brian
raises about democratic deficit in terms of being able to hold
them to account. Is that the real debate that is happening?
Mr Ainsworth: If you put a single
person in charge of the whole of the national security environment,
or the counter-terrorism environment in that regard, then that
single minister winds up being responsible for MoD's ability to
counter-terrorism in the—
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