Joint Memorandum from the Department for
Business, Enterprise & Regulatory Reform and the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office
CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT
RESPONSE CM
7485
Recommendation 3: Responses from COARM Member
States to UK questionnaire— Government will send the Committees
a copy separately. (FCO lead)
Please find report attached (Annex A) [15]
Recommendations 5 and 6: Extra-territorial
controls —
This has been covered in the Government's End
of Year Response. The response is available on the Department
for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) website,
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strateqic-export-control/legislation/export-control-act-2002/review/index.html
Recommendation 7: Category B, transport and ancillary
services—
This has been covered in the Government's End
of Year Response. The response is available on the Department
for Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR) website,
http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/europeandtrade/strateqic-export-control/legislation/export-control-act-2002/review/index.html
Recommendation 21 : Civil Penalties for breach
of export controls—
We will write to the Committees at a later date.
Recommendation 28: Resources—
The Government will provide this information
in the next annual report.
Recommendation 29 : Annual Report best practice—
The Government has reviewed annual reports published
by other countries and has identified several examples of best
practice that we will adapt and introduce in the next and future
annual reports.
Recommendation 30 : Searchable database—
We wrote to the CAEC in September 2008. We will
provide a further update in late February or early March 2009.
Recommendation 33 : Ivory Coast—
We stand ready to provide the committee with
a briefing in confidence, if still required
QUARTERLY REPORT
FOR JANUARY
TO MARCH
2008 SEPTEMBER 2008
Israel: SIELs for components for helmet
mounted display equipment (including incorporation SIELs), components
for submarines and equipment for the use of weapon sights; the
Committees request a note on the Israeli naval and land blockage
of Gaza and whether the Government is prepared to export arms
that can be used to enforce the blockade;
The Committees on Arms Export Controls (CAEC)
have requested a note on the Israeli naval and land blockade of
Gaza and whether the Government is prepared to export arms to
enforce the blockade?
The Gaza Strip ("Gaza") forms part
of the Occupied Palestinian Territories. The United Kingdom and
many other states regard Israel as the occupying power, despite
Israel's unilateral disengagement from Gaza in September 2005.
Israel disputes this. Israel has imposed a mixture of land and
maritime restrictions on movement in and out of Gaza. These restrictions
have tended to be tightened or relaxed in line with the state
of peace negotiations and the Israeli assessment of the level
of security threat.
RESTRICTIONS IN
TERRITORIAL WATERS
Israel retains control of Gaza's territorial
waters. Under the Interim Agreement of 1995 between Israel
and the Palestine Liberation Organization (also known as "Oslo
II"), the waters off Gaza were divided into Maritime Activity
Zones, within which certain fishing activity was permitted. The
maritime zones were limited to 20 nautical miles from the
coast of Gaza. The Agreement sets out that the Israeli Navy has
authority to sail throughout the zones and to take any necessary
measures against illegal activity. Israel does not permit any
shipping to sail from Gaza to ports in a third country or vice-versa.
Although, the Israelis initially drew back from stopping some
of the recent protest ships, before enforcing the full blockade.
The Israeli argument is that the restrictions
are in place to protect Israel from terrorist attacks and to prevent
smuggling of weapons and other goods into the Gaza Strip. In April
2006, Israel unilaterally reduced the outer fishing limit to 10 nautical
miles. In June 2006, the Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit was kidnapped
and is still being held by Hamas. In October 2006, Israel reduced
the fishing limit to six nautical miles. More recently there have
been reports of Gazan fishing vessels being challenged and turned
back between four and six nautical miles from shore. In the absence
of a statement from the Israelis it would appear that they have
now unilaterally set the fishing limit at four nautical miles.
The justification given by the Israelis for this tightening of
the restrictions on maritime activity is that, in addition to
the previously stated aim of preventing arms being smuggled into
Gaza, it also stops Shalit from being smuggled out of Gaza. The
Israeli Navy has issued an advisory notice warning all foreign
vessels to remain clear of the designated maritime zone (the full
20 nautical mile zone). Since the recent conflict reports
from the UN in Gaza suggest that fishing boats are as tightly
controlled as before.
RESTRICTIONS ON
LAND
In terms of restrictions imposed by Israel in
Gaza on land borders, Israel began imposing restrictions on movement
between Gaza and Israel at the outbreak of the first intifada
in 1987. These restrictions were eased after the signing of the
Oslo accords in 1994 but were tightened again when the second
"Al Aqsa" intifada began in 2000. The election of Hamas
in January 2006, the kidnap of Gilad Shalit in June 2006 and
the Hamas take-over of Gaza in June 2007 led to further restrictions
on the movement of goods and people between Gaza and Israel. There
are currently five crossing points between Gaza and Israel and
one between Gaza and Egypt. The extent to which these crossing
points are in operation varies on a day to day basis. In general
for the past two years the crossing points have been open only
for humanitarian supplies, medical cases, a very small number
of Palestinians holding special permits, diplomats and some foreign
journalists and some fuel shipments. They are frequently completely
closed, most often in response to rocket attacks on Israel launched
from within Gaza, and occasionally as the result of direct attacks
by Palestinian militants against the crossings. For example a
major attack was launched on the Kerem Shalom crossing in April
2008 and Hamas have also attacked the Nahal Oz fuel terminal.
We have serious concerns about the Israeli restrictions
on the flow of goods and people into and out of Gaza and the impact
they have on the lives of Gazans. We have consistently called
on the militant groups to stop all acts of violence against Israel
and for the Israeli government to lift the restrictions at the
land crossings to allow the movement of people, humanitarian supplies
and commercial goods. Although there is no permanent physical
Israeli presence in Gaza, given the significant control that Israel
has over Gaza's borders, airspace and territorial waters, Israel
retains obligations under the Fourth Geneva Convention as an occupying
power. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel is obliged to
ensure the supply of food and medicine to the civilian population
of the occupied territory, and to facilitate access for and the
distribution of relief supplies if needed by the population of
the occupied territory.
HMG assesses whether there is a clear risk of
the use of proposed exports to the Israeli Navy for internal repression
or external aggression on a case by case basis, as the Criteria
require us to do. Equipment which is being exported to a platform
that specifically assists the enforcement of restrictions on Gaza
beyond those agreed in the Interim Agreement of 1995 would
require an individual assessment of the threat, the impact and
proportionality of the restrictions at the time of the application,
as well as individual consideration against Criteria 2 and
3.
We are continually reviewing the situation and
will of course take into consideration the recent Gaza conflict
when assessing licence applications. Our Defence Attach
and embassy staff in Tel Aviv continue to monitor
the behaviour of the IDF and the prevailing circumstances on the
ground.
SIE2007/002083, 1522 and 1221 (arms
components and ammunition for private companies in Iraq). It is
noted that these export licences cover goods supplied to private
companies. The Committees would be grateful for a note explaining
the level of control and supervision which the UK Government has
over these companies and the responsibility that it takes for
their actions and use of the goods supplied.
HMG uses Private Military and Security Contractors
(PMSCs) to provide security for our diplomatic posts and for civilian
officials in Iraq. As such, they play an important role in enabling
us to achieve our objectives in Iraq. A number of instruments
are already available to counter potentially illegal or unethical
activity by PMSCs. These include export controls, legislation
on arms brokering, United Nations arms embargos, the criminal
law and international humanitarian and human rights laws. For
PMSC's registered in or operating from the United Kingdom, a broader
examination of the issues is currently underway, both inside and
outside the industry, to assess the options for their regulation
of operations overseas, including Iraq.
24 February 2009
15 Not printed. Back
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