Memorandum from Ian Pearson MP, then Economic
and Business Minister at the Department for Business, Enterprise
& Regulatory Reform
NOTIFICATION OF
A SIGNIFICANT
EXPORT CONTROL
ERROR
I feel that it is important for me to write
to notify you of a significant error that has occurred within
ECO and—more importantly—to provide the Committees
with reassurance about the measures we have taken to put things
right.
One of the international commitments to which
HMG is party is the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). One of
the CWC stipulations is that chemicals listed in Schedule 2 of
CWC must not be exported to States that are not party to the CWC.
UK exporters are obliged to make a declaration of Schedule 2 exports
to the CWC UK National Authority within the Department of Energy
and Climate Change (DECC). In January 2009, a declaration made
by a UK exporter revealed that they had exported Cetaflam PD.P,
a Schedule 2 chemical, to Israel and Taiwan, two countries
who are not States Party to the CWC. DECC therefore followed this
inconsistency up with ECO, who found that the exports did indeed
take place; and that this was because the exporter had been wrongly
informed that Cetaflam PD.P did not require an export licence
and so had proceeded to export it.
This error is of course highly regrettable.
If we had correctly advised the exporter at the time that a licence
was required, the subsequent application would almost certainly
have been refused under Criterion 1 of the Consolidated EU
and
National Arms Export Licensing Criteria, since
it would have been inconsistent with the UK's international obligations
under CWC. The error occurred because the chemical mixture in
question is not specifically listed in the control lists—unlike
the great majority of controlled items—but is included in
a larger group of chemicals defined by their molecular structure.
It is not, therefore, instantly recognisable as being controlled
and so it was mistakenly overlooked. But we have taken prompt
action to update all the precedents on our databases so that in
future, technical staff doing research on past cases will get
the most accurate information; to advise all technical staff to
take special care in this area; and to highlight other sources
of information and advice that they can and should use.
Whilst not seeking to diminish this error in
any way, it is also worth stating that the real world risk posed
by these exports is small. Cetaflam PD.P has a legitimate use
for, the flame retardant treatment of polyester fabric. That was
the declared purpose of the exports and having made enquiries
through Posts as to the actual end-use there is no reason to suggest
that it was diverted to any other purpose. It cannot be used directly
as a chemical weapon and is controlled because, after processing,
it can produce a chemical precursor of use in the manufacture
of chemical weapons. That precursor can then, after undergoing
a further round of processing, produce a nerve agent. However,
this whole process would be very difficult and time consuming
and it would be easier to use other flame retardant chemicals,
available on the open market, for this purpose. So there is no
suggestion of WMD use, and indeed, little reason to suggest that
it would make sense to acquire it for those purposes.
We are primarily looking here at a technical
breach of the UK's commitments.
I do not seek to downplay it in any way, but
think that the important point is that we have identified it promptly,
advised the company so that it will not recur, and tightened up
our internal systems to the same end.
3 June 2009
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