Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08 - Defence Committee Contents

3  The MoD's PSA performance

Overall performance

42. Table 4, below, sets out the MoD's assessment of its achievement against its Spending Round (SR) 2004 PSA targets. Only one of its six PSA targets was assessed by the MoD as having been 'met'—success in military tasks undertaken.Table 6: MoD's performance against PSA targets 2005-2008
—  PSA Target —  2005-2006

—  Interim Assessment

—  2006-2007

—  Interim Assessment

—  2007-2008

—  Final Assessment

—  Objective I: Achieve success in the Military Tasks we undertake at home and abroad
—  1. Achieve the objectives established by Ministers for Operations and Military tasks in which the UK's Armed Forces are involved, including providing support to our civil communities. —  On course —  On course with some risk —  Met
—  2. By 2008, deliver improved effectiveness of UK and international support for conflict prevention by addressing long-term structural cases of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction, where the UK can make a significant contribution, in particular Africa, Asia, Balkans and the Middle East. (Joint target with FCO and DfID). —  On course —  Broadly on course with minor slippage —  Partly met
—  Objective II: Be ready to respond to the tasks that might arise
—  3. Generate forces which can be deployed, sustained and recovered at the scales of effort required to meet the Government's strategic objectives. —  On course —  Some risk—  Not met
—  4. Play a timely role in the development of the European Security Agenda, and enhance capabilities to undertake timely and effective security operations, by successfully encouraging a more efficient and effective NATO, a more coherent and effective ESDP operating in strategic partnership with NATO, and enhanced European defence capabilities. (Joint target with FCO). —  On course —  On course—  Partly met
—  5. Recruit, train, motivate and retain sufficient military personnel to provide the military capability necessary to meet the Government's strategic objectives. —  On course —  On course with some risk —  Partly met
—  Objective III: Build for the future
—  6. Deliver the equipment programme to cost and time. —  On course —  On course —  Partly met

Source: Ministry of Defence

43. The MoD points to the level of current operational commitments as the underlying reason for its poor performance against its PSA targets, particularly with regard to PSA target 3. It notes that:


44. In 2005-06, the MoD assessed that it was "on course" to meet all of its PSA targets. In 2006-07 it assessed that it was "on course" to meet two targets and "on course with some risk/minor slippage" to meet the remaining four targets. By the end of the SR2004 period it had met one target, partly met four targets and failed completely to meet another target. We therefore asked the Permanent Under-Secretary about the quality of the MoD's forecasting. He told us that there "may have been a bit of institutional over-optimism at some stage",[61] as the MoD was "staffed by people who are keen to deliver what they can for the Armed Forces, the ultimate user".[62] We commend the MoD for the efforts it clearly puts into supporting the Armed Forces and attempting to deliver its SR2004 PSA targets. However, we are disappointed by the quality of the MoD's forecasting during the 2004 Spending Review period. We are concerned that institutional over-optimism might in some areas significantly impact on efforts to improve performance. We look to the MoD to make improvements to the accuracy of its forecasting in future and to inject a greater sense of realism into how its personnel carry out forecasting in future, and to report progress on this in its next Annual Report.

45. We also asked the MoD about the terminology used to measure its progress against PSA targets; specifically whether "partly met" was an adequate expression when it could mean falling just short of the target or not getting close to it at all. The Permanent Under Secretary told us:

    I think occasions when we have used the phrase "partly met" are usually in relation to PSA targets where there is more than one element to them. The obvious example is in relation to the equipment programme itself and the objective "build for the future, deliver the equipment programme to cost and time". Our objectives there are partly met in the sense that we have delivered on key user requirements through the projects that the Committee knows about, but in relation to cost and time there has been slippage that exceeded the initial targets we were set, so in that sense the PSA target was met in part but not in whole. Elsewhere if you look at some of the international conflict prevention work, I think the view—and this is an inter-departmental one—has been that we have made significant progress but it would be overstating the case to say that we completely met the PSA target, so it is a variety. But I quite take the point, if you look in particular at the readiness target, over the last few years, as I have and as many members of this Committee have, we were possibly holding out hopes of reversing the position longer than it was realistic to do so. I think that is a fair criticism.[63]

46. We asked the Secretary of State whether he would consider ascribing an absolute value to the MoD's assessment of progress against targets in the future, since the expression 'partly met' was far from clear.[64] He promised to write to us to explain what 'partly met' meant in each case, and with an assessment of whether the MoD might consider moving to using an absolute value instead.

47. In a supplementary memorandum, the MoD pointed out that HM Treasury had mandated the use of the term 'partly met'. With regard to PSA target 2, of twelve sub-targets, two were met, nine partly met and one not met. With regard to PSA target 5, only five of twenty-two sub-targets were met. With regard to PSA target 6, only one of three sub-targets were met. The MoD stressed the fact that the judgement as to performance with regard to targets was often necessarily subjective. The number of sub-targets met in the context of PSA target 5—compared to those only partly met or not met at all—was "not a particularly helpful way of viewing achievement in such a complicated target set".[65] Despite this qualification, no attempt was given in the response from the MoD to set out to what extent each sub-target was 'partly met'.

48. As far as giving an absolute value to the MoD's performance, the supplementary memorandum stressed the problems: "it was difficult to see…[how] meaningful quantitative indicators" could be assigned to any of these targets as such a process would rely upon judgements which were "likely to be subjective and will not replace the written assessment in allowing a reader to get a feel for what has been achieved in pursuit of the target".[66] Although no suggestion had been made to the MoD that assigning an absolute value to performance ought to replace a detailed written assessment of that performance, we acknowledge the difficulty of recording performance at least with regard to such areas as represented by PSA target 5. But woolly terms such as "some slippage" and "partly met" may themselves have fostered the over-optimism that led to such poor forecasting.

49. We do not consider the MoD's current system of reporting its progress against its targets to be sufficiently transparent. The response we received from the MoD to our queries on this issue only emphasises the unsatisfactory way in which the headlines of the Annual Report were constructed. When targets comprise many sub-targets, when subjectivity is key to measurement, when no metrics are provided to assess what is meant when a sub-target is 'partly met', there is clearly insufficient transparency. We understand the need sensibly to balance clarity and accuracy with brevity. Nonetheless, we recommend that the MoD develop a more accurate method of measuring its progress against targets for next year's Annual Report and Accounts, and at the very least make performance against sub-targets a much more prominent part of that Report's headlines in future.


50. PSA target 1 required the MoD to "achieve the objectives established by Ministers for operations and military tasks in which the UK's Armed Forces are involved, including those providing support to our civil communities".[67] The MoD assessed that it had met this target. Given the sensitivity of the information upon which judgements are made within the MoD as to performance against this target, it is perhaps the least transparent of the PSA targets in use by the MoD in the SR2004 period. This was raised in evidence with Sir Bill Jeffrey who explained that "at root, the assessment of PSA1… rests on quite detailed military judgements…Inevitably, it is subjective in its assessment and the only people who can make, in my view, a reliable assessment of that are our military commanders".[68]

51. As the Permanent Under Secretary noted in his evidence, we as a Committee receive regular classified briefings and updates on progress in operations from the MoD, for which we are very grateful. Such regular operational briefings and updates should enable us to monitor whether good performance against the new equivalent Performance Indicator (within the revised targets) is being maintained. We encourage the MoD to look into making publicly available as many of the unclassified elements of assessment within this area as possible, but we understand the operational sensitivities will mean that this area of performance will necessarily remain less accessible to the public than other areas of the MoD's performance.

Conflict prevention

52. PSA target 2 required the MoD to "deliver improved effectiveness of United Kingdom and international support for conflict prevention by addressing long-term structural cases of conflict, managing regional and national tension and violence, and supporting post-conflict reconstruction, where the United Kingdom can make a significant contribution, in particular Africa, Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East".[69] This was a joint target shared with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and with the Department for International Development (DfID). The MoD assessed that it had partly met this target. In supplementary written evidence to us, the MoD confirmed that, of the twelve sub-targets within this PSA target (which largely cover activities in individual countries, such as Sierra Leone, Nepal and Sudan), only two were met, nine were partly met and one not met at all. The MoD memorandum explained that "the nature of the sub-targets… were qualitative assessments made about regional stability issues many of which were outside of the control of the MoD".

53. It is not clear what the relative weight and subjectivity of these sub-targets is, nor is it clear to what extent nine of the twelve sub-targets were only partly met. The detail of performance in this area again serves only to disguise exactly how the MoD has performed, given the very broad range of performance covered, with regard to targets or sub-targets, by the phrase "partly met". We accept that a number of the outcomes set out in the MoD's Public Service Agreements for the period from 2004 to 2008 and in its Departmental Strategic Objectives for the period from 2008 to 2011 are not subject to easy measurement. We also accept that the MoD's own direct influence in relation to some of its international objectives will be necessarily limited. However, we reiterate the need for the MoD to try to develop more rigorous and objective methods for assessing performance.


54. PSA target 3 required the MoD to generate forces which can be deployed, sustained and recovered at the scales of effort required to meet the Government's strategic objectives. The MoD assessed that it had failed to meet this target. One of the measures of performance within this area was the percentage of force elements containing critical or serious weakness, meaning they were at significant risk of being below their target levels of readiness. The components of readiness are: manning levels, equipment, logistic support, and collective training (the training to assist units in working together as part of a larger force).[70] The level of actual operational commitments obviously has an impact on the readiness of the UK Armed Forces to respond to future or contingent operations. Concurrent operation in Iraq and Afghanistan have led to a deterioration in readiness levels and an enduring inability to improve them for as long as this concurrent operations remained at the same tempo or magnitude. During the whole SR2004 period, this area of performance was the one that always looked the most difficult to achieve. Yet even here there was no sense of impending failure against this target until right near the end of the SR2004 period.

55. At the time of the 2007-08 Spring Performance Report in May 2008, we wrote to the then Secretary of State with our concerns about the MoD's continuing poor performance against the readiness target. He responded that:

    "As we set out in March in our reply to your report on last year's Annual Report and Accounts, it is simply not possible for the Armed Forces to operate at the level and intensity they have sustained for some years while simultaneously being prepared for the full range of potential additional hypothetical contingent operations underpinning Defence Planning Assumptions. Success on current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is our overriding priority. We have therefore deliberately prioritised resources, including in the equipment programme, to support current operations. It is not that we are resigned to a low level of readiness, as you suggest. It is simply that there is a limit to how much we can expect the Armed Forces to do at the same time. Readiness levels should start to improve (with about a 6 month lag time) as commitments reduce. These are, quite simply, the two sides of the same coin".[71]

Notwithstanding these comments, we find it perplexing that the MoD thought for so long that it would not fail against this readiness target, especially since it understood that the Armed Forces were "continuing to operate above the overall level of concurrent operations which they are resourced and structured to sustain over time".

56. The NAO noted in its briefing for us that the MoD "is not currently able to generate the full Joint Rapid Reaction Force capability, which is intended to be a pool of agile and trained forces, ready to deploy in support of Britain's foreign and security policy objectives. Critical standby capabilities which include the ability to mount a civilian evacuation mission, were maintained in 2007-08, but have been drawn on heavily in 2008-09 to deploy the Operational Reserve Force to Kosovo".[72] The 600-strong 2nd Battalion The Rifles deployed to Kosovo as part of the UK commitment to the NATO/EU shared pan-Balkans Operational Reserve Force (ORF).[73] The NAO sets out the different challenges for each of the three Services in achieving future readiness at expected levels. The Royal Navy needs to overcome reduced spending on supporting some ships in 2004-2006 which has reduced the readiness of the surface fleet for the full range of potential future operations. The Army's lack of readiness is attributable to attrition caused by the current level of operations and the lack of training opportunities available as a result. The RAF has lacked training opportunities and suffers from shortages of personnel and equipment: operational losses and planned modification and maintenance programmes have also had a particular impact.[74]

57. In its memorandum, the MoD told us that it had reviewed and modified the way it will calculate readiness for Reporting Year 2008-09 and for the period covered by the new Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSOs) and their performance indicators. This has entailed changing, for some force elements, the weightings used in measuring readiness, and relaxing some longer term readiness targets "for forces not required for current operations in order to focus resources on operational priorities".[75] It was put to the Permanent Secretary in oral evidence that the changes to the readiness system had perhaps been put in place in order to improve the assessment of performance in future. He pointed out that these changes "have in fact had the effect of making the measured readiness level slightly worse than it otherwise would have been by about 2%".[76] We welcome the openness that the MoD has shown in explaining the complex metrics for measurement of performance with regard to readiness. We expect an assessment in the Spring Performance Report of how the MoD considers the new metrics to be working.

58. The poor performance against readiness targets evident in the SR2004 period, and ending with failure in 2007-08, has continued into the new Reporting Year. The Quarter One Report for 2008-09, issued on 30 October 2008, showed a deterioration in performance with regard to readiness in the first three months of the year. The Quarter Two Report from the MoD, the Autumn Performance Report, issued on 15 December 2008, reveals a slight improvement since the Quarter One Report—but a level of performance still below that detailed in the 2007-08 Annual Report and Accounts.[77]

59. This continuing poor performance against readiness targets is serious. As the MoD's recent Autumn Performance Report accepts, it limits "the ability of force elements to engage in new contingent operations and military tasks". It also reveals the significant stresses which exist currently upon manpower, equipment, training and logistics. This puts into stark perspective the UK's capacity to sustain current operations into the medium term.

60. Improving performance in this area of readiness clearly must be a priority for the MoD. The Permanent Secretary explained that his Department is currently working on plans to support a programme to restore full contingent capability to the Armed Forces by 2013 or 2014 which "means that the force elements that [are assessed]… for these purposes are at a satisfactory state of readiness without significant or tactical weaknesses".[78] In effect, this means that the MoD expects soon to commence a programme of recuperation which will allow readiness targets largely identical to those set out in the SR2004 PSA 3 to be achieved by 2013-14.

61. This programme is founded upon the assumption that there will be "for some time to come… a significant commitment" in Afghanistan and the MoD will be "able very substantially to reduce the 4,000 or so troops…in southern Iraq"[79]—in other words, it assumes a draw-down in Iraq, a continuing presence in Afghanistan of the current order of magnitude and no further operational commitments. The timescale within this programme appears to envisage continuing poor performance against current readiness targets for approximately the next four years, in effect for the duration of the SR2008 targets and possibly into the next target cycle.

62. Restoring full contingent capability for our Armed Forces is one of the most pressing issue the MoD faces. It is essential that the MoD's programme of recuperation is effective and places no further strains upon our Armed Forces. We are particularly concerned that the programme is founded upon assumptions as to commitments which the UK Government may not be able to keep to over this period. We therefore stress to the Department the importance of this programme being able to take account of increased deployments in Afghanistan or new smaller operational commitments while still aiming to recuperate force elements to the required level in a reasonable time-scale. We are currently examining this issue of readiness and recuperation in more detail in a separate inquiry and hope to report to the House on this subject late in the Spring.

The European Security Agenda, NATO and ESDP

63. PSA target 4 required the MoD to play a leading role in the development of the European Security Agenda, and enhance capabilities to undertake timely and effective security operations, but successfully encouraging a more efficient and effective NATO, a more coherent and effective European Security and Defence Policy operating in a strategic partnership with NATO, and enhanced European defence capabilities. This PSA target was shared with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The MoD assessed that it had partly met this target, and noted in its supplementary memorandum to us that the "targets were about qualitative assessments of the value of UK contributions to NATO and EU issues".[80] this is clearly another far from transparent area of performance. As a shared target and area of activity where the ability to reach aims and objectives lies in good part outside the MoD's—or the UK's—control, the MoD ought still however to he held fully accountable for failing fully to meet a target designed to measure its contribution rather than its success. Other departmental select committees have in the past expressed concern about targets shared between departments, on the grounds that each department involved is tempted to believe that principal responsibility for action or success lies elsewhere. This is clearly unsatisfactory, and it is vital that areas of responsibility and sub-targets within each target are formally assigned to particular government departments so that lines of activity and responsibility are clear.

Armed Forces personnel

64. PSA target 5 required the MoD to recruit, train, motivate and retain sufficient military personnel to provide the military capability necessary to meet the Government's strategic objectives. The MoD assessed that it had partly met this target. In its supplementary memorandum to us, the MoD noted that only five of twenty-two sub-targets were met which "suggests a 23% achievement rate". The memorandum also adds, however, that "this is not a particularly helpful way of viewing achievement in such a complicated sub-target set".[81]

65. The five principal areas within this PSA target were manning balance, gains to trained strength, numbers medically fit for task, voluntary outflow rates and performance against harmony guidelines. With regard to manning balance, there was clear improvement during 2007-08 with regard to the RAF, some improvements tailing off in the last quarter with regard to the Royal Navy and continuing deterioration with regard to the Army. Targets for gains to trained strength were largely not achieved, except for Naval Service Other Ranks and RAF Officers. A total of 85.4% of Armed Forces personnel were reported fit for task as against a target of 90%. Voluntary outflow in all Services at Officer and Other Ranks levels was higher than the stable long-term rate, although figures were not available in some areas and were provisional in others on account of failings within the JPA system. With regard to harmony guidelines, all three Services continued to exceed the target for levels in individual separated service, although the Royal Navy and Royal Marines only exceeded the guidelines by less than 1%. Performance on unit tour intervals was patchier, the Royal Navy and Royal Marines broadly meeting the guidelines, parts of the RAF exceeding them, and the Army as a whole exceeding them.[82]

66. A full range of issues relating to Armed Forces personnel and the sub-targets within this PSA target were examined in our earlier Report, Recruiting and retaining Armed Forces personnel, which was published after the end of the 2007-08 Reporting Year, on 30 July 2008, and which was built upon evidence on performance from MoD made available during that year up to and including the time of the Spring Performance Report.[83] Evidence taken during the Annual Report and Accounts inquiry therefore largely explored performance in 2008-09 against the new manning and personnel targets in the context of areas of poor performance in previous years.

67. The Secretary of State in his evidence to us acknowledged that the MoD has to improve its performance in particular with regard to manning balance and harmony guidelines. He also reported progress with regard to gains to trained strength: "We are seeing not just an increase in the training strength but in the numbers of those joining the regular forces coming through training".[84] The Permanent Secretary in his earlier evidence to us suggested that the deteriorating economic situation would assist in recruitment and retention—as it had done historically—but that the MoD is not "banking on it" to solve all their personnel problems. He explained that the focus of much of the Department's work in this area would be on how effective …[the MoD is] at adding to the trained strength and …in retaining people", key to which was the "ability to convert initial recruits into additions to trained strength."[85]

68. Performance in 2008-09 so far within the new DSOs against the new performance indicators has so far been poor, with a slight improvement in manning balance in the Royal Navy and Army but a fall in the Royal Air Force recorded in the first quarter (all three Services remaining outside target levels), and no progress for the Army and a deterioration for the RAF and Royal Navy recorded in the Autumn Performance Report at the end of the second quarter.[86] Numbers of personnel medically fit for task also fell against the target. Harmony guidelines remain largely breached for the Army and the number of pinch-points in significant trades remains a cause for anxiety.

69. Personnel and manning issues are clearly another area of the MoD's performance that needs addressing as a matter of urgency. The recuperation programme which the MoD is about to put in place to assist in improving readiness levels following the drawdown in Iraq will have to focus not just upon equipment and training issues but also upon manpower issues.


70. PSA Target 6 requires the MoD to deliver its equipment programme to cost and time. The Department assessed that it had partly met this target. The MoD's supplementary memorandum makes clear that one of the three sub-targets was met which "suggests a 33% success rate". The Department failed against the sub-targets relating to cost and to time and succeeded with regard to its sub-target in relation to the percentage of Key User requirements achieved.[87] We did not pursue the issue of equipment in any detail during oral evidence for this inquiry, as oral evidence for our defence equipment inquiry was already planned for the following weeks. We have just recently published our annual Report on defence equipment, Defence Equipment 2009, which deals with this performance and many other issues relating to procurement and the performance of Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S). We noted in that Report that, in is first year of operation, DE&S failed to meet its Public Service Agreement to 'Deliver the equipment programme to cost and time'. The Report continues:

    "We note that the National Audit Office examined the procurement costs relating to the 20 largest projects and found that the aggregate forecast costs of these projects increased by £205 million and the aggregate in-service date slippage increased by eight years in 2007-08."[88]

As our Report on defence equipment makes clear, we are not satisfied with explanations that have been given by the MoD as to what it intends to do to rectify this decline in performance with regard to defence equipment, and we will be returning to this matter in the future.

Future DSO targets

71. The Comprehensive Spending Review, published in October 2007, announced a new smaller set of PSAs cutting across departments. The MoD was not given a lead role in any of the new PSAs. The CSR also introduced Departmental Strategic Objectives (DSOs) for each Department, either contributing to its own or joint departmental PSAs.[89] The MoD has three DSOs (success on operations; readiness; and equipment capability) which have been developed into six top level performance indicators and are set out in the Defence Plan 2008-2012.[90] The table below compares old PSA targets with new DSO targets.

72. It is of course too early to say definitively whether this new structure for assessing performance improves on that used for the SR2004 reporting period. We have already commented on the opacity of headline performance against some of the targets under the old system. It is clear from the first two quarterly reports that the MoD is monitoring the new system carefully. The MoD notes that it is paying particular attention in respect of readiness performance where the new metrics permit a variation in measurement of 2-3%. Both quarterly reports also note that much of the personnel and manning related data is still provisional on account of uncertainties about the accuracy of data derived from the JPA system (all such data from April 2007 onwards is classed as provisional).[91]

73. The NAO notes in its briefing for us that "with fewer PSA indicators than previously, the amount of information that the Department is mandated to report publicly will decrease. There is a risk that some data that the Department has routinely published in recent years will no longer be placed in the public domain". The briefing however goes on to say that the MoD has made known its intention to cover "much of the same ground" in the provision of information as it did under the previous PSA system.[92] Certainly the first two quarterly reports appear thorough and cover the same approximate level of information as their equivalent reports under SR2004 for those target areas where indicators or DSOs match previous PSA targets.Table 7: Comparison of SR2004 PSA targets with new DSOs
—  MoD's SR-2004 PSA targets —  CSR PSAs/DSOs
—  1 (military tasks undertaken) —  MoD DSO 1: Achieve success in the military tasks we undertake, at home and abroad)


—  Performance Indicator 1.1 Success on operations assessed against the military strategic objectives for each operation or military task we are conducting, including Counter Terrorism.

—  2 (conflict prevention) —  (contributes to FCO-led Performance Indicators under PSA 30)
—  3 (readiness) —  MoD DSO 2: Be ready to respond to the tasks that might arise


—  Performance indicator 2.1 UK Defence Contingent capability and delivery of Force Elements at Readiness: Our ability to maintain forces at the readiness we deem necessary to respond to possible threats, assessed against the requirement set out in Strategic Guidance and the Defence Plan.

—  Performance indicator 2.2 Manning Balance: Our ability to attract, recruit and retain the military personnel we need to deliver the capability to succeed on current operations and support our future readiness, assessed against what we deem to be the appropriate size and structure of the Armed Forces.

—  4 (ESDP and NATO) —  (contributes to FCO-led Performance Indicators under PSA 30)
—  5 (military personnel) —  [See DSO 2.2 (manning balance)]
—  6 (equipment programme) —  MoD DSO 3: Build for the future


—  Performance Indicator 3.1 Procuring and supporting military equipment capability, through life, assessed against achieving of targets for Key User Requirements, Full Operational Capability Date, and in year variation of forecast costs for design, manufacture and support.

—  Performance Indicator 3.2: Procuring and supporting military non-equipment capability through life, assessed against achievement of targets for Key User Requirements, Full Operational Capability Date, and in year variation of forecast costs.

—  Performance Indicator 3.3: Sustainable Development, assessed against achievement of objectives for sustainable consumption and production, climate change and energy, natural resource protection and environmental enhancement, and sustainable communities.

74. However, the NAO also notes that in some respects the MoD's contribution to overall government performance is now less prominent on account of all PSA targets now being shared and the Department leading in none of them.[93] It is indeed hard to see how this will not affect the amount of information that the MoD makes available on those areas where it now contributes to performance indicators under PSA 30 ('to reduce the impact of conflict through enhanced UK and international efforts') on which the FCO leads—namely those areas represented by old PSA targets 2 and 4. The two quarterly reports issued so far this reporting year lack data on areas covered by old PSA targets 2 and 4, areas in which the Department is still very active. We will monitor the MoD's reporting under this new system and call upon the MoD to include reporting on its work under the FCO-led PSA 30 in quarterly reports in future.

60   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08, HC 850-I, p 43, para 43 Back

61   Q 2 Back

62   Q 4 Back

63   Q 6 Back

64   Q 142 Back

65   Ev 46 Back

66   Ibid. Back

67   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08, HC 850-I, p 13 Back

68   Q 61 Back

69   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08, HC 850-I, p 13 Back

70   Ministry of Defence, Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08, HC 850-I, p 49, para 47 Back

71   Letter from the Secretary of State to the Chairman, 9 June 2008 Back

72   NAO, Performance of the Ministry of Defence 2007-08, p 20, Box: PSA Target 3  Back

73   "2 Rifles ready for Kosovo role", Ministry of Defence press notice, 30 May 2008 Back

74   NAO, Performance of the Ministry of Defence 2007-08, p 21, para 2.20 Back

75   Ev 32 Back

76   Q 83 Back

77   Ministry of Defence, MoD Public Service Agreement, Performance Report, Quarter 1 2008-09, pp5-6; MoD Public Service Agreement, Autumn Performance Report 2008-09, p 6 Back

78   Q 65 Back

79   Q 67 Back

80   Ev 46 Back

81   Ibid. Back

82   Ministry of Defence Annual Report and Accounts 2007-08, HC 850-I, pp 21-3 Back

83   HC (2007-08) 424 Back

84   Q 141 Back

85   Q 127 Back

86   Ministry of Defence, MoD Public Service Agreement, Autumn Performance Report 2008-09, pp 7-12 Back

87   Ev 46 Back

88   Defence Committee, Third Report of Session 2008-09, Defence Equipment 2009, HC 107, para 50 Back

89   HM Treasury, The 2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review, Cm 7227 Back

90   Ministry of Defence, Defence Plan, Including the Government's Expenditure Plans, 2008-2012, Cm 7385, pp 5-6 Back

91   See, for example, MoD Public Service Agreement Performance Report, Quarter 1, 2008-09, p 7, footnote 1. Back

92   NAO, Performance of the Ministry of Defence 2007-08, p 11, para 1.5 Back

93   NAO, Performance of the Ministry of Defence 2007-08, p 10, para 1.2 Back

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